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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”  
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.” 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s 
all.” 
             -- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to present and apply a way of looking at literature that is 
based on a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In Part 1, I first provide a general 
introduction to the problem of defining rhetoric. This leads to a discussion on rhetoric’s 
field of operations: opinion. I finish with a brief review of the literature. In Part 2, I 
present a model based primarily on a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This consists of an 
in-depth discussion of the three modes (deliberative, judicial and epideictic) after which 
I present aspects of the three rhetorical proofs: logos, pathos and ethos. In Part 3, I first 
discuss the role played by the audience as judge. I then discuss the work by scholars 
who use rhetoric in fields that are somewhat distant from literary studies. I also briefly 
discuss travel literature in order to provide background for the second narrative under 
study. Part 4, I use the model presented in Part 2 to critique and analyze two narratives. 
The first narrative to be analyzed in Part 4 is a fictional narrative from William H. Gass’ 
Fiction and the Figures of Life. The second is a non-fiction narrative by David Lansing, 
“Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” General conclusions follow Part 4. 
I am using the phrase “way of looking at literature” in the sense used by Peter 
Barry in his seminal Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural 
Theory (6). In this primer, which begins with I. A. Richards’ method (Practical 
Criticism) in the 1920s and ends with theoretical approaches of the 1990s 
(postcolonialism and postmodernism) (12-34), Barry explains in clear and 
comprehensible language the various ways of looking at literature in use during this 
13 
 
time period. He then proceeds to illustrate their use by example. My dissertation is 
modeled after these two aspects of Barry’s text (i.e. the type of language he uses and his 
procedure of explanation and illustration). But these are not the only attractive features 
of Barry’s primer, for he is also quite fair-minded in his presentation of the various 
contemporary approaches. That is, not only does he present the respective merits of 
each, but also reveals what he views as flaws. Barry is thus, in my opinion, a scholar 
who does not let himself, in spite of his pro-theoretical stance, to cease from being a 
critical thinker. His example is one that, in an age where post-modern theorists are 
pitted or pit themselves against so-called Liberal Humanists and vice versa, merits 
imitation. An important conclusion we can draw from Barry’s equitable treatment is that 
each approach has something valuable to offer and yet at the same time must be 
examined for inadequacies or inconsistencies.  
 The question “Which rhetoric?” must be answered for, as the reader will 
discover in my discussion, the definition of the term rhetoric has been a subject of 
dispute since its earliest extant appearance in Plato’s Gorgias. Several different 
definitions of rhetoric were being proposed and fought over in antiquity and that 
number has grown ever since. Rhetoric and its practices are being defined and redefined 
today. What I present below is, in effect, one possible definition of “classical rhetoric.” 
We can add to the myriad past and present definitions another problem. For even 
supposing that one chooses a particular definition of rhetoric – in the present study an 
“Aristotelian” definition – each one usually has so many aspects that it is only possible 
to reasonably address a few of them. Thus the reader must keep in mind during the 
discussion below it has been necessary to focus on certain aspects that form part of 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric and to leave many others aside. Further, even after 
narrowing down my focus on certain elements, I have only managed in my discussion to 
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scratch the surface, due to the vast amount of literature. Be that as it may, it is my hope 
that the way of looking at literature that I am presenting here will fill what has been 
identified by scholars as a gap in terms of critical approaches in English studies. The 
approach I present is based on classical rhetoric with borrowings of ideas, concepts and 
methodology from classics scholars, from contemporary scholars of rhetoric and 
literature, and from scholars working in fields not normally associated with literary 
studies: sociology and business administration. While maintaining certain aspects taken 
from the abovementioned sources, I then provide an approach that I believe is different 
from other current approaches. I am aware that that a classics scholar like Heinrich Plett 
might rightly level the accusation against me that there is nothing new under rhetoric’s 
sun.
1
 Still, I believe that the way of looking at literature I am presenting differs from 
other rhetoric-based approaches advanced in recent decades by scholars of English and 
literature. 
 The question, “Why rhetoric?” must also be answered. In 1983, Terry Eagleton 
made a call for a return to rhetoric in Literary Theory: An Introduction. Eagleton states 
in this primer to literary theory that rhetoric has been in disuse for several centuries.
2
 
Thus, my dissertation is, in some way, a response to the plea made by Eagleton (and 
other scholars) for students of literature to return to rhetorical methods practiced in 4th 
century Athens. But rather than focusing on the power and signification of discursive 
political ideology the way Eagleton does, I instead use concepts from Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric to examine how logos, ethos and pathos are at work in the texts under study to 
persuade their audience or readership. These same rhetorical proofs can be used to 
reveal and evaluate the system of values in which the discourse is enmeshed. My 
definition is similar to Eagleton’s in that I seek to reveal the effects of argumentative 
                                                 
1 See Plett. 
2 See Eagleton. 
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discourse as well as how these effects are produced and what they mean in a particular 
historical socio-cultural milieu. However, the way I go about doing so is different in 
that I seek to show in the narratives under study basic rhetorical mechanisms presented 
in Aristotle’s treatise. Eagleton defines rhetoric as a socio-political discursive ensemble. 
I break that ensemble down into its constituent parts. 
 Eagleton made his plea in 1983. It is therefore, given his importance as a 
theorist, perhaps surprising that twelve years later rhetoric does not figure in Barry’s 
introduction to literary theory as an approach for looking at or analyzing literature – in 
either an ancient or contemporary version.  Barry does, however, state that theory about 
literature “goes back to Greek and Latin originals,” meanwhile identifying Aristotle’s 
Poetics as the “earliest work of theory” (21). To Barry’s assertion must be added the 
very important fact that it is best not to read the Poetics in isolation from other works in 
the Aristotelian corpus. One reason for this is because in the Poetics Aristotle refers his 
readers to the Rhetoric for his discussion of dianoia, or thought, a major component of 
discourse that appears in his discussion of poetics. Nor does Aristotle stop there. For, in 
Aristotle’s definition, rhetoric is the “offshoot” or “counterpart” of dialectic, which is 
the object of study in his Topics. Further, in Aristotle’s framework, rhetoric is linked 
with politics which he equates with ethics. This means that in order to gain an adequate 
understanding  of what Aristotle means when he discusses literary theory in his Poetics, 
the student of literature must at very least have read Aristotle’s Topics, Nichomachean 
Ethics, Rhetoric, and Politics. The original texts that have traditionally been used in 
relation to literary criticism and theory have only been Aristotle’s Poetics, and, much 
less frequently, his Rhetoric. Both texts have traditionally been studied in isolation not 
only from each other but from the other works by Aristotle mentioned above. For most 
students of English studies have read or are obliged to read Aristotle’s Poetics. A 
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somewhat smaller number, perhaps motivated by Eagleton’s behest or work done by 
other contemporary scholars of literature, have read his Rhetoric. But very few will 
have obtained a more comprehensive picture of Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric and 
“poetics” (i.e., literature) within the broader framework of his corpus. 
Nor is it just rhetoric which the student of literature ought to have gained 
adequate knowledge of in order to understand how it has been defined throughout 
history. The importance of also gaining as much related knowledge as possible about a 
field of inquiry can be illustrated by taking a brief look at an article written during the 
period when literary theory was at the height of fashion. Michele Lamont, in “How to 
Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida,” analyzes the 
deconstructionist philosopher’s enormous success from the perspective of sociology. 
Calling deconstruction a metascience that “seeks both to contain and transcend 
philosophy” (593), she makes the following interesting and important observation:  
Deconstruction gives its audience the means to interpret the whole philosophical 
tradition and to overcome it by becoming acquainted with a single system. As 
such, it offers important payoffs to those unfamiliar with the classics; for example, 
one of my informants has observed that, on the basis of Derrida’s work, American 
undergraduate students in literary criticism currently discuss the logocentrism of 
the philosophical tradition without having read a single classic of philosophy 
(593 - italics mine).  
 
Not only did the American students mentioned by Lamont manage to engage in 
philosophical discussions about logocentrism, but they probably did so without having 
read the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche and Hegel (593), philosophers whom 
Derrida had studied in depth. The question that arises is the following: Is it possible to 
gain an adequate understanding of work done by Derrida without having read the 
conversation he as a philosopher entered into or, equally important, without having 
gained significant knowledge on the dialogue that has gone on since the “logocentric” 
tradition started? Or is it, in fact – in the case of deconstruction – not possible to attempt 
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to adequately understand in order to make an informed and valid critique of this 
theoretical approach without having read and critically thought about at least a good 
percentage of the dialogue of the major thinkers in philosophy on which Derrida’s 
system is based?
3
 It would seem that the proper attitude of anyone intending to use an 
approach to analyze and critique literature would be similar to that of the classics 
scholar Kidd, who imposed the following guidelines upon himself when studying 
Posidonius:  
Here, first of all again, it seems to me, knowledge of context, this time the larger 
context of genre, is essential. Since Posidonius is a philosopher writing in the 1
st
 
c. BC, it is necessary to be fully acquainted with the history of philosophy up to 
his contemporaries; and not just in general, but in detail (235). 
 
Kidd asserts here that the larger context and detailed knowledge of previous argument 
are crucial to guaranteeing adequate knowledge and academic rigor. So we can ask, in 
the case of students of literature, whether the same type of preparation ought to be 
carried out when attempting to understand and then utilize critical approaches that are 
based on other disciplines (i.e., political, psychoanalytic, linguistic, and so forth) – that 
is, when using any of the approaches based on the writing of thinkers who – one 
assumes – have undertaken the academic labor necessary in order to produce crucial 
theoretical works in their respective fields.  
The point that I am making here has to do with attaining a proper orientation as 
illustrated by philosopher Charles Taylor in order to avoid getting lost in a field of 
inquiry.
4
 That is, in order to avoid missing the forest for the trees – or vice versa – one 
must do extensive reading in a field of inquiry to prevent skewed visions or misreadings 
in one’s academic undertakings. Taylor uses the metaphor of a visitor to a geographic 
region who can either fly over the region in a plane, which gives the visitor one 
                                                 
3 A question that arises is whether the Sokal hoax could have been avoided had students of literature 
done the necessary work in order to properly understand deconstruction. See Sokal. 
4 See Taylor, Charles, for an extended metaphor on orientation, pp. 41-42. 
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perspective, or be taken by a guide through the same region on foot. In Taylor’s 
metaphor for orientation, one needs both vantage points in order to get an adequate idea 
of the geographical region being visited. To experience just one of the perspectives is 
inadequate.
5
 In addition, if one has done the necessary academic work in a particular 
field of study, one will be able to 1) identify the perspective of writers doing work on 
the same area, 2) identify the particular tradition they are basing their work on, and 3) 
identify their insights and blindspots.   
What I am presenting below is, in effect, a definition of classical rhetoric. 
Definitions are more or less unstable, due to the fact that they represent, in the end, 
agreements about the limits, qualities and characteristics that a particular term, concept, 
system and so on has. Broadly speaking, definitions are either based on 1) empirically 
provable assertions or 2) opinions. While, as I discuss below, it is true that empirical 
facts are not completely stable or fixed, at this point it bears mentioning briefly that in 
Aristotle’s definition, rhetoric is the mode of discourse that we use when determining 
the truth or apparent truth about matters which can have various arguments that are 
contradictory. That is, matters which cannot be determined using science, mathematics 
or logic. If, for example, we want to know how tall the tallest building in the world is, 
we simply take out the equipment and measure it to find the answer. Similarly, if we 
want to know how many cars there are at a certain point in time on the island of 
Madagascar, we just have to go there and count them. There can be no argument here. 
The exact number of cars can be determined and it is not a matter of opinion as it can be 
proved. In cases of pure logic we find the same situation. Since the sun has been rising 
and setting from the beginning of known history, we logically assume – perhaps while 
                                                 
5 Since rhetoric’s field of operations is opinion, the caveat against obtaining skewed readings can quite 
easily be countered with a somewhat ironic statement Jonathan Barnes makes regarding two 
philosophers whose readings, although less than adequate in his view, nevertheless produced good 
philosophy: “After all, a misreading or a lazy reading of a text may be more fruitful philosophically 
than a profound and accurate study” (Companion, xvii). 
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keeping Hume’s (completely valid) arguments in mind – that the sun will in fact rise 
and set tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and so on ad infinitum. Another example 
where empiricism holds sway would be a statement like “You can’t walk through 
walls.” Putting aside miracle stories that argue the contrary, this assertion can be proven 
true using the experimental method. Try as you may, it is simply not possible. The 
examples that I have provided above are what I call in my dissertation “hard facts.” 
There is no arguing about these issues, precisely because they can be proven by 
empirical and rational means. Rhetoric, on the other hand, operates in the field of 
opinion, in which it is possible to present arguments that contradict each other, and in 
which it is not possible to reach a conclusion using scientific method.
6
 
A simple example would be to try and answer questions like, “What is love?” or 
“What is happiness?” or “Which form of government is the best?” It goes without 
saying that the opinions on these questions are myriad and, of course, disputable. This is 
where rhetoric operates. Since opinions, not “hard facts” are the stuff of rhetoric, this 
means, as Aristotle states, that persuasion is the key factor when we using this mode of 
reasoning. If a matter cannot be proven by empirical means, it is then a question of 
discovering arguments that are persuasive. Rhetoric, in Aristotle’s definition, has to do 
with issues about which we as human wish to determine what is true and what is right 
(in an ethical sense) about these issues in the sublunary realm. Aristotle is optimistic in 
this regard, for in his definition of rhetoric it is possible to discover the truth or apparent 
truth on the issues which comprise its object. This is, of course, Aristotle’s definition, 
and as such it cannot be proven empirically and is therefore open to dispute. This means 
that rhetoric is its own object, in the sense that any definition of it will be a matter on 
which various arguable perspectives are possible.  
                                                 
6 Throughout my discussion, I contrast opinion with scientific “hard facts.” See Dawkins for a 
discussion on proofs in mathematics and science, which reveals important differences between what is 
accepted in these fields as intractable proofs or “facts.” 
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In Aristotle’s definition, rhetoric is the mode of discourse that we use 1) to make 
decisions about the future, 2) to pass judgments on past acts (i.e., to determine whether 
or not they occurred and whether they were just or unjust) and, with respect to the 
present, 3) to praise or condemn persons, places, things and so on. These three spheres 
fall into the field of rhetoric, that is, opinion.  
It is, for example, impossible to predict the future with empirical certainty in the 
vast number of cases. The question, “Given X, what is the best plan of action?” can only 
be answered with opinions. Similarly, it is often impossible to know with certainty what 
has happened in the past, on the one hand, and further, where human agency is 
involved, determining whether the action was either just or unjust will also be a matter 
open to debate. This same paradigm holds when evaluating, in the present, a person or 
an object (i.e., individual, thing, place, idea, and so on) for positive or negative 
qualities. Various opinions will surface with reference to the same person/object, each 
of which is capable of being argued from different stances.  
These three areas correspond to Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into three 
spheres: deliberative, judicial and epideictic (i.e., celebratory). These three spheres 
corresponded to the respective socio-political frameworks in 4
th
 century Athens of 1) 
political assemblies, 2) law courts and 3) ceremonial public occasions for praising or 
blaming, such as funeral orations. In all three cases, as the reader will discover in the 
course of my discussion, judgment takes place. The judgment is based on informal logic 
or reasoning that is enmeshed in a system of values that provides the basis for any sort 
of judgment. Thus, agency and ethics enter into my discussion below. I borrow 
Aristotle’s model and apply its temporal/functional framework to narrative. As the two 
texts that I analyze are narratives, the primary framework that I use when examining the 
texts under study is judicial. This is because, as I hope to show, the narratives that I 
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examine can be read as pleadings, in which the narrator (or the person being narrated 
about, in the fictional case under study) acts as a defendant and attempts to persuade the 
audience or readership to evaluate them as praiseworthy. A case is being made for an 
agent in both narratives which is judged by the reader. In the first case study, it is the 
guilt or innocence of a woman who has left her husband and taken the children with her. 
The narrative presents details that allow the reader to judge her from the standpoint of 
ethics. In the second case study – a travel narrative - the narrator tells the story of 
transporting contraband to the United States from France. His aim is to persuade the 
audience that he is should be pardoned and is worthy of praise, both for his actions as 
well as for his talent as a writer. In both texts, I demonstrate how logos, pathos and 
ethos function implicitly and explicitly to make judgment from the standpoint of ethics 
possible. In Part 2 I go into depth on the three proofs, but at this point the schema that 
Ross provides an initial definition: 
Ethos – persuasive bearing on the character of the speaker (i.e. devices of speech 
by which he induces his hearers to form a favourable opinion of his character). 
Pathos – arousing of emotion in the hearers. 
Logos – which produce proof or its appearance by sheer force of argument (281). 
 
The schema above is very brief, and, as the large number of pages dedicated to each 
proof in Part 2 shows, inadequate. Still, as an introduction, it is sufficient. These three 
proofs function simultaneously and come to bear in argumentative discourse whose 
object is to persuade when it is not possible to obtain proof by empirical means. In my 
analysis, I reveal how these proofs function both implicitly and explicitly in the 
narratives under study, and how they are inextricably linked in their function as tools to 
persuade the reader of the arguments being put forth either by the narrator or the content 
of the text itself. 
The judgments made by the reader are necessarily based on the system of values 
in which the producers and consumers of both texts under study are enmeshed. I argue 
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in my dissertation that it is possible, using rhetoric as analytical and critical tool, 1) to 
reveal the system of values that provides the basis of the judgment that occurs and 2) to 
subsequently examine this same system of values with a view to evaluating it. My 
analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive. I describe what I have detected as components 
and characteristics of a particular system of values in the respective texts.  
My primary aim is to show that the definition I present of classical rhetoric is a 
valuable tool that can be used advantageously on several planes by students of literature. 
I focus primarily on one of these planes in my study. That is, I attempt to show how 
rhetorical analysis makes it possible to reveal the system of values in a particular text 
with a view to opening a dialogue on issues related to this system. My definition will 
necessarily be a matter of debate, but this is the nature of rhetoric itself – this has been 
rhetoric’s history from its earliest moments: a matter of dispute as to just what it is and 
precisely how it can be used. For the debate over how to define rhetoric is still alive, as 
Erik Gunderson asserts. After discussing several versions of rhetoric from antiquity, he 
writes in the introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric: 
Assuredly, none of the aforementioned alternate approaches to rhetoric are by any 
means “false,” but each does correspond to a vision of what most defines rhetoric 
and hence properly shapes an account of rhetoric. Their various forms are thus an 
index of a variety of theories of rhetoric, theories that are being promulgated by 
modern as well as by ancient authors. This volume adopts and adapts these 
approaches while nevertheless recognizing that the very desire to specify the 
nature of our relationship to words is itself a rhetorical move. And this desire to 
define often bespeaks a desire to end the debate about the nature of language. It is 
useful to resist this impulse as it can efface the complexity of the debate itself (10 
– 11). 
 
There are few points that I wish to make on the passage above. First, there is 
Gunderson’s idea that each account of rhetoric, while a variant, still has elements of 
“truth” that bring important issues to bear on the overall discussion of what rhetoric is. 
That each variant has elements of “truth” parallels the point that I made above in 
reference to Barry’s treatment of approaches to literature. That is, Barry brings into his 
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discussion the merits and flaws of each. Second, Gunderson does not dismiss the past, 
but instead connects it with the present. My choice to present a definition of “classical 
rhetoric” is an attempt to do the same. The third point that I wish to make has to do with 
Gunderson’s warning that those who wish to define often betray the desire to present 
the final word on what he insists should be an open debate on the nature of language. In 
this regard, the definition that I present below of rhetoric, a definition that I do not 
pretend is conclusive by any means but instead is subject to scrutiny and debate, is at 
the same time, in my view, a mode of argumentative discourse that makes it possible to 
contribute to the debate about what literary analysis and criticism is.  
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A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
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1.1 THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE RHETORIC 
The first task facing the student of literature whose aim is to use rhetoric as a form of 
criticism is to attempt to reasonably assess the myriad definitions the word has yielded 
since its earliest extant documentation in Plato’s Gorgias.7 The origins of rhetorical 
practices can be traced as far back as Homer and Hesiod, but Plato’s dialogue stands as 
a reasonable point of departure to discuss the struggle over meaning that has lasted 
more than twenty three centuries.
8
 In this dialogue Socrates attempts to strong-arm 
Gorgias, Polus and Callicles into telling him precisely what they mean by rhetoric, each 
of whom then responds with his own version, or versions, of what the term means. 
Socrates alone refers to three different types (Hamilton, 299). During their discussion, 
the interlocutors bring to the fore many rhetorical concepts and characteristics which 
provide what stands today as the theoretical bedrock upon which later definitions were 
built. The debate in the Gorgias on rhetoric reflects an attempt made by the participants 
to define what rhetoric is (i.e., its essence) and how it is to be used (i.e., its function).
 9
 
In a later dialogue – Plato’s Phaedrus – the conversation is picked up again by Socrates 
and yet another participant (475). In this dialogue, Socrates expands upon and refines 
statements he has made in the Gorgias. The concepts addressed by Plato are later dealt 
with by Aristotle, who adds further layers and responses in his own magisterial treatise, 
which is, in essence, an extended definition of the same term. The point that I wish to 
make here is that the term rhetoric as used in antiquity yields multiple and highly 
                                                 
7 With regard to definitions, Schiappa argues that attempts to answer the question “What is X?”, which 
he calls an attempt to accurately describe “facts of essence,” are “unproductive,” as there are “infinite 
answers to such questions” (Evaluating, 78). He suggests that it is more profitable when defining to 
employ “issues of linguistic usage.” That is, we should turn “What is X?” questions into “How should 
we use X?” questions (67-68). Schiappa’s case, while perhaps overstated, nevertheless provides a neat 
dichotomy with which to categorize the various definitions that follow, whether the texts are ancient or 
contemporary. For both types of definitions surface in the work of the scholars cited. 
8 Dugan discusses the problematics of defining terms in “Modern Critical Approaches to Rhetoric.” He 
states, “Each of the central terms of this investigation (“modern,” “critical approaches,” and “rhetoric”) 
is open to a range of interpretations” (9). 
9 See Yunis for an exploration of the various stances put forth in the Gorgias. 
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complex definitions and does not mean quite the same thing when used by Socrates, 
Gorgias or Aristotle. This idea bears mentioning because, according the Heinrich Plett, 
modern rhetoricians have been misled to view classical rhetoric as a unified system of 
concepts and structures. Plett argues that the histories of classical rhetoric written by 
scholars such as Richard Volkmann, George A. Kennedy and Josef Martin “rather 
provide extensive evidence of the diversity of concepts and structures in the rhetorical 
theory and practice” (125). In other words, the various definitions arrived at in antiquity 
betray a struggle over the meaning of the term rhetoric, for which we find evidence in 
Plato’s abovementioned dialogues. The division over what rhetoric means and what use 
it has forms part of its history, and the debate is still alive today. It is wise to always 
keep in mind the above-mentioned twenty-three-century-old history, as well as the 
highly divergent rhetorics that have appeared. It is also important to be aware that 
contemporary scholars work within their respective academic discipline, which 
influences its interpretation and application.
10
 
It is not just defining what rhetoric is or how it is used that is disputed. It is also 
possible to detect in the literature division on rhetoric’s current and historical status. 
Some scholars call recent interest in rhetoric a renaissance, while others affirm that 
classical rhetoric has always been present in some form. For instance, Mortara Garavelli 
identifies a beginning of renewed interest in rhetoric with the publication of The New 
Rhetoric by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Mortara Garavelli calls this 
movement a “revival” that is more than half a century old (12). Against this position, 
Heinrich Plett argues that classical rhetoric has in every age been interpreted as a 
practice that has current relevance, that is, as being modern (125). Thus we can see that 
when reference is made to a “revival” in rhetoric, it can, from the standpoint of a 
                                                 
10 For a thorough discussion of the many ways in which rhetoric has been defined and used throughout 
history, see Vickers. 
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classics scholar, be placed against the larger picture of other movements that have taken 
place throughout history – ever since, as suggested by Plett’s commentary, rhetoric has 
been a practice of discourse in the western tradition. I do not wish to trivialize claims 
made about current academic activity in rhetorical studies. Instead I want to underscore 
the idea that – if Plett’s view is taken into consideration – classical rhetoric has always 
held great importance, has always been re-invented by successive generations, has, 
throughout twenty-three centuries, been part of the western academic tradition. Plett’s 
stance is, of course, the stance of a classics scholar. Those scholars and critics who 
speak of a renewed interest and activity in rhetoric tend to be working in other 
disciplines, and so from their perspective, rhetoric can be seen as undergoing a revival. 
Curiously however, even Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, scholars working in the 
tradition of classical rhetoric, state in their treatise that it is their hope to “contribute to 
the revival of an ancient and glorious tradition” (5).11  
Whether or not we call it a renaissance, a wave of activity in rhetorical studies 
during recent decades has been identified, which reveals the interest taken in this 
discipline. For instance, in The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece, 
Edward Schiappa states that his intention is to “contribute to a scholarly conversation of 
the origins of rhetorical theory that is taking place across four disciplines: classics, 
philosophy, communication studies, and English” (vii). This conversation, a reflection 
of the recent interest being taken in rhetoric, involves “issues of philology, 
methodology, historiography, and philosophy of language” (vii). Whether we view 
recent activity in rhetoric telescopically as does Plett, or whether we view it with a 
magnifying glass, as Mortara Garavelli and Schiappa do, we can see that rhetoric is still 
                                                 
11 Bice Mortara Garavelli, who also works in the classical tradition, states that Perelman’s and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric has, “more than any other work    . . . driven the current renaissance 
of rhetoric” (12).  
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considered as a significant framework for discourse theory in a large number of 
disciplines. 
Mortara Garavelli lists several of these disciplines when advocating for the 
importance of rhetoric: 
Treinta años de estudios neorretóricos eximen de justificaciones previas de la 
materia. Sus teorías, hoy ampliamente difundidas, conciernen a las 
investigaciones filosóficas, jurídicas, lingüísticas, literarias, semióticas, 
pragmáticas, a los estudios sobre las técnicas de la información y de la 
comunicación de masas: el conjunto es desordenado y voluminoso, pero aún le 
falta mucho para estar completo (7). 
 
We can add a number of other disciplines to the above list: Sociology, Business 
Administration, Speech, Composition, as well as cross-disciplinary work carried out by 
scholars from other fields. Depending on the discipline within which each writer is 
working – as well as their respective theoretical, political or methodological stances and 
practices – a different opinion on how to define rhetoric obtains both in terms of its 
essence or “linguistic usage” (see footnote 7 above). For example, Thomas Cole  
identifies our age as “antirhetorical,” meanwhile describing revivals in rhetoric as 
failures (20). What is more, backing his argument with Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, 
he accuses neorhetoricians Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman of “aggrandiz[ing 
rhetoric] virtually beyond recognition.”12 Cole’s stance can be juxtaposed with Plett’s 
abovementioned perspective, who might call the former’s position a “(pseudo-) 
rejection” of classical rhetoric that is taking place not during a lull, but instead during a 
current high point of activity in rhetoric’s long history (125). 
Other contemporary scholars have questioned whether there is any turning back 
to Aristotle. Robert Gaines provides a summary of how Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian 
                                                 
12 Cole writes: “Kenneth Burke and Ch. Perelman, for example – who wish to turn it into an art of 
practical reasoning concerned not simply with mastering, as need arises, premises drawn from 
ethics, politics, psychology, or wherever, but making significant additions on its own to the total 
store of such wisdom. To proceed in this fashion is, as Aristotle says (Rhet. 1.4 1359b12), to claim 
for rhetoric what belongs to a different art; and later antiquity, with the exception of Cicero and 
Quintilian in their more assertive moments, would have agreed” (20).  
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criticism came into and fell out of fashion in the United States between 1925 and 1965. 
Referring to neo-Aristotelian Edwin Black, he writes:  
Black’s critique, along with the works of others in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
reduced ‘neo-Aristotelian criticism’ to a minor, ‘old-fashioned’ approach within a 
broad spectrum of critical methods. And although there have been attempts to 
revive its influence (Hill, 1972; Leff and Mohrmann, 1974; Mohrmann and Leff, 
1974), it remains in disrepute (6). 
 
Gaines’ statement above would appear to contradict the optimism of Gross and Walzer 
who – while asserting that there are primarily two fields (communication and 
composition) that draw on Aristotle’s Rhetoric as fountainhead – write in the same 
volume that there are “rising numbers of scholars in other disciplines – history, 
anthropology, and law, to name a few – who have found a rhetorical perspective useful 
in their own work” (xi).   
These differences of viewpoints fall solidly within rhetoric’s field of operation – 
expressed in Burnyeat’s re-phrasing of a line from the Rhetoric which states that its 
field of operations is “about things, which, in the main, are capable of being otherwise 
than they are” (100). These differences also demonstrate the challenge that I have 
identified with respect to making a reasonable assessment of the vast number of 
definitions of rhetoric. 
Since rhetoric is a term whose definition is a matter of opinion and therefore 
dispute, the contemporary student of literature must keep this in mind when it is used, 
for many of the participants in the above-mentioned revival of rhetoric work are 
scholars of literature. Unless an in depth understanding of how rhetoric was being 
defined from its beginnings is obtained, it will be difficult for the student of literature to 
properly understand and evaluate the directions being taken by contemporary writers, 
some of whom are towering figures in literary and cultural studies. For instance, as 
mentioned above, Terry Eagleton has made pleas since 1983 for students of literature to 
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return to this ancient practice. Paul de Man has also been designated as a literary 
theorist using rhetoric as a form of criticism, which can be seen in the title of one of his 
works: The Rhetoric of Romanticism.
13
 Further, in recent work a number of less 
prominent literary scholars have used rhetoric, or one of its definitions, when analyzing 
literary texts. The student of literature must bear in mind that literary scholars (nearly 
always) use a different definition of rhetoric, often – perhaps conveniently – without 
mentioning the diverse number of meanings the term has generated in its long existence 
as signifier.  
The etymology of the term and the various ways it has been translated provides 
insight into its meaning and its polysemous nature. The word rhetoric is derived from 
rheo (ρέω) in Greek, which can be translated with the idea of “to flow” (Garrido, 33), 
which is applicable to speech, but it is also the root for words in Greek translatable as “a 
saying,” “speech,” “declaration,” “tale,”  “a verbal agreement,” “bargain,” “covenant,” 
as well as the Greek words “rhetor” and “rhetorike” (Walker – Poetics, 5). The suffixes 
-ike and –ikos, both of which are added to rhetor, can mean a “person with a particular 
skill” (Schiappa – Beginnings, 15). The word rhetor normally meant court or Assembly 
politicians engaging in legal and political procedures, respectively (Schiappa, Hamm, 
5). Walker provides a concise summary of who the rhetores were and what role they 
played in 4
th
 century B.C.E. Greek society: 
By the fourth century there emerged a small, elite class of more or less 
professional rhetores: men who generally came from aristocratic or wealthy 
families, who had the requisite education and the confidence, who regularly spoke 
before the people in civic forums, and who were the dominant force in city 
politics. These leading citizens had a social role and status comparable to that of 
career politicians and lawyers today, and like them were regarded with mixed 
feelings of respect and distrust (Poetics, 31).  
 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, de Man makes the following statement in the introduction to this work: “Like 
Monsieur Jourdian’s proverbial prose, I was apparently doing rhetorical analysis before I knew such a 
thing existed by name” (viii). His approach is, in essence, the interpretation of images.  
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Although the early rhetores represented a privileged minority, and it is possible to see 
that ancient rhetoric is still, in the sense given in the passage above, alive in 
contemporary politics and law, both Plato and Aristotle also consider rhetoric to be the 
domain of ordinary people (see below). In any case, the ancient rhetores mentioned in 
the passage above operated in two of rhetoric’s three modes: the legislative and 
deliberative. (Epideictic is the third mode which eventually comprised, among other 
types of rhetorical practices, poetry and literature [Schiappa - Beginnings, 202-03].) The 
link of rhetoric with presenting different argumentative stances is evident in the roles 
played by the rhetors: proponents of political policy and legal advocates. Further, 
rhetoric’s importance with respect to major political and governmental institutions 
comes to the fore in the defining aspects considered above.  
Schiappa informs us that in the 4
th
 century B.C.E., “the term [rhetorike] quickly 
became useful as a means of organizing thought and effort around a specific set of 
problems – those of being a persuasive rhetor” (Schiappa – Beginnings, 27-28). The 
persuasive aspect of rhetoric provides the axis of Aristotle’s definition, and is tightly 
linked to its contentious nature. However, prior to launching into considering Aristotle’s 
position – the object of this dissertation – I shall consider Plato’s views. For Aristotle’s 
treatise is a response to Plato’s position.  
In the Gorgias, Socrates condemns rhetoric (as used by Gorgias) as mere 
flattery, meanwhile contrasting it with dialectic, which he defines as a tool to discover 
absolute Truth. He thus equates Gorgianic rhetoric with falsehood and trickery. 
However, in the Gorgias Socrates also mentions – albeit only once and in passing – 
what he calls the “true rhetoric,” which he later expands upon in the Phaedrus. The true 
rhetoric he speaks of is the rhetoric that will be used by the philosopher only after he 
has – by means of dialectical inquiry – gained true knowledge. Only then will he 
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attempt to be persuasive. Plato thus identifies two rhetorics, each with its respective 
terrain: Gorgianic rhetoric is flattery, falsehood, and trickery that has to do with the 
particular and evanescent, whereas true rhetoric expresses absolute knowledge obtained 
via dialectic. Kennedy provides a concise summary of Plato’s preliminary, negative 
stance in the Gorgias:  
Socrates apparently taught that truth was absolute and knowable and that a clear 
distinction should be made between dialectic, the question and answer method of 
obtaining the one correct answer, and rhetoric, which does not seem interested in 
the universal validity of the answer but only in its persuasiveness for the moment. 
This criticism Plato developed to such an extent that he is the most famous and 
most thorough-going of the enemies of rhetoric; the other Socratics do not seem to 
have felt an equally intense aversion (Kennedy – Persuasion, 14). 
  
Regardless of Plato’s attack on rhetoric – which, it must be noted, is less harsh in the 
Phaedrus (a work written after the Gorgias)
14
 – care must perhaps be taken not to view 
either Socrates or Plato as dogmatic adherents to doctrine. For, as Jaeger writes, there 
was a perennial search for the truth among students in Plato’s Academy: The “classic 
doctrines about the Ideas, about unity and multiplicity, about pleasure and pain, about 
the state, about the soul and virtue, were by no means inviolable sanctuaries in the 
discussions of the students. They were constantly being tested, defended, and altered, in 
[terms of the] logical validity” (14).  
We must not forget that the abovementioned discussions were predominantly 
conducted using oral, as opposed to written discourse, a newly arrived form of 
communication that posed a threat to the established framework. With a view to 
obtaining a proper orientation (as described by Charles Taylor) of the terrain we are 
now exploring, we can consider comments made by Socrates that, ironically, are 
preserved in writing. His observations, which shed light on how spoken and written 
discourse were being analyzed in antiquity, are pertinent and worth reflecting on today.  
                                                 
14 “He [Plato] did rehabilitate it [rhetoric] in the Phaedrus, but only in a completely reconstructed form 
identifying the genuinely accomplished orator with the philosopher who has full knowledge of ethical 
and political matters and who will also apply it in moral practice” (Engberg-Pedersen, 116). 
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This dispute bears recalling, for it still has relevance, in spite of (or perhaps because of) 
the tendency to regard written texts as sources of great reliability.
15
 In the Phaedrus, 
Socrates compares writing with speaking: 
Soc. You know, Phaedrus, that’s the strange thing about writing, which makes it 
truly analogous to painting. The painter’s products stand before us as though they 
were alive: but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It is 
the same with written words: they seem to talk to you as though they were 
intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be 
instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing for ever. And once a thing is 
put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, 
getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those 
who have no business with it; it doesn’t know how to address the right people, and 
not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always 
needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself 
(Hackforth, 158). 
 
Socrates’ point is perhaps taken for granted, and perhaps a bit too obvious. But caution 
must always be used with written texts by any author, for the reasons Socrates gives 
above. Further, since most thinkers change and evolve throughout their lives, often their 
earlier works do not express the mature thought of the same writer at a later period in 
life. We might ask, for instance, how many thinkers fall into the same category as Hans 
Georg Gadamer, who, in the second edition of Truth and Method writes that although 
he had read the criticisms of this work, he did not heed the requests for modifications 
due to the fact that, in his opinion, the method he had arrived at was still valid 15 years 
later (xvi). The question that arises is whether or not a greater number of scholars stand 
closer Montaigne in his Apology for Raymond Sebond, thinking one thing one day (or 
minute) and another the next.
16
 The point that I wish to make here is that, in spite of the 
reliability usually attributed to written texts, there are dangers involved with such a 
position, dangers that Socrates identified in the 4
th
 century B.C.E. 
                                                 
15 I am speaking in general terms. Obviously, many theorists argue that all discourse, written and oral, 
is completely unstable. Derrida, for instance, takes the position in “Plato’s Pharmacy” that neither 
written nor spoken discourse is free from ambiguity. This is, however, a stance that has generated an 
unresolved dispute among scholars that continues to the present. Further, it is a point of view 
foreshadowed by Gorgias in On What Is Not (see Wardy: 1996). 
16 See Frame. 
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To the problems associated with written discourse we can add another: the 
possible evolution of the writer in terms of his thought. Both Plato and Aristotle present 
challenges, for both thinkers evolved over time. It is necessary to keep the 
developments of each in mind when examining their works. As Aristotle’s definition of 
rhetoric is the focus of this dissertation, contributions made by scholars on his 
development and writing bear consideration. In relation with his development, Werner 
Jaeger argues that the reason for what have been viewed as blatant inconsistencies in 
Aristotle’s surviving works is that he had gone through a transition from being a full-
blown Platonist to rebelling and becoming his own thinker.
17
 According to Jaeger, 
Aristotle underwent dramatic changes in his philosophical thought, which must be kept 
in mind when reading his works and attempting to present how one interprets the way 
he defines and expresses his terms and ideas.  
Jonathan Barnes identifies other challenges specific to Aristotle’s corpus. First 
of all, the surviving works “were not ‘written up for publication’ and they were not 
given a literary polish – indeed, they were not literary texts at all” (12). Instead, they 
were “working drafts,” having nothing in common with works such as “the Theaetetus 
or the Meditations or the Critique of Pure Reason” (14-15). Barnes then gives sound 
advice on how to read Aristotle: “You should surely read Aristotle’s drafts in the 
manner in which you would read the notes which a philosopher had written for his own 
use” (Companion, 15). Barnes states that Aristotle’s sentences are “crabbed” and 
“sometimes telegrammatic: you must expand and illustrate them. The arguments are 
enthymematic – or mere hints: you must supply the missing premisses. The transitions 
are sudden – and often implicit: you must articulate and smooth and explain” (15). After 
telling us that there are “downright contradictions and inconsistencies” and providing a 
                                                 
17 See Jaeger. 
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number of examples and then referring to Jaeger’s stance, Barnes sums up with his 
general sense of Aristotle’s writing as a whole:  
More generally, in reading through Aristotle’s works, you do not gain the 
impression that you are gradually becoming familiar with a systematic 
construction. On the contrary, you seem to be led through a series of exhibition 
rooms, each stocked with problems and difficulties: the problems and difficulties 
can be looked at from this angle and from that . . . but – for the most part – 
nothing systematic seems to emerge. Rather, Aristotle is still searching for the 
answer – and inviting us to search with him (24). 
 
Barnes view that Aristotle is inviting us to join him on a quest for answers he has not 
found the answer to defines the stance that, in my opinion, ought to be utilized not only 
when reading Aristotle’s works, but to any work we as critical thinkers explore. In any 
case, we can also add to Barnes’ suggestions that common sense ought also to be used 
when reading Aristotle. Barnes tells us that we must read Aristotle’s works in the way 
outlined above, and that that while it is “difficult”, “challenging”, and “fun”, there are 
also “dangers”, for “disciplined reading sometimes softens into imaginative 
interpretation – and then in to free association” (15). Barnes rounds off his discussion 
by stating that “only a small portion of Aristotle’s work has actually survived. . . . we 
only possess a few of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, and they do not suffice to 
determine the original picture” (23).  
In spite of the gaping holes in Aristotle’s surviving works, and no doubt due to 
the ability of the human mind to build towering structures of thought based on a mere 
fragment
18
 as well as what Abbot identifies as an automatic, subconscious narrative-
generating mechanism in the human mind,
19
 scholars have constructed and continue to 
construct pictures of Aristotle and versions of what they believe his thought is as if they 
were delivered by Aristotle himself. How accurate these pictures and formulations 
really are can be questioned, including the present study.  
                                                 
18 See Most. 
19 See Abbot. 
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Keeping the above mentioned caveats in mind, we can now discuss in greater 
depth aspects of Aristotle’s definition of the term under consideration, a definition 
which is necessarily an opinion that stands in opposition not only to Plato’s but to those 
of other thinkers, past and present. 
Aristotle departed from Plato in the first line of his manual. As Robert Wardy 
writes, “The famous first words of the treatise, ‘rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic’ 
(1354a1), flatly reject Socrates’ uncompromising thesis that philosophical arguments 
are categorially [sic] distinct from rhetorical pleas” (Mighty, 58). Aristotle’s stance was 
thus different from Plato’s. Based on this schism, Hunt makes the assertion that the 
“history of rhetoric can be read as a series of responses to Plato.”20 Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
stands as the most significant (if not most formidable) rejoinder to Plato’s position. A 
systemized account of the principles and ideas in Plato’s and other works from the 
period, Aristotle’s treatise is, according to Thomas B. Farrell, inexhaustible in terms of 
its content and complexity. We will never manage to have the last academic word on it:  
As with the Greek language, or perhaps Mozart’s muse, there is something 
curiously bracing in the realization that we will never quite get “to the bottom” of 
all the mysteries in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It is simply too densely layered, with far-
reaching, albeit elusive, tributaries to other aspects of his thought, Greek culture, 
and unknowable circumstance. So be it (93). 
 
This is elegant testimony to the profound and wide-ranging content of Aristotle’s 
treatise, which, as mentioned above, can be read not only as having responded to and 
participated in the conversation on defining rhetoric that appears in Plato’s Gorgias and 
Phaedrus, but also as having supplied a rich resource for subsequent attempts to do the 
same.  
Aristotle provides two short definitions of rhetoric in his treatise. The rest of the 
Rhetoric can, in my opinion, be read as a discussion that is, in essence, an extended 
definition built upon them. The first short definition Aristotle makes appears in Book I: 
                                                 
20 Cited by Kastely (29). 
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Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as 
are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no 
separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; 
for all, up to a point try both to test and uphold and argument [as in dialectic] and 
to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric] (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 30 – 
author’s brackets). 
 
In the above passage, a major difference in terms of definition vis-à-vis that of Plato’s 
comes to the fore. As stated above, dialectic as presented in the Gorgias was in Plato’s 
view a tool to discover absolute and universal truths whereas rhetoric was denigrated as 
a mere knack like cookery. Plato later defines rhetoric in the Phaedrus as the means to 
convince souls of the universal truths of dialectic. In contrast, Aristotle in the above 
passage conflates rhetoric and dialectic. Since the Greek term antistrophos can be 
translated as “counterpart,” “correlative,” “coordinate” or “complement” (30 - footnote 
4), he considers two modes of discourse that Plato had isolated from one another to be 
sister arts. Whereas Plato separates dialectic from rhetoric and assigns each practice 
different functions, Aristotle links them together with similar functions.  (Universal and 
irrefutable truths are dealt with by Aristotle in his Analytics.) In any case, we can see 
that the two philosophers take, on this significant point, divergent stances.
21
 
                                                 
21 With respect to Kennedy’s translation above, we immediately run into further challenges with 
respect to written texts. For in addition to Socrates’ assertion that a text cannot explain itself, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the problems that arise with written texts due to the evolution of their 
authors, another difficulty arises: scholarly interpretation. For when Kennedy translates the above 
passage, he inserts brackets that link dialectic with testing and upholding an argument and later in 
the passage brackets that link rhetoric with defending one’s position. He thereby separates the 
functions of rhetoric and dialectic in a way that a careful reader of Aristotle will easily identify as 
erroneous. For in Sophistical Refutations Aristotle makes the following points about dialectic: 
“Hence, everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of 
examining; for all undertake to some extent a test of those who profess to know things. What 
serves them here is the general principles; for they know these themselves just as well as the 
scientist, even if in what they say they seem to go wildly astray. All, then, are engaged in 
refutation; for they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic is concerned 
professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of deduction” (Barnes 
- Complete, 292).  
Aristotle is speaking in this passage of dialectic, whose users participate in two activities: 
1) the carrying out of tests of the knowledge that they possess and 2) refutation. Aristotle attributes 
functions to dialectic that Kennedy has separated in his translation. Kennedy has read Aristotle as 
stating that rhetoric is for attack and defense and that dialectic is for examining an argument. Since 
Aristotle merges rhetoric with dialectic, it would appear that both modes of discourse, if we 
consider the above text from Sophistical Refutations, deal not only with examining arguments for 
their soundness, but with defending one’s own arguments and attacking those of others. Both arts, 
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A key observation that Aristotle makes regarding both rhetoric and dialectic in 
the passage above 
22
 is that, in his definition, all people use both modes of discourse.
23
 
The mechanisms and devices of both rhetoric and dialectic are, in his opinion, 
universally employed.
24
 Along these lines and working in the 20
th
 century, Perelman 
appropriates Aristotle’s assertion when he comments on everyday conversations among 
individuals, while making the important observation that most authors of treatises have 
practically eliminated this area of rhetoric’s application from their discussions:  
In ordinary dialogue the participants are simply trying to persuade their audience 
so as to bring about some immediate or future action; most of our arguments in 
daily life develop at this practical level. It is a curious and noteworthy fact that 
this everyday activity of persuasive discussion has received very scant attention 
from the theoreticians. Most authors of treatises on rhetoric have regarded it as 
foreign to their discipline (Treatise, 39).  
 
In relation to the above, Perelman writes that “Alfonso Reyes has rightly pointed out 
that private discourse is a field contiguous to that of ancient rhetoric; it is indeed in the 
course of daily conversation that the opportunity to engage in argumentation most 
commonly presents itself” (Treatise, 39). We can see that – as participants in an ongoing 
conversation that began in 4
th
 century Athens, both Perelman and Alfonso Reyes are 
rewording and expanding upon statements made by Plato, Aristotle and other thinkers. 
Take, for instance, the following comments made by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus:  
Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind 
by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in 
private places also? And must it not be the same art that is concerned with issues 
great and small, its right employment commanding no more respect when dealing 
                                                                                                                                           
in Aristotle’s definition, have similar aims, and should not, as Kennedy’s translation has it, be read 
as performing separate functions. So we can see that while Aristotle’s stance in the same passage is 
perhaps somewhat condescending when he speaks of amateurs as going “wildly astray” in their 
arguments, the danger looms large for experts as well. In this case, Kennedy does not seem to take 
into consideration the passage from Sophistical Refutations.  
22 See also footnote 22 above. 
23 Lausberg asserts that it is through education that awareness of the latent knowledge of rhetoric that 
humans possess naturally occurs (14). 
24 Certain authors extend Aristotle’s definition and assert not only that all humans engage in rhetorical 
activity, but that 1) “persuasion is at the heart of all communication be it in discourse with the self or 
the other” (Grimaldi, 4) and 2) that “[a]ll symbol/language-use is rhetorical” (Schiappa, Hamm, 5). 
The assertion that all human communication is rhetorical is disputable.  
41 
 
with important matters than with unimportant? Is that what you have been told 
about? (Hackforth, 158). 
 
We have stated that Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric and dialectic are different from 
Plato’s. But, if we look closely, we can follow Aristotle’s thought and see where his 
position – at least with respect to rhetoric – is similar with Plato’s. For there are 
similarities not only in the first lines of his treatise, but in the second short definition he 
provides:  
1. Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the 
available means of persuasion. This is the function of no other art; for each of the 
others is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example medicine 
about health and disease and geometry about the properties of magnitudes and 
arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences 
(Kennedy – Rhetoric, 37-38). 
 
The first, and most important similarity we find, has to do with essence. Socrates 
infers that rhetoric is the influencing of the mind using words. Aristotle calls it an 
ability to see the available means of persuasion. The similarity we find lies in the 
terms influence and persuasion for, roughly speaking, we could say that to influence 
is to persuade and vice versa.
25
  
The two thinkers also agree in general terms on who uses rhetoric. For 
Socrates states that the influencing of the mind that he has identified is carried out 
not only in courts of law and other public places, but in private places also. Aristotle 
states that all people use rhetoric and dialectic when they put their arguments to the 
test or defend them. We can thus read both Plato and Aristotle as asserting that 
rhetoric, which in Plato’s wording is influencing the mind and in Aristotle’s is 
identifying the means of persuasion, are activities that all humans engage in. (We 
                                                 
25
 Hackforth writes: “Rhetoric is [for Plato] at bottom persuasion, and persuasion is generically the 
same  
     whatever be the mode of its expression, oral or written, poetry or prose.” (Hackforth, 115-116) 
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have seen above that contemporary scholars Perelman and Reyes agree on this point 
as well.) 
Now, while it is true that Aristotle states that all people use rhetoric in order to 
show its pervasiveness in human discourse, one of his aims could very well be to defend 
his position (contrary to Plato’s) of rhetoric as techne. For just as Aristotle discusses 
representation in relation with children’s imitative behavior in his Poetics in order to 
show its development from a natural activity to techne, his discussion here about 
rhetoric’s being used by everyone is to highlight his refining and bringing its structures 
to light. In this sense, he defines rhetoric at a higher level in terms of its essence and 
function than Plato does.
26
 Further, that he gives it as a mode of discourse more value 
than Plato can be seen first in his calling it the antistrophos to dialectic, as well as in his 
having written this treatise for the ancient equivalents of today’s politicians and lawyers 
(Walker – Poetics, 31), who practiced the art of oratory in Athen’s assemblies, courts of 
law, and at events appropriate for epideictic, or celebratory rhetoric.  
Aristotle’s main focus is on three primary modes of rhetorical operations in his 
Rhetoric. Other scholars have expanded on his (and other ancient scholars’) ideas, 
demonstrating rhetoric’s near all-pervasiveness in the various modes of human 
discourse, thereby elaborating on Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric’s domain. For 
instance, the medieval rhetorician Furió’s view was that “all of the other [academic] 
disciplines are subject to rhetoric, not due to their nature, but because all of them are 
expressed in and learned through speech” (Garrido, 34 – my brackets). Along these 
                                                 
26
 Plato, when giving a more positive appraisal of rhetoric in the Phaedrus, nonetheless champs 
considerably at the bit, as evidenced by Socrates’ commentary: “So contending with words is a 
practice found not only in lawsuits and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we find 
this single art, if indeed it is an art, which enables people to make out everything to be like everything 
else, within the limits of possible comparison, and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who 
disguise what they are saying” (Hackforth, 124 – my italics). 
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lines and extending the types of discourse that comprise rhetoric’s domain, Kennedy 
writes: 
Wherever persuasion is the end, rhetoric is present. This is most marked in formal 
speeches in epic or drama or history, but it can be found in passages not formally 
oratorical both in lyric and in philosophy. This philosopher in weighing the 
evidence, drawing the conclusion, and presenting a literate exposition is fulfilling 
much the same functions as the orator in court, and so is the historian, who has 
similar problems of witnesses, psychological credibility, narration of incident, 
ascription of motive, weighing of evidence, and estimation of justice, expediency 
or honor. The Greek philosopher and dramatist share the concern of the historian 
and orator with justice and responsibility (Rhetoric, 7).  
 
Rhetoric’s near all-pervasiveness in human discourse and its modes is also highlighted 
by Walker, who, in his discussion of the origins of epideictic rhetoric, writes as follows: 
From the presocratic philosophers, historians, and sophists onward, it [epideictic 
rhetoric] proliferates into the varied kinds of spoken and written prose – histories 
and prose romances, dialogues and treatises, lectures and panegyrics, 
declamations and literary imitations of pragmatika, “hymns” and “monodies,” and 
so forth – that, with the more traditional forms of poetry, continue to constitute the 
rhetorical paideia (Poetics, 128). 
 
We can find a parallel in the passage above in the writings of Suetonius (1
st
 century 
A.D.). He includes, in the content of rhetoric, “the study and composition of fables, 
narratives, eulogies, invectives and arguments for and against a thesis, and the staging 
of debates” (Morgan, 309).  Rhetoric takes other forms as well, such as “the sermon, the 
political pamphlet, the educational treatise, the funeral encomium, and the imaginative 
exercise, as well as the more expected judicial and deliberative orations” (Kennedy - 
Rhetoric, 7). All of the above manifestations from ancient sources give credence to and 
demonstrate a link with Eagleton’s assertion in 1983 that a return to rhetoric ought to be 
initiated, in order to “develop a form of study which would look at the various sign-
systems and signifying practices in our own society, all the way from Moby Dick to the 
Muppet Show, from Dryden and Jean-Luc-Goddard to the portrayal of women in 
advertisements and the rhetorical techniques of Government reports” (Introduction, 
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207).
27
 The concrete examples Eagleton provides are manifestations of signifying 
practices from a variety of fields (i.e., literature, TV, film, advertising, and so on).  
Aristotle distinguishes between rhetoric and other fields in the first of his two 
short definitions. For he contrasts rhetoric as an ability to see the available means of 
persuasion in each case, while in other disciplines such as medicine, geometry and other 
arts and sciences, he states that they are persuasive with respect to their content. 
Rhetoric, in contrast, is content free. We find this idea in the Rhetoric in passages where 
Aristotle speaks, for example of using rhetoric in politics and distinguishes between the 
two fields. His text was written for the politicians and lawyers to be of his day, and so 
the examples that he uses are specific to their practices. But in his treatise he 
consistently states that when the content from another discipline is employed in 
rhetorical argumentation, it ceases to be rhetoric per se. Aristotle viewed rhetoric as a 
system of reasoning that used mechanisms translated as commonplaces that are outlined 
in his Rhetoric and Topics. They are logical structures that are not connected to a 
particular discipline, but that can be utilized in many different types of argument and 
across disciplines. As stated, Aristotle differs from Plato in that his definition of rhetoric 
and dialectic are tools not – as Plato’s Socrates argues – for discovering absolute Truth 
but for arguing opinion. But we shall see below that, in Aristotle’s lights, even opinions 
have their “truths.”   
  
                                                 
27 Cf. Cicero who in De Inventione views rhetoric as being applicable to all forms of literature 
(Culpepper Stroup, 26). 
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1.2 RHETORIC’S FIELD: OPINION 
We have stated that although Aristotle maintains Plato’s position that rhetoric is 
concerned with persuasion, he differs from Plato in that he does not view dialectic as a 
tool to discover universal truths, but as being concerned with opinion. He states this 
blatantly in the Topics, his treatise on dialectic: “For purposes of philosophy we must 
treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to 
opinion” (Barnes – Complete, 176). In this phrase Aristotle states clearly that dialectic 
is concerned with opinion, which he differentiates from philosophical truth. Since, as 
we have seen, Aristotle views dialectic and rhetoric as sister arts, we can read assertions 
he makes in the Topics about dialectic as informing rhetoric, and vice versa. Thus, his 
assertion above that dialectic is used for opinion can also be applied to rhetoric. The 
following assertion about dialectic also applies: “Our treatise proposes to find a line of 
inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject 
presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid 
saying anything contrary to it” (167). Here we can identify three basic concepts that can 
be applied to both rhetoric and dialectic. The first concept is that both dialectic and 
rhetoric can be read as operating in the terrain of reputable opinions as opposed to 
empirically demonstrable issues (which in this dissertation I am calling hard facts). The 
other two concepts Aristotle sets forth in the passage above are that 1) dialectic and 
rhetoric can be used for any subject and that 2) the aim is to avoid contradiction. When 
Aristotle distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from Plato’s definitions of the same terms 
and views these disciplines as sister arts and as having to do with reputable opinion, he 
is defining rhetoric and dialectic as the argumentative tools we use for maneuvering in 
the uncertainties our material existence, where much of the time we do not have 
absolute answers to the questions that arise in our minute-by-minute existence. We 
argue with ourselves about what the truth of a matter is, often taking different 
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perspectives that in their argumentative structure are sound, but that nevertheless 
contradict other opposite (or varying) perspectives. That is, while a particular argument 
may not contain any contradictions, this does not mean that other perspectives presented 
as arguments structured by informal logic will not present contrary – and sound – 
arguments. Each argument ought to stand on its own in terms of informal logic. This 
idea is presented in the quote above when Aristotle states that when arguing, the aim is 
to “avoid saying anything contrary” to that argument. An opinion, by definition, can be 
contradicted or challenged by another opinion. Aristotle also makes this point in the 
Rhetoric: “None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric 
alone do this . . .” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35).28 
 The division between opinion and hard facts is discussed by Perelman, who 
identifies where one field stops and the other starts. According to Perelman, the first 
extreme which stands as a limit to rhetoric’s possible application is “where the admitted 
thesis is self-evident and imposes upon every attentive mind there is no cause for 
argumentation” (Perelman – Justice, 120). In such cases, there is no use for rhetoric, for 
where truth is concerned, there is no need for argumentation: “When truth is manifestly 
clear, when self-evidence leaves no room for willful choice, all rhetoric is superfluous” 
(120). Perelman notes mathematical equations as an example of this type of case. That 
is, no judge is needed to “arrive at the conclusion that two plus two equals four” (120).29 
He states that Plato shows in the Euthyphro how “[w]hen we must justify preferences, 
deliberate about a decision, or discuss values, then argumentation and recourse to 
dialectics are indispensable” (151). While Plato would argue that these areas of 
                                                 
28 The possibility of arguing from opposite poles is one of the reasons that scholars often link rhetoric 
with the rise of democracy, and indicating its low presence in tyrannies and monarchies, which often 
resort to the bestowal of gifts or benefits for persuasion, or, as Erskine informs us, to arms for coercion 
(279). The results may be the same, but the means are different (Perelman - Treatise, 54). 
29 Whereas Perelman has overstated his case by not taking into consideration Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica, his argument holds true for non-specialists. 
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argumentation can be reduced to absolute truths, in Aristotle’s definition preferences, 
decisions and values all fall into the category of opinion. So we can see that rhetoric is 
the mode of reasoning that we use when dealing with the inconsistencies and 
uncertainties of human action and knowledge in our material existence. Moreau 
paraphrases the discussion in the Euthyphro, showing the inherent predicament that 
takes place, not with respect to hard facts, but instead with abstract notions: 
We do not discuss what can be objectively determined by incontestable 
procedures. If we differ in opinion, you and me, says Socrates to Euthyphro, about 
the number of eggs in the basket, about the length of a piece of cloth or about the 
weight of a sack of corn we will not argue about it, we will not discuss it; it will 
be sufficient to count, to measure, to weigh and our difference is resolved. 
Differences are prolonged and poisoned when such procedures and objective 
criteria are lacking. This is precisely the case, Euthyphro, when we disagree on 
the just, the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad: in one word, 
on values (Cited by Perelman - Justice, 151). 
  
The first point that can be made from the passage above is that where it is possible to 
demonstrate the answer to a question empirically, there is no need for argumentation. 
The second, very important point is that we can see that where opinion is involved, 
values necessarily enter in. This aspect is primarily due to the need in these areas for 
qualitative judgment as opposed to quantitative measurement. 
The other limit of rhetoric’s field, according to Perelman, is mindless 
compulsion through physical violence. That is, where “the thesis is shown to be 
arbitrary and there is no reason to favor it, the demand for submission to a constraining 
power can come about only through brutal force, without any concern for intellectual 
acceptance” (120). The distinction between bis (force) and logos is crucial. When a gun 
is pointed at one’s head, no real power to decide or to judge exists based on reason. But 
Perelman notes that the two limits he discusses are exceptional, and so he concludes that 
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“the field of rhetoric is thus immense” (120).30 It is in this immense field that a “judge is 
indispensable,” in situations where “there is reason to make a decision and not when the 
result can be had from a calculator” (120). The idea of a judge is critical, and I shall 
expand on this concept in Part 2. But even where no judge is assumed to be necessary, 
there are writers like Dostoevsky who even take to task cases that are based on 
mathematics. In Notes from Underground, the narrator disputes the notion that 
numerical equations stand as uncontroversial facts:  
Twice two’s four, well in my opinion it’s a cheek. Twice two’s four watches 
smugly, stands in the middle of your road with his arms akimbo, and spits. I agree 
that twice two’s four is a marvellous thing; but to give everything its due praise, 
twice two is five can also be a very nice little thing (34). 
  
Dostoevsky’s underground man’s comment is, of course, an attack on the attempt to 
reduce human behavior to formal rules of math or logic, which would thereby eliminate 
free will. And the fact is, if one changes the axiomatic bases of a mathematical equation, 
it is possible to multiply two times two and have it equal five. Still, although 
Dostoevsky’s challenge is both intriguing and intellectually stimulating as an exercise in 
unconventional (but sound) logic, in this dissertation I differentiate opinion from hard 
facts. The latter can be proved empirically from the standpoint of a layperson, and 
removed from a system of values involved in choice and agency. Opinions, by 
comparison, can only be proved in terms of probability and, as we shall see, emotions, 
and are at the same time tied to a system of values as seen in the following passage. 
Plato’s Socrates had already presented ideas that Perelman certainly draws on with 
respect to rhetoric’s vast field:  
Soc. Well now, is not the following assertion obviously true, that there are some 
words about which we all agree, and others about which we are at variance? 
Ph. I think I grasp your meaning, but you might make it still plainer. 
                                                 
30 In “The Politics of Rhetorical Education,” Joy Connolly takes a stance that differs radically from 
Perelman’s. She argues that the violence of political systems is masked by means of rhetoric. In this 
way, she asserts, rhetoric participates in violence. See Connolly, Politics. 
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Soc. When someone utters the word ‘iron’ or ‘silver’, we all have the same object 
before our minds, haven’t we? 
Ph. Certainly. 
Soc. But what about the words ‘just’ and ‘good’? Don’t we diverge, and dispute 
not only with one another but with our own selves? 
Ph. Yes indeed. 
Soc. So in some cases we agree, and in others we don’t. 
Ph. Quite so. 
Soc. Now in which of the cases are we more apt to be misled, and in which is 
rhetoric more effective? 
Ph. Plainly in the case where we fluctuate. 
Soc. Then the intending student of the art of rhetoric ought, in the first place, to 
make a systematic division of words, and get hold of some mark distinguishing 
the two kinds of words, those namely in the use of which the multitude are bound 
to fluctuate, and those in which they are not. 
Ph. To grasp that, Socrates, would certainly be an excellent piece of discernment. 
Soc. And secondly, I take it, when he comes across a particular word he must 
realise what it is, and be swift to perceive which of the two kinds the thing he 
proposes to discuss really belongs to. 
Ph. To be sure. 
Soc. Well then, shall we reckon love as one of the disputed terms, or as one of the 
other sort? 
Ph. As a disputed term, surely. [. . .] 
Soc. [. . .] But now tell  me this . . . did I define love at the beginning of my 
speech? 
Ph. Yes indeed, and immensely thorough you were about it (Hackforth, 126-127). 
  
Socrates’ point is not complex: there are words whose meanings cannot be disputed, 
like “iron” and “silver”, for we know, or, in any case, have all agreed on what these 
terms mean. By comparison, there are terms that are not so easy to define, and further, 
that were we able to manage to arrive at definitions for terms like “just” and “good” that 
did not fluctuate but were agreed on, like “gold” and “silver”, such insight would, as 
Phaedrus suggests, be admirable. The problem, of course, is that there is disagreement 
about the words that Socrates calls disputed terms. 
In this passage it is possible to see Plato’s stance with respect to dialectic and 
rhetoric. Rhetoric is more effective where the chance to err when defining terms occurs. 
Socrates, in this dialogue, attempts to reach a final and absolute definition of love 
through dialectic which can then be related through rhetoric. It is here that Aristotle and 
Plato differ: Plato attempts, through dialectic, to find universal definitions (or truths), 
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whereas Aristotle would argue that it is possible to use dialectic and hence, rhetoric, to 
argue in opposing directions about terms like love, the good, the just, and so on.
31
 
Another concept discussed in antiquity will add to Socrates’ assertions, for it is 
linked to the change that disputable, abstract terms undergo when manifested in 
concrete human action. Epitectus in his Dialogues discusses what he calls prenotions, 
which, in Stoic philosophy, manifest in human thought by the age of seven. These 
prenotions are equivalent to Socrates’ fluctuating terms: 
Prenotions are common to all men. No prenotion is in contradiction with any 
other. Who among us does not accept that good is something useful and desirable, 
to be sought and pursued in all circumstances? Who does not accept that right is 
something beautiful and suitable? Then, at what point is there a contradiction? 
When one applies the prenotions to particular realities, when one says: ‘He acted 
honestly, he is a courageous man’ and another says, ‘No, he is a fool.’ There is 
thus conflict between them. Such is the conflict which opposes Jews, Syrians, 
Egyptians and Romans: that it is necessary above all to respect holiness and to 
seek it in everything is not in question; but one wonders whether the act of eating 
pork conforms to holiness or not. Such is the conflict which opposes Agamemnon 
and Achilles. Call them before you. What will you say to Agamemnon? Is it not 
necessary to act as one should and with honesty? It is necessary. And you, 
Achilles, what do you say? Are you not of the opinion that one must act honestly? 
I am totally of that opinion. Now, apply these prenotions: here is where the 
conflict beings (Perelman – Justice, 124).  
 
The above excerpt details the how abstract values, when expressed in concrete action by 
particular groups or individuals, become matters of dispute. Nearly everyone will agree 
that it is good to be honest, brave, and so forth, but it is in the action itself that 
difference of opinion arises as to whether or not the action is, in fact, a concrete 
                                                 
31 As an interesting aside, we can note that terms like gold and silver, which are indisputable for the 
layman, are questioned by scientists, such as F. Waisman: “For instance, we define gold in contrast to 
some other metals such as allows. This suffices for our present needs, and we do not probe any further. 
We tend to overlook the fact that there are always other directions in which the concept has not been 
defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would necessitate new limitations. 
In short, it is not possible to define a concept like gold with absolute precision, i.e., in such a way that 
every nook and cranny is blocked entry of doubt” (Cited by Perelman – Treatise, 130). 
Although discussions like the one from the passage above are fascinating in and of themselves, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, rhetoric shall be defined as operating in the field that lies between 
“hard facts” indicated by terms such as “gold” and “silver” or statements such as “one plus one equals 
two”. Rhetoric, for our purposes, must be interpreted as operating in connection with those terms and 
actions that are normally associated with possible dispute. That is, terms like just and good, not gold 
and silver.  
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example of the term under consideration. In Part 4 I bring rhetorical mechanisms to the 
surface that are necessarily tied to a system of values. The narrator, as human agent, 
takes action based on abstract notions that will be interpreted differently by each 
member of the audience or readership. It is in the analysis of the narrator’s actions and 
motives that rhetoric provides insight into the mechanisms of reasoning that are used by 
humans when carrying out their deeds and as defined by their place in society and the 
role they play in it.  
 With respect to our discussion of the matters falling into the vast field in which 
rhetoric and dialectic operate, that is, controversial matters, it must be noted that 
Aristotle, when touching on issues that might be viewed from various perspectives, 
gives clues that make it seem that he believes that it is in the arguing about or presenting 
of different viewpoints that truth or ostensible truth may be found (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 
39). In this regard, W.K.C. Guthrie writes that Aristotle was driven by a “constant 
anxiety to give due consideration to the opinions of others” (Aristotle, 91). Guthrie 
quotes Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics on this point: “‘Therefore we must pay 
attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older men, or 
those of practical wisdom, no less than to demonstrations; for through the eye of 
experience they see correctly’” (203). As can be seen, in the above assertion, Aristotle 
attributes similar value to sayings and opinions based on experience or age as he does to 
empirically demonstrable facts. In this sense, he equates opinion with truth, albeit not 
(necessarily or unnecessarily) absolute or universal. Aristotle not only lends credence to 
opinions based on experience and wisdom, but he is also, as Guthrie underscores with 
eyebrows raised, apparently not at all averse to utilizing premisses for argumentation 
which are, in effect, ad populam fallacies: 
His [Aristotle’s] defiant (in view of people like Parmenides and Plato) 
championship of the consensus omnium is truly remarkable: “We maintain that 
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what everyone believes is true. Whoever destroys this faith will hardly find a 
more credible one.” In the Ethics (1153b27) he quotes with approval the line of 
Hesiod (Erga 763): “No word is ever wholly lost that many peoples speak.” At 
the least, lay or earlier philosophic opinions made an excellent starting-point for 
argument. Brought to bear on them, the mind trained in dialectic and analytics 
could purge the dross of unscientific thinking and extract the true metal that 
remains. “If on any question, that in itself is sufficient proof” (1145b6) (Aristotle, 
91). 
 
We have already mentioned that everyone, in Aristotle’s lights, uses rhetoric to argue 
and persuade. Vox populi arguments have their element of truth, and it is in the use of 
rhetorical argumentation that certain truths, or perhaps types of truths, can be 
discovered.  Aristotle writes in the Rhetoric, “Persuasion occurs through the arguments 
[logoi] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in 
each case” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 39). If the aim is to discover the truth for ourselves, 
here and now, it is possible to take Aristotle’s contention that a variety of opinions must 
be heard in order to do so. Guthrie expands on Aristotle’s method for seeking truth from 
the opinions of others when examining a particular subject: 
The first book [of De philosophia] illustrates a practice of Aristotle familiar from 
the first books of the Metaphysics, De anima and elsewhere, that of introducing 
his own study of a subject in the context of a historical review of previous 
opinions. This in turn resulted from the characteristically Aristotelian faith (which 
I personally find attractive) that in every sincerely held belief, however overlaid 
with error, patient sifting will reveal a grain of truth (Aristotle, 83-84).  
 
Guthrie relates how Aristotle took pains to consider all possible opinions on a subject, 
however unassuming, as possible sources of wisdom or truth: “Once again, [in De 
philosophia] he [Aristotle] refuses to dismiss popular wisdom as beneath the notice of 
the philosopher” (86). The dialectical and rhetorical process, whether involving the truth 
of a specialist or that of the man or woman on the street, is the same: two sides (at least) 
are presented in their most reasonable form, and, based on the arguments, an assessment 
is made.  
 When discussing the truth of rhetoric, we must keep in mind statements Aristotle 
makes in this regard. Here we must use common sense and infer that Aristotle 
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distinguished between the “truth” of rhetoric and dialectic the pure or abstract “Truth” 
of philosophical speculation, as well as that of pure logic (analytics). This idea becomes 
clear in statements that Aristotle makes in the Nicomachean Ethics about the “science” 
of ethics, and its “truths”: 
We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to 
indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are 
only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind  to reach 
conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our 
statements be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision 
in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently 
equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand 
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs (Barnes – Complete, 1730). 
 
Aristotle qualifies the truth of ethics in the above passage by stating that we must be 
satisfied with premises that lead to it roughly and in outline. This is due to the low 
possibility of achieving absolute precision in matters upon which often very little 
agreement has been achieved.
32
 This is due to the great number of opinions on the 
subjects that rhetoric deals with, and over which we as humans dispute. We find an 
example in Aristotle’s Politics, where he discusses the problems that surface with 
respect to the term education, which is, in the end, a pre-notion on which little 
agreement has been achieved:   
Education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of the state . . . For 
men are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to 
excellence or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned 
with intellectual or with moral excellence. The existing practice is perplexing; no 
one knows on what principle we should proceed – should the useful in life, or 
should excellence, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training? – 
all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no 
agreement (2121). 
  
                                                 
32 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes the following with respect to the subject of his treatise. 
Ethics, he tells us, is a nebulous field from which little precision can be expected: “And we must also 
remember what has been said before, and not to look for precision in all things alike, but in each class 
of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the 
inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles in different ways; the former does so in so 
far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; 
for he is a spectator of the truth” (Barnes – Complete, 1735-1736).  
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We see here the problematics related to a term about which aims this same term ought 
to hold, or how these aims should be carried out in real practice. Opinions differ, and, as 
Aristotle points out, there is division about how education ought to be implemented in 
concrete terms. It appears as if things have not changed much over time, especially if 
we consider the recent Bologna Accords whose aim is to reform higher education in 
Europe. There is also a parallel in the affirmation Aristotle makes about education being 
a matter of the state. In connection with this, it bears mentioning that in his treatise, 
Aristotle also calls rhetoric an offshoot of ethics and politics. For after stating that in 
rhetoric persuasion is the result of showing the truth or plausible truth of a particular 
case, he then goes on to assert the following:  “The result is that rhetoric is like some 
offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called politics)” 
(Kennedy - Rhetoric, 39). What I wish to underscore here is the interconnectedness of 
rhetoric and dialectic with politics and ethics. In Aristotle’s definition, there is no 
separating the three fields. And so, according to Aristotle, we can only, when dealing 
with any of these disciplines, be as precise as the subject matter allows. Here it might be 
possible to argue that Aristotle means not to shrug our shoulders and throw in the 
ethical towel, but to be as exact as humanly possible when dealing with matters that are, 
by nature, inexact. 
The imprecision necessarily involved in rhetorical operations and its field 
(opinion) is tightly linked to the concept of contingency. The consensus that is attained 
through argumentation is often based on opinions that are based on common sense or 
experience, that provide the basis for decision-making and judgment. A.E. Bons states 
that this awareness of the need to use opinions is crucial due to the uncertainty which 
human beings confront: 
Humankind lives in a contingent world, in which the state of affairs or (lack of) 
facts alone more often than not is not sufficient to reach a clear decision on an 
55 
 
issue. . . there is reasoning on the basis of probability (eikos). If decisive proof is 
lacking, the question of fact or the interpretation of fact depends on criteria of 
comparison with what the person or persons called upon to judge take to be the 
case or the state of affairs generally. Their criteria are based on experience and 
commonly accepted knowledge about human behavior, and the expectations they 
have on the basis of this (Bons – Gorgias, 41). 
 
The material world presents circumstances that are, by nature, only predictable to 
varying degrees. Past experience is a source for prediction based on probability. Still, as 
there is no fool-proof mechanism for determining how future events will fall into place, 
in the end, predictions based on experience stand as opinions. As noted throughout our 
discussion, an issue that is the object of rhetorical debate will always have at least two, 
conflicting perspectives, each of which can be argued forcefully. That is, arguments 
based on experience and commonly accepted knowledge about human behavior will 
have respective proponents that disagree on the same issue, and how it is to be judged. 
Along these lines, Connolly makes the following assertion: “Rhetoric’s 
abstracting and rationalizing impulse imposes systematic order on speech that always 
threatens to escape its proper bounds. It anchors persuasive eloquence in a rational 
system that seeks to compensate for contingencies with a superabundance of 
possibilities for classification” (Order, 148). The threat to go beyond its own limits is an 
echo of Aristotle’s caveat against using logic but at the same time going wildly astray in 
argumentation. This is a danger, but, in normal circumstances, rhetoric aims for fixity in 
a framework of reality that presents differing degrees of order. The aim of rhetoric is to 
ascertain correctly, using past experience as its base, to take the chaos of contingency 
and make sense out of it. In this sense, it is tightly linked to narrative. That is, the aim of 
both rhetoric and narrative can be read as making sense out of what often seems to be 
pure chaos. The unruliness of our existence in the physical world is brought under 
control, at least on the page and, one assumes, in the mind of the writer.  Chaos 
becomes orderliness; bedlam becomes structure and harmony. Of course, as Connolly 
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suggests above, out of this chaos a vast number of interpretations, all based on 
syllogistic reasoning is possible. The aim, when using rhetoric, is to either predict what 
will happen or to establish what has happened accurately. Both modes of reasoning 
have as their aim to achieve certainty amidst uncertainty, and, in this sense, represent 
means that attempt to fulfill the deep-rooted human desire for unshakeable knowledge. 
Curious in this regard is Ross’ opinion on Aristotle’s position with respect to 
contingency, for he believes it is difficult to pin Aristotle down in this respect:  
It is excessively hard to be sure whether Aristotle thinks in the long run that there 
is a sphere of real contingency in the world. He sometimes speaks as if necessity 
ruled in the celestial and contingency in the sublunary region. But even in the 
sublunary world there are necessary connexions – the connexions between a 
subject and its genus, differentiae, and properties. And even in the celestial region 
there is contingency; a planet which is here is capable of being there. The 
contingency attaching to the heavenly bodies, however, is only a capacity for 
movement, while terrestrial things have also the capacity of changing in quality, 
of growing and diminishing, and of coming to be and passing away (31). 
  
The first point that I wish to bring up about the above passage is that we can see how 
contingency operates even in the commentaries that experts make on a particular 
thinker. For depending on how one reads Aristotle, it is possible to conclude as Ross 
has, that it is difficult to determine whether Aristotle believes contingency per se exists 
in the world. At the same time, if one reads the Topics, Aristotle states clearly that 
dialectical, and thus, by association, rhetorical arguments have to do with both “hard 
facts” and the contingent: “Some things occur of necessity, others for the most part, 
others however it may chance . . .” (Barnes – Complete, 187).  In this statement it 
appears as if Aristotle views both contingency and necessity as existing and forming 
part of the real world. It is possible that Ross has misread Aristotle. Our knowledge is 
thus contingent upon careful reading of available texts, upon which we must exercise 
our reason in order to attempt to discover the truth. 
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Be that as it may, in the above passage Aristotle defines three categories for 
things that happen: 1) those that are inexorable, 2) those that usually, or as a norm, 
happen, and 3) those that are subject to chance. In this tri-partite division, Aristotle 
neatly sums up the vast majority of events that occur in the physical world. Whether or 
not Ross is right about Aristotle’s views on contingency, we experience life and the 
reality it presents as if it did exist – in the way Aristotle describes it in the passage 
above. The reasonable choice is to confront our existence as if contingency does, in fact, 
exist. We then make decisions based on a system of values that lead to action and which 
can be judged. The fact is, however, that in our dealings with others, there is often very 
little certainty or agreement on what the right course of concrete action is. It is precisely 
in this sphere that rhetoric, as counterpart to dialectic, operates. The sphere of rhetoric 
stands, for all practical intents and purposes, in full contrast with hard sciences, even 
though the latter is an evolving body of knowledge and is subject to argument and 
interpretation of data. Few if any phenomena are free from contingency and flux. 
Toulmin argues that only mathematics can be placed outside of uncertainty:   
Mathematical arguments alone seem entirely safe: given the assurance that every 
sequence of six or more integers between 1 and 100 contains at least one prime 
number, and also the information that none of the numbers from 62 up to 66 is a 
prime, I can thankfully conclude that the number 67 is a prime; and that is an 
argument whose validity neither time nor the flux of change can call in question. 
This unique character of mathematical arguments is significant. Pure mathematics 
is possibly the only intellectual activity whose problems and solutions are ‘above 
time’ (Return, 127). 
  
Thus we must take Aristotle’s famous advice cited above when entering into the sphere 
in which rhetoric operates. That is, it is equally unreasonable to expect a mathematician 
to deal in the logic of probability or to expect a rhetorician to deal in hard, provable 
facts. Again, Aristotle may not here be looking down his nose at the rhetorician. Rather, 
it would seem that he is stating that one ought to apply a determined mode of thought as 
dependent on its aims and aspects. That is, a mathematician’s  aims for intellectual 
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query and the attendant premisses are much different from those of the rhetorician  who 
is dealing with possibility, probability, and the unforeseeable on the one hand, and 
myriad points of view regarding the how and the what of things in the material world on 
the other. The formal knowledge of mathematics and philosophy must be distinguished 
from the sticky business of the quotidian. Just because rhetoric’s aim is not the formal 
truth of either geometry or philosophy, this does not mean, from Aristotle’s point of 
view, that the arguments it puts forward are unreasonable. For as we have already seen 
in the Topics, Aristotle states that the aim of dialectic is to avoid contradiction in 
argumentation (Barnes – Complete, 167). That is, opinions, as assailable as they may 
be, also have their own logic upon which solid arguments can be built. Whether or not 
they establish certainty is part of the reasoning that defines rhetoric and dialectic. This 
means that, in both dialectic and rhetoric, arguments can be based on both “hard facts” 
and reputable opinion. In the end, even arguments permeated with contingency have 
some basis in the physical world. A simple example will illustrate this idea: if a human 
being goes without water for more than three days, he/she will die. (Here contingency 
also enters, for the number of days a human can survive depends on the temperature.
33
) 
This is one example of what I am calling a “hard fact”. It is also a “hard fact” that it is 
physically possible to load a Land Rover with enough water that will make it possible to 
cross the Sahara. Within the boundaries of these two hard facts lies the contingency of 
the trip itself. Assuming all goes well, we will make it safely across the desert. 
However, if things go awry – that is, if we are hit by a sandstorm and end up drinking 
most of the water – we then run the risk of dying in the attempt. Our daily existence is 
filled with contingent possibilities that operate in the arena of “hard facts,” most of them 
much less dramatic than the example given here. Most of the time in our daily lives we 
                                                 
33 See: U.S. Government. www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/09-29981.pdf 
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have to make much more mundane decisions, such as whether or not to take an 
umbrella to avoid getting rained on. But whether or not the consequences are as dire as 
running out of water in the desert is immaterial, at least with respect to the fact that this 
is rhetoric’s field of operations. That is, in the end we use rhetoric-based reasoning to 
make our way through and face a material existence that is made up of both hard facts 
and contingent possibilities.   
Thus the rhetorical thought structures that provide the reasoning upon which 
opinions are based, are, in spite of the chance to err, logical. Taylor affirms this idea, 
when he states that rhetoric studies “deductions, it studies logic” (Barnes – Companion, 
261). His assertions are based on affirmations Aristotle makes in the Rhetoric that 
define it as a deductive thought process:  “It is plain, then, that the technical study of 
rhetoric is a sort of proof (since we are most persuaded when we consider a thing to 
have been proved); the orator’s proofs are enthymemes, and an enthymeme is a sort of 
deduction . . .” (261). Aristotle defines an enthymeme as a sort of syllogism, calling it 
the equivalent of a dialectical syllogism (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 34). I shall deal in greater 
detail with this aspect of rhetoric in Part 2, in the section I devote to the proof logos. At 
this point I am simply bringing to the fore Aristotle’s idea that rhetorical thinking has to 
do with logic. That is, opinions are necessarily based on reasonable thought processes. 
We can add the following commentary by McCroskey along these lines to our 
discussion: 
Rhetorical thought is neither logical nor illogical: it is psychological. This is not to 
suggest that rhetorical thought is irrational; quite the contrary. It is rational, but it 
takes account of the fact that human reasoning does not occur in a vacuum. 
Research has indicated that reasoning is strongly affected by an individual’s 
attitudes. Consequently, matters of formal logical validity have little relevance for 
the communicator concerned with influencing an audience. The real test of a 
communicator’s reasoning is acceptance by the audience (103-104). 
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In the passage above, what is important to note is that McCroskey distinguishes 
between “rational” and “logical,” and that when he refers to logic, he is referring to 
formal logic. He perhaps overstates his case when he states that rhetoric is “neither 
logical nor illogical,” for, as Taylor notes when reiterating Aristotle’s ideas, rhetoric is a 
logical process. However, in a strict, formal sense, rhetoric cannot be viewed as logical, 
due to its sphere of operations, where contingency and probability come into play. 
When McCroskey states that rhetoric is psychological he ignores the deductive thought 
processes that are active when rhetorical thought is used. When McCroskey makes his 
assertions, he is no doubt referring to formal logic, which operates in a different area, 
where absolutes come into play. In any case, McCroskey would concur that when a 
speaker’s ideas are accepted by the audience, they are, in the end, being persuaded by 
her arguments that support an opinion, as opposed to a fact that can be verified by 
empirical means. 
What is the arena and what are the components where opposing opinions are 
presented and tackled? Bons provides a schema for rhetorical activity where differing 
opinions are asserted using informal logic:  
The area of operation for a reasonable argument has the following constituents: 
first of all, there has to be an issue about which there are opposing claims, but the 
conclusive proof of either claim cannot be given by both parties involved. Then, 
the matter in question allows of being otherwise and, thirdly, both parties, or at 
least one if this party challenges an already existing claim made by the other, 
intend to make their case as strong as possible by showing that it stands to reason. 
Finally, the rhetorical situation is in most cases some kind of dicanic or 
deliberative gathering, like a court room or an assembly, but other situations of a 
more private character can be imagined as well (Reasonable, 14). 
  
Bons here provides a succinct summary of the basics of rhetorical argument: 1) an issue 
that is disputable, due to its inconclusive nature, 2) at least two parties that take opposite 
positions, 3) a setting in which a judgment is made on the opposing views, in order to 
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determine which is the most reasonable. The views of Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
shed further light on the rhetorical process that seeks truth from contrary opinions: 
At any rate, there always has to be an issue – however indeterminate – about 
which there is supposed to be critical doubt, disagreement, controversy, a dispute, 
disagreement, or even a conflict. This means that there are at least two parties 
involved, irrespective of whether these parties voice their views orally or in 
writing or keep silent, and irrespective of how many people the parties consist of. 
The speaker or writer may address one other party, but also two ore [sic] more 
parties at the same time. These other parties may be present during argumentation, 
and actively engage in the argumentative discourse, but they may also consist of a 
listening (and watching) audience or a collection of readers known or unknown to 
the writer (Always, 10). 
  
In the passage above we see again that in rhetorical argumentation, a disputed issue or 
opinion is necessarily present and that there are at least two parties. What these authors 
add to the discussion is that the parties may speak, write or maintain silence, and 
further, that the arena where the argumentation and the latter’s enactment takes place is 
necessary. However, they refine this aspect by stating that the parties may or may not be 
present, may or may not actively engage in discourse, and may be listeners, watchers, or 
readers, known or unknown to the writer. Two important points to note here with 
respect to this dissertation is that in the analysis to be carried out in Part 4, the audience 
is necessarily a reader unknown to the writer on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
writer/narrator is physically absent. In other words, the judgment will take place in the 
mind of the audience/reader through the act of reading. The narrator of the travel 
narrative presents, in my interpretation, a case that is controversial, with the aim of 
resolving a difference of opinion.  The narrator is, in effect, pleading a case, using  
argumentation whose aim (among others) is, in Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s words, 
“creating consensus” (Always, 10). As for the fictional case under study, details are 
presented that seek resolution, but in the end are inconclusive. 
The possibility to argue in opposite directions in the frameworks outlined above 
has, as we have been asserting, the concern of rhetoric throughout history. Skinner, in 
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his discussion of Cicero, speaks of how the latter admired the orator Carneades for his 
ability to convincingly argue opposing sides of the same issue. In the case Skinner 
elaborates on, the term under consideration is “justice”: 
[Cicero’s] admiration flows from the fact that Carneades managed on a famous 
occasion to argue convincingly in favour of justice on one day and no less 
convincingly against it on the day following. He thereby demonstrated that, even 
when discussing the virtues, it will always be possible to uphold the central 
contention of rhetorical theory, the contention that there are two sides to every 
question, and thus that one can always argue in utramque parte (9-10). 
 
Arguing in utramque partem, on both sides of an issue, became the most prized of skills 
in Roman oratory as evidenced by the writing of Cicero and Quintilian. The skill to 
argue in utramque partem reached its zenith in the Renaissance, where, according to 
Skinner, there was an “unparalleled degree of interest in the exploration of paradoxes, 
dialogues and other forms of argument lacking obvious closure. The dictum that there 
will always be two sides to any question eventually became proverbial . . .” (99). And it 
is this skill and thought process that we as humans use to discover the “truth” on an 
issue. In the case Skinner discusses, Carneades argues forcefully in both directions, and 
is able to persuade for and against justice. In both cases, even though different 
conclusions were reached, a separate truth was affirmed. What is crucial to note here is 
that the arguments for and against will necessarily depend on the bases used in each 
argument. Contingency and extenuating circumstances can be used to argue that justice 
can be either a virtue or a vice. Skinner also brings to the fore what he identifies as 
rhetorical theory’s central contention: arguing both sides of an issue is always possible.  
Just what are the issues that comprise the object to be disputed in rhetoric? 
Goodwin states: “an issue is a more or less determinate object of contention that is, 
under the circumstances, worth arguing about” (86). But it is not just the arguing that 
matters or that is the aim of rhetoric. As Goodwin asserts, an issue must have “some 
significant consequences for action or belief” (85). Goodwin argues correctly here, but 
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it must be noted that the “significant consequences” can always be placed on a scale of 
importance. If the consequences are that by saving fifteen minutes one may sit in front 
of the TV a bit longer before going to bed and thus disconnect from one’s worries, the 
significance of this decision is of much less importance than if the same fifteen minutes 
will provide time enough for a lover’s tryst, before one or both of the parties must return 
to their respective wife, husband or partner. The first circumstance and its results – 
fifteen extra minutes of TV – would make for a poor story, unless some other highly 
significant components were introduced into the event. The second situation, however, 
is the stuff of literature and, due to its high moral content, a matter of dispute that must 
be pleaded and judged. The narrator of a lover’s tryst may opt to present the story in 
such a way so that this crime of passion will be forgiven, approved, condemned or 
dismissed as insubstantial by the reader through rhetoric. Much – if not all – of the 
reader’s ensuing judgment depends on how the story is told, the case is pleaded and 
what values come into play on both the narrator’s and reader’s part. These issues are 
called “hoary problems” by Toulmin, who reminds us that even in philosophical ethics, 
“general ethical truths can aspire at best to hold good in the absence of effective 
counter-claims: conflicts of duty are an inescapable feature of the moral life” 
(Argument, 117). Such conflicts are the stuff of literature in general, and, in particular 
of the travel narrative and narrative in dialogue form to be examined in Part 4. The 
actions narrated in both cases involve human agency, and difference of agreement about 
whether they players have acted appropriately or not will necessarily surface.  
Can the decisions and judgments on issues be categorized in terms of quality? In 
Aristotle’s lights, there is wise and unwise rhetorical thinking that leads to action. The 
name that Aristotle gives to the knowledge or wisdom used when making decisions in 
the contingency of human affairs is phronesis, often translated as “practical wisdom,” 
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which governs both rhetoric and dialectic (Reinhardt – Rhetoric, 376). Isocrates, like 
Aristotle who cites him often in the Rhetoric, believes that phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, is based on the use of opinions:  
For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a knowledge (episteme) by the 
possession of which we can know positively (eidenai) what we should do or what 
we should say, henceforth I hold that the man to be wise (sophos) who is able by 
his opinions (doxais) to arrive in most cases (hose pi to polu) at the best course, 
and I hold that man to be a philosopher (philosophos) who occupies himself with 
the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight (phronesis) 
(Bons – Reasonable,  16).  
 
Isocrates views logon techne, or the “art of discourse,” to be the manner in which a 
young man obtains practical wisdom. Walker argues that Isocrates’ art of discourse is, 
in essence, rhetoric, which was a misnomer coined by Plato in his attack on the sophist 
Gorgias and rhetors in general.
34
  Here we see again that there is no absolute knowledge 
about human action, and that the man who is able to make decisions based on opinions 
that make it possible, for the most part, to act appropriately in most circumstances, is 
the philosophos in possession of insight. The right course of action necessarily entails 
the material act itself for the good, as well as its ethical nature. It is in using one’s 
phronesis to make the right decisions that matters above all.  
Using phronesis to argue both sides of an issue is necessarily tied to ethics in 
Aristotle’s treatise, as can be seen in the passage below from the Rhetoric. Logical 
reasoning comes into play that may be used to argue with equal force from opposite 
stances, but this skill must be used for virtuous ends:   
Further, one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just 
as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not 
persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the 
real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another 
person uses speech unjustly (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35). 
  
                                                 
34 Walker writes, “Rhetorike from the beginning is the misname of an art that keeps resolving itself 
back into, or that simply becomes, or that always was, something like an Isocratean logon techne” 
(Poetics, 40-41). 
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Aristotle’s parenthetical comment that rhetoric ought not to be used for debased ends 
brings his stance that the capacity to argue from different perspectives should instead be 
used for persuading what is good. Kennedy tells us that the term ta phaula in Greek can 
mean “whatever is bad, cheap, or morally and socially useless” (35 – footnote 26). We 
shall see that in the travel narrative under study in Part 4 that just how the term good is 
defined is also a matter of dispute and is based on a system of values that the narrator 
uses to his advantage when pleading his case. 
Other aspects of rhetoric must be considered in order to complete our discussion 
in relation with rhetoric’s field. For instance, Day argues that persuasion is rhetoric’s 
aim and is linked to the audience, which will be “swayed in proportion as its members 
perceive the speaker’s conclusions as following from principles that they themselves 
accept” (379). Here rhetoric’s importance as a rational communicative and social 
activity is highlighted. As mentioned above, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, rather than 
use the word persuasive, prefer instead to call the audience’s response “adherence”. In 
this way they bring to the fore the reasoning used by the audience when evaluating the 
discourse, whether spoken or written. 
Edwin brings out another possible aspect of rhetoric in connection with the 
persuasion or adherence of an audience when he states that that the speaker is 
“compelled to use discourse that can overcome an active opposition and, 
simultaneously, contribute to the attractiveness and credibility of the rhetor’s ideas” 
(150). Viewing rhetoric in this way highlights the possibility for conflict, which was 
part of the game of ancient rhetoric and dialectic.
35
 The agon of presenting a winning 
argument can also be seen in modern-day presidential debates.  
                                                 
35 See Smith, 1997. 
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Whereas contemporary scholars of rhetoric view persuasion as the primary aim 
of this discipline, Aristotle himself held somewhat different views, or, in any case, saw 
the “art” of rhetoric as an analytical capacity. For, as we have seen, he argues that to 
persuade is not rhetoric’s function, rather seeing the possible means of persuasion in 
each particular case (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 36). Thus, in Aristotle’s statement on 
rhetoric’s function, the ability to see the available means of persuasion is an analytical 
activity, which, however ingenious this ability is in its conception, may not produce the 
desired results because of the audience, which he compares with a person that is 
terminally ill. The simile of treating an individual suffering from an incurable disease 
can be tied with Aristotle’s (and Plato’s) negative view of the audience. The term 
Aristotle uses for the audience in Greek is mochtheria, which has, according to certain 
authors, connotations of “depravity” (Walker – Pathos, 75), “bad moral character” 
(Engberg-Pedersen, 133), or of persons that are “at least less than thoroughly good” 
(119). Walker, however, discusses the etymology of this term which offers other 
possible interpretations:  
Mochtheriak derives from mochtheo, which means to be weary with toil, to labor, 
to undergo hardships or execute painful tasks. Aristotle has in mind, it seems, the 
blunted, lowbrow sensibilities of hoi polloi, “the many,” the crowds of working-
class citizens who fill the theatres and assembly places of Greek cities for poetic 
and oratorical performances (283). 
 
Whatever inferences can be made for Aristotle’s looking down on or perhaps 
condescending to the hoi polloi, a parallel he draws metaphorically between 
medicine/incurable patient and rhetoric/moctheria indicates that he at times thought that 
no matter how well an argument is constructed, due to the audience’s negative 
attributes, the capacity to think and persuade rhetorically used to create that same 
argument may very well be a good that is wasted. This means that, at least on two 
levels, it is possible to fail to persuade. Firstly, the opposite argument may be more 
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convincing. Secondly, the argument may be lost on an audience that is incapable or 
hostile to what is being presented logically. In both cases, opinion enters in. The first 
situation is obvious: the second opinion is simply argued more convincingly. In the 
second situation, the audience is embedded within its own rhetorical, hence, opinion-
laden framework, and either prefers to remain therein or is incapable of perceiving a 
differing viewpoint. 
The major point of the above discussion has been that rhetoric deals with 
opinion, and that if there is an issue which is disputable, from a rhetorical standpoint it 
can be argued both ways, that is, in utramque partem. This does not, however, mean 
that, as stated above, rhetoric is to be used for debased or evil ends, that is, to make a lie 
sound like the truth, even though this is possible. We have seen above that Aristotle 
views rhetoric and dialectic as tools for discovering the truth of an argument. Further, in 
the Rhetoric he states that the power to persuade will do enormous damage if 
improperly used, just like other goods that are capable of misuse: 
And if it is argued that great harm can be done by unjustly using such power of 
words, this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to 
the most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strength; for by 
using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm 
(Kennedy – Rhetoric, 36).  
 
The conclusion to be drawn here is obvious: a virtuous person would not use rhetoric 
for evil intentions. This does not mean, however, that Aristotle was innocently unaware 
of its potential for damage. Nor were the Roman rhetoricians, who gave pride of place 
to arguing in utramque partem, for they defined rhetoric as sapientia combined with 
eloquentia, that is, wisdom with eloquence. As Skinner writes, in reference to the 
Roman rhetoricians, “The man of eloquence, they declared, is not merely the model of a 
good citizen; he is nothing less than the embodiment of humanity in its highest form” 
(106).  
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 Precisely what the highest form of humanity or its particular characteristics are 
was a matter of dispute in antiquity.  As we have seen, no unanimity existed on the 
concrete expression of abstract terms and concepts. Aristotle writes in the Politics that 
there are three goods, and that everyone agrees that the “happy man must have all three” 
(Barnes – Complete, 2100). These goods Aristotle divides into three separate categories: 
“external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul” (2100). As we have seen in 
this discussion on opinion however, it should come as no surprise that, in the case of the 
pre-notion “the good life” and stances taken with respect to it, Aristotle asserts, “These 
propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men 
differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good” (2100).  
And so while Aristotle views rhetoric as a tool for discovering the truth on 
matters, the possibility for disagreement and dispute in this search is always present. 
Burnyeat sums up the intricacies of rhetoric advocating its use, while, at the same time 
recognizing the potential for conflict: “[T]he clash of opposing arguments . . . is a 
positive expression of human reasonableness in a world where issues are complex and 
deciding them is difficult, because there really is something to be said on either side. As 
such, Aristotle’s doctrine is one of his greatest and most original achievements” (91). 
The complexity of human interact difficulties inherent in any decision or judgment are 
brought out concisely by Burnyeat in the passage above, and his assertion that both 
sides of an issue will be characterized by sound arguments underscores the 
responsibility that we as critical thinkers have when engaging in our search for the best, 
the most accurate, or truest evaluation possible. This sense of responsibility, although a 
burden, can also serve as a source of motivation to make decisions based upon 
principles which have also been determined through critical thinking to be best. If, of 
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course, we accept Aristotle’s view that it is possible to use rhetoric as a tool to discover 
truth or apparent truth for virtuous ends and undesirable to do otherwise. 
Now that I have discussed aspects related to rhetoric’s field of operations (i.e., 
opinion), I shall in the following section provide a brief review of some of the recent 
work in the literature in order to show some of the directions scholars have been taking 
in their work related to this age-old discipline.  
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1.3 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Before discussing the work of scholars in English Studies and Literature, a brief review 
of the literature from other fields will illustrate the position taken by many academics 
that there has been a cross-disciplinary renaissance of rhetoric underway in recent work. 
At the same time, the broad scope of rhetoric’s application will become evident. 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric often stands as the fountainhead text among contemporary 
scholars for the renewed academic interest and activity; however, much of the work 
being done in various disciplines also focuses on other seminal works of rhetoric written 
over its long history (i.e., from antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment and the 20
th
 century). The material is so vast that a representative but by 
no means exhaustive selection is presented below. 
In philosophy, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty’s aim is to “reclaim the Rhetoric as a 
philosophic work” (ix). In this regard, she enters into the more-than-two-millennium-
old turf war begun in Plato’s Gorgias between the two disciplines (i.e., philosophy vs. 
rhetoric).
36
 Troels Engberg-Pedersen works along the same lines in his attempt to 
answer the question whether Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a mere Redetechnologie, or is, 
instead, a Wahrheitsfindung worthy of philosophical inquiry (122). In the field of 
history, P. Chiron compares Aristotle’s Rhetoric with Anaximines’ Rhetoric to 
Alexander, the former focusing on “dialectic, ethics and politics,” the latter on “very 
practical ambitions” (122). A number of scholars have recently made efforts to re-write 
rhetoric’s history, at times revising the anti-sophist stance initiated in Plato’s dialogues 
to put the sophists in a better light, at times taking the same anti-sophist position.
37
 
Focusing on the literary history of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Lawrence Green explores the 
                                                 
36 See Reinhardt 2006 for a discussion on the struggle between philosophy and rhetoric. 
37 See Kennedy (1963), Cole, and Schiappa (1999). 
71 
 
influence of Aristotelian lexis (style) on Renaissance writers.
38
 Theorists in educational 
history have also shown the importance of rhetoric in educational curricula whether due 
to influence from Aristotle or from Isocrates, whose “influential form of intellectual 
inquiry and education . . . continues into present times” (Papillon, 71).39 Bringing into 
focus ancient practices in education and their relation to socio-economics, Vanderspool 
demonstrates that “a rhetorical education became virtually a minimum requirement for 
full élite status” in Hellenistic times (129).40 In ethics, Hanna M. Roisman analyzes 
what she terms “right rhetoric” in Homer, comparing speeches made by Odysseus, 
Thersites and Agamemnon in the Iliad. Here it bears mentioning that Homer was in 
later antiquity deemed as source for material related to rhetorical theory and practice.
41
 
In political science, Andrew Erskine argues that rhetoric is tightly linked with the 
democracy of the polis. The rise of democracy linked with rhetoric stands as a major 
theme in the literature.
42
 But it is not just the democracy of the polis or contemporary 
political arenas that provide an arena for rhetorical activity: Ken Dowden shows its 
importance in religion, as rhetorical mechanisms can be shown to be present in texts 
that supplicate the gods in prayer. Rhetoric, therefore, and contrary to Perelman’s and 
other scholars’ assertions in this regard, appears to be quite alive in non-democratic 
frameworks as well. Both the gods and despots are capable of being persuaded, and 
there are formulae for doing so. In the field of discourse analysis Robert Gaines 
examines how contemporary thinkers working in the theory, criticism and pedagogy of 
the practical arts of discourse have made use of the Rhetoric. Eugene Garver, working 
                                                 
38 See Green, Lawrence D. 2000. 
39 See also Morgan. 
40 See also Connolly: 2009. 
41 Kennedy writes: “Techniques of rhetorical theory are already evident in the speeches of the Homeric 
poems to such a degree that later antiquity found formal rhetoric everywhere in Homer and on the 
basis of Iliad, 15.283 f., even conjured up a picture of practice declamations among the Homeric 
heroes” (Rhetoric, 35-36). 
42 Erskine writes: “Rhetoric, the art of public speaking, developed out of the polis, or more precisely, 
the democratic polis” (Polis, 272). 
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from an ethical-psychological perspective, argues that there is no easy way “back to 
Aristotle” through the latter’s practical reasoning, in spite of attempts to do so in ethics - 
there is simply too much time between us and the Greeks, and things were so different 
then (57). Alan G. Gross, a semantics scholar, tries to answer the question, “What did 
Aristotle mean by rhetoric?” His study is an attempt to determine what type of 
Aristotelian art rhetoric is. We can compare Gross’s position with that of Michael 
Leff’s. Whereas Leff writes that “scholars have argued respectively that rhetoric is a 
productive art, a theoretical art, a practical art, or some combination (318-323),” Gross 
takes a hardline position, arguing that rhetoric is “a productive art, and only a 
productive art” (24). A. López Eire, takes a deconstructionist look at several figures 
from antiquity such as Gorgias, Democritus, and Protagoras. 
Major work in rhetoric has been conducted in the pragma-dialectics school.
43
 
With the ultimate goal of conflict resolution, this approach is tightly linked with 
informal logic in terms of its highly-structured framework of rule-governed phases.
44
 In 
the field of legal history, Craig Cooper challenges Aristotle’s assertion that deliberative 
oratory holds pride of place over forensic (204). On the “revival” in rhetoric in general, 
Takis Poulakos takes a significantly different stance from scholars who study classical 
rhetoric to “appropriate it for contemporary concerns”; he insists that, instead, there is a 
“responsibility to explore classical rhetoric in itself” (18). Poulakos’ position stands in 
direct contradiction to that of Plett, who argues, as mentioned above, that classical 
rhetoric is constantly being defined and applied by successive generations. 
Work using rhetoric as a dialogic approach has been done in sociology. George 
Myerson, in Rhetoric, Reason and Society: Rationality as Dialogue, creates a platform 
for “new dialogues” using his interpretations of major contemporary thinkers (i.e. 
                                                 
43 See Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002. 
44 For an introduction to informal logic, see Walton 1989. 
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Habermas, Putnam) as well as other viewpoints (i.e. communication based on dialogic 
rationalism, feminist philosophy, political theory, and so on) (4). Myerson’s aim is to 
promote rationalism as manifested in dialogue in order to regain “confidence in the 
power of ideas, particularly the power of ideas to change societies” (18). His work 
promotes theory as a means for change (19). 
Another sociologist working in relation with rhetoric is Richard Harvey Brown, 
in Society as Text: Essays on Rhetoric, Reason, and Reality. His work is of interest 
because he is similar to Eagleton, who, according to David Kirby, is well-known as a 
“[s]till an unreconstructed champion of the lower classes.”45 Brown wants to help the 
lower classes and is interested in finding a connection between theory and practice 
(279). Like Eagleton, he finds an answer in rhetorical theory and criticism: 
How might social theory be linked with political praxis in a humanizing, 
nontechnicist way? How may we join knowledge of society with public moral 
action? My belief is that for this to occur we must restore judgment to its former 
privileged status in intellectual and public life. One resource for this project is the 
critical theory of rhetoric, since rhetoric on the one hand shows that all knowledge 
is achieved through the persuasive use of language, and on the other hand 
provides canons of reasoned judgment in political discourse (1). 
 
Brown’s desire to find a way to link sociological theory with political practice that is 
“nontechnicist” has an echo in other scholars’ attempt to bring literary studies down to 
earth. For instance, Andrew Ford (discussed below) states that recent work in criticism 
indicates that certain scholars are abandoning the “absorbing complications of literary 
theory” (ix). 
In the excerpt above, Brown’s reference to judgment is crucial, as it is an aspect 
of rhetoric that plays a major role. Brown’s work is also of interest here because the 
final goal of this paper is to use classical rhetoric as a critical approach to analyze a 
travel narrative. Thus, one of the questions to be addressed is Brown’s assertion below: 
                                                 
45 See Kirby, David. 
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Contemporary society is eviscerated of narrative form. The notion of moral 
agency in protagonists, or of meaningful plots in social events, has become harder 
to find in fiction, social science, and life. This is because factual or fictional 
narratives presuppose a social order of meaning in which public action by moral 
agents is possible, and in which lived connections between personal character and 
public conduct prevail. Because such a presupposition is no longer valid in 
advanced industrial societies, the narrative social text has become an extinct or 
endangered species. Despite this, however, narrative remains vitally needed in 
contemporary civic discourse (3). 
 
In Part 4, I contradict Brown’s assertion that contemporary society has no narrative 
form and that there is a hard-to-detect notion of moral agency in its protagonists. Once I 
have articulated the definition of rhetoric to be used for analysis in Part 2, the analysis I 
carry out demonstrates that, contrary to Brown’s view and in accordance with scholars 
such as Paul Ricoeur, narrative by definition provides examples of action carried out by 
moral agents. However, just what societal values are being represented and the function 
their narratives serve in relation to the latter must be closely examined, in order to 
reveal the values held by both narrator and audience/readership. 
 Some scholars have explored rhetoric as a form of power embodied in discourse. 
For instance, in his discussion on the influence that Isocrates has on Cicero Michael 
Leff states that Cicero conceives of “rhetoric as an unbounded art of eloquence and 
pragmatic discourse . . . [spanning] all fields of human inquiry . . . and functioning as a 
culture-shaping art that both constructs and preserves the possibilities of civil 
community” (79).46 
Not only is rhetoric attributed with power to build and change society due to its 
persuasiveness, but it is viewed by contemporary scholars has having a link with 
epistemology. For, according to Ross, rhetoric plays a role in the apprehension of reality 
                                                 
46 One of the foci of scholars is the effects of rhetoric. For instance, Walker informs us that as far back 
as Plato’s Phaedrus the term psychagogia is used to name its power for persuasiveness, and that the 
sophist Gorgias referred to poetry and rhythmic prose as “witchcraft” or as having a “druglike power” 
(Poetics, 72). If we turn to Cicero, we find that in De Inventione he attributes the foundation of cities to 
the persuasive power of reasoned eloquence, i.e. eloquentia united with sapientia, which also works to 
fight evil for the common good (65). 
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(22). Other scholars, such as Clifford Geertz, Renato Rosaldo, Richard Rorty, Stanley 
Fish and Judith Butler, coincide with Ross when they argue that “epistemology is a 
matter of rhetoric”, and that human knowledge is “rhetorically constructed.”47 
We use rhetoric, therefore, to grapple with the reality of our material existence. 
As a major part of the reality that we face as humans lies in the realm of the contingent 
and probable, hard facts and absolute truth must give way to opinion, upon which the 
premises of rhetoric are predominantly based. In this way, rhetoric provides the means 
to “work with the messy inconsistencies of popular opinion, not to mention with the 
special contingencies, including the emotions, of the moment” (Vanderspoel, 152). 
Rhetoric, by means of “reasoned argument and emotional arousal . . . closely identifies 
language’s power to order language with language’s power to order the world” (152). In 
this respect, rhetoric also functions as the means by which humans take the chaos of the 
sublunary realm and make sense out of it, as mentioned earlier. 
Connected with the idea that rhetoric operates epistemologically, Schiappa 
asserts that it constructs social reality, which is necessarily tied to ideology: 
Most, though not all, argumentation/rhetorical critics are guided by the belief that 
our communicative interactions are epistemic and inform most of what we come 
to know about the world. As a result, rhetoric/argument is important because it is 
both the how and what of socially-constructed reality. Rhetorical/argumentation 
analysis is thus also ideological analysis, since all understandings of the world 
serve particular interests (Beginnings, 67). 
  
Schiappa asserts in the passage above that it is through rhetorically governed discourse 
that we obtain most of our knowledge. He then states that the importance of rhetoric is 
tied to its function in terms of how reality is created and what that reality is. What 
Schiappa does not say directly but perhaps intends to suggest when he states that 
rhetorical analysis is also ideological is the fact that rhetoric also functions with the why 
                                                 
47 See Olson 2003. 
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of epistemologically-based knowledge whose construction, as he states, is determined 
by particular interests. 
Schiappa and Hamm in their definition of rhetoric assert that it can be used in 
five categories:  
1) rhetoric as an instance of speech-making (or oratory); 
2) rhetoric as persuasive technique; 
3) rhetoric as a tactical function of language use (rhetoricity); 
4) rhetoric as an educational agenda or program that inculcates the art or skill of the 
rhetor; and 
5) rhetoric as a theory about human communication (5). 
Item 2 is of interest in connection with the approach to be used for the analysis of the 
travel narrative under study, for the narrator persuades the reader to view the events of 
the story and the narrator as human agent in a particular way. This ties in with point 3 
above, rhetoric as a tactical function, for to persuade is strategic. The other items on the 
list above identify rhetoric’s link with other major disciplines: public speaking, 
education and communication.  In this way, the idea brought out earlier that rhetoric 
takes part in all disciplines and all forms of persuasive communication is reinforced. 
 Dugan writes that rhetoric has taken on new dimensions among literary theorists, 
giving it a definition that departs from the classical idea of rhetoric being limited to 
public speaking and instead affirms that “rhetoric is a basic component of all language” 
(13). He links this comment to the explosion of literary theory that has taken place and 
refers the reader to Eagleton’s introduction to literary theory, which he calls a “reliable 
and readable account” (13). Equating rhetoric with linguistics, Dugan states that 
“insights into the nature of language proved a major impetus for literary study” (13).He 
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then makes an assertion that coincides with the idea that epistemology is the terrain of 
rhetoric:  
This ‘linguistic turn’ (to borrow a phrase from the philosopher Richard Rorty) in 
the humanities and social sciences emphasized the notion that there is no way to 
get beyond language: the world as we know it comes to us as a linguistic 
phenomenon (13). 
  
I also bring up Dugan’s discussion because there is a tendency among literary theorists 
to conflate “rhetoric” with “linguistics” when defining the former term. 
Now that we have discussed scholars from various fields working in rhetoric, we 
can turn to those who have used or advocated a return to rhetoric as a form of literary 
criticism and analysis in recent literature. I have already mentioned Terry Eagleton, but 
he has not been the only critic in the history of literary criticism from the 20
th
 century to 
have made an attempt to bring rhetoric back to life as a critical approach. In 1936, I.A. 
Richards, another major scholar who appears in both Eagleton’s and Barry’s primers as 
an important figure in the history of English literary criticism, published a series of 
lectures on rhetoric he delivered at Bryn Mawr.
48
 In the introduction to The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric, Richards states that he is making an attempt to “revive an old subject” (3).  
His aim in this work was to give life to “the dreariest and least profitable part of the 
waste that the unfortunate travel through in Freshman English!” (3). Richards’ 
distinguishes between the “old Rhetoric,” which he calls “an offspring of dispute” and 
which “developed as the rationale of pleadings and persuadings” and other uses to 
which rhetoric can be put (24). Richards’ object is to show that “[p]ersuasion is only 
one among the aims of discourse,” (24) and that more important is the endeavor to 
embark on “a persistent, systematic, detailed inquiry into how words work that will take 
the place of the discredited subject which goes by the name of Rhetoric” (23). Richards’ 
lectures detail a redefining of rhetoric in terms of semantics. We can see this when he 
                                                 
48 NB: Neither Eagleton nor Barry mention Richard’s work in rhetoric. 
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states that what is needed is “a revived Rhetoric, or study of verbal understanding and 
misunderstanding, [which] must undertake its own inquiry into the modes of meaning” 
(24). He thus steers away from rhetoric as a tool for reasoning and argumentation, while 
insisting that “this inquiry must be philosophic” (23). “Rhetoric,” declares Richards, 
“should be a study of misunderstandings and its remedies” (3). In these lectures, 
Richards discusses “shifts” in meaning that occur in language, thereby bringing into 
focus the “fluidity of meaning.” With respect to the meaning that is unstable, Richards 
asserts that we must manage “not to resist these shifts but to learn to follow them” 
(Lyons, 73).  The Cambridge Professor of English then makes the following claim: 
“And with such a clarification, such a translation of our skills into comprehension, a 
new era of human understanding and co-operation would be at hand” (73). 
  The suspicion that arises immediately is that this sort of visionary zealotry has 
to do with what Eagleton calls “the peculiar history of English” (Introduction, 199). 
That is, as both Eagleton and Barry assert, English literature was used as an educational 
and political tool to serve as a substitute for religion, which was on the wane as English 
studies were on the rise.
49
 In any case, the time was not ripe for Richards’ version of 
rhetoric, whose ardent delivery in the United States received a cool reception, at least if 
we consider a 1939 review of Richards’ book whose tone is caustic in its irony: 
“Unfortunately we are not enlightened as to the pattern of shifts by which desirable 
ambiguity becomes systematic clarity. The new era of understanding must wait” 
(Lyons, 214).  
 Curiously, Richards’ work on rhetoric could seem, based on the same review 
above, to be a precursor of poststructuralist/deconstructionist theories of language: “In 
his endeavor to emphasize the fluidity of meaning, Richards, if he is correct, makes one 
                                                 
49 On literature as substitute for religion, see Eagleton and Barry. 
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cease to wonder at loss in communication; one  doubts its  possibility at all” (214). The 
ironically cool reception might, however, have had less to do with the timing of 
Richards’ philosophical approach to meaning in language than with his possibly low 
appeal in terms of rhetorical ethos (see Part 2 below) as compared to the high ethos 
appeal of French theorists like Derrida. I.A. Richards perhaps lacked what the French 
have always been famous for and, as a result, was less persuasive: sex appeal. 
Another scholar of literature, writing in 1947, uses yet another definition of 
rhetoric and articulates yet another approach. Rosemond Tuve, in Elizabethan and 
Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth-Century Critics, discusses 
the “logical” base for rhetorical images in Renaissance poetry. Her background and 
training in rhetoric is solidly classical. She states that it is not enough to study the 
significance of an image, but that its underlying logic must also come into critical play: 
“It is obvious from the reading of any sixteenth- or seventeenth-century poem using 
figures of even a minor degree of complication that to discuss the significancy of 
images and stop short of their possible logical functions in a poem is an impossibility” 
(251). Tuve’s approach is significant due to its focus on the logical structures of images. 
Tuve argues that applying her methods wholesale does not always work for the poetic 
images of the present. In her lights, contemporary notions of poetic images are radically 
different from their notions in the Renaissance, which were, in essence, based on 
classical notions of rhetoric. 
With respect to the applicability of classical rhetoric, some scholars question 
whether doing so is anachronistic when working with contemporary texts or for texts 
that precede the codification of rhetoric in 4
th
 century Athens. For instance, Cole takes 
an extreme position with respect to its use in the present: “The study of “rhetorical” 
techniques and strategies as now conducted is far more likely to involve an adaptation 
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of ancient terminology to the expressionist notion of the uniquely adequate 
verbalization of a unique idea” (21). What Cole is asserting here is that the ancient 
terminology has very little or no place when it comes to analyzing contemporary 
literature and poetry. Conversely, William H. Race, with respect to applying classical 
rhetoric on texts of the past, provides a rationale for using it to analyze lyric poetry 
written prior to rhetoric’s being established as a “discipline” in the 4th century B.C.E. 
While admitting that dangers of anachronism loom, he nevertheless makes an appeal to 
authority of authors such as Schmid, who in 1616 “read [Pindar’s] odes through the 
lense of forensic and deliberative rhetoric” (511). Race also appeals to the work carried 
out by Bundy and Walker. Both of these scholars apply concepts of 4
th
 century rhetoric 
to archaic poetry pre-dating Plato and Aristotle (518).  
Although Cole asserts that classical rhetoric cannot at present be properly 
applied to poetry or literature, he does allow for its use in other fields: “[v]irtually the 
only areas where rhetoric is still vigorously practiced are those of propaganda and 
advertising” (108). His stance can be brought into question. One look at the course 
outline – for example – of any U.S. college-level composition and writing course picked 
at random will prove Cole’s statement wrong: that is, although different terminology is 
used, the practice in these courses find their source in classical rhetoric. In any case, 
Cole’s stance figures as one of many competing and often conflicting opinions in recent 
literature as to what rhetoric is and how it is to be defined and applied.
50
 My stance is 
first that classical rhetoric still holds value as a way of looking at literature, and second, 
that it is not, in my view, an anachronism to use it (in the way I define it) as a form of 
criticism and analysis on texts produced before, at the same time as, or subsequent to 
the Gorgias and the Rhetoric. 
                                                 
50 See Enos, Richard Leo and Lois Peters Agnew, who state that the contemporary “re-examination” of 
rhetoric “has led to rival interpretations that have fueled considerable controversy” (xi). 
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R.S. Crane is identified by Booth as a rhetorical critic.
51
 Cranes’ approach in 
The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry falls in line with classical 
rhetorical practice. His discussion of definitions has parallels with Epitectus’ 
prenotions. In Crane’s view, we must be precise about what Critic X means when using 
the word “drama” as opposed to what Critic Y means when using the same word. The 
confusion that results from the various critical voices or languages is that each critic is 
defining the essential words of literary criticism in a personal way. If we attend to the 
meaning of each critic’s usage, the confusion will vanish, and we will have instead, a 
variety of perspectives – valuable perspectives, all of which are equally valid and which 
add to the experience of literature:  
The true state of affairs, however, often reveals itself whenever, on being 
confronted with an extreme clash of doctrines between two obviously serious and 
intelligent critics employing the same vocabulary, we undertake to pry into the 
hidden structures of definitions and assumptions which their respective arguments 
presuppose (14). 
 
The above passage is Socrates and Epitectus revisited in the sense that both of these 
ancient thinkers would argue that defining one’s terms is crucial to understanding as 
well as a source of conflict. The focus of Crane’s work is meaning, and so is similar to 
I.A. Richards’ approach, except that Crane does not speak of meanings that shift. 
Defining terms is, in essence, a practice of dialectic. Since Aristotle equates the two as 
sister arts, the definition of terms can be viewed as rhetorical practice. 
In the 60s and 70s, Wayne Booth’s Rhetoric of Fiction gained considerable 
renown. His approach defines the various “artificial devices” used in narrative (3). 
Booth’s work, however, appears at first glance to be more closely related to narrative 
technique than classical rhetoric. We can see this in the beginning lines of his book:  
One of the most obviously artificial devices of the storyteller is the trick of going 
beneath the surface of the action to obtain a reliable view of a character’s mind 
and heart. Whatever our ideas may be about the natural way to tell a story, artifice 
                                                 
51 See Booth (93: footnote 8). 
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is unmistakably present whenever the author tells us what no one in so-called real 
life could possibly know (3). 
 
Terms like “going beneath the surface of the action” and “the natural way to tell a story” 
are indicators that Booth is equating rhetoric with narrative devices.
52
 One searches in 
vain throughout A Rhetoric of Fiction for a definition of precisely what he means by 
rhetoric, and the only answer that repeatedly surfaces is “artificial device” and “trick.” 
At one point, in fact, Booth reveals that his definition is new, and perhaps not based on 
classical definitions of rhetoric. In the footnote immediately following a discussion 
contrasting showing as opposed to telling we read, “This is not to say that what I am 
calling rhetoric has been entirely ignored” (90 – italics mine). To give a word a 
personal definition is fair game in academic practice as well as in the practice of 
rhetoric throughout history. As opinion is the rule in rhetoric and since so many 
different definitions of rhetoric have surfaced throughout the history of the word, 
Booth’s assigning a personal definition is justifiable. Interestingly, the description of 
Wayne Booth’s approach in Wikipedia53 sounds like classical rhetoric in that the proof 
logos, or argument, is described as being a primary component: “In this book, Booth 
argues that all narrative is a form of rhetoric, that is, an argument on the part of author 
in defense of his or her “various commitments, secret or overt [that] determine our 
response to the work.”54 Perhaps Booth was taking fundamental rhetorical concepts for 
granted in his work, and for this reason chose not to provide definitions and 
explanations in his seminal text. 
As already stated, Terry Eagleton advocates rhetoric as a form of criticism that 
ought to be taken up again in Literary Theory: An Introduction. He highlights rhetoric’s 
                                                 
52 Rodden makes the following important observation on Booth’s treatment of rhetoric: “The Rhetoric 
of Fiction principally discusses the use of fictional devices, with rhetoric conceived not primarily as 
argumentation but as technique or style” (155). 
53 I am aware that Wikipedia is not, by academic standards, the most reputable of sources.  
54 “Wayne C. Booth.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayne_Booth#cite_note-0. 
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long and important, albeit abandoned, history. He writes that rhetoric “was the received 
form of critical analysis all the way from ancient society to the eighteenth century” 
(205). He makes his call for a return to rhetoric because he sees both the plethora of 
approaches he has discussed in his primer and the literary scholars practicing them as 
lacking unity and coherence (199). 
In the light of this situation, he asks whether the fact that there are numerous 
ways to tackle literature critically is not, actually, something to be happy about, and if 
our stance ought not to be to embrace them all, meanwhile rejoicing in the liberty of not 
being under the thumb of just one critical method (198). He then, however, pulls the rug 
out from under the theoretical utopia he has just outlined. This is because, as he states, 
“not all of these methods are mutually compatible” (198). To illustrate this 
incompatibility, he provides a graphic, if somewhat sardonic, portrayal of literary 
scholars:  
Literary criticism is rather like a laboratory in which some of the staff are seated 
in white coats at control panels, while others are throwing sticks in the air or 
spinning coins. Genteel amateurs jostle with hard-nosed professionals, and after a 
century or so of ‘English’ they have still not decided to which camp the subject 
really belongs (199). 
 
The point Eagleton makes here is that the various methods and theoretical frameworks 
providing the bases for literary analysis have egregious differences, a situation which 
results in discord. Eagleton informs us that the reasons for the incompatibility are 
ideological (199). Further, he explains in a famous statement that there is no resolving 
the discord because “departments of literature in higher education . . . are part of the 
ideological apparatus of the modern capitalist state” (199-200).  
As a possible solution for criticism’s inability to define precisely what literature 
is or to decide which critical lens to view it through, Eagleton proposes rhetoric. In what 
he calls at once a radical as well as a traditionalist position (206), Eagleton describes 
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rhetoric as a single, critical approach that might bring scholars together – regardless of 
their critical leanings (i.e. structuralist, deconstructionist, and so on) – and that could 
make it possible to critically analyze the entirety of discourses generated by what he 
deems a very illusive object of study: literature. Eagleton contrasts the aims of the 
various critical approaches – aims which, in his opinion, have little to do with what the 
true aims of literary criticism should be – with that of rhetoric’s:  
It saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, to be aesthetically 
contemplated or endlessly deconstructed, but as forms of activity inseparable from 
the wider social relations between writers and readers, orators and audiences, and 
as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they 
are embedded” (206 – author’s italics). 
 
Eagleton here argues that, rather than removing the activities of speaking and writing 
from the social schema they are embedded in, ancient rhetoric defines discourse as 
being fully integral to the social matrix within which it is set. Also, instead of 
objectifying discourse through mere empty theorizing disconnected from the real world, 
rhetoric would instead be a means to analyze and participate in “genuine moral 
argument, which sees the relations between individual qualities and values and our 
whole material conditions of existence” (208 – author’s italics). The aim of using 
rhetoric as a form of critical inquiry, according to Eagleton, would be to study “the 
effects which discourses produce, and how they produce them” (205 – author’s italics).  
He states that his wish is “to recall literary criticism from certain, fashionable, new-
fangled ways of thinking it has been seduced by – ‘literature’ as a specially privileged 
object, the ‘aesthetic’ as separable from social determinants, and so on – and return it to 
the ancient paths which it has abandoned” (206). Rhetoric will enable literary critics to 
push the question of whether literature exists to one side and enter into the task of 
critiquing the entirety of human discourse. 
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A safe assumption would be to read Eagleton’s goal as a desire to define literary 
criticism as an activity that is directly connected with human political and social 
concerns; that is, an activity whose goal is to make possible a fairer distribution of 
wealth and power.
55
 He writes,  
Since all art is rhetorical, the tasks of the revolutionary cultural worker are 
essentially threefold. First, to participate in the production of works and events 
which, within transformed ‘cultural’ media, so fictionalize the ‘real’ as to intend 
those effects conducive to the victory of socialism. Second, as ‘critic’, to expose 
the rhetorical structures by which non-socialist works produce politically 
undesirable effects, as a way of combating what it is now unfashionable to call 
false consciousness. Third, to interpret such works where possible ‘against the 
grain’, so as to appropriate them from whatever may be valuable for socialism. 
The practice of the socialist cultural worker, in brief, is projective, polemical and 
appropriative (Walter, 113). 
 
Eagleton’s tripartite plan includes 1) production of new works of art that will further the 
socialist revolution, 2) analysis of works whose effects deter the revolution in order to 
expose them, and 3) interpretation and analysis of the same works with a view to 
making them useful for the revolution. The final aim of rhetorical criticism in 
Eagleton’s definition is major social and political change.  
It is not just in Literary Theory that Eagleton makes a call for a return to 
rhetoric. In How to Read a Poem (2006), he again advocates a return to the practices of 
ancient oratory, suggesting that we can only move forward politically and socially by 
looking backward through the lens of his reading of rhetoric’s beginnings, where he 
describes logos and politics as being still united with real human action. In How to Read 
a Poem, however, there is a difference. Whereas in Literary Theory Eagleton writes as 
if no academics were using rhetoric as a form of literary criticism, he maintains in How 
to Read a Poem that certain scholars in literature have, in fact, been conducting 
                                                 
55 Eagleton’s “A Short History of Rhetoric” bears this assertion out. His interpretation of the history of 
rhetoric is Marxist, at once looking back to the past when, in his view, there was a tighter link between 
rhetoric and the polis, and between logos and human action. Meanwhile, he advocates for a return to 
rhetoric as a cure for the post-modern disconnect. See Bernard-Donals and Glejzer: pp. 180 – 205. 
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academic work in line with his definition of the classical rhetorical tradition. Making 
reference to the theoretical trends that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, Eagleton writes: 
From feminist criticism to cultural materialism, the devotees of Mikhail Bakhtin 
to the New Historicism, there were other lines of inquiry which sought to keep 
faith with the project of classical rhetoric. Ironically, it is now these so-called 
newfangled theorists who were most in line with tradition. They, too, set out to 
investigate literary works as both patterns of meaning and historical events, places 
where power and signification converged (15).  
 
Following the same argument, Eagleton states, “What is known today as cultural theory 
is a modern version of traditional criticism” (16). By traditional criticism Eagleton here 
means classical rhetoric, as he has defined it. He opposes this group of critics/theorists 
(traditional criticism’s modern version) with another group of scholars, whom he also 
labels traditionalist – although he distinguishes the term by using inverted commas: “It 
is the ‘traditionalist’ opponents of . . . [cultural] theory who are the blow-ins and 
interlopers” (16).  Eagleton here appears to be labelling the ‘traditionalists’ as 
reactionaries that stand in opposition to cultural theorists who he claims are carrying on 
with what he views as the classical tradition of rhetoric. He ends his discussion with a 
crescendo: “The slogan of a radical literary criticism . . .  is clear: Forward to 
antiquity!” (16 – italics mine). His point is clear: classical rhetoric can be used as a form 
of literary criticism or discourse analysis to produce socio-economic change. Doubtless 
due to his stance as Marxist critic, Eagleton’s desire here is to present rhetoric as a form 
of criticism that has direct practical results. 
 Putting aside the fact that Eagleton grouped what he calls the new-fangled 
theorists with those he in 1983 accused of tossing sticks in the air or spinning coins, he 
nonetheless argues forcefully for choosing rhetoric as an alternative critical form for 
analyzing “the field of discursive practices in society as a whole” (205). We might ask, 
however, whether Eagleton has been the voice of one crying in the wilderness, for it is 
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questionable if much attention has been paid to either of his rhetorical calls to arms.
56
 
Barry (1995) gives full consideration to several other critical approaches that Eagleton 
had either not addressed or that had developed during the period following Literary 
Theory’s 1983 publication. For instance, Barry discusses gay and lesbian criticism, 
cultural materialism, new historicism, and so on. However, neither Eagleton’s plea nor 
rhetoric as a critical approach appears in Barry’s primer. In any case, for the moment, a 
full-scale rhetoric-based revolution – political, cultural, or otherwise – has not erupted, 
as in the case of the massive social and political upheavals for which Karl Marx’s 
writings acted as catalyst.  
Another critic, James Kastely, takes a stance similar to Eagleton’s – that is, he 
views using rhetoric as fundamentally a political activity.
57
 In Rethinking the Rhetorical 
Tradition (1997), Kastely argues against certain postmodern scholars’ tendency to view 
ancient rhetoric as attenuated and thus ineffectual with respect to taking action towards 
resolving society’s socio-economic ills. Kastely, a professor of English at the University 
of Houston, takes a new look at early texts such as Plato’s dialogues and the dramas of 
Sophocles and Euripides, with a view to re-connecting the post-modern age with what 
he sees as a tradition of Platonic, refutational rhetoric. Both his aims and his definition 
of rhetoric are political.  
 Andrew Ford, in The Origins of Criticism, also argues for taking a fresh look – 
from the standpoint of a classics scholar – at ancient rhetoric. Reviewing what he calls 
“a series of theoretical revolutions” in recent decades, Ford describes how these same 
“revolutions” supply a stimulus for necessary change:    
                                                 
56 Clifford and Schilb testify to a wave of activity, but I have not been able to find evidence other than 
their article. 
57 Wohl’s discussion on citizenship in ancient Athens provides a backdrop for the political roots both 
Eagleton and Kastely hark back to. She states, “The rhetoric of citizenship not only has a politics but is 
a politics, for the ways in which citizens speak about their relation to the city and to one another not 
only reflect but create those relations. Rhetoric opens channels of thought along which real political 
relations can flow” (166).  
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We have . . . witnessed a great burst of critical activity since the 1960’s, when the 
relatively placid reign of New Criticism broke up and was succeeded by a series 
of theoretical revolutions as structuralist, poststructuralist, psychological, and 
sociological approaches to literature radically reconceived its nature, and in some 
cases rejected its coherence as a subject. These debates became quite sharp at 
times . . . attracting the notice not only of other disciplines within the academy – 
such as law, history, and politics – but also of a wider public questioning the goals 
of a traditional education in literature. One of the benefits of our own critical wars 
has been at least that we have been forced to reconsider what literary criticism can 
and ought to do and what value literary study might have in education (ix). 
 
What is significant in Ford’s commentary is his assertion that scholars of literature, due 
to the “critical wars” that have been taking place, have no choice but to attempt to 
answer the questions that have arisen as a result of these same wars. His position is 
similar to Gunderson’s in that he infers that debate is still possible with respect to what 
literary criticism is and how it is to be put to use.  Ford’s The Origins of Criticism can 
be seen as an invitation to study and provide an answer to charges of literary scholars 
being “hopelessly out of touch with both reality and literature”.58 Further, Ford’s book 
could be viewed as a sort of answer, albeit unintentional, to Eagleton’s request in 1983 
for an approach that more fully connects literary studies with social and/or political 
issues. In fact, the historical approach Ford uses takes its lead from other critical work 
that has taken a different academic direction, that is, work that is entering new areas of 
research in a different way: 
A historical perspective on criticism may be of interest, as is suggested by recent 
work that has turned from the absorbing complications of theory to examine the 
social and institutional history of criticism. Within this perspective, which has so 
far focused on the rise of “modern” criticism since the eighteenth century, the 
period to which this book is dedicated may be of special interest, for it can fairly 
be described as the point when Greek, and hence Western, literary criticism was 
founded” (ix). 
 
As Ford states above, his historical perspective focuses on the social and institutional 
history of criticism. His work is thus an attempt to provide a substantive alternative to 
the complications of theory that may provide value for literary studies by returning to 
                                                 
58 See Kirby, David. 
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the origins of literary criticism. However, although Ford presents his work as an 
alternative, it would perhaps fall in line with what I have suggested in the present 
dissertation. That is, rather than attempt to erase the past and disregard previous 
approaches, it would prove more fruitful to scrutinize the approaches that have been 
utilized in the past for their strengths and weaknesses with a view to benefitting from 
what they have to offer and learning from their inadequacies. Thus, when Ford homes in 
on rhetoric’s terminology and practices as the oldest form of literary criticism, as well 
as on its socio-linguistic functions, his work can be examined with a view to benefitting 
from his scholarship and perspective. Ford’s viewing rhetoric in terms of its socio-
linguistic functions parallels Eagleton’s position that rhetoric viewed written and oral 
communication as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in 
which they are embedded. Ford suggests that there is something to be learned from the 
link between rhetoric and real social practices “from the end of the archaic age in the 
late sixth century to the rise of poetics in the late fourth” (x). Although Ford’s is not a 
“radical” position like Eagleton’s, and although it is a work of history examining 
ancient literary practices, there is a link between Ford’s work and Eagleton’s behest in 
terms of increasing literary criticism’s relevance to real world issues.59 
Stephen Walker’s seminal Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity rewrites the history 
of rhetoric. Walker’s claim is that ancient poetry originally functioned as rhetorical 
discourse. In his argument, Walker challenges the standard history of rhetoric:  
Practical rhetoric is understood as an art of argumentation and persuasion suitable 
for deliberation, debate, discussion, and decision in the civic arena – or what 
Jürgen Habermas might call the “public sphere” – while epideictic, poetic, or 
literary rhetoric is understood as “display” (or “mere display”) of formal 
eloquence serving chiefly to provide aesthetic pleasure or diversion, or to provide 
occasions for elegant consumption and displays of high-class taste or to rehearse, 
reconfirm, and intensify dominant ideologies. From this point of view, a 
conversion of “rhetorical” genres or techniques from practical to epideictic 
                                                 
59 David Kirby writes, “Eagleton now accuses theory of toying with esoterica while ignoring the real 
issues of life dealt with by literature.”  
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purposes is often seen as a step toward decadence, and is typically thought to 
reflect corruption of the civic sphere by autocratic or oppressive political regimes 
(viii).  
 
Rather than mere ornamentation, Walker argues that early poetry functioned rhetorically 
to persuade on issues in politics and ethics. William Race sums up Walker’s argument:  
Indeed, Walker argues in his book that archaic lyric embodies an epideictic 
discourse which is the theoretical and historical forerunner of later rhetoric. By 
employing a definition of enthymeme as argumentation intended to persuade the 
thymos (heart) of the listener, particularly in striking ‘caps’, he argues that Hesiod, 
Theognis, Pindar, Alcaeus, Sappho, and Solon (among others) employ a 
‘rhetorical transaction’ that requires their audiences to make ethical and political 
judgements (518). 
 
The importance of Walker’s study for this paper lies in its view of ancient poetry as a 
form of persuasive discourse that links it to politics and moral agency, as opposed to 
empty ornamentation on the one hand or, on the other, the expression of an individual’s 
subjective state. Walker’s argument is that ancient poetic texts argue with a view to 
persuade. He focuses on the enthymemes that are embedded in poetic texts, which he 
brings to the surface in order to analyze the underlying logic whose aim is to persuade. I 
borrow from Walker’s analysis in that I believe that both of the texts that I examine can 
be examined with a view to making underlying syllogisms explicit in order to show how 
persuasion is at work, as well as how persuasion is intertwined with and dependent upon 
the system of values that infuses the logic upon which the writers build their arguments. 
Other scholars such as Enos and Lauer also see a tie between ethics and rhetoric, 
for they call it “an evolving interplay of images, ideas, values, and beliefs, whose power 
is channeled through art into what Neel calls ‘strong discourse,’ which argues for 
desirable courses of action with consequences for society” (210-211). In this definition, 
the content of rhetorical discourse is presented as a complex, which is a source of power 
that leads to action that has impact on the community. Enos and Lauer’s linking rhetoric 
with action can be tied with comments Eagleton makes:  
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Rhetoric in its major phase was neither a ‘humanism’, concerned in some intuitive 
way with people’s experience of language, nor a ‘formalism’, preoccupied simply 
with analyzing linguistic devices. It looked at such devices in terms of concrete 
performance – they were means of pleading, persuading, inciting and so on – and 
at people’s responses to discourse in terms of linguistic structures and the material 
situations in which they functioned (206). 
  
In the passage above, we can see that Eagleton makes a direct link between rhetorical 
linguistic structures and concrete action, as do Enos and Lauer. In this way all of these 
scholars support the idea of rhetoric’s  being linked with ethics, for action is dependent 
on choice by a human agent.  
The other aspect of rhetoric Eagleton brings out in the excerpt above in relation 
with concrete performance is the materiality of the situations in which the linguistic 
structures are at work. This idea can be linked with Michael Leff’s reading of Epitectus, 
who he interprets as having divided dialectic’s and rhetoric’s functions respectively into 
thesis and hypothesis. The hypothesis, or “case,” is necessarily concrete, and entails per 
force reactions from the human agents who act as judges on various levels. These 
hypotheses, or what Walker calls “practical, real-world situations” find their source in a 
thesis (2000b: 60)
60
 which is evaluated by the community. Cicero translates thesis and 
hypothesis into Latin as quaestionae and causae, “propositions” and “cases” (60). 
Edward Schiappa asserts that “exemplary case studies or problem solutions” in 
rhetorical studies are more productive than “highly abstract theoretical debate” (2002: 
                                                 
60 Michael Leff discusses Epitectus’ division of dialectic’s territory from that of rhetoric, and presents 
a good example of the difference between the abstract idea – in this case on marriage being good or 
not – and its concrete, particular manifestation: “In his De topicis differentiis, Boethius succinctly 
articulates one of the most persistent distinctions made in separating dialectic from rhetoric: ‘The 
dialectical discipline examines the thesis only; a thesis is a question not involved in circumstances. The 
rhetorical [discipline], on the other hand, discusses the hypothesis, that is, questions hedged in by a 
multitude of circumstances. Circumstances are who, what, where, when, why, how, by what means’ 
(1205C). The dialectical thesis – e.g. should a man marry? – is unencumbered by particulars, and thus 
dialectical arguments focus upon principles of inference per se. On the other hand, the rhetorical 
hypothesis – e.g. should Cato marry? – must deal with the specific persons and actions that enter into 
consideration of a social or political situation, and so rhetorical argument must apply principles to 
actual cases” (53-54). 
Whether Aristotle would agree with the separation is disputable, given his definition of rhetoric and 
dialectic (see above). What is important here is the example that provides an extension to 
Epitectus’ concept of prenotions.  
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67). By using this line of attack, it becomes possible to reveal, in narratives, “habits of 
thought, value hierarchies, forms of knowledge, and cultural conventions,” which 
Warnick asserts must be taken into consideration in rhetorical transactions (108). For, in 
order to argue rhetorically, it is necessary to “know the values, presumptions, 
predispositions, and expectations of the audience” (108) in order to attain what 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call “adherence.” That is, it is necessary, as will be 
explained below, to argue from premisses that the audience accepts in order to persuade 
or convince its members of the arguments put forth in speech or writing. This 
necessarily involves argument that is based on the values, knowledge and thought 
schema held by the audience.  
Another important concept in that Eagleton brings to the fore in the passage 
above is the performative aspect of rhetoric. For in my analysis, I shall view the 
narratives as particular cases, but cases that are necessarily performances. For both of 
the texts under study can be conceived of as written performances due to the fact that 
they are, in the end, stories told by story-tellers. The performative aspect of rhetoric has 
to do with the how of a rhetorical enactment, as opposed to the what or the why. In the 
third book of his treatise, Aristotle deals superficially with rhetoric’s performative 
aspect: delivery. However, it does come into play whenever rhetoric is at work. My aim 
at this point is merely to bring to the fore another aspect that adds to the definition of 
rhetoric that I am presenting. The importance that rhetoric’s performative aspect holds 
will become evident when I analyze Lansing’s travel narrative.  
The narratives to be analyzed in part two of this paper epitomize abstract notions 
and thus provide material for analysis and critique of these same concrete 
manifestations as expressed by the narrators. It will be seen that little has changed since 
the time of Achilles and Agamemnon, with respect to the possible interpretations of 
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how a particular human agent puts what Epitectus calls prenotions into concrete action, 
and, further, how an agent makes a case – by means of rhetorical strategies – which is 
then presented to or performed before the court of the text’s readership.  
 As can be seen from the recent literature on rhetoric, scholars have varied and 
often conflicting opinions on what rhetoric is and how it is to be used. In the next 
section I shall present a definition based on a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that will 
necessarily be a matter of agreement or disagreement, due to its being a matter of 
opinion. 
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PART 2 
RHETORICAL MODES AND PROOFS 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL MODES 
In this section I shall present a model of classical rhetoric based primarily on a reading 
of Aristotle’s treatise and of works by authors who also use this seminal text as a 
cornerstone for rhetorical theory and practice. I shall use this rhetorical model to 
analyze and interpret the text under study in Part 4. The discussion that follows brings 
to the fore a great number of points that reveal the multifaceted nature of rhetoric. I use 
the term multifaceted first because it is a trope derived from gemology and thus has 
connotations of beauty and complexity, and secondly in order to alert the reader to the 
extremely high number of concepts that any attempt to define rhetoric as a term entails. 
The aspects that are brought to the fore in the discussion that follows are too numerous 
to be brought to bear on the final analysis that I carry out in Part 4. Nevertheless, as part 
of my intention is to present a model for rhetorical analysis and criticism which I 
believe will be new information for students of literature, what is presented below will 
hopefully serve as a source of useful background information that will make it possible 
to use this same model for a variety of critical and analytical ends.  
Aristotle tells us that there are three species of rhetoric: “symbouleutikon 
[‘deliberative’], dikanikon [‘judicial’], epideiktikon [‘demonstrative’]” (Kennedy – 
Rhetoric, 48). Each of these species has its respective audience, time frame and 
objective (48). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle bases his division on the aims and listeners in 
each context, for it is the listener which must be persuaded. In in each case, the listener 
is there for a specific objective (Oksenberg, 3). In rhetoric, the aim of the discourse is to 
persuade the listener and, according to Aristotle, in the three genera the listener differs 
and is present in respective frameworks of discourse. Aristotle tells us that the listener is 
either an observer [theoros] or judge [krites], depending on the species. According to 
Aristotle, the listener is a judge in both deliberative and judicial rhetoric, for in these 
98 
 
two species, he is “a judge of either past or future happenings” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 
47-48). In the case of deliberative rhetoric, the listener is a judge of future happenings, 
whereas in the case of judicial rhetoric, the listener is a judge of past happenings. In 
demonstrative or epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle views the listener as an observer who “is 
concerned with the ability (dynamis) [of the speaker]” (48). As will be seen below, this 
concern with the speaker’s ability is also a form of judgment.  
Whereas the time frame for judicial rhetoric is the past and for deliberative 
rhetoric the future, that of epideictic rhetoric is the present (48-49). And so we have in 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetorical thought the basic time frames of human existence in 
the material world: past, present, future. The events that Aristotle refers to in the past of 
judicial rhetoric are to be judged as just or unjust (49), whereas the future events in 
deliberative rhetoric are to be judged in terms of their being advantageous or harmful. If 
the future event is advantageous, the end for the deliberative speaker is to persuade the 
listener to decide in favor of taking action based thereon; if the future event is harmful, 
the deliberative speaker’s aim is to dissuade the listener from taking a particular course 
of action (49). In the case of epideictic rhetoric, the end is to present “the honorable 
[kalon] and the shameful” (49). In each species, the speaker makes reference to 
considerations relative to the qualities that define their aims, with a view to persuading 
the listener of the same.  
The means of achieving the respective ends in each species of rhetoric are also 
identified by Aristotle. In deliberative rhetoric the speaker exhorts and dissuades 
towards the advantageous or away from the harmful; in judicial rhetoric the speaker 
either accuses or defends with respect to past happenings that are to be judged as either 
just or unjust; in epideictic rhetoric the speaker either praises or blames with respect to 
the honorable or disgraceful (49).  
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It is important to keep in mind that Aristotle did not view the above schema as 
hard and fast rules that pertain only to or are to be used only with each species. For 
example, when he speaks of the rhetoric used in democratic assemblies, he states that 
“deliberative speakers often advance other facts . . .” (49). I mention this here as a 
backdrop that must be kept in mind when considering the schema below which presents 
the three species with their respective characteristics and aims: 
Species of rhetoric Where  Time  Means  Aim 
     Symbouleutic discourse Political  Future  Exhort  Beneficial 
        Assemblies   Dissuade  Harmful 
 
     Dikanic discourse Law  Past  Accuse  Just 
   Courts    Defend  Unjust 
 
     Epideictic discourse Non-pragmatic Present  Praise  Honorable 
   ceremonial   Blame  Shameful 
   settings 
Although there is evidence that Aristotle approved of the mixing of strategies from the 
different species of rhetoric, his threefold division has come under fire from various 
thinkers. Walker, for example, states that “this all too tidy classification scheme 
obscures the historically and socially determined specificity of the speech genres 
Aristotle is describing, and tends to make of them a set of timeless paradigms with only 
an approximate correspondence to actual speaking practices” (Poetics, 39). Perelman 
also criticizes Aristotle’s schema. He does not accept the threefold division by Aristotle 
into deliberative, judicial and epideictic species as valid for studying argumentation. 
Nevertheless, he concedes that they indicate the importance to be given the functions of 
the audience (21). Against these criticisms Krabbe informs us that Aristotle tells us that 
“there is an alleged proof that these are all the kinds there are (Rhet. I 3.1, 1358a36-b8)” 
(33). It is arguable that the tripartite schema was a springboard for types of rhetorical 
arguments that could be used together or separately, depending on the circumstance. For 
Walker writes that in the Rhetoric to Alexander, “Anaximenes . . . notes that all the 
types of politikos logos can be used in combination with each other as well as separately 
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(5 1427b), suggesting that he is thinking of their application in relatively fluid, 
unstructured speaking situations” (Poetics, 53). We can easily deduce that Aristotle also 
would agree that there is a certain fluidity to the speaking situations, for he tells us that 
everyone uses rhetoric (as discussed in Part 1) and also refers to public and private 
advising when he writes of deliberative rhetoric (Kennedy - Rhetoric, 48-49). 
Oksenberg Rorty, citing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, writes that the “deliberative rhetorician 
can – by turning a phrase – use encomia [praise] to counsel a course of action. ‘If you 
intend to praise, consider what you would have suggested; if you intend to suggest 
(hupothesthai), consider what you would praise’ (1368a6 ff.) (4). To round the idea of 
mixing genres off, we can consider Walker’s following commentary:  
But the only way that Aristotle’s taxonomy can be made to work, and in truth the 
way it usually has been made to work, is by simply disengaging the situational 
forum-and-function aspect of the definitions from the universalizing time-and-
subject aspect, and by treating the three rhetorical genres as general argumentative 
modes defined by the kinds of questions they deal with, modes that occur at least 
potentially (and for the most part actually) in both epideictic and pragmatic 
discourse. But when “rhetoric” has been defined as a “counterpart of dialectic,” a 
general art of reasoning and argument dealing with questions of advantage, honor, 
and justice in any kind of discourse – which brings us back to Plato’s 
equivocation between techne rhetorike and logon techne – there is no longer any 
need to identify “rhetoric” exclusively or narrowly with the characteristic genres 
of the professional rhetor (Poetics, 39). 
 
 The point that Walker makes in the above passage is that the genres can 
intermingle with each other on the one hand, and, on the other, if we view rhetoric and 
dialectic as sister arts, the generic division is superfluous. We can safely conclude that 
the tripartite structure functions primarily to orient its user in terms of basic 
argumentative aims. Once the aim has been decided on, the characteristics necessary for 
the same can then be adopted and adapted to suit an argument in particular. 
Now that we have discussed the fundamental aspects of each species of rhetoric 
as Aristotle has defined it, we can examine each of them in greater detail. I begin with 
deliberative rhetoric because its time frame is the future, and provides a point of 
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departure for the rhetorical model that I am presenting in terms of its chronology in 
terms of human thought. That is, the framework for human action defined by choice is 
divided into: 1) thought about the future, 2) thought about the past, and 3) thought about 
the present. This sequence is often repeated, and is thus cyclical. For in our decision-
making about our actions, we first deliberate about the future to determine the end we 
desire and how best to achieve that end. Once the action has been carried out, we look 
back on it and identify it in order to place it into a category of action. Since we look 
back on it, it is judgment of past actions. Once the action has been categorized, it can be 
labeled as either being praise- or blameworthy, which is the function of epideictic 
rhetoric, whose time is the present. Actions that have been labeled as praise or 
blameworthy provide models to either imitate or avoid in terms of future action, thereby 
completing the circular time framework of rhetorical thought. The cycle is then 
repeated. 
As stated above, the thought processes involved in rhetorical thinking are highly 
complex and the division of this complexity into neat categories of future, past and 
present is an oversimplification. This basis framework nevertheless provides a starting 
point for our discussion. We deliberate about what we are to do in the future, judge 
what we have done in the past, and once judgment has taken place on our past actions 
we then establish these actions as models for future action by praising or condemning 
them in the present. We can now turn to deliberative rhetoric. 
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2.2 DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC 
Aristotle addresses future rhetors in his treatise. Its contents are tailored to the topics 
that his pupils would have been taking into consideration as well as the audience they 
would have been addressing. Their audience was the “senate,” which would listen to 
and decide upon future action for the polis. For this reason, deliberative rhetoric is also 
at times referred to in the literature as “symbouleutic oratory.” The root for this term is 
boule, the “senate” or council, from which are also obtained symbouloi, “statesmen” and 
symbouleutikon, the discourse of the boule (Usher, 220; Walker – Poetics, 38). The 
council members would take into consideration matters related to the future of the polis 
to be delivered via oratory to the ekklesia, or popular assembly (Walker, 38). According 
to Aristotle, the topics that the council members would deliberate about and 
subsequently deliver were “mostly five in number . . . finances, war and peace, national 
defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 53). The 
five areas identified by Aristotle are, of course, relevant to the aims of his treatise. For 
rhetoric in general, any future matter in which human agency is involved is fair game 
for this mode of argumentation.  
Crucial to molding the supporting arguments is the need to take into 
consideration the audience. In this regard, Aristotle declares the importance of knowing 
the constitution specific to the audience to be addressed. He mentions four types of 
constitutions, and advises that the end of each must be kept in mind in order to select 
the arguments that will persuade: “There are four forms of constitution: democracy, 
oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy” (74). The end of each is as follows: 1) democracy – 
freedom, 2) oligarchy – wealth, 3) aristocracy – things related to education and 
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traditions of law and 4) tyranny – self-preservation (74).61 Since each type of 
constitution has a different aim which depends on those who have drafted them, in each 
case we can conclude that the aims are related to general goals for the good of those 
governing and being governed by the respective constitutions, and the welfare, or 
eudaimonia, as defined by each. The rhetor must present his arguments so that they 
coincide with the audience’s view of how eudaimonia is defined, in order to then 
persuade the audience of the usefulness or the harm that a particular proposition may 
bring (Oksenberg, 6). In the list Aristotle provides of the four types of government, the 
complete adaptability of rhetoric to content surfaces.  
With respect to what we deliberate about, Aristotle is keen to point out that we 
only do so about things that are both possible and that are in our power to achieve:  
First, then, one must grasp what kinds of good and evil the deliberative speaker 
advises about, since [he will be concerned] not with all, but [only] with those that 
can both possibly come to pass or not (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 52-53). 
 
Aristotle’s use of the adverb “possibly” highlights the contingent nature of matters that 
are the concern of deliberative rhetoric in particular and rhetorical topics in general. At 
the same time, he marks the limits of rhetoric’s field in this mode by inferring that 
things that are impossible and are not in our power to carry out fall outside of the limits 
of rhetoric. On the other hand, those things that can possibly occur are necessarily based 
on other possibilities and certainties, all in a complex web of probability and in which – 
as the bases themselves used for arguing about whether or not specific possibilities will 
come about are not always absolutely certain – opinion plays an important role. On 
another level, whether or not the consequences of the decision to be made are beneficial 
or harmful is also a matter of opinion subject to debate. Finally, ethics enter in, as often 
decisions about the future are characterized by a conflict between expediency and 
                                                 
61 The contemporary association of rhetoric with democracy in current scholarship can be contrasted 
with the types of government Aristotle lists. 
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morality. Often morality is sacrificed for the sake of expediency and vice versa. 
Aristotle adds further layers to his discussion of what is worth deliberating about:  
Nor is there deliberation about all contingent matters; for some benefits among 
those that can come to pass or not are the work of nature or happen by chance, on 
which deliberation is not worthwhile (53). 
 
And so we can see that within the uncertain and contingent sphere that rhetoric deals 
with, there are matters that although contingent, do not merit consideration due to the 
fact that they are beyond control or unpredictable. Here Aristotle mentions the work of 
nature and chance. As these types of events cannot be predicted with certainty, in 
Aristotle’s view they have no place in deliberative argumentation. However, because of 
our comparatively greater scientific knowledge of nature, accumulated data based on 
observation could be used and applied in argumentation. An obvious example would be 
earthquakes or tsunamis. A particular case is Japan’s 2011 disaster. Based on the 
Japanese history of the last 100 years, a question that certainly loomed large was not 
whether that area of Japan would experience a major earthquake, rather it was a 
question of when. In spite of the probability for disaster, decisions were made to build 
nuclear reactors upon unsafe ground that finally brought negative consequences of 
spectacular magnitude. But so many forces come into play that, while hindsight is 
always one hundred percent accurate, desire for immediate or present material 
wellbeing and its respective arguments overshadowed those arguments that predicted 
disaster. Risk, as we can see, is necessarily a factor that plays an important role in 
rhetorical argumentation, and is linked to the uncertainty of how events occur in life.  
 Aristotle rounds off his discussion of what can or cannot be considered in 
deliberative rhetoric as follows:   
But the subjects of deliberation are clear, and these are whatever, by their nature, 
are within our power and of which the inception lies with us. [As judges] we limit 
our consideration to the point of discovering what is possible or impossible for us 
to do (53). 
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In the end, we decide what is possible and impossible and within our power to carry out. 
Things that are impossible or lie beyond our capabilities are not reasonable to enter into 
debate over. For it makes no sense at all to deliberate about things that are impossible.
62
 
Aristotle refines his definition of what he means when he states in the Nichomachean 
Ethics that “we deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done”: 
And in the case of the exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, 
e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be 
written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, e.g. questions of 
medical treatment or of money-making” (Barnes - Complete, 1756). 
 
Vital here is the point Aristotle makes about what he calls self-contained sciences, for it 
adds another dimension to how he conceives of possible and impossible. In the chapter 
on opinion a distinction was made between opinion and hard facts. Hard facts can be 
reflected in normal day-to-day language such as “You can’t walk through walls” or 
“What goes up must come down.” These types of expressions exemplify what Aristotle 
means when he states that “no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise” (1798). 
But here we see that, in the example of how to write the letters of the alphabet, the 
indisputable area is that we know how to write the letters of the alphabet and do not 
argue over such issues. This does not mean that the alphabet could not be written 
differently. For indeed this is possible. But the convention that has been agreed upon is 
that the alphabet is written in a certain way and is thus not a topic for deliberation. 
Aristotle contrasts the way the alphabet is written with medicine and finance, two fields 
that are much less precise as to possible outcomes and thus are areas in which 
deliberation and decisions to be made for the future come into play. He gives further 
examples in order to reinforce his point:  
                                                 
62 Aristotle expands on the topic of deliberation in the Nichomachean Ethics, where not only does he 
state that “we deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done,” but also things that “can 
be done by their [men’s] own efforts” (Barnes - Complete, 1756).  
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And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, 
inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in 
the same ration, and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; 
for we have more doubt about the former (1756). 
 
There is a gradated continuum of possibilities that have been worked out based on the 
past, as well as on inductive logic. Each example in each field that builds the respective 
data base that provides the basis upon which to make future decisions reinforces the 
proof used in argument. In Truth and Method, Hans Georg Gadamer comments on the 
differences between the hard sciences and human sciences. Everything can be logically 
proven – ex post facto. The main difference between the hard sciences and the human 
sciences is that not enough data has been collected for the human sciences to make them 
predictable enough to earn the title of scientific. Gadamer uses the science of 
meteorology as prime example of a so-called hard science that has much in common 
with the human sciences. It is not that the weather cannot be predicted; its 
“unpredictability” has more to do with collected data that would make its prediction 
possible. Similarly, he argues that if we had more data on human behavior, more 
accurate predictions could be made, and, in turn, the human sciences could then be 
denominated hard sciences. The problem is one of insufficient data.
63
 Because of this, 
human behavior is predictable only to certain degrees of probability. 
The more contingency enters into a particular matter, the greater role the art of 
deliberation plays when deciding about it. The example of navigation as opposed to 
gymnastics demonstrates this difference concisely. If we then move towards the 
opposite pole to the science of mathematics, these examples show how the need for 
deliberation decreases at this end, and increases as we travel the opposite direction 
towards meteorology or human psychology.  
                                                 
63 See Gadamer. 
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Aristotle tells us that when deliberating about the future we often do not trust our 
own intuition and seek input from third parties:  
Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way and for the 
most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is 
indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, 
distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding (1756). 
 
Perelman picks up this idea of seeking aid from a person or persons we trust by 
referring to the Antoine de La Salle story “Le réconfort de Madame du Fresne.” Antoine 
de La Salle must make a morally complex decision, a decision which his wife 
reinforces: 
The decision is never in doubt, but Antoine de La Salle nonetheless attaches great 
importance to the wife’s words, which he relates with a wealth of detail. Her 
words transform the way in which the decision is face: she gives her husband a 
sense of pride in himself, poise, confidence, and consolation. She puts order into 
his ideas, gives the decision its setting, and, in so doing, reinforces it. She is like 
the theologian who provides the rational proofs for a dogma in which all members 
of the church already believe (Perelman – Treatise, 43). 
 
The terms that describe the benefits of good counsel proliferate in the paragraph above, 
thereby showing the importance given to the same in human decision making. The list 
could easily be expanded, but pride, poise, confidence, consolation, and rationality are 
salves that allay anxieties that surface with our ignorance when facing the future, both 
that future before the decision has been made, and that future that extends beyond the 
point the decision that has been carried out, and which is defined by consequences. The 
fact that we seek reinforcement from another, whose system of values are similar or 
coincide with ours, demonstrates the common need we have as humans for reassurance 
in matters that cannot be determined by empirical, mathematical or strictly logical 
means. Our own judgment is dependent upon the judgment of others whom we trust.  
What motivates this calling out, this unwanted yet necessary need for outside 
counsel? Aristotle tells us point blank: “Fear makes people deliberative” (cited by 
Konstan, 417). Konstan tells us that, according to Aristotle, “it is not pain itself that 
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induces fear, but rather things that threaten pain” (417). Here the importance of the 
future aspect comes into high relief. Our decisions for future action can by no means be 
made with complete accuracy with regards to outcome. And the stakes are high. This is 
an important point, for once the negative consequences of a poor decision have begun, 
our natural response is to take measures to rectify the poor decisions, in order to avoid 
further deleterious effects. Our deliberation is based on fear of future ills that have not 
materialized. This fear of things that might lead to unwanted and negative consequences 
is due to the great possibility for error that we have in our decision making. This 
possibility to err or ascertain produces anxiety and hope, and the concomitant risk that is 
ever-present gives an edge not only to the decision process, but to human existence 
itself.  
Fear of painful consequences is a primary motive for deliberation about the 
future, but pleasure is also important. Our decisions about the future are based on hope 
and desire to avoid unpleasant consequences of poor decisions and to attain positive 
results of good decisions. According to Perelman, our beliefs are determined to a great 
by our expectations and wants related to the future, which are linked with the 
pleasurable. In this regard, Perelman argues that it is not our beliefs which determine 
our hopes and desires, but the contrary. He writes: “It is almost commonplace to insist 
on the way in which our hopes and desires determine our beliefs” (Treatise, 61). He 
links this with what we as humans perceive as pleasurable, quoting Pascal: “All men 
whatsoever are almost always led into belief not because a thing is proved but because it 
is pleasing” (61). Pascal provides the following rational for his assertion: 
Things are true or false according to the aspect in which we look at them. The 
will, which prefers one aspect to another, turns away the mind from considering 
the qualities of all that it does not like to see; and thus the mind, moving in accord 
with the will, stops to consider the aspect which it likes and so judges by what it 
sees (61). 
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The above passage asserts that humans determine whether something is true or not 
based solely on whether it is or is not viewed as pleasing. Thus our ethics could be seen, 
on one level, as hedonism – that is, as the avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. 
While this idea is a commonplace – and, granted, an oversimplification – it provides us 
with a vantage point to analyze our thought processes when deciding about the future. 
According to Perelman, rhetoric (argumentation) provides us with a tool that 
gives insight into how our decision-making process operates: 
Argumentation alone (of which deliberation constitutes a special case) allows us 
to understand our decisions. This is why we will consider argumentation above all 
in its practical effects: oriented toward the future, it sets out to bring about some 
action or to prepare for it by acting, by discursive methods, on the minds of the 
hearers (47). 
 
Narrative plays a role in deliberative rhetoric. For the efforts to bring about some action 
or to prepare for the future occurs in the present, and, as Paul de Ricoeur spells out in 
Time and Narrative, is the result of making the future a present as an existing event. 
Ricoeur writes, “We are in fact prepared to consider as existing, not the past and future 
as such, but the temporal qualities that can exist in the present, without the things of 
which we speak, when we recount them or predict them, still existing or already 
existing” (10). According to Ricoeur we speak of the future as already existing in the 
present, thus we examine what we imagine the future to be from the vantage point of the 
present, viewing it as future-having-passed. We use the events and deliberation of the 
future-having-passed in order to guide us towards the best decision about the real future 
to come, with a view to avoiding error in the decision-making process. Similarly, we 
make events of the past present by re-telling them. In our decisions about the future, we 
attempt to avoid error and pursue proper action by recounting the events of the past by 
treating them as present occurrences – that is, as if they still existed. 
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A point that I wish to make here is the importance of creating an envisioned 
future to come through discourse, a future that may or may not occur as imagined once 
it transpires in the present. It is this aspect of deliberative rhetoric in which the risk 
factor surfaces. For our plans for the future seldom match exactly what manifests as 
present reality. The hopes and desires we plan for are always in jeopardy, on the one 
hand, and in a state of possible fulfillment on the other. The stakes are high, and as 
players in this game of risk we place our bets to win while facing the prospect of losing. 
For the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure provide the undercurrents of 
narrative tension. We are innate judges of the events that unfold in our own lives as well 
as those of others, examining both the decision-based action and underlying motives. 
Tom Waits, in a meditation on the human need for resolution in the face of narrative 
tension, sings as follows: “Everyone wants to know / How’s it going to end?”64 And the 
fact is that everyone wants to know the end of each story, in order to not only put all the 
pieces of the narrative puzzle in their place, but to subsequently judge from an ethical 
and esthetic standpoint. As the creators/protagonists of our own life narrative, we wish 
to make adequate decisions about our future in order that, once the means to achieve the 
decisions’ end have been carried out, our life is viewed with approval – not only our 
own approval, but that of those who know us. To please the crowd that pleases us is our 
objective. Making the right decision makes this possible. The risks can be high, and the 
possibility for pain or pleasure is great. 
We have mentioned above that the input from another trusted individual aids us 
in our decision-making, both prior and subsequent to having made a decision. But we 
also engage in private self-deliberation. Perelman comments on this aspect of human 
thought. His insights merit examination: 
                                                 
64 See Waits. 
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The secrecy of self deliberation seems to guarantee its value and sincerity. Thus 
we find Chaignet, in the last work in French to consider rhetoric as a technique of 
persuasion, contrasting persuasion and conviction in these terms: “When we are 
convinced, we are overcome only by ourselves, by our own ideas. When we are 
persuaded, it always by another (41). 
 
Chaignet distinguishes in the passage above between persuasion, which comes from 
others, and conviction which comes from within ourselves. The obvious question that 
arises is, since we become members of a community through language itself, whether 
any of our thoughts can be separated from the thoughts of the community in which we 
are enmeshed. While this question lies beyond the scope of the present study, 
Perelman’s observations on self-deliberation which he contrasts with deliberation with 
others give pride of place to the latter:   
We feel . . . that it is highly desirable to consider self-deliberation as a particular 
kind of argumentation . . . It also very often happens that discussion with someone 
else is simply a means we use to see things more clearly ourselves accordingly, 
from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that 
we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa (41). 
 
Perelman’s point in the excerpt above is that even though the act of self-deliberation is 
carried out in solitude, it is in the presenting of our arguments to others that we can 
understand our own arguments. For the opinions and standpoints that we entertain when 
carrying out self-deliberation necessarily come from others with whom we have had 
contact via some form of discourse. We have, as it were, our own assembly, if not 
jostling throng, of voices that we can retrieve via memory in the logical processes when 
arguing a specific point in private. Pros and contras from the past become present 
syllogistic arguments that we utilize in self-deliberation with a view to making proper 
decisions about the future. Even still, due to the great chance to err in our deliberation, 
we do not completely put all of our faith in our own capability to make the right 
decision, or to reason accurately. We even suspect that, while deliberating alone, we are 
capable of duping ourselves:  
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Can we wholly rely on the sincerity of the deliberating subject to find out whether 
he is in quest of the best line of conduct or is pleading a case within himself? 
Depth psychology has taught us to distrust even that which seems unquestionable 
to our own consciousness (42). 
 
The possibility for self-deception increases the risk for poor decision-making, and, at 
the same time, increases the tension that we experience as protagonists playing our 
respective roles in our particular material existence. And so Tom Wait’s question, 
“How’s it going to end?” takes on much more meaning when we realize that the 
question is, in effect, “How are we going to try and make it end?” 
I have stated in Part 1 that to make wise decisions is to possess and utilize what 
Aristotle calls phronesis, which is translated into English as “practical wisdom.” The 
“this-worldliness” character of rhetoric, which I have been emphasizing, can 
immediately be detected in the translation of phronesis. The practically wise man is a 
phronimos. In Aristotle’s definition, both terms are necessarily linked to excellence and 
the good, for he states “it is impossible to be practically wise without being good” 
(Barnes – Complete, 1807). Important here is to emphasize the fact that what is “good” 
is a matter of opinion and subject to dispute. Aristotle states that every system of human 
thought, irrespective of its political or philosophical underpinnings, aims at some good 
in the beginning of his Nichomachean Ethics.  He then proceeds to offer his version of 
the good. But his version of the good is necessarily an opinion which is not beyond 
criticism.  
 We can now consider the basic model that Aristotle uses for choices when using 
practical wisdom when deliberating about the future:  
It is plain that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than 
without excellence; for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the 
things that lead to the end (1808). 
 
Proper choice is based on practical wisdom and excellence. Of course, the definition of 
both practical wisdom and excellence will be different for each person. I have hinted at 
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this when discussing the fact that Aristotle brings the need for being knowledgeable 
about the different types of constitutions and the aims of each. Each was written with a 
particular definition of excellence in mind. Further, I have also mentioned in Part 1 the 
prenotions Epitectus writes of in his Dialogues. Achilles and Agamemnon would both 
agree that to act honestly is important, but just how the abstract prenotion honesty is 
interpreted by each is a term for dispute. It is my opinion that Aristotle would have the 
hope that some sort of truth can be agreed on through rhetorical thinking. But at the 
same time, I believe that, as he provides the various types of constitutions with a view 
to arguing for those particular audiences, he would also state that that is precisely how 
things work in this world as opposed to the ideal sphere of Plato’s Forms. Aristotle’s 
writing provides support for this argument. For when speaking of phronesis, or 
“practical wisdom,” Aristotle distinguishes it from the wisdom we associate with 
philosophers, which is not practical: 
From what has been said it is plain, then, that wisdom is knowledge, combined 
with comprehension, of the things that are highest by nature. This is why we say 
Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have wisdom but not practical wisdom, 
when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say 
that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but 
useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek (1802). 
 
Here we can see that phronesis is not the wisdom of philosophers who “have their heads 
in a cloud,” so to speak. Phronesis has to do with the rough and tumble of our day-to-
day and physical existence, with the choices that we deliberate about and then make in 
real-world decisions. 
Aristotle bases what is a conclusion above about the nature of correct choice 
(when using phronesis) on the following assertions:  
So that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is 
deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if 
the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts 
(1798). 
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Here we see that there is, in Aristotle’s conception of choice, interplay between reason 
and desire. Reason must be defined by truth, and desire by goodness for a choice to be 
judged as morally excellent. This same framework for determining the quality of a 
choice can be used to analyze any choice whatsoever, regardless of the political or 
ethical stance held by the subject doing so. And so vice and virtue necessarily enter into 
Aristotle’s discussion on the subject’s responsibility for choices that lead to actions: 
Excellence also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power 
to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa . . .  Now if it is in our 
power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this 
was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or 
vicious (1758). 
 
The subject, in Aristotle’s definition, is capable of carrying out acts that are virtuous or 
vice-ridden. Important here, for our purposes, is to keep in mind that the definition of 
vice and virtue is open to discussion. If, as some scholars of literature affirm, Satan is 
the real hero in Milton’s Paradise Lost, that evaluation is based on a system of values 
that can be examined. Similarly, if the real hero of Flannery O’Connors’ “A Good Man 
Is Hard to Find” is the Misfit – and of course he is an anti-hero –  we must examine why 
a character of that sort can be seen as being “good” from the system of values is being 
used to provide a foundation for that appraisal. As for recits de voyage, there is a 
correlation between the author and the narrator. That is, we assume that the author of 
the text is the narrator, and so we assume that we are reading narratives that have to do 
with things that really happened, and, by extension, actions that were in the narrator’s 
power to decide whether to carry them out or not.  We can connect this with another 
point that Aristotle makes in the Nichomachean Ethics:  
We cannot refer actions to moving principles other than those in ourselves, the 
acts whose moving principles are in us must themselves also be in our power and 
voluntary (1758). 
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Aristotle would insist that we are responsible for our actions, which are based on 
choice. In practical terms, our actions are subject to law, a point which Aristotle also 
makes:  
Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their private capacity and 
by legislators themselves; for these punish and take vengeance on those who do 
wicked acts (unless they have acted under compulsion or as a result of ignorance 
for which they are not themselves responsible), while they honour those who do 
noble acts, as though they meant to encourage the latter and deter the former 
(1758). 
 
We are, on a practical and legal plane, responsible for our actions which we, as subjects, 
choose to do, and these very actions are punishable by law or praised as honorable. We 
judge the choices and actions we make and carry out, as well as those of others from an 
ethical standpoint, and, according to Aristotle, use our judgments to decide who, in fact, 
possesses phronesis: 
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the 
persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical 
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for 
himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to 
health or strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in 
general (1800). 
 
Again, the terms Aristotle uses, “man of practical wisdom” and “the good life in 
general,” are necessarily open to interpretation. Not everyone will agree on precisely 
what is the good life or precisely what things produce it. And the persons whom we 
attribute with practical wisdom will depend on our own system of values. Aristotle, 
using his system of values, presents examples of persons that in his appraisal possessed 
phronesis:  
It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical 
wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good 
for men in general; we consider that those can do this who are good at managing 
households or states (1800). 
 
It is interesting that Aristotle uses Pericles, for in the Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates attacks 
Pericles as not acting in the best interest of the state. The dispute that occurs between 
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Socrates and the other speakers in the Gorgias demonstrates the point that I wish to 
make here: 1) that whether certain actions are determined as being products of 
phronesis, and 2) that whether certain persons are judged as possessing this faculty will 
depend on those who judge the actions, using their own system of values as foundation 
for their reasoning. And so, when Aristotle states, “[p]ractical wisdom, then, must be a 
reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (1801), we must 
always keep in mind that the appraisal will necessarily be made by a judge or group of 
judges whose system of values may differ from another judge or group.
65
 If we accept 
this reasoning, it becomes possible to use the core logic of Aristotle’s definition of 
practical wisdom to engage in a dialogue about precisely what that might mean here and 
now, with a view to evolving as individuals that are interconnected with others in what 
is, due to globalization, a planet-wide polis.
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 Aristotle fleshes out his discussion on what we deliberate about, which, as we 
have mentioned above, has limits. He links the limits he establishes below to phronesis: 
Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of 
deliberation, or is deliberation about some things? We ought presumably to call 
not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man 
would deliberate about, a subject of deliberation. Now about eternal things no one 
deliberates, i.e. about the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and 
the side of a square. . . . (1756). 
 
In Aristotle’s definition of phronesis, fools and madmen are excluded. And here we 
could argue that first, just what a fool or madman is needs to be defined, and second, 
whether examples of foolish or mad reasoning do or do not produce eudaimonia as 
defined by certain individuals. Two examples from literature will suffice to demonstrate 
this idea. First, there is Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who takes to task the idea that 
                                                 
65 Jaeger rephrases Aristotle’s definition of phronesis as follows: “In common usage it is a practical 
faculty, concerned both with the choice of the ethically desirable and with the prudent perception of 
one’s own advantage” (82-83). 
66 See Sanders on how globalization has resulted in the evolution of ethics, making questionable earlier 
frameworks. 
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an individual does best when acting in their own interest. Underground Man asserts that 
there are times that what a person must do is act against his or her own self-interest as 
defined by reason, and that that is precisely what produces eudaimonia – according to 
an alternative definition. In the field of rhetoric, any stance can be argued, and that is 
precisely what Dostoevsky does with great force in this work. Another example is 
Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, with his famous cry at the outset: “I have no money, 
no resources, no hopes. I am the happiest man alive.”67 Miller is speaking of his 
definition of eudaimonia, which he can argue has validity, and which, as he was very 
persuasive, convinced and still convinces some readers that there is another way that is 
worth living, a way that does not follow the straight and narrow path set forth by 
television commercials and Facebook aficionados.  
 Aristotle in the passage above adds to his limits eternal things, such as the 
universe and the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. He does this 
to hammer away at his point that we only deliberate about things that are within our 
capability to make happen. Along these lines he states: 
[One chooses] only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own 
efforts. Again, wish relates rather the end, choice to what contributes to the end; 
for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will make us 
healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we 
choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things in our own 
power (1755). 
 
The choices that we make have to do with the means. The end, according to Aristotle, 
has to do with desire. And the means must be within our power to execute, for if it were 
otherwise, choice would not be possible. Curious here is Aristotle’s stance that one 
cannot choose to be happy, which flies in the face of many current notions of happiness 
that, if we are to take only self-help books as an example, state the opposite.  
                                                 
67 See Miller, Henry. 
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That our choices have to do with ethics, as we have stated above, Aristotle states 
point blank: “Choice is determined by goodness or badness” (1755). Again, precisely 
what is goodness and what is badness are issues about which we can enter into dialogue 
using rhetoric. 
 With respect to the choices that people make and who can be seen to possess 
phronesis, Aristotle tells us that it is one thing to have the right opinion, and quite 
another to choose what is good: 
And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not 
know at all; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best choices 
and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, 
but by reason of vice to choose what they should not (1755). 
 
Knowing what right choices are and carrying them out are two different capabilities. 
Here again, we can recall Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, or we can see this same 
incapability to choose what is identified by most as the good in travel stories like 
“Absinthe Makes the Heart Grow” by Taras Gresco. After spelling out all of the dangers 
drinking absinthe presents and stating that absinthe was, in terms of dangerous 
substances, the cocaine of its day, the narrator nevertheless sets out to find out for 
himself what drinking this wormwood containing beverage is all about. He takes a risk 
that is potentially dangerous, yet, we must infer – based on his arguments – that he is 
seeking the good, or his definition thereof. This is, after all, very often the stuff of 
literature: rebelling against the rules established by law and society in order to discover 
another definition of the good, regardless of the damage that may incur. The writing of 
authors like Charles Bukowski or Raymond Carver epitomize the idealization of making 
what are, by conventional standards, “bad”  choices.  There is an entire set of values that 
extols this type of behavior in literature, and, by using rhetoric as analytical tool, 
frameworks of this sort can be analyzed in order to bring to the fore the arguments being 
used as foundations.  
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 Sometimes, in our deliberation about the future, Aristotle in the Topics asserts 
that we hit rational dead-ends. That is, at times when hashing out the best decision to 
make when two objectives are in play we cannot come up with an answer that is 
satisfactory, and the result is a dilemma:  
Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would seem to be a cause 
of perplexity; for it is when we reflex on both sides of a question and find 
everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which 
of the two we are to do (245). 
 
Aristotle is spelling out that sometimes it is not true that there is a lesser of two evils, 
for example, or at times, one simply has to accept the truth of statements like “You’re 
damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” This also applies to ends that are positive 
for often, when given the possibility to choose between two goods, regardless of how 
much we weigh the possible advantages and disadvantages, the equation comes out 
equal, and we have no choice but to toss a coin or be arbitrary. 
Whether the balance tilts in the direction of one choice or the other, the 
deliberative mode of rhetoric has to do with freedom. Grimaldi writes:  
In this matter of ‘persuasion’ Aristotle’s thesis is simply that good rhetoric 
effectively places before the other person all the means necessary for such 
decision making. At this point the person must exercise his own freedom (5). 
 
Freedom is always tied to responsibility. And this is where judgment enters and where 
narrative tension has its source. This is where we, as individuals that are free to choose 
how to reach our specific goals, find ourselves facing how to best act with respect to our 
own (and others’) anticipated future that eventually makes its transit through the present 
and finally becomes the past, from where the stuff of narrative is mined. The use of 
freedom by an individual that manifests in specific action is, as Ross states, an attempt 
on Aristotle’s part to formulate a conception of the will:  
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Thus choice is ‘deliberate desire of things in our own power,’ or, as Aristotle puts 
it elsewhere, ‘it is either desireful reason or reasonable desire, and that sort of 
origin of action is a man (207).
68
  
 
The conception of the will that Ross affirms Aristotle did not fully examine or explain 
is, in his opinion, the “plain man’s,” as opposed to the philosopher’s belief in it (209). 
That is, will as conceived of by the man- or woman-on-the-street, who believes that he 
or she is the agent of his or her decisions, who believes that freedom to choose does 
indeed exist and further, has consequences.
69
 
A final point of interest with respect to deliberation and to the object of study 
(i.e. travel narratives) is the one that Aristotle makes in the Rhetoric when discussing 
this mode of rhetoric for making decisions about the future: 
Thus, it is clear that in constitutional revision the reports of travelers are useful 
(for there one can learn the laws of foreign nations) and [that] for debates about 
going to war the research of those writing about history [is useful]. But all these 
subjects belong to politics, not to rhetoric (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 55). 
 
Here we can see that Aristotle is telling future 4
th
 century rhetors to rely on travelers’ 
reports when revising constitutions. And while he insists that matters of constitutions 
and warfare are not rhetoric but politics, it is nevertheless relevant to our discussion, for 
the final object of study is a travel narrative. Recits de voyage can be utilized from this 
perspective as models for deliberation about the future with respect to travel. For the 
input of other travelers can often be highly valuable on several fronts were one to travel 
to the same place the narrative takes place in. Nor is the value that travel narratives hold 
just in relation to practical information. More critical and far more arresting are the 
rhetorical arguments underlying the choice-based action carried out by the narrator in a 
specific place and time in a particular sample of travel writing. Analyzing the arguments 
                                                 
68 Interestingly, in Aristotle’s definition of phronesis, not just humans, but even animals are accorded 
this faculty. So while Aristotle would deny fools and madmen the capacity to make correct choices, he 
nevertheless states that “even some of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are 
found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own life” (Barnes - Complete, 1802). 
69 While arguments have been presented throughout history that free-will does not exist, it is still an 
issue open to debate. See Mackie. 
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used by the narrator will shed light on both the system of values adhered to by both the 
author and readership on several levels.  
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2.3 JUDICIAL RHETORIC  
Once an act has been carried out by an agent it makes the transition from future 
possibility through the present to become a past event, and as such falls within the 
sphere of judicial rhetoric. As stated above in the section introducing the three rhetorical 
modes, the aim of judicial rhetoric is justice and its time frame is the past. Since the 
culpability of a person who has been accused of having committed an offense must be 
determined, the initial twofold aim of judicial rhetoric is to establish1) whether or not 
the action did in fact take place and if so, 2) who the agent was. Once it has been 
established that a particular agent carried out a particular criminal act, a secondary aim 
guides the process: the evaluation of the nature of the crime. This is necessary in order 
for justice to be adequately meted out, which means that the consequences that the agent 
is to assume for having committed the crime must match its severity. These must neither 
be too harsh nor too lenient in order for justice to be perceived by the community as 
having been carried out with equanimity. Two enormous challenges arise with respect 
to the aims of judicial rhetoric. First, there will be criminals that, in the hopes of 
evading the consequences dictated by the community’s judicial system, either commit 
perjury on the one hand, or attempt to cover up the evidence on the other, thereby 
obstructing justice. That is, they will, using deceit, make the determining of whether the 
act occurred or not difficult or impossible. Second, the possibility of an innocent person 
being accused or charged with criminal acts of which she is not the agent arises. With 
respect to the two types of challenges, there would ideally be sufficient evidence to 
empirically prove innocence or guilt. As this is often not the case, due to the fact that we 
are dealing with events from the past and the collection of evidence for a particular act 
can be hampered by circumstance or human agents, contemporary law dictates that 
proof must be beyond reasonable doubt in order to convict an individual of a crime. 
And it is the impossibility itself of presenting irrefutable empirical proof in certain cases 
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that, in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric, locates events of this type within the sphere of 
rhetoric. For as we have said, rhetoric’s field of operation is opinion. While the 
connotations of the term opinion are pejorative, it is precisely the conjectural nature of 
judicial cases that legal expressions like “prove beyond reasonable doubt” epitomize, 
albeit in a way that removes or at any rate glosses over any negative connotations the 
term opinion conveys. (This in itself is a rhetorical mechanism: the restatement of a 
concept in terms that define it positively or negatively.) Within this framework of facts 
that cannot be proven with absolute empirical certainty, argumentation through 
probability necessarily forms part of the process leading to proof. The nature of this 
process entails utilizing other means for determining truth and falsehood that operate in 
conjunction with informal logic. For when we as humans weigh the evidence of or 
consider arguments whose bases are defined by likelihood, our emotions play an 
important role in our efforts to determine the truth of a matter. Since rhetorical 
argumentation operates beyond the confines of empirically provable hard facts, the 
possibility of using its mechanisms to deceive by manipulating the emotions that we use 
to judge whether a particular argument is true or not exists and, as is well-known, stands 
as an enormous challenge when a particular case is being presented. For because we 
know that the possibility of having our emotions swayed by unethical means or of the 
matters of a case being distorted by false or impertinent evidence exists, the ability to 
read between the lines in order not to be either deluded due to being carried away by 
clever emotional appeals or duped by shrewd manipulation of logic stands as both a 
crucial task and ability. Aristotle knew this, and it is on these two points that he focuses 
when discussing judicial rhetoric. In his treatise he gives deliberative rhetoric pride of 
place, for it is his opinion that one ought to argue using logos, or reasoned 
argumentation as the primary means. His view is that deliberative rhetoric is not 
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contaminated by appeals to the emotions, that it is governed by logos-based arguments. 
Thus he views deliberative rhetoric as being less characterized by irrelevant (thus 
unethical) emotional appeals, due to the fact that its audience is affected personally, and 
is therefore engaged emotionally because of self-interest.  Aristotle spells this out when 
he compares deliberative and judicial rhetoric:   
It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking 
is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the 
state than private transactions, [the handbook writers] have nothing to say about 
the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in a law court, because it is 
less serviceable to speak things outside the subject in deliberative situations; for 
there the judge judges about matters that affect himself, so that nothing is needed 
except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says (33). 
 
In the above passage we see Aristotle’s complaint about the writers of rhetorical 
handbooks is formulated in terms of logical argumentation. For when he states above 
that to bring in issues that are irrelevant to the argument and that in deliberative forums 
it is only necessary to “show that circumstances are as the speaker says,” he is, in effect, 
asserting that argument in deliberative rhetoric has a more solid grounding in logos – 
that is, in reasonable or logical argument. The connection with emotions is evident in 
the excerpt above when he states that with respect to deliberative situations the judge 
appraises matters that affect him. Because the judge in deliberative rhetoric has a 
personal, vested interest, he is already (and necessarily) emotionally engaged. 
The link between emotions and logical argument in Aristotle’s definition comes 
to the fore in the passage above. Aristotle criticizes the other writers for only writing 
about judicial rhetoric, where it is possible to both manipulate the emotions and bring in 
irrelevant issues. I shall deal more specifically with Aristotle’s criticism of the unethical 
use of emotions in the chapter I devote to pathos. 
Whereas Aristotle’s main focus in his treatise is deliberative rhetoric, and states 
that not enough attention has been paid to it, other thinkers from antiquity writing after 
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him consider judicial rhetoric to be the most important of the three genres. Cicero, as 
Walker informs us, deems judicial rhetoric “the ‘most difficult’ and crowning genre in 
which the whole art is subsumed” (Poetics, 79). Further, when claims are made in 
antiquity for rhetoric having in its early (and mythical) stages brought humans out of 
savagery into community and civilization, it is identified as playing a major role in this 
process in the judicial arena. Aelius Aristides, writing in a response that defies the 
position taken by Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias, describes in the second century A.D. how 
rhetoric descended from the gods and made human community possible:  
As Aristides says, in his version of the myth of rhetoric’s beginnings, “[w]hen 
rhetoric had come among humankind from the Gods [being sent by Zeus, via 
Hermes, at the instigation of Prometheus], humankind were enabled to escape the 
savage way of life among the animals, stopping the cycle of strife against all, and 
they discovered the origin of community.” From this “discovery” proceeds the 
establishment of communal agreements, which make possible the foundation of 
laws and civil institutions . . . which in turn make possible the practices of 
pragmatic rhetoric in political/administrative and judicial forums (Walker – 
Poetics, 399-400). 
 
Here we can see the importance given rhetoric in antiquity with respect to our human 
and political nature, which at bottom means judging acts on moral grounds with respect 
to the community’s welfare, using its system of values as base. 
In connection with the community, Walker discusses Quintilian’s comments on 
the role that judicial rhetoric plays in the organization of the state:  
[The] overwhelming impression of the Institutio Oratorio is that Quintilian’s 
orator-in-training is preparing to serve the state and emperor primarily through 
judicial oratory, and especially through what Quintilian regularly figures as the 
“gladiatorial” combats of the courts (99). 
 
While Quintilian glorifies the confrontations that occurred in the courts as 
“gladiatorial,” it must be kept in mind that this heroic portrayal is in fact a search and 
struggle for truth. In Quintilian’s language a substantive connection with a search that is 
defined by confrontation over the truth of a case – whose procedures and outcome 
would be operative in the state’s management of its legal issues – becomes evident. 
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Judicial rhetoric’s connection and involvement with the management of the state give it, 
in Quintilian’s view, pride of place in terms of the three species. The importance of 
judicial rhetoric can also be seen in the administrative institutions of government that 
have arisen over time and that are in existence to this day:  
From Augustus’s principate onward, juristic scholarship evolved as a function of 
imperial administration . . . Out of this imperially sponsored scholarship emerged 
the first true law schools of the Western world, schools meant specifically for the 
training of professional jurists (91). 
 
The importance of judicial rhetoric in the affairs of the state is evident in the excerpt 
above, as well as its continued influence and presence. Still, the establishing of written 
laws and communal agreements does not mean that rhetoric’s job is finished. Constant 
evaluation and further judgment that develops over time is necessary: 
As Aristides adds, “while the art of legislation is done with once it has established 
laws, and that of jurisprudence busies itself no more after the vote [of acquittal or 
conviction], yet like some sleepless guard [rhetoric] never ends its watch; it was 
joined with those arts from the beginning, both guiding and teaching, and even 
now it treats all things anew, making proposals, going on embassies, forever 
shaping present circumstances” (401). 
 
The ongoing nature that rhetoric plays in the shaping of community is paramount. 
Important in the passage above is the notion that rhetoric is separate from both judicial 
and deliberative rhetoric. We find in Aristotle’s treatise the germ for this concept when 
he discusses, for example, politics and ethics in relation to rhetoric, but then reminds the 
reader that they are separate fields. Walker, commenting on Aristides’ comments above 
in Against Plato Concerning Rhetoric brings the separateness of rhetoric from other 
disciplines and fields of discourse to the fore: 
Rhetoric, that is, continually constructs and reconstructs the larger sphere of 
discourse within which specific acts of legislation and jurisprudence (decrees and 
judgments) have occurred and will occur. It not only leads to the production of 
laws and institutions through the cultivation of communal assent, and thence to 
the production of specific judgments in specific forums which enact and enforce 
the laws, but it also continues to cultivate the shared agreements on which the 
laws depend, as well as to instigate and shape the processes through which 
existing laws, policies, and civil institutions will be altered. As such rhetorike is 
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the “guide” and “teacher” of legislation and jurisprudence and is necessarily 
“joined” with them “from the beginning” of civil society but is not identical with 
them or limited to their sphere. It is, rather, their condition of possibility (111-
112). 
 
Walker states point blank that rhetoric is the condition upon which civil society’s 
legislation and jurisprudence are made possible. At this point it bears mentioning that 
while the focus of the treatises on rhetoric from antiquity is institutional, we must keep 
in mind the above-mentioned separateness of rhetoric, as well as Aristotle’s affirmation 
that all people use rhetoric. This means that the same mechanisms that are used in the 
organization of the state are at work in a much smaller scale. That is, the interactions 
that occur between individuals on an interpersonal level are characterized by the same 
mechanisms that are in operation in large-scale political or judicial forums. Walker’s 
assertion concerning the enormous rhetoric importance has as the condition that makes 
civil society possible is applicable in our small-scale, day-to-day interactions with 
others. 
From the above discussion we can see that writers from antiquity after Aristotle 
view judicial rhetoric as the most important of the three modes. Aristotle’s perspective 
is based on what he viewed as the inappropriateness of how judicial rhetoric was being 
used, which we can now discuss in greater depth. Aristotle’s bias is due to his desire for 
rhetoric to be based primarily on logos. Kennedy writes: “They [i.e., the rhetorical 
handbooks of the day] were, he complains, concerned only with judicial rhetoric and its 
parts and neglected deliberative oratory, a finer genre, and they gave too much attention 
to arousing emotions to the neglect of logical argument” (Rhetoric, 10). Aristotle’s 
stance is based on his adverse reaction to the actual goings on in the courts. His 
disapproval of arguing outside the subject belies a desire to aim at the ideal of a rhetoric 
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whose basis is syllogistic.
70
 Logical argument should determine whether certain 
circumstances or events are or are not (in terms of probability or actual fact) possible or 
whether they have or have not occurred.
71
 The example given most often of what 
Aristotle meant with by things outside the subject in the law courts of his day is when 
the defendant’s wife and children were dragged into court in order to appeal to pity, 
regardless of the crime that was committed. The obvious danger of this type of activity 
is that justice will not, due to manipulation of emotions, be administered fairly. 
Craig Cooper, in his study on forensic oratory in 4
th
 century Athens, provides a 
summary from the Wasps of just what “trickery” the orators were known to utilize. The 
character Philocleon expects to encounter the following: 
All sorts of words aimed at securing acquittal; there will be flattery of the dicasts, 
pleas of poverty to elicit pity, fanciful stories told, funny little tales from Aesop 
and even some joking to raise a laugh and release his anger. If all else fails the 
defendant will parade his small children and aged father before him. . . (205). 
 
As comical as this may appear to a contemporary reader when considering the 
enormous emphasis placed on factual evidence, we will see that in the travel narrative to 
be analyzed the narrator also plays with the reader’s emotions, making appeals that are 
ethically questionable, but at the same time quite convincing. And it is the ethical aspect 
that keeps the reader engaged. Although the what is important in literature, without the 
why a succession of events from the past would hold very little interest. 
                                                 
70 Reeve writes, in his interpretation of Aristotle’s aims when the latter discusses cities where rhetoric 
is being used appropriately, “Thus rhetoric is not only restricted to enthymemes in such cities, but 
enthymemes are restricted to the very narrow role of establishing the facts. The speaker is not even 
allowed to comment on whether what happened is ‘important or trivial, just or unjust’ (1354a28-29). 
Let us say, then, that in well-ordered cities rhetoric – whether deliberative or judicial – is narrowly 
enthymematic. To be sure, this ideal is closely approximated only in cities with good laws, and fully 
achieved only in cities wth the very best ones, but it remains the ideal nonetheless” (197). 
71 Important with respect to judicial rhetoric is to keep in mind that while Aristotle wished to give 
priority to logos, he at the same time recognized the importance of ethos and pathos as argumentative, 
rhetorical proofs: “Aristotle does not want to deny the utility of emotional appeal in judicial oratory, 
but he does believe that the writers of handbooks have failed to recognize not only the importance of 
rational argument but also that of persuasion through character” (Fortenbraugh, 115). 
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Although the use of “trickery” is an obvious threat to the meting out of justice, 
Cooper provides an argument that allows for justifiable appeals to the emotions. Writing 
in relation to the emotional appeals discussed above and other means of persuasion, he 
states that he does not think “that forensic oratory was more about plausibility than 
truth” (214). Cooper explains that it “was about justice and equality, and in an effort to 
obtain these, the truth sometimes needed rhetorical assistance” (214). This meant that 
the rhetorical means of argumentation were necessary in order to obtain justice: 
As I have shown, such emotional appeals and arguments were absolutely essential 
as they allowed the litigant not only to grab and focus the attention of the dicasts 
but also to fire their imagination and define for them juristically the actual issue at 
hand. Was this particular action, let us say, hybris or not? Moreover, the stakes 
were often high, life and death, satisfaction for a crime against one’s person or 
family, and a litigant needed to use whatever rhetorical means at his disposal in 
order to persuade his fellow citizens of the justice of his case. In similar 
circumstances we would do no less (215). 
 
Cooper makes a strong argument for the use of devices other than logical proof in order 
to achieve justice. The extreme issues he mentions were being judged by a potentially 
indifferent jury, and so the job of the rhetor was to ensure that her audience was 
engaged. In addition, Cooper’s argument squares with Aristotle’s stance that rhetoric 
should not be used for evil aims, and that, if used properly, truth and justice will prevail. 
Aristotle makes this clear when he criticizes the handbooks of the day: 
That other writers describe as an art things outside the subject [of a speech] and 
that they have rather too much inclined toward judicial oratory is clear; 12. But 
rhetoric is useful, [first] because the true and the just are by nature stronger than 
their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the 
just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure 
(Kennedy – Rhetoric, 35). 
 
In the above passage, Aristotle expresses his disapproval of using rhetoric to defeat 
what is true and fair. At the same time, we see Aristotle’s faith in the capacity of 
rhetoric to discover truth and impart justice. 
I have referred to the vested interest that Aristotle states would characterize a 
judge in a deliberative forum, and how a personal stake in the decision process affects 
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the outcome. Aristotle indicates the influence on judgment that being affected 
personally by the issue under consideration holds, and distinguishes deliberative from 
judicial rhetoric on this count. The assemblyman that is deliberating on a future action is 
emotionally engaged at bottom due to selfishness. But this selfishness is not necessarily 
a drawback. In fact, Aristotle gives every indication that selfishness can be seen as a 
virtue, for when no self-interest is involved, the possibility for abuse increases. Garver, 
while arguing that Aristotle’s system of ethics has no relevance for us moderns, 
nevertheless provides a good summary of Aristotle’s viewpoint. He first presents the 
modern conception of justice which views judicial rhetoric as more fair due to the 
absence of personal interest: 
We [moderns] act more justly and morally in judicial rhetoric because of the lack 
of a personal stake, while in deliberation selfishness is inevitable, and even 
appropriate. But Aristotle says that judicial rhetoric is more open to abuse because 
of this lack of personal interest. We want to get things right in deliberative 
rhetoric because they affect us. If judicial rhetoric is characteristically less ethical 
than deliberative reasoning, then selfishness is not the prime enemy of morality. 
Failing to take things personally disables us from taking them morally. The 
judicial audience can ask, “Why should I be moral? (71). 
 
The judicial audience’s question above demonstrates the need for employing emotional 
strategies as outlined above by Cooper. Aristotle’s stance – initially against emotional 
appeal and subsequently in favour – is based on a realistic appraisal of human behaviour 
and how to manage it. His position is one of the factors that contributes to what have 
been read as inconsistencies in the Rhetoric, especially in what appears at first glance as 
a contradictory standpoint with respect to the use of emotions (pathos) and personality 
(ethos) as proofs when persuading during argumentation. For at first, as will be seen in 
the section on pathos, Aristotle argues that the emotions must not be used to warp the 
jury’s judgment. Later, however, he argues that the judge must be prepared emotionally 
in order to obtain a proper judgment on the case at hand. What we must not forget in the 
face of these seeming contradictions is that it is difficult to label Aristotle as a complete 
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cynic, for in his treatise he reiterates the possibility in the judicial sphere to determine, 
in the face of rhetorically presented cases, the truth: 
7. And [one can say] that the just is something true and advantageous but what 
seems to be just may not be; thus, the written law may not be; for it does not 
[always] perform the function of the law. And [one can say] that the judge is like 
an assayer of silver in that he distinguishes counterfeit and true justice (Kennedy – 
Rhetoric, 104). 
 
Here Aristotle is drawing a distinction between the written law and the spirit of the law, 
while arguing that it is possible to ascertain between falsehood and truth with respect to 
justice. This same capacity for distinguishing the truth can be applied to all cases being 
judged by an audience. In this dissertation, when analyzing the texts under study, it is 
my aim to identify what I view as the underlying truth of the narrators’ words, and to 
judge the system of values that provide the framework for the narrative itself. By doing 
so, I do not pretend to hold the final word on the matter, rather to open up a possible 
conversation on what I view as present in the explicit and implicit logos of the narrative. 
I shall view narratives under study as testimony. For this reason I call them case studies, 
which must be taken on their own terms and viewed as unique. The narrations will be 
read as cases being made with the aim of persuading their audience to view the actions, 
character and – in David Lansing’s recit de voyage – writing skills as laudable.  
As stated above, the two primary aims of judicial rhetoric are: 1) the 
determination of whether an act was committed or not, and 2) whether the act was just 
or unjust. As readers, we do this automatically with respect to ethics while reading a 
narrative, if only because motive is a necessary element for plot to exist in the first 
place. Without motives, narrative becomes mere sequence of events, outside the realm 
of morality. When reading a narrative, each reader determines individually how the 
events are to be judged. Each reader can then present her assessment and enter into the 
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dialectical/rhetorical fray to make the attempt to determine the arguments and 
underlying motives of the actions described in the narratives. 
On one side of a rhetorical event is the judge, and, at the other, the persuader. 
Aristotle, in his attempt to steer rhetoric away from unethical emotional appeals made 
by the rhetor who is, in judicial rhetoric, attempting to persuade, insisted that the proofs 
of an oration should be logically valid: “1. Proofs should be demonstrative” (242). In 
this regard, Kennedy informs us that Aristotle “anticipates some categories of later 
stasis theory. His four questions are fact [denial something was done], harm [it did no 
harm], importance [it was or was not important] just [it was done justly]” (242 – 
author’s brackets). Questions of this sort can provide guidelines for the questions that 
might be asked of narrative texts, with a view to judging them on several planes, 
including those on matters that are related to facts and to ethics.  
Vanderspoel presents Aristotle’s configuration in different terms, basing his 
model on its expression in the Rhetorica Ad Herennium, which drew on, extended and 
developed principles outlined in Aristotle’s treatise: 
After the orator decides whether the issue is a matter of fact (did he do it), legal 
(did it, how is act defined under the law), or judicial (did it, but action justified) he 
then analyzes the conflict “with a view toward plausibility of presentation and 
ultimate resolution. He must decide whether the case is honorable, suspicious, or 
petty, whether it demands direct or indirect introduction, and whether the 
defendant will benefit from a straightforward or subtle presentation of the 
evidence (150).
72
 
 
Judicial rhetoric provides possible avenues for analyzing narratives with the final aim of 
evaluating the system of values embedded within them. When the Auctor of the 
Rhetorica Ad Herennium writes that the orator must decide if the case is honorable, 
suspicious or petty, we are provided with a with a model which can be extended to the 
ethical evaluation of a travel text, if only to question its inherent morality and how its 
                                                 
72 This quote contradicts Corbett’s assertion: “Whereas judicial discourse is concerned primarily with a 
man’s legal innocence or guilt, ceremonial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s moral 
goodness or badness” (140). 
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value system resonates with the readership. Further, the terms honorable, suspicious and 
petty are only three of a multitude of possible evaluative terms in relation with ethics 
and values. The possibility of using a vast number of evaluative terms demonstrates the 
complexity and importance of rhetoric when it comes to critiquing and appraising on 
ethical grounds. 
It is possible to question whether or not the story being told is the complete 
truth, which as we have stated is an aim of judicial rhetoric. However, as the narrator is 
not present for “cross-examination,” the details of the narrative must be accepted as 
true, with a basis on the autobiographical pact. That is, since the I of the narrator is the I 
of the author, the assumption is that what the narrator relates are facts. It would be 
naïve, of course, to assume that all narrators of travel narratives are always telling the 
truth.
73
 And examples of recits de voyages that are either completely or partially false 
abound in the literature. But as it is impossible to speak directly with the narrator in 
order to exact more details with a view to ascertaining the truth or falsehood of what has 
been related, the reader must accept the content of the tale as true, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. 
We have stated that Aristotle’s aim was to present a logos-based rhetoric. His 
Topics provided a cross-reference in his corpus for building arguments built on logos 
when attempting to prove a case. Later, the Roman rhetoricians would use Aristotle’s 
treatise and expand on the “commonplaces” or loci, in judicial argumentation. When 
searching for loci, questions related to the case would be used to provide orientation: 
The De inventione and the Ad Herennium both provide examples of the loci in 
which we can hope to discover such wise saws and modern instances. First they 
consider the predicament of the judicial orator, whose concern is either with 
prosecution or defense. Among the headings under which he is advised to search 
for general maxims are the following. Should we consider only the crime itself, or 
also the motives for committing it? Should we consider only the text of the law or 
                                                 
73 For an excellent discussion of the truthfulness or lack thereof in travel writing, see chapter 2 in 
Adams: “The Truth-lie dichotomy.” 
134 
 
also the intentions of the legislator? Should we always follow court procedures or 
is there room for flexibility? (Skinner, 114). 
 
In the excerpt above we see the importance that interpretation plays in judicial rhetoric. 
That is, the evaluation of the specific case, keeping in mind all of the possible details in 
order to reach an adequate and fair judgment. In the recit de voyage to be examined in 
this dissertation, the crime that the narrator presents must be evaluated against the 
underlying motives, as well as the extenuating circumstances as the narrator presents 
them. Details related to motive and circumstance will also prove to be the sought after 
details by the interlocutors in Gass’ narrative. T.H. Irwin comments on the assessment 
of human action from a rhetorical perspective, where the act and motives are taken into 
consideration: 
Moral assessment is not directed simply to the gravity of the action, but to the 
attitude underlying it (1374b24-29); that is why evidence of premeditation 
warrants a harsher judgment (1375a7), and why we distinguish action on decision 
from action on emotion (1373b35-38). We present our character in making our 
prohairesis clear (1395b13-14); since a prohairesis characterizes a person as a 
whole, a reference to a person’s prohairesis draws attention to the broader context 
of his action, and therefore to his normal behavior, so that we do not confine 
ourselves to this particular action (1374b13-16) (164). 
 
The motives behind an act necessarily color our moral evaluation of the agent. The 
motives determine the way in which we, as judges, evaluate the actions and, by 
extension, of the responsible agent’s character. This sort of ethical evaluation is 
necessarily complex, as will be seen in Part 4 in the hypothetical case presented by Gass 
of a woman who “abandons” her husband, taking her children with her. Only when 
sufficient information about a particular case is obtained can an adequate judgment be 
made on it. In this way the moral character of an individual, her prohairesis, can be 
evaluated in particular cases. It is interesting to note, as T.H. Irwin tells us, that 
Aristotle deals with certain topics of ethics more fully in his Rhetoric than he does in his 
Ethics (142). This is due to the tight connection that rhetoric has with ethics, although 
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Aristotle would argue that once we have begun to use syllogisms from the field of 
ethics, we have left the field of rhetoric per se behind.  
 We can now, with a view to bringing to the fore further aspects of the judicial 
sphere of rhetoric, examine other commentary made by Aristotle in his treatise that will 
add to the critical and analytical tools that it provides: 
7. Thus, all accusations are either in regard to [wrongs done to] the community or 
to the individual, the accused having acted either in ignorance and involuntarily or 
voluntarily and knowingly and in the latter case either with deliberate choice or 
through emotion (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 98). 
 
We see here the increasing complexity with which Aristotle examines human action. 
First, there is the dichotomy between community and individual. The examples that 
Aristotle provides are:  “[c]ommitting adultery and beating someone up are wrongs to 
some defined individual; refusing to serve in the army wrongs the community” (97). As 
stated in the passage above, ignorance, will and knowledge all play a part in the 
judgment of an action as just or unjust. If emotions play a part, further nuance is added. 
Aristotle also distinguishes between written and unwritten laws: “8. And [one can say] 
that it is characteristic of a better man to use and conform to the unwritten rather than 
the written [laws]” (104). Aristotle’s assertion that the unwritten laws are more 
important than the written laws carries much weight. For the unwritten laws govern our 
behavior with each other in the human community and are those which, as they are not 
expressed in writing, necessarily require a greater degree of tact and character in order 
to meet their standards. 
Aristotle writes that sometimes there are written laws on the books that have 
become obsolete, which reveals that legal matters are always in a state of flux, that that 
what has been put in writing often does not reflect the current reality:  
11. And if, on the one hand, the situation for which the law was established no 
longer prevails but the law still exists, one should try to make this clear and fight 
with this [argument] against the law (104). 
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The system of values that a community uses to base its evaluation of acts on is always 
in evolution. What is deemed ethical or unethical at one point in time is often later 
viewed as obsolete. Attitudes and customs change as society and culture change. An 
obvious case in point would be the use of the so-called soft drugs. The varying attitudes 
towards the use of marijuana, for example, from the 1950s to the present shows how the 
pendulum of values has swung back and forth, and continues to do so up to the 
present.
74
  
Aristotle also writes of the importance of defining wrongs. People will admit to 
having done an action, but will disagree on how it is to be categorized or labeled:  
For this reason, [in speaking we] should give definitions of these things: What is 
theft? What [is] violent assault? In so doing, if we wish to show that some legal 
term applies or does not, we will be able to make clear what is a just verdict . . . 
for if someone has struck another it does not in all cases mean he has “violently 
assaulted” him, [only] if he has done so for a certain reason, such as to dishonor 
him or to please himself. Nor has he committed “theft” in all cases if he took 
something but [only] if for harm and his own advantage. The situation in other 
cases is similar to this (98-99). 
 
This passage from the Rhetoric demonstrates to what extent contingent variables affect 
the definition of a particular action being judged in a case. Precise definition is 
necessary in order to judge appropriately. In order to attain a precise definition, as much 
pertinent detail as possible must be obtained. This point will be illustrated in Part 4 of 
this dissertation with the first narrative under study, but it is crucial in any case that is 
being evaluated: a definition of a specific case must be made based on attainable details 
of actions carried out by human agents, which will lead to a judgment that is based on 
their interpretation. The details, must, at the same time, match a particular definition. 
 The facts of each particular case also include the meaning of what has been 
stated or put into writing. We find this practice in the works of Plato for, as Walker 
                                                 
74 See Nagourney, Adam. “Marijuana, Not Yet Legal for Californians, Might as Well Be.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/us/politics/stigma-fading-marijuana-common-in-
california.html?_r=0 
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informs us, in the Protagoras much of the discussion has to do with establishing what 
the poet Simonides meant. Walker writes: 
This hermeneutical, philological sort of operation is, of course, necessarily a step 
on the way to judgment in a rhetorical encounter: one must determine an agreed-
on version of the “facts” in any given case before advancing arguments and 
making judgments about those facts; one must reach a perception of what a poem 
says and what persuasions it advances before one can assent (or not) to those 
persuasions (Walker – Poetics, 150-51). 
 
The establishing of facts has to do not only with the motives that lie behind actions, but 
a clear understanding of meaning in written and spoken discourse. This procedure forms 
part of the rhetorical process: an attempt must be made to determine the meaning of the 
words and statements used therein. The attempt to do so is linked with the identification 
of what Goodwin calls the “issues” of a case, which she states “are what the trial is 
supposed to be about” (81). She identifies the various ways in which issues can be 
explored in judicial discourse:  
If the arguing is aimed to resolve, it is the issues that are resolved; if it is aimed to 
clarify, it is the issues that are clarified; if it is aimed to explore, it is the issues 
that are explored. Contrariwise, any aspect of the arguing that does not bear on the 
issues can be criticized – e.g., as a fallacy – and perhaps even excluded (82). 
 
These examples bring into high relief the various directions rhetorical analysis can take. 
It is not impossible for all four to be found in (or brought to bear on) a single discussion 
on a particular topic. Although Goodwin’s focus is legal cases, her schema provide 
valuable frameworks that can provide analytical shape to argumentative discourse in 
general. 
Although judicial rhetoric is a field that is not at first glance connected with 
literary studies, if we do some violence to ideas presented in Toulmin’s discussion of 
field dependence, a case can be made for overlapping of methods in legal and literary 
argumentation methods. Toulmin argues that the type of argumentation one uses is 
dependent on the field in which one is working. In his view, it does not make sense to 
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apply the argumentative procedures of one discipline to those of another. Each has its 
own specific discourse and corresponding rules: 
Legal principles hold good in virtue of statutory enactments and judicial 
precedents, the scientist’s laws of nature in virtue of the experiments and 
observations by which they were established, and so on. In all fields, the force of 
our warrants is to authorise the step from certain types of data to certain types of 
conclusions, but, after all we have seen about the field-dependence of the criteria 
we employ in the practical business of argument, it is only natural to expect that 
inference-warrants in different fields should need establishing by quite different 
sorts of procedure (Toulmin – Return, 129). 
 
Toulmin distinguishes between very disparate fields in his discussion above, and argues 
that a different form of argument must be used for each field. While this is true, it is 
possible for some overlap between fields to occur. That is, two fields may have much in 
common in terms of their essential characteristics, and, even though they are very 
different on the surface, at a deeper level the argument tactics that might be employed 
are similar. Literary studies and law are ostensibly very different fields, but I would 
argue that a narrator can be viewed as pleading a case. Thus, some of the procedures 
applied in judicial rhetoric can be applied in rhetorical criticism of a travel narrative. 
There is a parallel between a defendant and a narrator in their presentation of the details 
of their particular experience, which allows us to view, as I have been asserting, a 
narrative to be conceived of as a specific case. The narrator presents the case and the 
reader – in the role of judge – passes judgment on several levels that parallel legal 
procedures of argumentation. I am basing my argument on a broad view of the term 
“case,” as presented in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Kennedy’s remarks on Aristotle’s 
terminology will shed light on this idea: 
It may help the reader if other terms in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric are 
explained in advance. “In each case” (peri hekaston) refers to the fact that rhetoric 
deals with specific circumstances (e.g., particular political or judicial decisions)     
. . . “The available means of persuasion” renders to endekhomenon pithanon, 
“what is inherently and potentially persuasive” in the facts, circumstances, 
character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc. (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 37). 
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Kennedy’s discussion reveals that the term peri hekaston pertains to both political and 
judicial decisions, which can be extended to the judgments of particular cases of 
narrative. We can see that Toulmin’s argument can be supported by Aristotle’s 
terminology in that what is inherently and potentially persuasive in each case will allow 
for field-specific inference-warrants and procedures. At the same time, if there are 
parallels between the procedures of different fields, due to the similarity in terms of 
those characteristics that define a case, it is possible to use similar procedures in 
different disciplines. As narrative is used in judicial cases as a proof which must be 
judged as persuasive or not, judicial procedure can be applied when critiquing and 
analyzing narrative in general. Along these lines, the courtroom can be viewed as an 
extension and institutionalization of what happens on a smaller scale among individuals 
who use narrative in their attempts to persuade and convince their listeners in 
argumentation. 
 Now that aspects of judicial rhetoric have been presented, we can turn to the 
third mode of rhetorical argumentation in Aristotle’s definition. For once judgment has 
been passed on actions that have taken place in the past, these same deeds can then be 
evaluated as either blame- or praiseworthy in the present. This is the territory of 
epideictic rhetoric.  
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2.4 EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC 
The third sphere addressed by Aristotle in his treatise is epideictic rhetoric. Carey 
provides the etymology for the word epideixis in Greek which can be translated as 
“display,” “show,” or “demonstration” which, at first glance, indicates low practicality 
and high ornamentation (Carey 237). The time frame, as has been mentioned above, is 
the present, and its aim is to praise worthy actions or to denounce unworthy actions. 
Corbett provides a succinct description: 
All the rhetoricians agreed that the general aim of ceremonial discourse is praise 
or censure of someone . . . the obvious special topics would be virtue and vice or, 
more generally, the noble and the base. . . Whereas judicial discourse is concerned 
primarily with a man’s legal innocence or guilt, ceremonial discourse is 
concerned primarily with a man’s moral goodness or badness (140). 
 
At once we can see the connection with ethics and epideictic rhetoric. That is, the 
actions of an individual are, in epideictic rhetoric, deemed either praise- or 
blameworthy, evaluative terms that are based on goodness or badness, as Corbett states 
above. 
Focusing only on goodness, Schiappa provides a list of qualities that would be 
praised by Aristotle as honorable and excellent: 
Aristotle provides a definition and description of to kalon, “the honorable,” which 
is the “end” or telos of the epideictic genre. The relationship between to kalon and 
arête (“excellence” or “virtue”) is described . . . The list of praiseworthy qualities 
described by Aristotle would be appropriate primarily for encomia – “justice, 
manly courage [andreia], self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, 
gentleness, prudence, and wisdom” (1.9.5) (Schiappa – Beginnings, 201). 
 
The above list of qualities is linked tightly to what, in Aristotle’s system of values 
would be considered praiseworthy. Of course, an entirely different list of qualities that 
contradict what Aristotle considers praiseworthy could be formulated by another 
individual or group of individuals. None of the values Aristotle lists are necessarily 
universal. “Manly courage,” for example, might be viewed with suspicion from any 
number of critical perspectives. Further, as already discussed, the concrete and specific 
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manifestation of these qualities often leads to dispute about whether or not they are, in 
fact, material epitomes of abstract notions as defined by a particular individual or group. 
What is magnificence to one individual or group could be perceived as extravagance by 
another. What is considered prudence by one individual will be labeled as cowardice by 
another. Along these lines, we have seen how Aristotle prefigures the possibility for 
differing opinion with regards to what different political groups consider the good in the 
discussion in Part 1 on the different types of constitutions. That is, each political group 
has different goods that they value. This idea holds true with differing readerships. In 
this dissertation, I shall, in Part 4 analyze the rhetorical mechanisms present in the travel 
narrative under study from the standpoint of a group that I call a “highly educated and 
cultured readership.” The content of the system of values also surfaces in my analysis. 
The way I define this group is – like other abstract notions – open to dispute, and I do 
not pretend that my definition is conclusive. Further, what I assert to be viewed as 
honorable and excellent by “highly educated and cultured readers” is a definition that is 
meant to be an invitation to a dialogue, with a view to discovering the truth with respect 
to the system of values that underlies the way in which this readership construct 
evaluates the narrator as agent and the recit de voyage under study as work of literature.  
This will become apparent in Part 4 of this dissertation when the text under study is 
examined at close range. 
Due to the celebratory and “ornamental” nature of epideictic rhetoric, its 
usefulness has been questioned. As for judicial and deliberative rhetoric, both have an 
obvious direct link with practical outcomes. In the case of the former, it is to determine 
the facts of a case, and subsequently, the innocence or guilt of the agent being judged. 
As for deliberative, it has as its aim decision-making either for or against particular 
matters in order to prevent harm from coming to the polis on the one hand and to benefit 
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it on the other. Scholars are divided as to whether or not epideictic rhetoric leads to 
practical action or not. Carey, for example, identifies what he views as the role 
epideictic rhetoric takes in decision-making when he states that, unlike judicial rhetoric, 
it has “no immediate practical outcome.” The key word in Carey’s evaluation is 
immediate. For epideictic rhetoric may be viewed as having a persuasive function that, 
although characterized by a lack of immediacy, leads to action which uses the epideictic 
mode as source for the bases of decision-making. The reason for this is that the praise or 
blame of epideictic rhetoric is based on the content of the system of values of the 
community during celebrations, for example, in which this rhetorical mode manifests. 
Along these lines, Walker describes the authority epideictic discourse holds in oral 
societies, and how this rhetorical mode functions as a storehouse of the very values that 
act as the governing persuasive force that both gives shape as well as cohesion to what 
he calls “traditional” societies: 
This power [i.e., suasive] derives, in part, from its felt authority as “permanent” or 
“timeless” discourse embodying ancient, ancestral wisdom. We might say, to 
speak in more contemporary terms, that the epideictic discourse of an oral or 
“traditional” society enunciates, or is felt to enunciate, that society’s archival 
knowledge, its deep belief systems, its sacred postulates, its precedents and 
premises (Poetics, 12). 
 
Walker is writing about oral societies, but it is possible to make the same claims about 
contemporary societies as well, with regard to epideictic discourse. That is, 
contemporary societies’ archival knowledge, deep belief systems, sacred postulates, 
their precedents and premises can also be seen to be present in and operating within 
epideictic discourse documented in written texts. And here it is important to be aware 
that it would be a mistake to assume that what Walker calls ancient, ancestral wisdom 
were an indisputable, monolithic body of knowledge and rules that every member of so-
called “traditional” societies adhered to without questioning. Difference of opinion has 
been present since the beginning of human interaction, even among early or traditional 
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communities.  Although we moderns bemoan our fragmented state when we compare 
our current so-called alienation with that of the Greek polis, division has been part of 
the human story from time immemorial, and when scholars look back on the past and 
view primitive societies as having more cohesion, certainly no small amount of 
idealization of what are often called “golden ages” of humankind is taking place. What 
does remain constant is that at present, we also have a code of values that provides 
meaning to our existence, as well as standards by which to judge what we deem as to 
kalon, just like ancient or previous cultures had. The bases of what is deemed excellent 
may be similar or different, but there is now and always has been a system of values 
that informs human existence, and that is used as a referent for evaluation of praise- or 
blameworthy actions. Literature, as we shall see below, falls under the rubric of 
epideictic rhetoric, and is a similar vehicle for the shaping, storage and transmission of 
the deep belief systems, sacred postulates, precedents and premises of contemporary 
culture and society. If we then take Walker’s assertion that epideictic is “the central and 
fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture” (10 – my italics), we can gain an idea 
of the importance that literary studies hold not only for providing exempla for making 
decisions and taking action, but also for judging that action as being worthwhile or not 
during the fleeting and precarious time we spend, collectively and as individuals, 
between the cradle and the grave.  
 Nor are these the only important functions that epideictic rhetoric, and therefore 
literature, holds. Carey writes that this mode of rhetoric has the function of determining 
what he calls “collective self-definition and self-assertion” (see below). What Carey 
discusses below are the effects that epideictic rhetoric has on the community, in its 
transmission of the deep values contained in a society’s archival knowledge that we 
have mentioned above: 
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While commemorating the achievements of the specific honorandi, it locates them 
in a larger tradition and in the process defines the group present at the event, in 
this case the whole polis, (at least in theory). It thus becomes an act of collective 
self-definition and self-assertion. This is the task of persuasion for the speaker of 
the funeral oration. He must present that collective self-image in a way that is 
inherently convincing and so conducive to the general sense of identity 
(Epideictic, 243). 
 
The values that are present within the society’s archival knowledge are transmitted and 
reflected in commemorative orations. The knowledge that is shared must be presented 
to the listeners so that a feeling of collective identity is attained. This is a major function 
of epideictic rhetoric: creating a sense of a group which holds similar values. In this 
function the overpowering tendency on the part of humans to wish to belong to a group 
composed of individuals that hold similar values is highly evident. Nietzsche calls the 
human tendency to band together in a group the herd instinct, and states that it is linked 
with morality.
75
 The we of epideictic discourse becomes a communal I that identifies 
with the underlying values that are embedded in the speech or text. Of course, when 
Carey states above that the whole polis is defined “in theory” by the process he 
describes, he is suggesting that any society will have its dissenters. To think that an 
entire community completely and harmoniously adheres to all of the rules would be 
absurd. This being the case, it is still true that specific groups can be shown to be 
sharing, along general lines, the same system of values, and that epideictic rhetoric is 
the tool used to express and reinforce these same values in spoken and written 
discourse. 
                                                 
75 Nietzsche writes about this behavior in The Gay Science: “Herd instinct: - Wherever we encounter a 
morality, we find an evaluation and ranking of human drives and actions. These evaluations and 
rankings are always the expression of the needs of a community and herd: that which benefits it the 
most – and second most, and third most – is also the highest standard of value for all individuals. With 
morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as 
a function. Since the conditions for preserving one community have been very different from those of 
another community, there have been very different moralities; and in view of essential changes in 
herds and communities, states and societies that are yet to come, one can prophesy that there will yet 
be very divergent moralities. Morality is herd-instinct in the individual” (114 – 115). 
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 It is the capacity of members of the same community to evaluate and judge that 
makes dissent and/or difference of opinion possible. We have already discussed the 
respective functions of judicial and deliberative rhetoric where a judgment must be 
made. In the case of epideictic rhetoric, the question of whether the audience is a judge 
or not arises. For since epideictic rhetoric has no immediate and no practical outcome, 
the role of the audience is less clear. In this sense, Aristotle can be read as creating a 
dichotomy between judicial/deliberative rhetoric on the one hand and, on the other, 
epideictic rhetoric. For in Aristotle’s definition of the three genres, he states that the 
hearer of judicial and deliberative rhetoric is a judge, but that the hearer of epideictic 
rhetoric is a spectator. As Kennedy explains, the orator spoke “before spectators rather 
than before judges of fact or policy” (Persuasion, 153). We must, however, bear in mind 
Jonathan Barnes’ advice on how to read Aristotle – that is, we should read Aristotle’s 
writings as unfinished texts, as bringing up questions or problems without necessarily 
providing complete answers, or as being thought in process. This makes it possible to 
critically explore what Aristotle has put in writing, instead of using his corpus as a final 
or definitive basis for a system of thought. This way of reading Aristotle also invites us 
to critique or attack his views for inconsistencies. I have also extended this idea and 
suggested that, were he here today, Aristotle would – in the spirit of seeking the truth of 
opinions that characterizes his works – not object to readers’ critiquing his work with a 
view to reaching some sort of reasonable answer to the problems that he presents. This 
is precisely what Brunschwig does in his critical, close reading of the two types of 
hearers found in the Rhetoric (i.e., judicial/deliberative vs. epideictic): 
According to the first dichotomy, the hearer of epideictic speeches should be a 
mere spectator, and not a judge. However, in the following lines, he turns out to 
be a judge of a sort, namely the judge of the ability of the speaker (krinon is 
certainly to be understood at the beginning of the sentence that concerns him) 
(48). 
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Brunschwig includes the epideictic hearer in the category of judge, in this case of the 
speaker’s ability. But we could also reasonably extend the bounds of the object under 
scrutiny and include the content of the speech (i.e., not mere delivery), as well as the 
object of the speaker’s speech (that is, once having heard the oration, the listener could 
then judge if the person [for example] about whom the speech was delivered was, in 
fact, as blame- or praise-worthy as described by the orator). All of this is fair game, 
especially when we consider the fact that the object of praise or blame will be based on 
the norms for this type of assessment held by the specific group that makes up the 
audience. The object of praise or blame either meets or falls short of the standards of the 
community’s agreed upon values. As for dissenters, they will judge the content and 
object of the speech based on their respective system of values, even though there will 
necessarily be overlapping – for dissenters are embedded within the same system. What 
is important here is that, whether as a member of the status quo or as a dissenter, the 
listener acts as a judge, even though there is no immediate practical outcome. The 
listener (or reader) of epideictic rhetoric judges the speaker’s (or writer’s ability) as well 
as the content presented in the body of the speech or text. Action based on the 
assessment may come afterwards. 
Walker writes along these same lines (i.e., practicality vs. impracticality of a 
particular rhetorical mode) when he provides an overview of the differences between 
pragmatikon and epidikteon. In his discussion he sheds light on the functions of each 
type of discourse with respect to judgment and action. According to Walker, the 
traditional division placed the pragmatikon into two categories: 1) legal accusation and 
defense speeches and 2) political assembly speeches. As for the epidikteon, Walker 
states that the “panegyric” discourse used by Isocrates and described as having 
similarities with poetry whose content dealt with “philosophical” questions was the 
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most influential (7). Other models of epideictic discourse were Thucydides and the 
dialogues of Plato. As Walker states, “Epideiktikon . . . came to include everything that 
modernity has tended to describe as ‘literature,’ and more and more comprised a range 
of genres much greater and more various than the handful of speech-types identified as 
pragmatika” (7). Walker takes a sophistic notion of epideiktikon, distinguishing it from 
the pragmatikon based on the audience and venue it is aimed at, as well as the purpose 
it serves. The basic difference between the two modes is that the pragmatikon 
discourses were delivered to judges whose decisions led to specific action. In the case of 
judicial rhetoric the decisions led to a decision on guilt or innocence on the one hand, 
and the enactment or rejection of a law on the other. In the case of deliberative rhetoric 
the enactment or rejection of a proposal which led to action was the objective (8). 
Walker disagrees with the way contemporary scholars oppose the pragmatikon from the 
epideiktikon based on the non-pragmatic nature of the latter. He argues that if the 
epideiktikon are defined by being presented in “nonpragmatic settings, such as festivals, 
public ceremonies, or symposia” (8) in which the audience does not vote for the 
enactment or reject of a verdict or a law but simply applauds and departs, then by the 
same token, if a speech by Cicero is read outside of a courtroom or a speech by 
Demosthenes is read outside of the assembly – due to the fact that no judgment is made 
– they “cease to be pragmatika and instead become epideiktika: they become, in effect, 
performances the reader ‘witnesses,’ as if in a theater – or performances the reader 
mimetically rehearses . . .” (8-9). Walker then states that the audience of epideictic 
rhetoric, according to Aristotle, “is to be not a krites but a theoros, that is one who is to 
make ‘observations’ (theoriai) about what is praiseworthy, preferable, desirable or 
worthy of belief in the speaker’s logos.” This quality of the audience presents epideictic 
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“in more positive terms” (9).76 Walker rounds off his discussion by affirming the 
importance epideictic rhetoric has in terms of its function in the community: 
In every case the function of the epideictic in its nonpragmatic setting is a suasive 
“demonstration,” display, or showing-forth (epidixis) of things, leading its 
audience of theoroi to contemplation (theoria) and insight and ultimately to the 
formation of opinions and desires on matters of philosophical, social, ethical, and 
cultural concern (Poetics, 9 – author’s italics). 
 
The first important point that I wish to highlight in the above passage is Walker’s 
assertion that it is the setting that determines whether texts are to be defined as 
pragmatika or epidiktea. That is, texts such as Cicero’s courtroom speeches or 
Demosthenes’ assembly speeches were in their first setting pragmatika, but when read 
outside of the setting of the courtroom or assembly were epidiktea. The interplay 
between the function of the epideiktea to present and promote values and that of 
pragmatika to make judgments and decisions based on the former comes in to high 
relief in Walker’s discussion. The discourse whose function was decision-making or 
judgment becomes, outside of their original settings, part of the archive of exempla that 
make up the content of epideictic rhetoric. They are, in essence, judgments and 
decisions which have been made already, and thus represent particular instances of the 
system of values of the community. Their functions in their original settings no longer 
have a use with respect to the issues they were concerned with. Still, they are recorded 
representations of previous decisions and judgments made, based on the society’s belief 
system. The second crucial point that Walker makes in his discussion is that the role of 
an epideictic’s audience is to be not a krites but a theoros, and that, in this role, the 
audience engages in the contemplation and formation of opinions and desires on matters 
                                                 
76 Kennedy, who writes that the aim of epideictic speeches is “usually the demonstration of the 
honorable or disgraceful,” adds the important point for our discussion that these orations “are adapted 
to being read as well as being heard by the exactness and detail of the style (1414a18)” (Persuasion, 
152-53). The important point that Kennedy makes here is that not only do epideictic speeches lend 
themselves to the auditorium, but to the reading room as well. As stated, epideictic rhetoric over time 
became equated with literature.  
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of philosophical, social, ethical, and cultural concern. Keeping Walker’s comments in 
mind, we can add Brunschwig’s abovementioned stance regarding the role of the 
audience in epideictic rhetoric as being a judge, due to Aristotle’s having used the 
Greek term krinon to describe its function. That is, that the audience acts as judge. In 
this respect he contradicts Walker’s reading. Be that as it may, if we take both Walker’s 
and Brunschwig’s commentaries into consideration, we see that opinions can be formed 
on the one hand and, on the other, that judgment takes place in epideictic rhetoric. When 
we connect these ideas with the third important point that Walker makes in the passage 
above, that is, that this rhetorical genre has come to include everything modernity 
describes as “literature,”77 the role that a student of literature plays as evaluator and 
judge of not only the aesthetics, but the ethical content with which literary texts are 
saturated, takes on great importance. 
We can take statements that Walker makes when rounding off his discussion of 
the difference between the epideiktikon and the pragmatikon in terms of how each 
functions in the larger mechanism of human thought and communication: 
In this view, “epideictic” appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic 
codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the 
ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a 
community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the 
fundamental grounds, the “deep” commitments and presuppositions, that will 
underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic 
forums. As such, epideictic suasion is not limited to the reinforcement of existing 
beliefs and ideologies, or to merely ornamental displays of clever speech (though 
clearly it can serve such purposes as well). Epideictic can also work to challenge 
or transform conventional beliefs – plainly the purposes of Plato’s dialogues, 
Isocrates’ panegyrics, what remains of Gorgias’ epideictics (particularly Helen 
and the surviving paraphrases of On the Nonexistent), and the sophistic or 
Protagoean practice of antilogy that is parodied in the “speech of Lysias” in 
Plato’s Phaedrus. All such discourses, again, are “epideictic” according to the 
late-sophistic theory of Hermogenes of Tarsus . . . When conceived in positive 
terms and not simply in terms of lack, epideictic discourse reveals itself (as 
                                                 
77 Schiappa writes: “In antiquity, for example, Cicero and Quintilian would later expand the epideictic 
category to include poetry and history. And ‘modern rhetoricians prefer to think of epideictic rhetoric 
as a discourse in any literary genre’ that does not urge specific action (Kennedy 1994, 61-62)” 
(Schiappa – Beginnings, 202-03). 
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Perelman recognized) as the central and fundamental mode of rhetoric in human 
culture. . . Conceived in positive terms, then, the distinction between the 
epideiktikon and the pragmatikon comes down to this: the epideiktikon is the 
rhetoric of belief and desire; the pragmatikon the rhetoric of practical civic 
business, a rhetoric that necessarily depends on and appeals to the beliefs/desires 
that epideictic cultivates (2000 Walker, 9-10).
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Several important points surface in Walker’s discussion. First, epideictic rhetoric 
functions to shape and cultivate the basic codes of values that a particular society or 
culture uses to live by, as well as the ideologies and imageries used by individuals and 
the community. More important is epideictic’s role as the fundamental grounds in terms 
of shared values for decision-making and debate in their respective settings. Thus, as 
Walker asserts, epideictic is not mere reinforcement of the system of values in effect, 
rather it functions to modify this same system by challenging its tenets. His final 
comment that belief and desire govern the epideiktikon and that the pragmatikon, whose 
aims are the management of the practical affairs of the community, shows the 
interdependence as well as the interplay between the two categories. Belief and desire 
establish and provide the motives for the action carried out by material agents in a 
system that operates in mutual feedback. There is cross-pollination between the three 
spheres of rhetoric in terms of values. All three reinforce each other and come into play 
with one another. In relation to these ideas, Walker in his discussion cites Perelman, to 
whom we can now turn. 
In his treatise on rhetoric, Perelman also argues that in its function to persuade or 
to increase adherence epideictic rhetoric has practical value and does not necessarily 
present heady, theoretical ideas; rather its final aims are similar to judicial and 
deliberative rhetoric: practical and decisive concrete action:  
                                                 
78 Perelman views epideictic as reinforcing the value system held by the community of listeners, and in 
this way provides solid ground for the judgments arrived at in judicial and deliberative speeches: “The 
purpose of an epidictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by 
the audience and the speaker. The epidictic speech has an important part to play, for without such 
common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest?” (Treatise, 52-53). 
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The intensity of the adherence sought is not limited to obtaining purely 
intellectual results, to a declaration that a certain thesis seems more probable than 
another, but will very often be reinforced until the desired action is actually 
performed (Perelman – Treatise, 49). 
 
 Praise of an action can easily be interpreted as motivation for the listener (or reader) to 
imitate and carry out the same action. Censure of an action or individual can be read as 
providing the sign posts leading away from the action that is denigrated in the discourse, 
whether oral or written. So we see that viewing epideictic rhetoric as mere 
ornamentation is, in Perelman’s lights, wrongheaded. He takes to task the theoreticians 
who might perceive this mode as mere display of that which is beautiful (to kalon) or 
ugly (to kakon):  
They state that the speaker’s sole concern in epidictic oratory is that which is 
beautiful or ugly . . .To the theoreticians, it was a degenerate kind of eloquence 
with no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing them, facts that 
were certain or, at least, uncontested. . . According to Aristotle . . . in epidictic 
oratory, which is concerned with praise and blame, his sole concern is with what 
is beautiful or ugly. It is a question, then, of recognizing values. But in the 
absence of the concept of value-judgment, and of that of intensity of adherence, 
the theoreticians of speech, from Aristotle on, readily confused the concept of the 
beautiful, as the object of the speech (which was, besides, equivalent to the 
concept of “good”) with the aesthetic value of the speech itself . . . The epidictic 
genre of oratory thus seemed to have more connection with literature than with 
argumentation (49). 
 
Perelman’s interpretation of Aristotle in the above text is, in my view, perhaps a 
misreading. Earlier in this dissertation we have seen that Aristotle has compared the 
judge of judicial rhetoric to an assayer of silver in terms of discovering what is true or 
not about a case. Further, given Aristotle’s work in ethics and how the good is to be 
interpreted on a vast number of areas as well as the attention he pays to minute details 
of every topic he examines, it seems a bit unreasonable to assume that, in his model of 
epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle only pays attention to superficial elements related with 
beauty. Aristotle, as we have seen, states that rhetoric (in general) ought not to be used 
for debased ends. This statement, in my view, necessarily implies that Aristotle presents 
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a definition of rhetoric that, as an art and practice, is linked to ethics in all three forms 
that he has delineated. Perelman’s comment on the theoretician’s appraisal of epideictic 
rhetoric as being degenerate eloquence due to their conflating, from Aristotle on, the 
concept of the beautiful with the object of the speech, whether mistaken or not, is not 
new. Whether epideictic rhetoric is mere surface ornamentation or whether it has 
substantive depth in terms of values has been a point of contention since antiquity.
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Perelman then accuses the theoreticians of viewing epideictic rhetoric as being related 
only to literature and not to persuasion, meanwhile presenting his views as innovative. 
Walker’s work on epideictic rhetoric provides a view that in this regard stands in stark 
contrast. In any case, Perelman’s assertion that epideictic does, in fact, have persuasion 
as its aim or, in any case, often results in persuasion towards action, is crucial to the 
way in which I am using rhetorical analysis to examine what is, in fact and effect, a 
literary (i.e., epideictic) text. My analysis is thus in agreement with both Walker’s and 
Perelman’s stance in that they perceive epideictic rhetoric as playing a crucial role in 
argumentation and persuasion towards concrete action, as well as a form of discourse 
that often challenges existing beliefs and conventions of the community. 
The argumentative bases for the challenges made via epideictic rhetoric are to be 
found in the same system of values that necessarily has opposing points of view. 
Perelman illustrates this idea when he states that “the argumentation in epidictic 
discourse sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might 
not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against 
other values that might come into conflict with them” (51). Along these lines, Perelman 
makes the important point that when epideictic rhetoric is used to reinforce the values of 
                                                 
79 Carey reveals that early in antiquity there was divided opinion, even in the same theoretician, over 
the value of epideictic rhetoric: “Blanket dismissal of epideixis . . . is especially common in Isocrates 
(cf. 4.17, 12.271, 15.247) . . . But despite his sometimes dismissive tone, Isocrates was perfectly happy 
to practice epideictic oratory. He took it seriously” (237). 
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the community, the orator functions as an educator (51). When challenging norms and 
beliefs, the orator may be viewed, from one extreme, as a proponent of change to its 
opposite, that is, as enemy of the community, assuming the stance taken is viewed as 
radically contrary to latter’s interests. In any case, given Walker’s and Perelman’s 
arguments, literary texts can, on a very important level, be seen to function as 
guidebooks that contain the deep values of our culture, and that provide us with models 
for ethical behavior that also reveal points of friction within the same system of values, 
due to inherent yet differing interpretations about what is right and what is wrong. 
Based on the arguments that affirm the persuasive function of epideictic rhetoric 
towards action, it is possible to view literary texts in general and recits de voyage in 
particular as having the power to persuade in favor of or against certain types of 
behavior. In the recit de voyage to be examined in Part 4, the reader as judge can decide 
whether the narrator’s actions are either praiseworthy or blameworthy. Once the 
judgment has been made, the narrator’s actions as described in his narrative can be 
viewed as a model that serves as a source of inspiration for future action to be taken by 
the reader of the text its opposite: behavior to be shunned. 
Walker and Perelman are not alone in their view of epideictic rhetoric’s function 
as persuasive. Oksenberg Rorty also views epideictic rhetoric, due to its embeddedness 
in the system of values, as having an intentional effect on action to be carried out, not 
only by those in power, but by the population at large:  
Even when epideictic rhetoric is directed to ordinary people whose judgments are 
not, by virtue of any public office, constitutive of action, it is intended to form that 
sort of evaluative judgment which is intended to influence their future actions 
(29). 
 
In Oksenberg Rorty’s view, therefore, epideictic rhetoric can be viewed as providing a 
model or anti-model for future behavior or action. This type of modeling is inescapably 
tied to ethics, which, as Walker states above, come into play when the reader or listener, 
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as theoros, contemplates the content of epideictic discourse, or as Brunschwig asserts, 
she acts as judge (krinon) of its content, form, or both. 
What forms does epideictic rhetoric take? It has been mentioned above that 
epideictic rhetoric came to be known as what modernity calls “literature.” This process 
had its beginnings in antiquity, and its extension is broad, for, as Kennedy informs us, 
4
th
 century epideictic rhetoric later evolved into different genres:  
The subdivisions of epideictic recognized in later antiquity, for example 
panegyric, encomium, invective, and funeral oration, are all concerned with 
praising or blaming, and from the rhetorical point of view the more apparently 
unworthy the subject the greater the achievement . . . (Persuasion, 153). 
 
In addition to these subdivisions, all poetry was included in the category epideictic 
(153). This tradition carried over into Roman rhetoric and had an enduring influence on 
rhetorical practices in the system of education:  
The preliminary exercises (progymnasmata) which formed the cornerstone of 
rhetorical training in the Roman period included both praise (enkomion) and 
invective (psogos), refutation (anaskeue) and confirmation (kataskeue) of a range 
of issues (Carey – Epideictic, 249). 
 
The exercises often took the form of paradoxes, in which seemingly unimportant things 
were praised, such as mice, salt, death, beggars, and so on (247). But this does not mean 
that the function of these exercises in epideictic rhetoric was entertainment alone. Carey 
writes: 
Certainly amusement is one of the effects sought by (at least some of) these 
exercises. We have to remember always that most people probably encountered 
these texts in performance. Entertainment value must have been an important 
factor in performance for an audience. But since Gorgias uses his praise of Helen 
to make some important (and programmatic) statements about the art of the logos 
that he professed, this should not be taken as indicating lack of seriousness (247). 
 
Obviously, the idea of entertainment that does not necessarily mean a lack of 
seriousness can also be applied to literary texts written throughout history. The recit de 
voyage to be examined in Part 4, while highly entertaining, can also be read as a serious 
critique of values that are manifest in political practices and the behavior of the players 
155 
 
that take part in the narrative. Further, as the narrator uses rhetoric to make a case for 
himself as agent in a narrative that necessarily conforms to the values of the community 
of readers at whom he aims his discourse, the same system of values can be revealed 
and challenged for its worth in terms of ethics. And so, the narrator, who might be read 
as a sort of dissenter from conventional thought and actions of the community at large 
he is a member of, may also have dissenters that challenge his system of values.  
 Connected to epideictic rhetoric’s function of providing models is its use in 
antiquity for honoring the deceased. As Carey states, in “Athens the most important 
opportunity for declamation was at the state funeral for the war dead” (239). In this 
way, the grave can be interpreted as a sort of symbolic repository that contains the 
entirety of the human community’s system of values. It is at once a reminder of where 
each individual is headed, as well as a point of reference from which to judge action 
carried out while alive. Much like the texts that were once pragmatikon but that, once 
their function was carried out, made the transition to epideiktikon, the actions of the 
dead speak to those of us who will one day join their ranks. The dead function, 
therefore, as agents of the narratives in which they have been immortalized, as crucial 
definers of that which is praise- or blameworthy in our present existence. The actions of 
the dead, whether recorded in memory or writing, hold immense sway over the living. 
Montaigne speaks of the vanity of being desirous of fame, and yet the possibility for 
doing good or harm even after one has passed away exists. Ironically, Montaigne’s 
essays stand as an example in point.  
In relation with our actions and their effects, Ross states that using our will and 
making decisions play an enormous role, for it is “only for voluntary actions that men 
are praised or blamed” (205). These same voluntary actions are recorded in a variety of 
forms, the most important one in a general sense being some form of narrative.  
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Carey brings out other aspects of this rhetorical mode when he states that in 
antiquity the “need for and claims of originality are constant themes” (244). In this 
sense, literature has remained the same throughout history, for contemporary writers 
also strive for originality. Also important is the artistic use of language. Carey writes 
that epideictic rhetoric was different from judicial and deliberative rhetoric in terms of 
its ornate use of language: “Since it is written as a performance, it can afford to put on 
display the verbal craftsmanship that produced it” (245). Thus, instead of perceiving 
epideictic rhetoric as empty ornamentation, it can be viewed as discourse that has value 
not only in terms of its content, but for having been artistically or technically well-
wrought. This demonstration of ability enhances the speaker’s or writer’s status in a 
highly competitive arena: “Thus though the outcomes of epideictic oratory have none of 
the urgency of the other categories, the stakes for the speaker are still high, in terms of 
public standing and (sometimes) profit” (239-240). The above remains true for 
contemporary writers of literature. A writer can make a name for herself due to her 
talent, and, at the same time, if the community in its judgment of her skills places her 
among the great, she can also parlay her skills into lucrative gain. Money and fame have 
been and still are possible rewards for those who publish works of epideictic rhetoric. 
There are three other aspects of epideictic rhetoric that are important for the 
present discussion: 1) its relation to laughter, 2) the naming of vice as virtue and virtue 
as vice, and 3) its function as a game for a highly educated and elite group. As I have 
been affirming throughout my discussion, epideictic rhetoric both praises and blames. 
One form of blame that is connected with this genre is laughter, for it functions as both 
a revealer of and a deterrent to inappropriate behavior: 
We start with a principle – the essential association of laughter with ridicule and 
denigration, and its use against targets regarded as ‘shameful’. This would have 
commanded wide assent from Greeks, since it ties comedy to the observable 
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function of derision in a culture which possessed a strongly developed sensitivity 
to public reproach and dishonour (Poetics, 85). 
 
Laughter can also be used not only against targets that are regarded as shameful, but as 
illogical, unimportant, and so on. In both texts to be analyzed in Part 4, the narrators 
attempt to make their readers laugh, with similar aims of revealing certain aspects of 
human behavior, thought and values as worthy of reproach. Laughter is also a tool that 
is used to disarm the listener or reader, and thus functions, via logos and pathos to the 
building of ethos. 
 Related to praise and blame is the naming of a virtue as vice or vice as virtue. 
When Aristotle presents his list of attributes that are worthy of praise, he also gives 
advice that has seemed to many scholars as being duplicitous. Schiappa writes: 
The section bothers many commentators because Aristotle’s advice is purely 
strategic and implies that speakers should stretch the truth where necessary. For 
example, Aristotle suggests that one should call “an irascible and excitable person 
‘straightforward’ and an arrogant person ‘high-minded’ and ‘imposing’ and 
(speak of) those given to excess as actually in states of virtue, for example the 
rash one as ‘courageous,’ the spendthrift as ‘liberal’; for this will seem true to 
most people and at the same time is a fallacious argument” (1367a33-1367b4) 
(Beginnings, 201). 
 
The important concept presented in the above passage is the fact that, on one level, what 
one person calls thrifty another person will call mean. On another level, Aristotle was 
practical, and, as he had a somewhat less than optimistic view of the audience at large, 
gave advice that – whether one agrees with it or not – is, in essence, expedient. Aristotle 
in this sense was no idealist as was Plato (although even Plato, as is well known, 
advocated lying to citizens, and viewed it as necessary). And so, with respect to how a 
particular behavior or characteristic is perceived, we again find ourselves in rhetoric’s 
field: opinion. Every vice can be viewed as a virtue, and vice versa. It is then up to the 
speaker or writer to argue her case and present sufficient proof in order to convince the 
listener or reader of the tags she uses when qualifying a person’s character or behavior. 
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The final aspect that merits discussion is epideictic’s function as a sophisticated 
game for highly educated elitists. This is important for my dissertation because the 
travel narrative under study is a product that has been produced, packaged and marketed 
for a readership that I am calling “highly educated and cultured.” In the construct that I 
present, this same readership could easily be labeled as elitist. And this group of readers 
plays the game based on the system of values to which it adheres. This game has its 
roots in antiquity, as Ford informs us. He states that in Plato’s Simonides the importance 
of being able to show off a sense for ta kala, which is “what the game is about” is 
present (193). This display was to be sophisticated, and was the territory of the elite, 
which both Plato and Aristotle agree on (Ford, 193-195). Ford spells this out in his 
discussion on Plato’s Simonides as follows: 
At the dinner party, by contrast, art is regarded from the point of view of the 
connoisseur, one who can praise and blame the products of artisans. The 
“aesthetic” observations here serve to establish social differences between general 
and schoolteacher, Athenian and Eretrian, and, by implication, between guest and 
servant, and indeed between the dyer-maid and one who can wear a purple cloak. 
These gentlemen regard the producers of art as a banausic class removed from 
“the fair” (193). 
 
A major difference that immediately comes to the fore is that in contemporary society 
there is a cult of the artist that, for all intents and purposes, deifies their endeavours. Be 
that as it may, the point that I wish to bring out is the game that has been played since 
antiquity by those “in the know” about what is fine and what is not fine in terms of art, 
music and literature – the good life – is still being played. What is more, the 
competition is fierce, and those who play, play to win. Just like the symposiasts 
mentioned above, contemporary connoisseurs use their knowledge to create difference 
in terms of socio-economics, placing themselves at the apex of the hierarchical 
construct whose foundation is built upon what is, at bottom, opinion of what the good 
life consists of. This sort of elitist attitude and behavior is still important among students 
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and readers of literature, as we will see in the analysis I undertake of the travel narrative 
examined in Part 4.
80
 
  
                                                 
80 See Bourdieu. 
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2.5 INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL PROOFS 
Now that major aspects of the three rhetorical modes in Aristotle’s definition have been 
presented, we may now turn to the bases of argumentation that are necessarily present 
and utilized in all three. As rhetoric’s area of operations is opinion and not hard facts, 
the most important structural element that provides the foundation for persuading or 
convincing a listener or reader of the argument that one is presenting are the reasons 
that give credence to the view being advocated.  We have already mentioned that 
Aristotle, in his discussion of judicial rhetoric, complains that prior manuals only 
provided strategies for emotional appeals to persuade the listener, and that his aim was 
to put logos at the center of his art of rhetoric, or art of persuasion. Later, however, to 
logos he adds pathos and ethos, the three of which he calls pisteis, or proofs.
81
 In the 
following passage from the Rhetoric, Aristotle criticizes the composers of manuals prior 
to his own with respect to their treatment of proofs: 
As things are now, those who have composed Arts of Speech have worked on a 
small part of the subject; for only pisteis are artistic (other things are 
supplementary), and these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the 
“body” of persuasion, while they give their attention to matters external to the 
subject (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 31). 
 
In the passage above we see that Aristotle initially divides forms of persuasion into two 
categories, artistic and non-artistic. He states that only pisteis are artistic, and that 
previous composers of manuals of rhetoric have not addressed the issue of enthymemes. 
That is, as we have mentioned above, they have only focused on appeals to the emotions 
which, as Aristotle states in this part of the Rhetoric, are not relevant to rhetorical 
argumentation. Kennedy provides a concise summary of the two categories Aristotle 
has delineated: 
                                                 
81 Kennedy provides several possible definitions of pistis: “Pistis (pl. pisteis) has a number of different 
meanings in different contexts: ‘proof, means of persuasion, belief,’ etc.” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 31) 
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Forms of persuasion are either:  
a. Non-artistic: direct evidence – facts, witnesses, documents 
b. Artistic: logical arguments constructed by speaker of two types: 
i.Inductive argument, called paradigm, or example 
ii. Deductive argument, called enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, from stated  
or implied premises (21). 
 
Non-artistic proofs such as direct evidence, facts, witnesses and so on are not created by 
the rhetor, rather they exist already and can be used as they stand. One simply needs, 
say, in the case of witnesses, to have them repeat their version of the event they have 
observed, their testimony serving as support to prove the case being made. Of course, as 
De Brauw argues, the non-artistic proofs were often utilized in an artful way.
82
 One 
need only consider the way the witness might put into words their version of what they 
perceived. The same is true of documents or evidence. It is not just the what of 
presenting evidence that matters. The how carries enormous weight as well. Still, in the 
Aristotelian model of proofs, those he calls artistic are different in the sense that the 
rhetor using the art of rhetoric – which, as we have seen, Aristotle views as an ability to 
perceive what is persuasive – must create them. These artistic proofs are based on 
inductive and deductive probability, due to rhetoric’s field being opinion. Thus, they are 
based on logic and reason.   
Aristotle then identifies three pisteis, or categories of artistic proof in the 
Rhetoric: “that found in the character of the speaker, that found in the state of mind 
produced in the hearer, and that found in the speech itself insofar as it proves or seems 
to prove (81356a1 ff.)” (Kennedy – Persuasion, 90). The first category in the above 
excerpt is ethos, the second is pathos, and the third is logos. Thus, while Aristotle’s aim 
at the beginning of his treatise is to create a rhetoric in which logos functions as the core 
proof, he also recognizes the importance that pathos (emotion) has, as well as a third 
                                                 
82 De Brauw writes: “Aristotle’s distinction between artistic and artless proofs is seminal, yet in 
oratorical practice the distinction is blurred, for artless proofs are handled quite artfully” (196). 
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proof which is equally or perhaps even more important: ethos (character). The three 
types of proofs are, in the definition of rhetoric that Aristotle elaborates, inextricably 
woven together. They make up the driving force behind rhetorical persuasion, and 
together stand as the underlying reasons that provide the foundation for reasonable 
argument. 
 As Aristotle’s modus operandi throughout his works is to critique (both 
positively and negatively) previous thinkers and writers,
83
 we can, at this point, with a 
view to providing a context for Aristotle’s ideas on this issue, consider some of the 
thinkers who were also working with argumentative discourse in 4
th
 century Athens and 
earlier. In this way it will be possible to see in what ways Aristotle worked along similar 
lines, and how he distinguished himself. 
Gorgias was one of these thinkers. Kennedy writes: “In addition to logical 
argument Gorgias recognized the persuasive force of emotion. He regarded an orator as 
a psychagogos, like a poet, a leader of souls through a kind of incantation” (63). 
Gorgias, therefore, based his method of argumentation on both logos and pathos. Nor 
was he the only thinker from antiquity that can be identified as using more than one 
proof as a tool for argumentation. Kennedy writes that “[f]ifth century oratory as seen 
especially in Antiphon and Euripides uses ethos and pathos as forms of proof, but then 
so did Homeric oratory” (63). So here we can conclude that, on the one hand, Gorgias 
addressed at least two of the proofs that Aristotle claims he is the first to theorize on 
and, on the other, that the usage in Antiphon, Euripides and Homer of ethos and pathos 
as forms of proof show that the two means were – at least in practice – known. Lysias 
also utilized several forms of proof, including direct evidence, refutation by probability 
and character (91). Thus, Lysias – although without categorizing them as such - utilized 
                                                 
83 Cicero followed Aristotle’s method, attacking earlier writers. See Dominik and Hall, “Confronting 
Roman Rhetoric.” 
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the two categories of proofs defined by Aristotle (i.e., artistic and non-artistic) in 
combination with the proofs logos and ethos (91). 
Isocrates was another thinker who recognized two categories of proofs. For, 
according to de Brauw, Isocrates’ Rhetoric to Alexander “employs essentially the same 
distinction [pisteis atechnoi, pisteis entechnoi] with different terminology” (195). So we 
see that other thinkers at the time were working along similar lines as Aristotle. 
However, Aristotle’s great achievement lies in his having brought the concept of artistic 
and non-artistic proofs together with the three pisteis (i.e., logos, pathos and ethos) and 
having combined all of these concepts into a single method of persuasive 
argumentation. We can now look at the text from the Rhetoric which outlines the above 
discussion:  
3. Of the pisteis provided through speech there are three species; for some are in 
the character [ethos] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some 
way [pathos], and some in the speech [logos] itself, by showing or seeming to 
show something (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 38). 
 
It is important to bear in mind in Aristotle’s threefold division of proofs that the three 
proofs are inextricably woven together, and are always present in persuasive 
argumentation. Another point that comes to the fore in the above passage is the idea that 
the bases of argumentation used in rhetoric include probability as well as hard facts. For 
when Aristotle states above that some of the proofs are in the speech, or logos, itself, 
and that these proofs show or seem to show something, he is stating in no uncertain 
terms that the field of rhetoric is opinion. At the same time however, classic syllogisms 
of pure logic that are not based on probability but on empirically verifiable truths also 
come into play. Aristotle goes on to define the two proofs ethos and pathos in greater 
detail. He first fleshes out his definition of ethos, or character: 
4. [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such 
a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded 
people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in 
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general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room 
for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that 
the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the 
handbook writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness 
[epieikeia] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; 
rather, character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion 
(38 – 39). 
 
What Aristotle is detailing in the excerpt above is the how of rhetorical transmission. 
For he states that when the speech is spoken in a way that makes the listeners believe 
the speaker, it has to do less with the content of the argument contained in logos, as with 
the manner in which the arguments are presented. Aristotle mentions fair-mindedness as 
being a quality that the speaker must present herself as possessing in terms of her 
character. This quality (among others he discusses later) works to persuade the 
audience. It is at this point in his treatise that Aristotle also makes the very important 
point that that the audience’s perception of the speaker as being fair-minded must not 
come from the speaker’s prior reputation. Rather, it must come from the speech itself – 
at the time the speech is delivered. The other striking point that Aristotle concedes in 
this passage is that ethos perhaps is the proof that carries the most weight in persuasion. 
What he is implying here is that a speaker might argue using logos forcefully, managing 
to not say anything that contradicts the point she is making, but if she does not present 
an image of herself as being fair-minded or amicable, she will not manage to convince 
her audience.
84
 This means that the opposite situation, where the arguments are poorly 
constructed yet the speaker manages to convince the audience in terms of her character, 
is possible. This, as we all know, is the strategy used by many politicians, where 
political elections are often more of a personality contest than campaigns that present 
reasonable argumentation for the policies that each candidate intends to implement.  
 Aristotle then expands on his definition of pathos:  
                                                 
84 In Roman rhetoric, a speaker’s auctoritas could, at times, make logos superfluous, even offensive. 
See Dugan (in Gunderson). 
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5. [There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion 
[pathos] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and 
rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said 
contemporary technical writers try to give their attention. The details on this 
subject will be made clear when we speak about the emotions (38-39). 
 
In the above excerpt we see again that the speaker must arouse emotions (pathe) 
through what she says in the speech (logos), and that emotional states affect the way we 
judge a particular case or circumstance. 
In this concise summary, Aristotle provides the basic weaponry of 
argumentation: Through logos a speaker shows or seems to show something via 
argumentative discourse - what I have been calling reasoning and informal logic. 
However, logos is not sufficient in and of itself: we believe a speaker who manages to 
prove to us that he is trustworthy in terms of his character. Crucial here is Aristotle’s 
comment that it is the way the speech is delivered that leads to belief. Finally, Aristotle 
states that we are persuaded when our emotions have been guided in a particular way. In 
relation with the emotions, Aristotle makes the important point that our emotions affect 
the way in which we perceive the reality of any given situation. Someone who is angry 
does not view the same situation on a Monday morning as she would on, say, a Friday 
afternoon. 
Aristotle sums up succinctly the three pisteis as follows: “All people are 
persuaded either because as judges they themselves are affected in some way or because 
they suppose the speakers have certain qualities or because something has been 
logically demonstrated” (194). In this excerpt Aristotle refers to pathos, ethos and logos, 
respectively. Important is his repetition of the term judges with respect to persuasion in 
general. This reinforces the idea that the listener of an epideictic speech is a judge. The 
other nuance that is important here is Aristotle’s stating that people view themselves as 
being affected in some way. This indicates the importance that selfishness plays with 
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respect to the emotions. If the listener views herself as being affected, she will 
necessarily become emotionally involved. The job of the rhetor is to effectively engage 
the listener emotionally, and that is done through making listeners feel that they are 
somehow implicated by the argument being presented. 
As for Aristotle’s stating that the speakers have certain qualities, here we see 
that it is not just presenting oneself as being fair-minded, rather that there is an entire set 
of qualities that the speaker must project if she is to be an effective persuader. 
Throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle brings more of the qualities that he views as 
necessary into his discussion. Crucial here also is that the speaker must be perceived as 
being a certain type of person for a particular audience. This concept is highly 
important, for a community of listeners is usually persuaded by a speaker who holds 
qualities that are demonstrative of the value system upon which the audience bases its 
evaluation of what is desirable. If a speaker is classed as an undesirable, the chances of 
persuading her audience of her position are low to nil, no matter how well she argues it. 
The usual rule for rhetorical persuasion in terms of ethos and logos is “like attracts 
like,” not “opposites attract.” 
The basic model presented by Aristotle on the three proofs has been commented 
on extensively throughout history. The commentaries shed light upon what Aristotle 
was trying to transmit in his model. Also, the way readers of Aristotle’s ideas reword 
what was presented in the Rhetoric adds to our understanding, thereby showing the 
richness of the original text. For example, the way in which Kennedy presents 
Aristotle’s arguments also adds nuance to our knowledge of Aristotle’s text. Kennedy 
states that three things provide the basis of persuasion: “[T]he truth and logical validity 
of what is being argued, the speaker’s success in conveying to the audience the 
perception that he or she can be trusted, and the emotions that a speaker is able to 
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awaken in an audience to accept the views advanced and act in accordance with them” 
(Rhetoric, x). Kennedy places importance on truth and logic with respect to logos, and 
in this way equates the two. This undermines criticisms of rhetoric as being purely 
sophistic argument that is used only by corrupt politicians or executives using Wall 
Street advertising tactics. Important here is the idea that the speaker must be perceived 
as trustworthy, for, although it is somewhat obvious to even make this assertion, an 
audience must view the speaker as being both credible and honorable. Kennedy goes on 
to state that contemporary rhetoric has expanded “somewhat” (quotation marks are 
Kennedy’s) Aristotle’s definitions: “Logical argument is called logos; projection of the 
speaker’s character is called ethos; awakening the emotions of the audience pathos” (x). 
Kennedy discusses Aristotle’s influence on later writers from antiquity. For Quintilian, 
Cicero and the Stoics all interpreted the Rhetoric differently and to their own ends: 
Quintilian 3.5.2) [sic] revived a set of three functions – to teach, to charm, and to 
move – which are basically the three forms of proof accepted by Aristotle - 
logical, ethical, and pathetical. In justifying the latter of the three Cicero 
introduced the notion that the orator must sincerely feel the emotions he is trying 
to awaken in his listeners (De oratore 2.189 ff.). The Stoic concept made 
unnecessary any distinction between a good statesman and philosopher on the one 
hand and a good orator on the other, for to the Stoics the thought of the speech 
was the speech and would produce its own natural and good expression. Rem tene, 
verba sequentur, ‘hold to the subject, the words will follow,’ was Cato’s 
expression of it . . . (Persuasion, 293). 
 
The interpretation of rhetoric in a way that modifies Aristotle’s version can be seen as 
the appropriation and use of rhetoric for ends that Aristotle may or may not have agreed 
with. This is a repetition of the process of evolution that Aristotle himself participated 
in. For, as we have seen, Aristotle took Plato’s definition of dialectic and rhetoric and 
reworked it to fit the way he viewed rhetoric as a method for argumentation, and, in his 
redefinition, radically changed its structure and aims. This is fair game in rhetorical 
practice, and, in the end, it is the audience that must decide which definition to use, 
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based on how convincingly the definition is presented in argument. That being the case, 
Quintilian’s use of the words to teach, to charm and to move in his discussion of their 
Greek parallels, logos, ethos, and pathos provides further insight into the way rhetoric is 
perceived as functioning, as well as into the system of values to which Quintilian 
adhered. For to translate logos as to teach is not quite the same as to prove logically. 
And to state that ethos has to do with charm adds nuance that we do not see in 
Aristotle’s text, but that nevertheless adds color to this proof’s qualities. At the same 
time, the term charm indicates how a person may convince through means that are not 
necessarily logical, their personal charisma often having an overpowering effect that 
perhaps has little to do with the force of argument, and which makes it possible to 
persuade, even in the absence of sound logic. 
 The notion introduced by Cicero that the speaker must sincerely feel the 
emotions could indicate uneasiness with what has been perceived as Aristotle’s having 
tossed in the towel in terms of ethics. That is, as Aristotle’s treatise is rife with 
ambiguities, he can be interpreted as being expedient to an extreme when it comes to 
persuading an audience – so much so that commentators label him as unethical. We 
have seen this in relation with his treatment of the virtues, where he asserts that a vice 
must be presented positively, for example, if someone is tight-fisted, they should be 
described as being thrifty. His discussion of the emotions comes under similar fire, for 
Aristotle can be interpreted as advocating the use of emotions to manipulate the judge 
unfairly, rather than using emotions to put the judge in the proper state of mind in order 
to adequately evaluate the seriousness of a particular case, or to engage the judge 
emotionally in order to ensure that he takes a vested interest in the case. So Cicero’s 
idea that the speaker must sincerely feel the emotions being aroused can be read as a 
desire to make sure that the emotions are not used for unfair manipulation.  
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 The Stoic notion rem tene, verba sequentur that Kennedy mentions in the 
passage above shows a similar preoccupation with the character of the speaker along 
ethical lines. As Walker states it, “[s]peaking well was a function of knowing well and 
thinking prudently, and the authority of what was said would arise from the speaker’s 
dignitas (Poetics, 74). A person that is morally upright will necessarily produce a logos 
that reflects her character. 
In relation with the three pisteis, Grimaldi accurately states that they address the 
whole person: “It should not, then appear strange that when Aristotle studies the art 
which is directed to pre-disposing the person to action he would consider the art as 
affecting the whole person: intellect, ethos, pathos” (27-28). Grimaldi extends his 
argument as follows: 
Philosophically no other approach would seem possible for Aristotle. Rhetoric 
incorporated as integral components reason, ethos and pathos and addressed itself 
to the whole man. There could be no division or separation between reason and 
purely logical demonstration on one side and the emotions and appetitive 
dynamism on the other. If rhetoric is to work within the terms of Aristotle’s 
philosophical commitments reason and appetite must cooperate (28). 
 
In Grimaldi’s discussion, we can see the particular bias that he (as well as many other 
scholars) gives to the institution of rhetoric. For when he states that “philosophically” 
no other approach would seem possible to Aristotle, his use of this term is no doubt an 
attempt to elevate rhetorical studies to the level of philosophy. I have mentioned this 
age-old dispute in my overview of the literature, but here the point that I wish to bring 
out is that Grimaldi is also participating in the process of borrowing and subsequent 
appropriation that Aristotle modeled when he wrote a treatise that stood, in many 
respects, in stark opposition to Plato’s ideas on the same discipline. The question that 
arises here is whether Aristotle would use the term philosophically to describe the 
approach he has articulated in the Rhetoric in the same way Grimaldi does, or whether 
there would be egregious differences in terms of how the two thinkers define the same 
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term. In any case, the way Grimaldi colors the tri-partite system of proofs outlined by 
Aristotle is interesting, in that it betrays a desire to take what, in my opinion, Aristotle 
viewed as a highly practical system to be used in the crush and hubbub of the material 
world, to the lofty heights of philosophical speculation, even though Grimaldi links it 
with desire. In any case, Grimaldi’s observation that Aristotle’s version of rhetoric 
works on the whole man, while using 20
th
 century terminology, provides an interesting 
stance in terms of how the three pisteis operate in conjunction within a single 
individual. 
Other contemporary scholars add nuance to Aristotle’s text when they use the 
term psychological. Oksenberg Rorty does so in order to describe the connections 
between the three pisteis: 
Aristotle distinguishes three interconnected dimensions of persuasion (pistis): 
ethos, pathos, and logos. Each of these interdependent avenues to persuasion 
explains the dominant place that Aristotle accords psychology in the Rhetoric. . . 
First, the knowledge of psychology enables the orator to present himself as having 
a trustworthy ethos. Second, it enables him to address the interests of his audience 
persuasively. Third, it provides some of the basic premises for his arguments (8). 
 
To apply the term psychology to the thought of 4
th
 century Athenians is perhaps an 
anachronism.
85
 Still, this appropriation by Oksenberg Rorty demonstrates Plett’s view 
that classical rhetoric is constantly being “re-invented,” and in this way continues to 
play a major role in human communication, as it has been doing throughout history. 
Oksenberg Rorty continues her argument on the psychological nature of Aristotle’s 
version of rhetoric: 
The third reason for Aristotle’s including a detailed discussion of the ethe and 
pathe among rhetorical topoi is that pretheoretical psychology provides useful 
information for practical deliberation. Like the poet, the rhetorician needs rough 
generalizations to represent the thoughts and desires, speech and action of many 
different types of agents, as they would be perceived by his audience (10). 
 
                                                 
85 In the next passage she uses the term “pretheoretical psychology.” 
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In popular, contemporary language usage, we would say that the rhetor, or orator, needs 
to “psych her audience out.” In Oksenberg Rorty’s discussion, therefore, we can 
observe the very practical nature of rhetorical discourse. The deployment of these same 
psychological skills needed to persuade an audience are, as Skinner informs us, also 
explored by Quintilian:  
The skill required, as Quintilian repeatedly emphasises, is that of knowing how to 
relate our views to popular opinion (vulgi opinione), how to make use of 
assumptions that are generally accepted (publice recepta) and how if necessary to 
make straightforward appeals to the prejudices of our audience (117). 
 
Quintilian’s method can also be viewed from a contemporary perspective as 
psychological. There are parallels in Perelman’s practice in the 20th century. Both 
writers use the Rhetoric as their source:  
Our thesis is, on the one hand, that a belief, once established, can always be 
intensified, and, on the other hand, that argumentation is a function of the 
audience being addressed. Consequently, it is legitimate that the person who has 
acquired a certain conviction should be at pains to strengthen it for himself and, 
more especially, against possible attack from without. And he will naturally 
consider all arguments capable of reinforcing that conviction. These new reasons 
may intensify his conviction, protect it against certain lines of attack he had not 
thought of originally, make its significance clearer (Treatise, 44). 
 
The assertions above about tailoring one’s speech to the particular audience using the 
proofs logos, pathos, and ethos, are psycho-logical. Perelman’s comments illustrate the 
importance of knowing and addressing the needs of the audience. And it will be the 
phronimos who, by means of the psychological art of persuasion, will manage to 
persuade the crowd of his arguments. Of course, Aristotle concedes that, due to the 
audience, even the best phronimos may not manage to persuade. As already stated, he 
compares this situation to doctors who, regardless of how well they diagnose, cannot 
always cure a patient.  
Aristotle provides the format for persuasion based on the three pisteis: 
7. Since pisteis come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an 
understanding of them is the function of one who can reason logically and be 
observant about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of 
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the emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and how) . 
. . The result is that rhetoric is like some offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and 
ethical studies (which is rightly called politics). Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself 
up in the form of politics . . . (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 39). 
 
In Aristotle’s view, in order to persuade using the three proofs, one needs to possess the 
capacity to grasp an understanding of the pisteis with logical reasoning, know the 
characters and virtues, and understand emotions. As we have seen, Oksenberg Rorty 
calls this pretheoretical psychology. And although Aristotle’s recipe is quite simple in 
its basic ingredients, it is, in fact, quite complex psychologically. To manage to 
convince an audience of one’s arguments is not easy. Nor, for that matter, is it easy to 
convince a single individual.  
Aristotle then states in the passage above to call rhetoric an offshoot of dialectic 
and ethical studies, which he states is rightly called politics. Doubtless this is due to 
Aristotle’s viewing ethics in relation to the existence of an Other. Once there is an 
Other, ethics come into play, and given sufficient numbers of others, this can be equated 
with politics. Politics is ethics on a large scale, and rhetoric is its vehicle, in Aristotle’s 
system.  
The fact that Aristotle includes ethos and pathos in his definition of rhetoric 
has importance with respect to its tradition.  According to Brunschwig, having 
included these two proofs stand as a response to Plato’s anti-rhetorical stance:  
In this way, he [Aristotle] is able to determine to what extent some parts of these 
data (rejected as a whole in a somewhat simplified version of the antirhetorical 
Platonic tradition, and one-sidedly exploited, on the contrary, by some 
technographers) could be saved and incorporated within a new rhetoric, both 
philosophically respectable and practically efficient (46-47). 
 
Vis-à-vis Plato’s Socrates’ true rhetoric, Aristotle’s salvaging of and incorporation of 
ethos and pathos into what was then a new rhetoric is both sound, in terms of 
reasonableness, and functional with respect to practical efficiency as it is related to how 
argumentation fits within human affairs. Aristotle’s presentation of ethos and pathos in 
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his text is seminal and masterly, for it is in his text that these two elements are fully 
interconnected with logos and properly defined as respectable and adequate proofs for 
argumentation. In fact, we must extend this argument further by stating that Aristotle 
recognized the roles that these two proofs necessarily play in the art of persuasion and 
argumentation. Without ethos and pathos, logos fails. In real rhetorical practice, both 
character and emotions can and do function as a guide to the validity or non-validity of 
arguments. Kennedy summarizes Aristotle’s position on pathos: 
In the first half of book two Aristotle discusses the disposition of mind which 
creates emotion, the persons at whom it is directed, and the occasion which 
produces it; anger and mildness, love and hate, shame, favor, pity, and envy are 
the principal emotions discussed. It is not Aristotle’s intention to recommend a 
change in practice – he points out the special need for a knowledge of the 
emotions in the peroration (1419b10 ff.) – but only to provide depth of knowledge 
and to emphasize those features of oratory which are in fact most important in 
successful speaking (Persuasion, 94). 
 
Here the point that I make above is reinforced: Aristotle was well-aware of the role that 
the pathe play in persuasion. This is also true for ethos, which at one point he, as 
Brunschwig informs us, “goes so far as to qualify ethos, although with some caution, as 
‘so to say, the main proof’ (1356a13)” (46). 
 There are other aspects of rhetoric that might also be considered proofs: lexis 
(style) and hupokrisis (delivery). Elocution also plays a role in gaining the trust of an 
audience. All three of these can be seen as manifestations of or at least as being tightly 
connected to ethos, for we judge a person’s character based on their style of speaking 
(or  writing), as well as on their delivery and elocution. The speaker (or writer) who 
does not have good style or delivery is certain to fail. Some theorists are unhappy with 
Aristotle’s having included these elements in his treatise, doubtless because they want a 
rhetoric whose arguments are based only on logos. But other scholars side with 
Aristotle: 
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Daniele Barbaro, for example, defends Aristotelian lexis and hupokrisis by 
arguing that every motion of the mind has its own face, and voice, and gesture, 
and it is important that these inevitable concomitants of expression not be at odds 
with what is expressed [Barbaro and Barbaro, 1545, 547-48] (Green, 57). 
 
This ties in nicely with the idea of expressing the truth, or, at any rate, what one 
believes to be the truth. If what the speaker has within is felt to be true, that which is 
expressed should accurately reflect that truth. As for elocution, Green writes that 
Cipriano Suarez, a 16
th
 century rhetorician makes the following statement:  
Inattention to elocution is like “leaving a sharpened sword in its scabbard” 
(similia gladio condito atque intra vaginam haerenti; Suarez, 1569, fol. 47v). So 
also for action, which is eloquence of the body (158). 
 
The simile brings into focus the link between truth and its potential vs. real power. For 
if a sword remains in its scabbard its true qualities cannot be put into use. In this simile 
the idea that Suarez wishes to bring out is that the truth of an argument must be 
uncovered and presented in its form per se, and that it is through elocution that its full 
effect and force will be achieved. It is through elocution that a sort of unveiling occurs, 
allowing the aim for which the argument is designed to be achieved. On the contrary, 
poor elocution will hamper the reception of the message being transmitted due to its 
being hidden, thereby reducing its capacity for persuasion.
86
 
 The three pisteis – logos, pathos and ethos – infuse narrative as a functional unit 
that operates as an integrated ensemble of proof in rhetoric. Narrative in classical 
rhetoric was often included in the proof section, one of the basic sections of an oration. 
Kennedy lists the four basic sections of an oration:  “1) prooemium or introduction   . . . 
2) narration . . ., [which is] the exposition of the background and factual details, 3) proof 
. . ., and 4) epilogue or conclusion. . .” (Persuasion, 11). So here we see also that 
                                                 
86 Poor elocution can also have a positive persuasive effect, depending on the circumstances. For it is 
possible that a sincerely, but poorly delivered speech (in terms of elocution) could arouse pity and in 
that way be persuasive.  
175 
 
narrative functions to provide background and factual details of a judicial case. De 
Brauw explains how narrative functions in the proof section as a proof in itself: 
[The proof sections] often consist of large portions of narration. The introduction 
of documents, for example, might require the speaker to relate additional 
background . . . [or to] recount a story to impeach an opposing witness’ 
credibility. . . [to] cite historical events . . . assert damaging ‘facts’ . . . hurl 
invective . . . (196). 
 
De Brauw states that the proof section is in practice “something of a catchall category” 
(196). His comment describes the various uses to which narrative can be put to use. The 
usefulness of narrative as example and basis for argumentation was known to Isocrates 
as well, as can be seen in this quote from his Panegyricus: 
For the deeds of the past are indeed an inheritance common to us all; but the 
ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to think of what is 
relevant about them in each instance (ta prosekonta . . . enthumethenai), and to set 
them forth well in words, is the peculiar gift of men who can think well (ton eu 
phronounton)” (Isocrates, Panegyricus 9, tr. G. Norlin, adapted) (Bons - 
Reasonable, 18). 
 
I bring this up because one of the functions I have mentioned above that the travel 
narrative to be examined potentially has is to provide a historical example that may 
provide a reference point for deliberative thought about future decisions. This also falls 
in line with Isocrates’ practice, for in the Areopagiticus he urges to be on guard for 
future problems in a time of peace and prosperity based on what has occurred in the 
past: “[Isocrates’] claim may seem uncalled for in the present circumstances, but he 
substantiates his call for alertness by referring to history” (17). From narratives about 
the past we can form doxa by which to guide our present and future actions and make 
predictions about the future:  
By observing what regularly happens as a consequence of something else one can 
gain insight in the laws of cause and effect, and this in turn provides one with a 
kind of prognostic capability by which one can react effectively in future 
occasions . . . [Isocrates’ phraseology in Greek] indicates that what Isocrates is 
thinking of is the tackling of pragmatic problems with reasoning of the basis of 
probability (17 – author’s brackets). 
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Isocrates’ aim is to use narrative examples from history as a form of proof when 
attempting to persuade rhetorically. As I will demonstrate in Part 4 of this dissertation, 
narrative necessarily utilizes logos, pathos and ethos in order to convince the reader of 
the underlying arguments. All three elements are always present in any narration, 
whether explicit or implicit. Since the three proofs are necessarily present in a narrative, 
this mode of discourse has persuasion as one of its aims, and thus has the capacity of 
standing as a proof in itself. 
 In addition to implicit arguments that can be made explicit in narrative, surface 
arguments can also be identified. Walker brings this point up in his discussion of 
whether story or argument is more elemental: 
It may be, of course, that posing a question whether story (narration) or argument 
(discursus) is more “fundamental” can only lead us to a chicken-or-the-egg 
problem that we ought not try to solve. Perhaps the most that we can say is that 
there will be places in an argument, or in a “speech” or “lyric,” where 
stories/narratives will arise – most notably, for classical rhetoric, in the narratio 
section of the standard oration, though story/narrative can arise anywhere for 
purposes of amplification and even for proof – and there will be places in a 
story/narrative where argument/discursus (or “speeches”) will arise, as the 
narrator and /or characters comment on their situations, deliver their rationales for 
one or another choice of action, debate with one another, reflect on the way of the 
world, apostrophize, and so forth (Poetics, 166-167). 
 
There are parallels between Walker’s commentary above and the work of Booth. 
Booth’s work on what he called rhetoric had, as a major focus, the division between 
telling and showing, which corresponds to Walker’s discussion above. In any case, it is 
possible to dig beneath the surface of both “story” and “argument” found in a narrative 
and reveal implicit syllogisms/enthymemes. By examining closely the underlying logos, 
along with a narrative’s ethos and pathos, we can then bring to light the ethical stance 
that informs the narrative, as well as the system of values on which the underlying 
arguments rest. 
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 Before turning to the individual pisteis, the following excerpt will demonstrate 
how logos, ethos, and pathos are present in what is perhaps the shortest speech in 
history: 
“Quirites!” This is the infamous one-word speech by which Julius Caesar won his 
rebellious legions over to fight the republican army in North Africa, in 46 BC. 
After having fought a great number of battles under Caesar’s command, the 
soldiers had refused to follow him again. Caesar’s use of the word quirites as 
form of address had a devastating effect. According to the classical scholar Anton 
Leeman (1992), ‘quirites’ was the dignified word a Roman magistrate used to 
address an assembly. Caesar’s use of this word to his soldiers made it clear to 
them that they had not only lost their privilege of being addressed as 
commilitones, or ‘comrades,’ but were even no longer entitled to a Roman 
general’s normal form of address for his soldiers: milites. “We are milites!”  they 
reportedly shouted when they all volunteered to follow Caesar once more into 
battle. Caesar’s use of the ‘neutral’ quirites as a qualification of argumentative 
language use can only be grasped if the discourse is first put in a functional 
perspective in which its social context and the commitments assumed by the 
participants are duly taken into account (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser - Strategic, 
131-132). 
 
The story speaks for itself, but we can see that the proof logos can be expressed in a 
syllogistic format that is in operation beneath the surface of Caesar’s one-word speech:  
True soldiers are not rebellious 
 Only true soldiers have the right to be called milites. 
 As you have lost that right, I shall address you as quirites. 
This one word, with its underlying syllogism,
87
 hit the soldier’s pride hard, and in this 
way, moved them to action. Calling them quirites could be seen as being on par with 
accusing them of being namby pambies or of cowardice. It is in this way that pathos 
functions in conjunction with logos in this speech. Neither characteristic is that of a true 
soldier, and a true soldier would pride himself emotionally in being nothing more or 
nothing less than a soldier, which is, by definition, both fierce and brave. To add that 
Caesar’s ethos was very high is to state the obvious, but his power here in this sense and 
the effect that it had on his listeners cannot be underestimated. This one word functions 
                                                 
87 The use of the term “syllogism” is broader than that used by formal logic. See next section. 
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rhetorically as it resonates in the system of values that were held by the speaker and 
listeners. The same speech would have little effect on a different audience, say, on anti-
war protesters, whose response would certainly be quite different, due to their system of 
values. We can now discuss in turn and in greater detail each of the pisteis: logos, ethos, 
pathos.  
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2.6 LOGOS 
Since Aristotle’s aim was, as mentioned above, to place logos at the center of rhetorical 
persuasion, I shall begin by considering further aspects from those discussed in the 
introduction to the rhetorical proofs that define this highly polysemous term over whose 
definition a dispute has been underway since its earliest documented appearances. 
Gorgias’ opinion of how logos was to be defined merits consideration. Walker 
summarizes what rhetoric’s most prominent figure in terms of what has been deemed its 
unethical use asserts in relation with this term:  
In the Helen (8-11) . . . Gorgias declares that logos is a “great potentate” that can 
“stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity” as well as shape the 
“opinion” (doxa) that is the soul’s chief “counselor” (symboulos), the soul having 
no other source of knowledge (Poetics, 27). 
 
Not only does Gorgias define logos as an all-powerful sovereign, but at other points he 
compares it to a powerful drug. Gorgias’ highly metaphoric language gives a 
perspective with which to perceive logos as the most significant and powerful motor of 
human affairs. Ford writes that Gorgias implies in his Helen that logos “works 
autocratically, with no need of truth or goodness to wield power” (176). Gorgias’ 
assertions provide a framework that makes it possible to understand why Aristotle 
argues against the unethical use of rhetoric. Due to its tremendous power, logos does 
not need in Gorgias’ conception of this term either hard facts or virtue in order to 
change the beliefs of an audience. Logos vanquishes all those who come under its 
influence. We might temper this extreme position by recalling that each community (or 
form of government, if we consider the different types of constitutions delineated by 
Aristotle) bases the way it perceives reality on its own system of values. And so 
Gorgias’ stance, while extreme, ostensibly does not take into consideration the 
underlying reasons for the power logos holds. The audience must be convinced of what 
the orator is trying to argue for, and that depends on shared values which necessarily 
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determine what is accepted as true and false, good and evil. Hitler, or any other 
exceptional orator for that matter, did not clamor in a vacuum. If an orator manages to 
present arguments that are based on shared values, the power of logos is then 
tremendous. This means that in order to control the masses, persuasive logos must be 
based on value-laden components embedded within the discursive framework the 
audience utilizes in its mediation of the phenomenological construct that, according to 
some scholars, is created by rhetorical mechanisms.  
 Alongside and in contrast with Gorgias’ definition of logos as some sort of 
almighty tyrant we have another view presented by Isocrates, another “sophist” that 
played a role in the shaping of discursive argumentation, and whose ideas Ford 
summarizes: 
The high civic role he [Isocrates] claims for artistic prose belongs to a larger, 
humanistic vision of the role of speech in society, a theme he repeated several 
times in his works. In opposition to Plato, Isocrates’ sense of “philosophy” did not 
aspire to advance beyond common reason; doxa was not Plato’s “opinion,” but the 
collective judgments people make about things that are impossible to know or 
difficult to decide. On Isocrates’ view, after getting as close to an understanding 
of realities as human nature permits (Antidosis 184, 271), society must construct 
its morality and wisdom somewhere between pure skepticism and pure idealism. 
And it is just here that logos plays its crucial role. Nature has given to us no other 
instrument than language to ensure our survival and self-realization. Language 
enables human beings to communicate with each other, to articulate values and 
organize societies, and ultimately to become civilized. A capacity bestowed 
equally on all by nature, logos yet distinguishes human beings from other animals, 
and its artistic employment may distinguish the true sages among men. Such a 
wise artisan will harness the resources of language to the good of the polity: its 
harmonious symmetries can charm citizens into reasonable accord. For all its 
strategic advantages, Isocrates’ literary formalism derives not from a fetishism of 
technique, but from an enlightened, humanistic view of language as a natural 
endowment that art may perfect to serve human ends (257-58). 
 
The view of logos that Isocrates presents is surprisingly modern, and betrays a faith in 
language as the ultimate tool for creating, organizing, and unifying human society. His 
views could easily be added to Aristotle’s definition, especially because of the 
optimistic stance that he takes with respect to the benefits that the proper use of logos 
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brings to the human community. Isocrates’ conception of logos differs from the 
tyrannical power Gorgias attributes to it because he views it as a shared or communal 
activity: reasoning together about matters that are impossible or difficult to predict or 
decide. Isocrates’ vision is based on the logic and ethics of those who collaborate 
together in wisdom, not on some all-powerful force that operates outside the bounds of 
reason and goodness. 
Another defining aspect of logos that can be culled from antiquity and that 
remains alive today is provided by the Stoics. Logos manifests in two basic modes: 
internal and external:  
Speech is external logos, thought internal logos, according to the Stoics, who are 
in accord with older views like that of Plato, who defined thought as internal 
speech (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 8.275; Pl. Sophist 263e) 
(Allen, 350). 
 
We find this conception of logos in contemporary expressions used in academic 
environments (i.e., high school and university English composition courses) like 
“writing is thinking on the page” or “put those thoughts down in pen and ink.” Plato’s 
and the Stoic’s defining logos as internal speech brings to the fore the idea of 
argumentation both with oneself and with others. Its transmission occurs either verbally 
or in writing, and it is in these two formats that positions are taken with respect to an 
opinion and where accord or discord surfaces. Internal thought within an individual that 
is characterized by division is a reflection of what occurs externally in the community of 
those participating in the construct of the discourse by which its members organize 
themselves and take action using argumentative bases that are accepted as true. While 
keeping in mind that the truth or truths that constitute objects of rhetoric are – due to the 
impossibility of determining their validity by empirical means – in fact and essence  
opinions, and that these opinions can function as operative bases for decision making 
that at least ex post facto become empirically provable truths, we can recall that 
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Aristotle asserts in the Rhetoric that “[p]ersuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] 
when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case” 
(Kennedy – Persuasion, 39). Interesting here is his affirmation that through logoi we 
show the truth or the apparent truth, for it reveals what I have been asserting throughout 
my discussion the role that both hard facts, on the one hand, and, on the other, opinion 
and probability play in rhetoric. Aristotle seems to be arguing here that rhetoric brings 
to the eyes the appearance of truth that later becomes truth as in deliberative rhetoric, or, 
as in judicial rhetoric, what appears to have been the truth in the past, or, as in epideictic 
rhetoric, what appears to be true at this very moment. When we cannot scientifically 
demonstrate the arguments that we put forth, rhetoric provides the machinery to present 
plausible truths that may or may not coincide with the real. What Aristotle means by 
apparent truth in the passage above is most likely that which appears to be truthful until 
proven false. It is important to bear in mind that this framework, which at first glance 
may appear to be somewhat flimsy in terms of its truth value, is in fact no different from 
the framework used by the hard sciences. Scientific truths are only accepted as true until 
they are proven to be false.
88
 Science is an evolving body of knowledge, for discoveries 
are constantly being made that prove previous “facts” and scientific theories to be false. 
In Aristotle’s system, logos was to be the central proof to persuade audiences of the 
points being argued. And it is with logos that we argue either alone in debate with 
ourselves or together with others – through speech and writing.  
 Kennedy comments on Aristotle’s insistence on the great importance logos has 
as argumentative proof in his version of rhetoric:  
                                                 
88 In this regard, Eagleton affirms: “A lot of scientists are fairly sceptical about science, seeing it as 
much more of a hit-and-miss, rule-of-thumb affair than the gullible layperson imagines. It is people in 
the humanities who still naïvely think that scientists consider themselves the white-coated custodians 
of absolute truth, and so waste a lot of time trying to discredit them. Humanists have always been 
sniffy about scientists” (After, 18). 
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Aristotle repeatedly says that the logical side of rhetorical theory is 
underdeveloped and yet is the most important (1354a14 ff. and 1354b21 ff.) He 
wishes to correct this situation and to offer practical help to the orator by an 
application of logic to rhetoric (Persuasion, 96). 
 
Aristotle provides argumentative bases called topics in order to equip the orator using 
his treatise with tools that are logic based. I shall discuss the topics in greater detail 
below, but at this point it bears mentioning that logic’s importance in rhetorical 
transactions involving a speaker (or writer) and audience (as listener or reader) is 
always characterized by transmission that flows in both directions. That is, not only 
does the orator bear the burden of making cogent, rational arguments that prove her 
case, but the listener is also responsible, for as Allen states: “Arguments serve as 
instruments of persuasion because anyone who takes an argument to be valid and 
accepts its premises as true is bound on pain of irrationality also to accept its 
conclusion” (350). This is where rhetoric’s similarity with dialectic is clear. For there is 
always a back-and-forth communicative movement in dialectic that, while it appears to 
be absent in rhetoric due to the rhetor’s presenting while the listener receives the 
message in silence, the listener must evaluate the argument and, if no valid argument to 
the contrary occurs to her, is obligated to accept the conclusions that the rhetor is 
arguing for. The good rhetor will, of course, anticipate the questions and doubts that the 
audience might have, and answer them in the body of his speech. This is also true in the 
underlying logic enmeshed in the rhetorical mechanisms found, both explicitly and 
explicitly, in narrative. The implicit logic must cohere and answer the questions that the 
reader may have in order for the story to make sense, and for the reader to accept the 
rational premises of both its sequence and plot. 
I have stated earlier that Aristotle’s corpus is cross-referential. That is, Aristotle 
in his Poetics, for example, when speaking of dianoia, or thought, refers his reader to 
the Rhetoric for a full discussion. Since Aristotle equates rhetoric with dialectic, in the 
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Rhetoric he makes cross-references to the work that deals with dialectic, the Topics. In 
this work Aristotle establishes his method for logos-based reasoning, and provides what 
are called the commonplaces for argumentation.  
The commonplaces are what are, in effect, pre-fabricated arguments whose 
underlying structures may be applied in a variety of situations, depending on one’s aims 
in argumentation.
89
 Perelman writes in this regard: “In his Topics, Aristotle studies 
every kind of locus that can serve as premise for dialectical or rhetorical syllogisms. He 
classifies them, according to the viewpoints established in his philosophy, as loci 
relating to accident, species, property, definition, and sameness (Treatise, 84).” 
Perelman goes on to state that the approach he uses is distinct from Aristotle’s. In spite 
of certain differences, he nevertheless borrows from Aristotle’s treatise, and provides 
explanations and examples. My aim here is to give an idea of what Aristotelian loci are 
as summarized by Perelman in order to illustrate how the former’s system works. The 
topic related to quantity provides a general starting point: 
By loci relating to quantity we mean those loci communes which affirm that one 
thing is better than another for quantitative reasons. More often than not, a locus 
relating to quantity constitutes a major, though implied, premise, without which 
the conclusion would have no basis. Aristotle mentions some of these loci: a 
greater number of good things is more desirable than a smaller; a good thing 
useful for a comparatively large number of ends is more desirable than one useful 
to a lesser degree; that which is more lasting or durable is more desirable than that 
which is less so. We note also that the superiority in question attaches to negative 
as well as positive values, so that a lasting evil is greater than one that is 
momentary. Isocrates declares that the merit of a person is proportional to the 
number to those to whom he is of service: athletes are inferior to those who teach, 
since their strength benefits only themselves, whereas those who think soundly are 
useful to all (85-86). 
 
In the examples that Perelman discusses, their relation with values held in common by 
the community is obvious. What is important here is Perelman’s observation that the 
loci are syllogistic. He brings this idea to the surface when he states above that, in the 
loci presented in the above passage, there is an implied major premise. So the first case 
                                                 
89 Much of what Aristotle explores in the Topics is directly related to definitions as well. 
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above could be restated as follows: A good thing is desirable / More of a good thing is 
more desirable / Therefore, a greater number of this good thing is more desirable than a 
smaller number of the same good thing. From this basic component of syllogistic 
reasoning Isocrates makes his assertion that teachers are superior to athletes: It is a good 
thing to benefit others / More are benefitted by teachers than by athletes, since the good 
that teachers possess benefits not only themselves (as is the case with the good that 
athletes possess) but others / Given that a greater amount of a good thing (the case of 
teachers) is superior to a lesser amount (the case of athletes), we can conclude / 
Therefore, that teachers are superior to athletes.  
 Barnes concurs with the idea that logos plays a central part in rhetorical 
persuasion. He states, “rhetoric, insofar as it is a technical or an art, studies deductions, 
it studies logic” (Companion, 261).90 Rhetorical arguments are presented via deductive 
logic. But we must ask what argument is in this sense. Smith informs us that 
“[a]rgument is discourse that tries to prove a point: any argument purports to give 
reasons for accepting some proposition” (Smith – Logic, 29). Smith writes that the basic 
form for this type of mechanism of thought is the syllogism. But this term also has 
various definitions: 
Logicians normally use “syllogism” to mean one of the specific forms of valid 
argument Aristotle discusses in An. Pr I.I-6, but Aristotle’s definition of 
sullogismos comprehends a much wider class: pretty much any valid argument, or 
at least any argument with a conclusion different from its premises (Logic, 30). 
 
What is important to grasp here is the notion that sullogismos, in Aristotle’s definition, 
is a very broad category. It is not, in Smith’s reading, only the classic syllogism in 
which Socrates’ mortality is presented as inevitable or those outlined in the Prior 
Analytics. Other forms of argument that attempt to prove something different from their 
premises count as syllogisms in Aristotle’s conception of this term. In Part 4 of this 
                                                 
90 Barnes states that this “would surely have surprised Aristotle’s contemporaries” (261). 
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dissertation, the syllogisms that are embedded in the travel narratives to be analyzed 
will be identified as informal logic couched in non-technical language.
91
 
One form of sullogismos is the enthumema, which Aristotle calls the syllogism 
of rhetoric. Much has been written on this term which has puzzled commentators of the 
Rhetoric since its appearance. This is no doubt due to the nature of Aristotle’s treatise, 
which as Barnes has informed us, must be read as incomplete notes, as a springboard for 
critical thought, as a way of exploring certain problems he poses. And so rather than 
enter into the labyrinth of arguments presented by scholars on this term, it is best to 
view the enthymeme as a syllogism, in the sense Smith uses above for sullogismos. That 
is, as a form of valid argument. What is perhaps more important than trying to 
determine exactly what Aristotle meant by enthumema, is its meaning in Greek: “Given 
its etymology, enthumema . . . is cognate to the verb enthumeisthai “to think to 
consider,” which includes both rational thought and feeling” (Reasonable, 26). What I 
want to propose here is that its function as a mechanism of thought is more important 
                                                 
91 Toulmin’s discussion in his text on argumentation, where he takes to task formal logician’s methods, 
proves interesting in connection with the discussion above. For he asks an important question about the 
syllogism: “Can we properly classify all the elements in our arguments under the three headings, 
‘major premiss’, ‘minor premiss’ and ‘conclusion’, or are these categories misleadingly few in 
number?” (Argument, 96). What Toulmin is after here is viewing argumentation as an organic process, 
one that is not tied to formulaic structures that are independent of specific fields of thought. He writes: 
“Light is thrown on these questions by the analogy with jurisprudence. This would naturally lead us to 
adopt a layout of greater complexity than has been customary. . .” (96). He then clarifies his 
methodology in terms of procedure in legal philosophy by asking a question: “‘What different sorts of 
propositions’, a legal philosopher will ask, ‘are uttered in the course of a law-case, and in what 
different ways can such propositions bear on the soundness of a legal claim?’” (96). What Toulmin 
wishes to demonstrate here is the inadequacy of the classic syllogism to provide proof when 
considering complex issues: “Legal utterance has many distinct functions. Statements of claim, 
evidence of identification, testimony about events in dispute, interpretations of a statute or discussions 
of its validity, claims to exemption from the application of a law pleas in extenuation, verdicts, 
sentences: all these different classes of proposition have their parts to play in the legal process, and the 
differences between them are in practice far from trifling” (96). Of course, a formal logician could 
easily argue that the entire complex of the different classes of propositions that Toulmin is outlining 
here can be expressed with classical syllogisms. The formal logician’s claim would be that it might be 
excruciatingly tedious and extensive, but nevertheless possible. But what I want to use from Toulmin’s 
argument is the idea that the way a literature student would go about arguing a point using rhetoric as 
her tool must address the object under study with language and structures that are appropriate to that 
object. I have already discussed how parallels can be drawn between judicial argumentation and 
narratives. This means that, in spite of Toulmin’s argument that each field of discourse must use its 
own bases of argumentation, some fields hold enough similarities to warrant the use of the same 
methods and procedures for more than one. 
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than trying to determine its precise form.
92
 As Bitzer argues, an enthymeme can be used 
for probability or formal absolutes (181), whether or not there are propositions that are 
not expressed implicitly. The following enthymeme demonstrates the capacity of an 
enthymeme to function as an irrefutable argument: 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates must die. 
The missing proposition is All men die. Thus, in spite of the above enthymeme’s being 
a truncated syllogism, it possesses the full force of an intractable argument expressed in 
formal logic. For the purpose of this dissertation, I shall bypass the complexities of 
distinguishing between enthymeme and syllogism and opt for a definition of syllogism 
as Smith has defined it. In this way, less importance is placed on the determination of 
the precise form, with the aim of presenting the underlying logos in the texts under 
study in language that will hopefully be clear, simple and cogent. 
 The syllogism (in the broadest sense of the word) is the basic unit of 
argumentation in rhetoric. We have seen that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle refers his readers 
to the topoi, or topics which are to provide the content of the syllogistic arguments. Not 
surprisingly, many different definitions of precisely what a topic or commonplace is 
have surfaced and been fought over throughout the twenty-four centuries since Aristotle 
wrote his Topics. Kennedy writes that Aristotle, as he did not provide a definition, took 
it for granted that his readers would be familiar with the term (Rhetoric, 45). The fact 
that Aristotle did not provide a definition has led to enormous polysemy for the term 
topos among contemporary scholars. Carolyn Miller, citing Michael Leff, writes: 
 “The term ‘topic’ incorporates a bewildering diversity of meanings. Hence 
among modern authors we find conceptions of the topics ranging from recurrent 
themes in literature, to heuristic devices that encourage innovation of ideas, to 
                                                 
92 See Bitzer for a discussion on differences and similarities between classic syllogisms and 
enthymemes. 
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regions of experience from which one draws the substance of an argument (Leff, 
1983, 23-24)” (132). 
 
Perhaps if we fold back to Aristotle’s heir of the peripatetic school, Theophrastus, we 
can obtain a definition that matches more precisely Aristotle’s use of the term. 
Brunschwig provides Theophrastus’ definition followed by a commentary: 
The topos is a principle or element, out of which (aph’hou) we grasp the 
principles [i.e., the premises] concerning each thing [i.e., each problem]; it is 
determinate as far as its description is concerned, and indeterminate as far as its 
particular applications are concerned. This Theophrastean definition, far from 
being revisionary in respect to Aristotle, seems to me to capture the essence of the 
topos in the Topics much better than any antistrophic version we could extract 
from the definition given in the Rhetoric. Substituting aph’hou for eis ho is a 
highly significant change in the definition of topos: aph’hou suggests that the 
topos is essentially the source from which the premises of a syllogism are to be 
derived; eis ho suggests that the topos is derived by reflection on what is common 
to a collection of particular instances of arguments (41-42). 
 
Theophrastus’ definition squares with Kennedy’s observations: “The materials of 
enthymemes come from the premises of other disciplines, especially politics and ethics, 
but their formal structure draws on topics, strategies of argument useful in dealing with 
any subject” (Rhetoric, 21). Another way of stating this is to define the topoi as Enos 
and Lauer have: “[T]he topoi are generative codifications for proofs that have already 
been invented by successful rhetors” (206). Skinner comments further on what came to 
be the purpose of the topoi as they were put together in compendia in the 1600s: “The 
whole purpose of assembling books of commonplaces was to build of stores of 
sententious generalities with which to amplify specific arguments” (119).  
Skinner then goes on the comment on how rather than using the codified topics 
as sources for arguments, the topics listed were overused to the point of ennui, for, 
during the Renaissance, the doctrine of commonplaces came to be not the “places or 
headings under which general maxims should be sought, but rather to the maxims 
themselves” (119). He then goes on to state: “It is thus a somewhat melancholy 
reflection on the contents of such compilations that, within a generation, the term 
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‘commonplace’ came to be used instead to refer to excessively obvious or well-worn 
platitudes” (119). Skinner informs us that Bacon in his ‘Of Discourse,’ wrote that 
“certain writers, due to the use of common places, lack variety and seem ridiculous 
when perceived” (119).  
 The sad state of affairs into which rhetorical topoi evolved must be set side by 
side with Aristotle’s original formula, in order to get a sense of the enervating 
knowledge that, as can be perceived when reading the Rhetoric, was being delivered. 
Solmsen gives us a nice glimpse of this in his discussion on what the topoi were meant 
to be in the Aristotelian framework: 
Aristotle compares this instruction to a procedure by which instead of learning the 
art of making shoes the apprentice receives a great number of ready-made shoes 
without any suggestion as to how to make them . . . He replaces this method by an 
altogether different system of τόποι, conceiving the τόπος as a “type” or “form” of 
argument of which you need grasp only the basic structural idea to apply it 
forthwith to discussions about any and every subject. Once you have grasped the 
τόπος of the “More or Less” you will be able to argue: If not even the gods know 
everything, human beings will certainly not know everything; or, Whoever beats 
his father will certainly also beat his neighbors, or to form any other argument of 
the same kind, always proceeding from the less likely thing (which has 
nevertheless occurred) to the more likely. What matters in this system is the 
“form” of the argument, this being perfectly independent of any particular subject-
matter or content (217-18). 
 
Here the idea that rhetoric is to be based on logic in the Aristotelian framework is 
reiterated, and then we see the very nice conceit that Aristotle uses when attacking the 
previous writers of handbooks of rhetoric. He states that it was as if, while trying to 
teach how to make shoes, they had provided several examples of shoes without 
explaining the basics of how they were made. The example then provided demonstrates 
more than adequately the way a specific topos (i.e., the “more or less”) may be used.93 
Solmsen informs us that, in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the author of this text falls in 
                                                 
93 “Solmsen writes that “Aristotle . . . bequeathed to the later rhetoricians a new conception of the 
τόπος. As we have seen, his new approach sprang from the idea that instead of providing a great 
number of ready-made arguments (one and all applying to quite definite and specific subjects or 
situations) the teacher of rhetoric ought to concentrate on general forms or types of arguments . . .” 
(226). 
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line with the framework Aristotle uses: “The loci or sedes argumentorum enumerated in 
II, 163-173 are of the Aristotelian type . . . They are not connected with any definite 
subject-matter, and yet they are applicable to every subject” (226).  
Aristotle’s system of topoi makes it possible to generate a potentially infinite 
number of arguments for a broad array of situations. But even this is not sufficient, for 
as Cicero argues, they will only be effective if the orator knows how to best utilize 
them: 
This doctrine of loci comunes clearly presupposes a particular view about the 
nature of the argumentative skills we need to cultivate. We must recognise, as 
Crassus reminds Antonius in book II of De oratore, that ‘although you yourself 
are able to speak with novelty and brilliance, the loci from which you derive what 
you say are nevertheless the sources of familiar maxims and widely accepted 
principles’. The most effective orator will therefore be the one who knows best 
how to select and appeal to such ‘popularities’ and apply them to uphold his own 
cause (Skinner, 117). 
 
One must appeal to the audience, but one must have the “know-how” necessary to make 
already accepted arguments and devices work. In this lies the art of rhetoric. The 
framework we have been discussing provides a storehouse for invention that increases 
the tools based on logic available to the rhetor which can be used to produce arguments. 
But as the old saw goes, it is not what you say, but how you say it. 
 Enos and Lauer tell us that Grimaldi argues that the twenty-eight topoi can be 
grouped into three basic categories, which imply a static quality. They assert that in 
spite of this connotation, Aristotle’s framework is productive of meaningful thought 
structures: 
Normally, topoi are characterized as “places” and, in that sense, connote a static 
quality. Taken with the meaning of heuristic advanced here, however, we can 
better capture the meaning of topoi as heuristics having the potentially dynamic 
characteristic of energizing thought by shaping meaning. Topoi, then, may appear 
as dormant “places” but can also energize ideas through the socially shared 
understanding of such modes of relational thought. In this sense, heuristic 
captures the meaning of Aristotle’s Rhetoric as an instrumental activity of 
invention through shared discourse. Such a perspective gives us a window to view 
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not only how ancient Greeks tried to share thoughts and sentiments with others 
but also how they came to artistically conceive of discursive meaning itself (206). 
 
In addition to the idea that Aristotle’s topoi are generative, Enos and Lauer make the 
important assertion that invention occurs within a framework of shared discourse. That 
is, often the invention will be the utilization of already existing modes of discourse 
known to the community of listeners. But they then give an important, second meaning 
to Aristotle’s phrase “invented by us.” They bring to the fore the function that the topoi 
have as generators of new proofs, and, in this way, show how much power new topoi 
can have in a particular community: 
The second application of the phrase “invented by us” refers to entirely new 
proofs generated by the rhetor. For example, Jesus Christ invented new proofs for 
making judgments about social action. . . James L. Kinneavy’s detailed account of 
pistis in the New Testament reveals that Christian faith itself, rooted in the notion 
of rhetorical pistis, constituted a set of new proofs by which to live. So new were 
the arguments that both Matthew (7.28) and Luke (4.22) record that the multitude 
were sometimes baffled and perplexed. George A. Kennedy asserts that Christ’s 
efforts at articulating new faith-proofs occasionally left listeners “astonished” . . . 
These proofs were not existing topoi but were invented within a faith community 
(206). 
 
Enos and Lauer’s discussion demonstrates a faith in the innovativeness that is possible 
using rhetorical mechanisms, however static they may be in terms of basic structure. 
This is no different from music, where, for example, the major scale remains ever the 
same, but is still the basic structure that can still be used as a basis for innovation. Along 
these lines, one way to view the topoi is as “building blocks, used again and again after 
being memorized” (Kennedy – Persuasion, 53). Carolyn Miller reinforces the above-
mentioned idea of the topoi as having a generative function, rather than a mere 
depository of ready-made arguments to be taken as is and inserted into a text: “Topoi 
have been considered as instruments of decorum, serving a managerial function in 
rhetoric, but McKeon noted that they can also be understood as sources of novelty, as 
having a generative function” (130). 
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The ready-made structures provided by the topoi are always based on 
argumentative structures whose aim is to persuade via logic. Oksenberg Rorty reminds 
us of the very strong tie rhetoric has with dialectic, while at the same time bringing to 
the fore the idea that the arguments that are used come from discourse repositories that 
are codified in the Topics and the Rhetoric in the form of topoi, arguments which are 
often at odds and which the rhetor must use to make her case. Crucial for the present 
discussion is the link Oksenberg Rorty states rhetorical argument has with teachings 
(doxa) and the good life (eudaimonia): 
The rhetorician himself relies on the results, the methods, and the skills of 
dialectic. Like the dialectician, the rhetorician does not have a distinctive, specific 
subject matter (1354a1-12, 1355b32 ff.). He depends on – and must skillfully use 
– a heterogeneous collection of accepted and often conflicting opinions for the 
details of his arguments: general endoxa about eudaimonia, the opinion of 
strategists about what is genuinely dangerous in battle, the views of philosophers 
about criteria for voluntary action, and the view of experienced legislators about 
what sorts of laws are enforceable. Like the dialectician and sophist, the 
successful rhetorician must be able to construct contrary arguments: he must first 
represent and then refute the considerations that appear to weigh against his 
position (7-8). 
 
The ability to argue in such a way that demolishes opposing arguments is crucial. It is 
this type of reasoning that makes rhetoric a tool to discover truth, even if it is the truth 
of the moment that will later be refuted by a new perspective on an issue or new 
scientific knowledge, which, as we have been asserting throughout this dissertation, is 
also stable until proved otherwise, and which also plays a role in the rhetorical process. 
(That is, empirical knowledge can be used to warrant inferences to argue an opinion.) 
Oksenberg Rorty underscores in the above passage the connection Aristotle makes 
between finding the truth via rhetorical argumentation and the good life. Throughout my 
discussion I have been referring to the link between rhetoric and values. By using an 
approach that is based on rhetoric, the student of literature can analyze text with a view 
to finding its true or apparently true arguments that, according to Aristotle, enable one 
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to apply knowledge of what is accepted as truth to the way one lives. We see this in the 
Nichomachean Ethics:  
True arguments seem, then, most useful, not only with a view to knowledge, but 
with a view to life also; for since they harmonize with the facts they are believed, 
and so they stimulate those who understand them to live according to them 
(Barnes – Complete, 1853). 
 
It is, of course, up to each individual to choose which arguments to live by according to 
her own vision of what eudaimonia is. 
 Now that aspects of what Aristotle considered to be the most important 
rhetorical proof has been examined, we can now turn to pathos. For, as Krabbe writes, 
“Logos constitutes the core-business of rhetoric . . . but other means of persuasion are 
not neglected by Aristotle” (33). And it is precisely in the interweaving of Aristotle’s 
three proofs that his genius when defining his version of rhetoric shines through most.  
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2.7 PATHOS 
With regards to pathos, Aristotle attacks the other writers on rhetoric at the beginning of 
his treatise, meanwhile setting the stage for the stance that he will take on the subject: 
1.1.4. [F]or verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the mind do not 
relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman. As a result, if all trials were 
conducted as they are in some present-day states and especially in those well-
governed [the handbook writers] would have nothing to say (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 
31). 
 
In this excerpt Aristotle establishes a dichotomy between emotional appeals and the 
facts of a particular case. Aristotle’s underlying statement is that the handbook writers 
of the day had only written about the use of the irrelevant manipulation of emotions, 
which he considers improper. In this section of the rhetoric, Aristotle states indirectly 
that the correct way to argue in judicial cases is through the presentation of facts. He 
then states his position in no uncertain terms: 
For it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity; that is 
the same as if someone made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it. 6. And 
further, it is clear that the opponents have no function except to show that 
something is or is not true or has happened or has not happened; whether it is 
important or trivial or just or unjust, in so far as the lawmaker has not provided a 
definition, the juror should somehow decide himself and not learn from the 
opponents (31-32). 
 
Aristotle’s stance here is hardline: it is wrong to manipulate the jury emotionally, for the 
judgment that they will reach will not be accurate. The rhetor’s only job is to try to 
prove the truth of a matter or to attempt to show that something has occurred via logos. 
The jury is to be presented the facts, and based on the evidence, judge for itself, without 
having been swayed emotionally. The rhetor, via logos, is also to argue for the 
significance and fairness of the act as defined by lawmakers. If there is no definition, 
the juror is to do the interpreting based on the arguments presented. This is judicial 
rhetoric’s twofold process: to prove whether an act occurred or not, and the subsequent 
evaluation based on the system of values held by the community in which the rhetorical 
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enactment takes place. Aristotle then states that the other writers have called the 
swaying of emotions an art, rather than becoming enthymematic: 
“If this is so [i.e., that judges are influenced by grief and pleasure],” says 
Aristotle, “it is clear that matters external to the subject are described as an art by 
those who define other things: . . . for [in treating these matters] they concern 
themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind, 
while they explain nothing about artistic proofs; and that is the question of how 
one may become enthymematic” (33 – Kennedy’s brackets and italics). 
 
Aristotle’s schema of artistic vs. inartistic proofs has been considered above, as well as 
enthymemes. What I would like to focus on in the excerpt above is Aristotle’s 
insatisfaction with the other writers’ work, which taught manipulation of the emotions 
using irrelevant (and inartistic) proofs as an art. A typical example of this type of 
emotional manipulation would be to bring in the wife and children of a person accused 
of murder in order to elicit pity. Whether the person accused has a wife or children has 
nothing to do with the facts of the case, nor, in Aristotle’s opinion, should factors of this 
sort have anything to do with the sentence to be delivered. Aristotle here tells the reader 
that he will be doing what no other writer has done: provide instruction on how to be 
enthymematic, that is, how to use logos, or the argument of probability when defending 
or representing a case. Aristotle then makes statements that, on first glance, would 
appear to contradict his hardline position stated above: 
But in judicial speeches this is not enough; rather, it is first serviceable to gain 
over the hearer; for the judgment is about other people’s business and the judges, 
considering the matter in relation to their own affairs and listening with partiality, 
lend themselves to [the needs of] the litigants but do not judge [objectively]; thus, 
as we said earlier, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject 
[in court cases]; in deliberative assemblies the judges themselves adequately 
guard against this (33 – Kennedy’s brackets). 
 
When Aristotle states above that in judicial speeches this is not enough, he is referring 
to a statement just prior, where he writes that, in deliberative proceedings, “nothing is 
needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says” (33). When 
deliberating about laws, the rhetor only needs to present the situation as it is. There is no 
196 
 
need to try to influence the lawmakers of the assembly emotionally. This is due to the 
fact Aristotle believes that the lawmakers will, in his view, put laws into effect 
legitimately, since as we have stated above, they already see themselves as being 
affected by the laws that are to be passed because, as Aristotle states above, they 
consider the matter in relation to their own affairs. They have a vested interest in 
deliberation about legislation. However, in judicial cases, Aristotle now contradicts his 
first hardline stance when he states in the excerpt above that it is not sufficient to show 
that the circumstances are as the speaker says they are. He instead states that it is first a 
good idea to gain over the hearer. This means that the hearer needs to be emotionally 
engaged in order to reach a proper judgment. This is, at first glance, a glaring 
contradiction. 
Aristotle then defines emotions within the context he is discussing:  
Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ 
in regard to their judgments, an upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example 
anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites (2.1, 1378a20-23) 
(Konstan, 414). 
 
Aristotle states in this passage above point blank that emotions affect the way people 
judge situations. And so, as he states that it is necessary to gain over the hearer, he 
appears to have changed his position radically from his hardline stance of strict 
presentation of the facts of a case free from emotional manipulation. These statements 
have produced enormous controversy among scholars, due to the what are viewed as 
blatant contradictions. At the beginning of his treatise, Aristotle is arguing for a logos-
based rhetoric that only takes the facts and syllogistic logic as the basis for proof, but 
later allows emotions to enter in. Walker comments on this portion of the text where 
Aristotle takes a stance against the use of emotions: 
[In Rhetoric 1.1.5] one detects a vehement moral judgment in the philosopher’s 
words: The verb “twist,” diastrephein, can also mean “pervert”; and the idea that 
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the rhetor is “pandering” to envy or pity, proagontas, portrays the pandering 
rhetor as a proagogos, a pimp . . . (Pathos, 74 – my brackets). 
 
Walker’s discussion of the possible connotations that the verb diastrephein holds shows 
the tight link between rhetoric and ethics, for it shows Aristotle’s view that the improper 
manipulation of emotions is, in the end, unethical. Further, it is Aristotle’s view that to 
manipulate a jury emotionally results in a distortion of justice.  And it is this hardline, 
ethical stance that Aristotle’s subsequent, opposing position produces such surprise, as 
can be seen in Walker’s commentary below:   
Such statements [i.e., Rhetoric 1.1.5 above] seem to reflect a settled, serious 
conviction; they suggest an ethics of persuasion. At the beginning of Rhetoric 2, 
however, Aristotle declares the necessity of “preparing” (kataskeuazein, 2.1.7) the 
“judger” (kreseis) to “change” (metaballein, 2.1.8) – and then he proceeds to offer 
ten extraordinary chapters on several key pathe (2.2-11), starting with anger and 
including both pity and jealousy, the very ones he has proscribed as “perverters” 
of judgment (74-75). 
 
Walker brings into clear focus the problem encountered in Aristotle’s treatise with 
regard to what might be called a logos – pathos either/or divide. How is it possible for 
Aristotle to take such an uncompromising stance and then make an about face? Walker 
comments on this discrepancy, and then provides possible explanations: 
Not only does the account of the pathe in Book 2 seem inconsistent with the 
expressed ethico-political convictions of Rhetoric 1.1 (and 3.1), but that account 
also seems, as George Kennedy has remarked, to have been imported into the text 
from somewhere else, as a late addition, and with only minimal adaptation to a 
discussion of rhetoric . . .The apparent inconsistency . . . has typically been 
explained within the given case; Aristotle’s psychology is opposed only to 
irrelevant appeals to emotion while leaving room for those emotions that are 
reasonable within the given case; Aristotle’s psychology provides emotion with a 
rationality similar to (and part of) that of the enthymeme, and thus he brings 
pathos under the rule of reason; Aristotle’s statements have been composed at 
different times and reflect earlier and later opinions, as he is moving away from 
Aristotle’s [sic – read: Plato’s] influence; or, in Book 2 as again in Rhetoric 3’s 
account of style and delivery, Aristotle is recognizing the rhetor’s practical 
necessity to accommodate the “depravity” (mochtheria) of the audience of 
common citizens, the crowd of hoi polloi (“the many”) that does the judging in 
the jury-courts and public assemblies (75). 
 
What is important to always bear in mind with inconsistencies such as the above is 
Barnes’ advice on how to read Aristotle, as discussed early on in this dissertation. That 
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is, it is necessary to read Aristotle’s works as unfinished texts, and that it is often 
necessary to follow Aristotle’s lead and to fill in gaps. In the above passage Walker 
touches on what is a reasonable solution to the problem that is presented when he states 
that Aristotle is only opposed to irrelevant emotional appeals and recognizes the need to 
emotionally guide the listener. I shall discuss this solution below, but first the 
“depravity” of the common citizens bears consideration. In Rhetoric 3.7 Aristotle could 
be seen as throwing in the idealist ethical towel. That is, perhaps due to his frustration 
with the moral integrity or intellectual capacity of the listeners, he follows a line of 
reasoning that is the complete opposite of his first comments where he states that it is 
wrong to emotionally warp the listeners. For, as Wardy informs us, in this chapter of his 
treatise, Aristotle appears to advocate unconscionable emotional manipulation in the 
style of Gorgias: 
Rhetoric 3.7 establishes a particular connection between effective word choice 
and oratorical working on the pathe of the auditors: “Appropriate phrasing also 
enhances plausibility; for the soul reasons as if the truth were being spoken, 
because people’s attitude to things like this is such that they think that things are 
as the speaker says, even if they are not; and the listener always sympathizes with 
[literally, “shares the pathos of”] someone who speaks with pathos, even if what 
he says amounts to nothing” (1408a19-24). This is almost undiluted Gorgias, 
whose rhetorical psychology is nothing but psychopathology, the theory of the 
dominance of the passive psyche by the active logos. Its mention of cognitive 
error induced by emotional distortion confirms that the passage is prescribing full-
scale emotional manipulation, not mere appeal to emotions that might complement 
true logos. If his auditors are reasoning faultily, that must be because their 
supposition that this orator speaks the truth is false; his “appropriate” phrasing – 
appropriate for deception – has cozened them. This orator is a sophistical 
rhetorician pure and simple, a rampant instance of Plato’s worst nightmare (and 
the persuasive paragon of The Encomium of Helen) come to life. And consider 
Aristotle’s last, deflationary, remark: most orators really are “full of sound and 
fury, signifying nothing.” Listening to them is like being hit over the head 
(Mighty, 79). 
 
The words “as if the truth were being spoken” from Aristotle’s text above glare out at 
the reader, especially when Aristotle’s extreme position against emotional manipulation 
is kept in mind. As Wardy states, this is undiluted Gorgias, and Aristotle is, in effect, 
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advocating pure, unmitigated manipulation. Here Aristotle is, to my mind, simply 
admitting that Gorgias was right in certain cases, whether we like it or not. He is 
admitting that another type of rhetoric, a psychagogic, or “soul-guiding” rhetoric, 
which, in Mortara Garavelli’s words, does not need to prove a case by technically 
impeccable means, but instead derives its power of persuasion “mediante la atracción 
que la palabra, sabiamente manipulada, podía ejercer sobre los espectadores” (18). That 
is, the objective was “la reacción emotiva, no la adhesion racional” (18-19). And so 
Aristotle here is quite possibly just facing facts: sometimes it is necessary to snow the 
public with nonsense. This would fit well with recent newscasts in Spain and France on 
national television when the figures of the current economic crisis are discussed. It is 
often impossible for the average viewer to understand what the graphs and tables mean, 
and the viewer is left baffled and perhaps dazed, which is no doubt better than the 
opposite possibility. That is, a presentation of the reality of the crisis that might end up 
angering the citizens who might then start demonstrating or, even worse in the eyes of 
those holding power, start rioting or a revolution. 
The two extremes and the various positions that might be taken in between have 
been a subject for discussion throughout history. Kennedy tells us that Quintilian made 
reference to the emotion-free use of rhetorical argument as practiced by the Stoics: 
Quintilian gives a glimpse of the Stoic theory, though he does not mention the 
Stoics, when he says . . . that some have thought the sole duty of the orator 
(oratoris officium) is to teach, and they have excluded all appeals to the emotions 
on the grounds that perturbation of mind is a fault, that the judge ought not to be 
distracted from the truth, and that it is unworthy of a man to seek to charm his 
audience in pursuit of a rhetorical victory (Persuasion, 292). 
 
And so the question remains: what is the appropriate stance to take? Ought emotions 
enter into rhetorical argument or not? Wardy, while addressing Rhetoric 3.7 with its 
admission that orators are full of sound and fury yet saying nothing, nevertheless credits 
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Aristotle with a major achievement in his categorization of the two basic uses of 
emotions: 
The modes of persuasion [i.e., emotional pleas] ostensibly rejected in 1.1 are 
clearly detailed later in the Rhetoric and most certainly do not conform to a 
program of exclusively rationalistic persuasion . . . one of the crowning virtues of 
Aristotelian philosophy of mind is precisely that it permits us to drive a wedge 
between the concepts of emotional appeal and of emotional manipulation 
(Mighty, 62-63). 
 
Wardy’s comments are insightful. There is a difference between emotional appeal and 
emotional manipulation. Identifying this difference is the first and highly important step 
towards the ethical use of emotions in persuasion. Chiron provides a concise and 
insightful discussion of what could have been the evolution of Aristotle’s thought in this 
regard:  
1) One is that 1.1 introduces an ideal rhetoric that limits itself to arguing the issue. 
That ideal is put aside in 1.2, where Aristotle turns to real political oratory, 
which includes emotional appeal. The trouble with this response is that 
emotional appeal need not be hostile to arguing the issue. Indeed, arguing the 
issue may arouse an appropriate emotion.  
2) [C]riticism in 1.1 is narrowly directed against contemporaries of Aristotle who 
were prepared to arouse emotions by non-discursive means like cries and tears 
and wry faces. But nowhere in 1.1 does Aristotle suggest that his criticism has 
such a restricted target. Indeed, it seems natural to read the text as a sweeping 
rejection of all forms of emotional appeal. For that reason, I much prefer a third 
answer: 
3) 1.2 and 2.1-11 reflect a development in Aristotle’s thought. We know from 
Plato’s Philebus and Aristotle’s Topics that during Aristotle’s residence in the 
Platonic Academy the relation between emotion and thought was a subject of 
discussion. Aristotle came to see thought as the efficient cause of emotional 
response, and that encouraged him to adopt a new and friendlier attitude 
toward emotional appeal. Changing thoughts is what orators do, and when the 
change is accomplished through reasonable arguments that result in emotional 
response, then the orator has done nothing wrong. He is performing his task in 
an artful manner (117-18). 
 
Chiron’s statement that Aristotle came to view thought as the efficient cause of 
emotional response is crucial to this discussion. Aristotle has laid the groundwork for 
20
th
 century cognitive psychology, which asserts that what one thinks determines how 
one feels, and that emotions play a role in our reasoning process, especially in relation 
to evaluation and judgment. The emotions form part of ethical reasoning. They are not 
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to be the focus, however, as Oksenberg Rorty asserts: “And although he [Aristotle] 
denies that rhetoricians are primarily concerned with swaying the emotions of their 
audiences, he manifestly thinks that this is an important feature of rhetorical argument” 
(7). The emotions are crucial, but are not to take the place of logos, in Aristotle’s 
version of rhetoric. As Ross states, “[Aristotle] himself recognises the part played by the 
appeal to emotion, but insists that the emotion must be produced by the speech itself 
and not by the cheap adventitious devices common in the Greek law-courts” (280). The 
devices that Ross is referring to are those already mentioned. That is, for example, 
parading one’s wife and children in order to appeal to pity, declaring all the good things 
that a person has done in order to detract from the crime committed, and so on.  
 Aristotle’s position was also important with respect to his teacher and friend, 
Plato. Wardy writes of the significance of Aristotle’s stance as opposed to that held in 
the Academy: 
The consequences for rhetorical oratory could not be more radical. Whatever 
version of the Platonic soul one chooses, Platonic emotions are irrational, not in 
the sense that they are reducible to, for example, simple tastes or tactile feelings, 
but rather because they are, by definition, unmotivated and unmodified by the 
full-blown, active rationality most evident in philosophical logos. In complete 
contrast, Aristotelian emotions are permeated by reason. When I, for instance, 
unhappily perceive it as unfortunate: cognitive, evaluative, and affective 
responses are, apart from pathological cases, typically indissoluble (Mighty, 63). 
 
Wardy rightly states that the emotions are inseparable from thought in evaluative 
thought. If an event is perceived as unfortunate, the corresponding emotion mirrors the 
thought. As such, Aristotle’s work on the emotions stands as an achievement in 
emotional psychology, due to the linking of emotion with rational processes and with 
discourse. As Konstan asserts: “Aristotle was also offering an account [of emotions] 
that corresponded far better to the actual way in which appeals to emotion worked in 
discourse than other writers had done” (419). And so Aristotle in his discussion of the 
emotions in relation with logos has presented a middle position that squares with 
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common sense. Humans are not machines that reason with cold logic. The emotions 
enter into the decisions we make as valid and necessary components in the process, as 
Kennedy asserts:
 
In Book 2, chs. 2-11, Aristotle’s inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion, 
despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings 
judgment is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every 
situation, and it is part of the orator’s duty to clarify these in the minds of the 
audience (Rhetoric, 39 – footnote 43). 
 
Our rational processes are inextricably linked to our emotions, and, as Kennedy brings 
to the fore in the above excerpt, the emotions are tightly linked with morality.  
 We can conclude, therefore, that, in Aristotle’s version of rhetoric, appeals to the 
emotions are both necessary and legitimate, and not irrelevant, provided the speaker is 
doing so in an ethical way. As we have already stated, rhetoric is not, in Aristotle’s 
opinion, to be used for evil ends. Thus, provided the influencing of emotions is done 
ethically, this type of rhetorical activity is fair game. Frede’s commentary supports the 
idea of a fair use of emotional appeal: 
“Working on the audience’s feelings” (1377b28-31) is a legitimate part of oratory. 
Although it is not part of a proof of the subject matter (“outside the 
demonstration,” 1378a7), it is a legitimate part of speaking to the subject as long 
as it is not used as a mere camouflage for speaking “outside the subject matter.”    
. . . in forensic speech the emotions are used to explain the defendant’s actions; 
when it comes to the audience’s dispositions it is rather a matter of influencing 
their judgment (265). 
 
Frede takes the stance that to guide the audience emotionally is not unfair, but 
necessary. Interesting here is her erroneous conclusion that, in Aristotle’s version of 
rhetoric, emotional appeals are not part of a proof of the subject matter. For the 
emotions (pathos) are, in Aristotle’s definition, a proof. The emotions themselves 
persuade us that a given argument is true or not and are, for Aristotle, part of the proof 
of an argument’s validity. Frede’s error is no doubt due to a desire to separate rational 
processes from emotions. But in Aristotelian rhetorical thinking, emotions form a 
crucial part of the judgment process. Aristotle views their use as negative and irrelevant 
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only when they are used unethically and without a connection to the details of the case 
at hand. That is, when emotions are not used as an appeal, but instead as unfair or 
irrelevant manipulation. Brunschwig details what Aristotle viewed as “outside the 
demonstration”: 
Pathos can find its legitimate place in the overall repertory of available technical 
means. This condition is precisely stated, in the description of the entechnical 
pathos, by the phrase hupo tou logou (1356a14): appealing to the passions is an 
entechnical practice when the pathos is raised in the audience “by the speech 
itself” (in contradistinction with nondiscursive means, like cries, tears, 
gesticulations, wry faces, or the production of moaning women or weeping 
children) (46). 
 
Here again we see the importance given by Aristotle to logos. That is, that if the 
emotions are to be influenced, in Aristotle’s version of rhetoric this is to be done in the 
arguments of the text itself, not by histrionics or by bringing out crying women and 
babies. 
The ethical use of pathos is, in Aristotle’s system, carried out through logos 
which, as Striker points out, functions in order to highlight the morally important 
aspects of a case. Striker here is discussing deliberative rhetoric, but the emotions play a 
part in all three rhetorical genres, due to the fact that some sort of judgment is made in 
each type: 
The role of emotion as described by Aristotle seems rather to be that of directing 
one’s attention to the practically or morally relevant features of a situation: “Fear 
makes people good at deliberation,” as he puts it in Rhetoric 2.5.1383a6 –7 . . . It 
is the right kind of emotional disposition that enables the morally virtuous person 
to see or recognize what is the best in any situation. A bad person, by contrast, 
might be described as morally blind: not only will she fail to notice the relevant 
aspects of a situation but even if someone told her “what is best,” she might fail to 
recognize it as the best. If this is correct, then the Aristotelians have a stronger 
argument to use against those who would rid us of our passions than just that 
emotions seem to be a natural phenomenon. They could claim that our capacity 
for emotional responses is what alerts us to morally important features of 
situations that we need to take into account in attempting to arrive at a rational 
judgment . . . In the contest of deliberation, an emotional response can be 
described as one that is in proportion to the good or evil perceived, and hence 
adequate, if the initial impression holds up under reflective scrutiny (298 – my 
italics). 
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Striker makes the very important point that a virtuous person will have the appropriate 
response to a particular situation, as opposed to a bad person, who will not. (Aristotle 
makes this same point in his work on ethics.) It is the emotions that act as the guides by 
alerting us to what matters in any particular rhetorical event. The obvious problem here 
is how to determine who the virtuous person is and who the vice-ridden person is. This, 
however, is precisely what a rhetorical approach to analyzing literature can make 
possible: the opening of a conversation on what is ethically right or wrong, or on what a 
definition of the good life is.
94
 And here Striker’s insightful comment that a judgment 
must hold up under reflective scrutiny is crucial, for the evaluation of a decision or of an 
action may vary over time. Ethical evaluations that do not change over time after 
ongoing examination often prove true. Striker’s observation also sheds light on the 
complexity and difficulty of reaching a judgment that will manage to withstand the test 
of both time and extensive analysis. 
Aristotle’s work changed the way emotions were to be viewed subsequently in 
rhetorical theory, as Chiron asserts: 
Recognizing the involvement of thought in emotional response had important 
consequences for rhetoric. In particular, emotional appeal could no longer be 
viewed as an extra-rational force that works on an audience in the manner of a 
drug or enchantment (cf. Gorgias, Helen 10-19). . . Through argument, the orator 
controls what a listener believes, and in this way he arouses an emotional 
response. To be sure, argument can be misused so that inappropriate emotions are 
aroused or emotions are intensified in an unreasonable way. But the possibility of 
misusing emotional appeal does not mean that all emotional appeal must be 
condemned. An orator of wisdom, virtue and goodwill advances reasonable 
arguments, and in doing so, he excites emotional responses that are appropriate to 
the situation (117). 
 
Chiron’s comments add to the already discussed departure Aristotle made with respect 
to views put forth in Plato’s Gorgias. Aristotle’s treatise broke important ground in the 
way that emotions were to be viewed from that moment onward. The emotions, as 
                                                 
94 Charles Taylor writes that “moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than 
on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life . . 
.” (3). In this way, he broadens the scope of moral philosophy’s possible concerns.  
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Aristotle defines them, form part of the rational process. They are inseparable from 
reason. Aristotle’s emotions are, in effect, syllogistic. In the excerpt above Chiron also 
brings out the important notion that logos can also be used to unfairly manipulate 
emotions and thus distort the judgment of the listeners. This idea highlights the 
audience’s responsibility to be critical in its reception of and response to the arguments 
themselves in order not to be emotionally swept away by a manipulative speaker or 
writer towards poor judgments, whether in terms of reason, ethics, or both.  
 Obviously, Aristotle did not invent the use of emotions to influence judgment. 
As Kennedy informs us, “These emotions, filial love, pity, reverence of the gods, 
respect for the aged, are feelings to which orators appealed throughout antiquity” 
(Persuasion, 93). (Along these lines it is interesting that Aristotle’s De anima is not the 
best place for finding discussions on the emotions in antiquity; rather, works on 
rhetoric, such as Aristotle’s Rhetoric or Cicero’s De inventione provide extensive 
discussion in this regard. Another related text in this regard is Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics.) 
Aristotle provides a list of emotions which he analyzes in terms of how they 
function. The good orator will have a good grasp on all of the emotions and how they 
function, for Aristotle states that “if we understood one or two of these [emotions] but 
not all, it would be impossible to create anger [in someone]” (Kennedy – Rhetoric, 
113).
95
 
At this point citing Aristotle’s definition of the emotions and how they function 
bears re-examining:  
                                                 
95 John M. Cooper writes: “He [Aristotle] gives separate, formal treatment to twelve, in the 
following order: feeling angry (orge), feeling mildly (praotes), feeling friendly (philia, i.e., to 
philein), feeling hatred (misos), feeling afraid (phobos), feeling confident in the face of danger 
(tharrein), feeling disgraced (aischune), feeling kindly (charin echein), pity (eleos), righteous 
indignation (nemesan), envy (phthonos), and feeling eagerness to match the accomplishments of 
others (zelos). Aristotle also examines schadenfreude and experiencing disdainful and pleasurable 
feeling at the punishment or other come-down of those who deserve it” (242). 
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8. The emotions [pathe] are those things through which, by undergoing change, 
people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and 
pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites 
(Kennedy – Rhetoric, 113). 
 
The two aspects that Aristotle brings to the fore here are 1) the emotions change while 
at the same time changing the judgment of the person experiencing them, and 2) they 
are characterized by pain and pleasure. Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions shows 
which underlying motive is in operation with each as well as their respective targets. 
Aristotle’s definition of anger will provide a typical example: 
1. Let anger be [defined as] desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] 
distress, for apparent retaliation because of an apparent slight that was directed, 
without justification, against oneself or those near to one. . .and a kind of pleasure 
follow all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation (116). 
 
Anger is the result of an unjustified apparent offence against a person or those near to 
her. The perception of this offence is accompanied by pain (i.e., distress) at the injustice 
of the offence. Once the offence has been perceived as such, anger turns into a desire for 
revenge that is accompanied by pleasure. In this model, the syllogistic nature of the 
emotions can be seen, as well as how they function in relation to judgment, on the one 
hand, and as stimulants for action, on the other. This means that a rhetor, through her 
arguments, could present a situation as an example of an unjustified offence, which the 
listeners would experience as pain – the pain of injustice. The logic is quite simple: 
since someone has been unjustly offended, pain at this injustice is experienced. Since an 
injustice has been experienced, a desire for retaliation emerges. The rhetor then could 
work on the desire for revenge by presenting possibilities to the audience to be later put 
into action. John M. Cooper provides a concise summary of Aristotle’s method: 
After giving his definition of the specific state of feeling, he goes on to discuss 
(not always in the same order) (a) what personal conditions or circumstances, 
especially what psychological conditions (what other feelings or beliefs, in 
general what frames of mind), make people apt to experience the feeling (pos 
echontes or diakeimenoi), (b) what sorts of people they do or do not feel the 
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feeling toward (tisin or pros tinas), and (c) what the occasions are of their having, 
or not having, the feeling for that kind of person (epi poiois  or dia poia) (243). 
 
Cooper outlines the three main aspects of Aristotle’s analysis: 
Aristotle seems to recognize three central elements as constituting the emotions – 
they are agitated, affected states of mind, arising from the ways events or 
conditions strike the one affected, which are at the same time desires for a specific 
range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation as it appears to her or 
him to be (251). 
 
Here again the syllogistic nature of the emotions becomes clear. All three elements can 
also be detected in the narratives under study in this dissertation. The narrators’ 
presentation of the events will strike the reader in a certain way, which will lead to 
thoughts that are accompanied by emotional pain or pleasure (depending on the moral 
evaluation made by the reader). This evaluation can be then shown to lead to a 
particular desire for a change in the situation on the part of the reader, which the 
narrator then provides as part of the narrative.  
 Aristotle’s linking pain and pleasure as accompaniments to emotions is tied to 
ethics. In his view, it is the proper experiencing of pain or pleasure when evaluating 
situations that determines whether a person is virtuous or not. The emotions are the 
response to a stimulus (i.e., some situation or action), and are accompanied by either 
pain or pleasure.  As Leighton writes, “The pleasure or pain is part of the concept of the 
emotion; neither is separable from the emotion” (220). We have already discussed 
Pascal’s observation that, in the end, what we view as ethical are those things that are 
pleasing to us. But it is also the experience of both pain and pleasure that determines 
what is ethical in Aristotle’s system. Ross explains how this notion functions in 
Aristotelian thought:  
The best indication of a man’s disposition is his feeling pleasure or pain in the 
doing of virtuous or vicious acts. Pleasure and pain may indeed be called the 
subject-matter of moral virtue. The pursuit of pleasure, the avoidance of pain, are 
the main sources of vicious action. Virtue is concerned with actions and feelings, 
and all of these are accompanied by pleasure or pain (201). 
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An individual will either feel pain or pleasure in the face of situations in which ethical 
judgment takes place, and this determines whether the same individual is evil or good. 
To experience pleasure upon evaluating an unethical situation would be an indicator of 
a person whose system of values is questionable. As accompaniments to emotions, pain 
and pleasure are in themselves amoral for Aristotle. They must be shaped according to 
an ethical system in order to be proper indicators of virtue: 
The tendencies to feel pleasure and pain are not to be suppressed but to be 
moulded into the right shape . . .  Aristotle neither praises nor condemns the 
tendencies inherent in man. They are indifferent in themselves; they become good 
or bad according as they are subjugated to or allowed to assert themselves against 
the ‘right rule’ which our reasonable nature grasps for itself and seeks to impose 
on them (201). 
 
The notion of pain and pleasure as becoming good or bad depending on one’s 
experience of them in relation with emotions shows how both pain and pleasure are 
indicators of one’s system of values. As humans we use pain and pleasure as connected 
to particular emotions to guide us in our reactions to situations as well as in the moral 
choices we make. In Cooper’s evaluation, “the emotions as Aristotle represents them in 
the Rhetoric Book 2 are feelings either of being distressed and upset about something, 
or of being excited about and relishing something” (246). In this analysis, we can see 
that, in Aristotle’s method, one is first struck by a situation which has the corresponding 
effect of pain or pleasure, which then leads to desire, which is accompanied by pleasure. 
It is this process that the rhetor must understand and manage in order to persuade her 
listeners. Oksenberg Rorty writes along these lines: 
Because Aristotle sees no need to develop a general theory about how pathe affect 
evaluative decisions, we can only extrapolate what he might say from his 
discussion of the aftermath of specific emotions – anger tends to lead to revenge, 
envy to emulation, and so on. The rhetorician evokes a cluster of pathe-laden 
memories: “Would your fathers have tolerated the persistent pattern of your 
neighbors’ provocations? Remember how our fathers’ responses to such 
challenges brought us both honor and benefit.” Having aroused the audience’s 
indignation and emulation, the rhetorician can direct their phantasiai of revenge 
or competition to actions that appear to satisfy long-standing attitudes and desires 
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(1385a21 ff., 1388a36 ff.). Even passions that are not immediately motivational – 
grief, for example – can be directed toward specific action-guiding phantasiai: for 
example, commissioning a memorial tribute of some kind (1384a24, 1385b16 ff., 
1387b22 ff.) (17). 
 
Oksenberg Rorty then outlines how the skillful rhetor will use his knowledge of the 
emotions to motivate his listeners into action: 
A skillful rhetorician can persuade an audience to accept a course of action by 
eliciting pathe that are typically associated with an appropriate desire. For 
instance, if he wants to provoke his audience to revenge, he tries to make them 
angry by trying to convince them that former allies have unjustly injured the polis 
(1382a18 ff.). Or, if he wants to persuade his audience to retreat from an exposed 
position, he elicits fear by evoking vivid phantasiai of imminent danger (1382a20 
ff.). In order for the rhetorician to form just the right sort of action-guiding desire, 
rather than whirligig diffuse pathe, he must be quite precise about the implications 
of his speech. Because phantasiai specify the intentional content of their 
associated pathe, they affect its typical concomitant desires: the pleasure of a 
specific sort of revenge in anger, for instance, rather than that of winning a race at 
the Olympics (19). 
 
In the recit de voyage under study, the narrator makes appeals to the reader’s emotions 
in order to be judged positively on several levels, one of the most important being his 
participation in the narration as an ethical agent. His aim – by means of what is, in 
effect, making his case – is for his readers to praise him for his actions, actions which, 
as we will see, could also be judged as unethical. In the fictional narrative, it is possible 
to see how the introduction of data relevant to the case modifies the emotional response 
as well as the corresponding judgment on the part of the reader. And it is in the 
evaluation of the narrator’s use of rhetorical logos, pathos, and ethos that it will be 
possible to bring to the surface the underlying system of values that function as the 
prime motor of the narrative. Once elements of a system of values is brought to the 
surface, it can then be evaluated in ethical terms. This will lead to a possible evaluation 
of narrators as well as readerships. 
 We can see, then, that emotions are, in Reinhardt’s words, “knowledge-related.” 
That is, they can be “explained with reference to judgments, opinions, and convictions 
of orator and audience alike; Aristotle holds that generating a certain emotion or set of 
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emotions on the part of the audience will require inducing them to make a series of 
judgements and evaluations” (Rhetoric, 376). The connection between logos, pathos 
and ethics can clearly be seen here in Reinhardt’s use of the terms judgments, opinions 
and convictions. The rational processes that we use when judging, holding an opinion or 
having a certain conviction are accompanied by emotions that we use to guide us in 
terms of quality and matters of morality. 
Our judgments, opinions and convictions are not necessarily stable, and, 
depending on opposing arguments, can be modified. Striker comments on how rational 
processes affect the emotions: 
Emotions are not based on reasoning, but, as Aristotle puts it, they (that is, the 
“part of the soul” to which they belong) can be persuaded by reason . . . This 
means not only that we can sometimes be talked out of an emotion by arguments 
to show that our first impression was mistaken; it also means that our reason-
based beliefs and convictions will make us disposed to be impressed in certain 
ways and to have the corresponding emotional responses (299). 
 
As Striker rightly asserts, we can have our minds changed by the arguments of others, 
and we can be shown to have been mistaken. Our emotions are changed depending on 
the argument. The possibility for error brings into focus the communal nature of our 
judgments and opinions as related to emotions. As humans we need others to aid us in 
evaluations we make on all levels. Skinner states that Montaigne discusses this 
instability of the emotional-rational process, which he asserts is in nearly if not constant 
flux: 
There [in the ‘Apology’ for the Spanish theologian Raymond Sebond] he 
[Montaigne] insists that our beliefs are so deeply affected by our passions, and our 
passions so wayward in themselves, that even in legal arguments ‘an exceeding 
confusion of judgements must arise’. The inevitable outcome is that ‘what one 
company hath judged another will adjudge the contrary, and the very same will 
another time change opinion’ (128 – my brackets). 
 
The communal aspect that our judgments depend on is brought out in Montaigne’s 
commentary, as well as the complexity involved in attempting to reach a final 
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conclusion on any matter, even legal ones.
96
 Not only do we respond to the arguments 
of others, but our own arguments are subject to our own rational and emotional 
responses to them. There is a back-and-forth movement between the emotions and 
reason that enters into the decision-making process. We argue with others and with 
ourselves in order to reach a proper evaluation. It could be said that there is a dialectic 
between rational thought and the emotions, each influencing the other. This process, as 
stated above, does not occur in a vacuum, rather in a social context within a dialectic 
framework as Konstan asserts: 
If Aristotle’s conception of the emotions is cognitive and evaluative in nature . . . 
it is in no small part because he understands the emotions fundamentally as 
products of social exchanges, in which the stimulus takes the form of an 
intentional act and the response, in turn, is an evaluation of that act together with a 
corresponding action or disposition (416). 
 
Konstan calls Aristotle’s approach “surprisingly cognitive-mediational” (412). That is, 
argumentation produces emotions that allow the audience to judge properly in a social 
setting where discourse is the medium for the exchange of ideas:  
If cognition, as opposed to instinctive reaction, indeed plays so central a role in 
Aristotle’s analysis of emotion, the reason in no small part is precisely the 
tendency to treat emotion in the context of dialogue and persuasion (412). 
 
 In this setting of dialogue and persuasion where the possibility to err looms large, the 
proper guiding of emotional reactions is crucial. This is the task of the rhetor, who must 
present a case through logos, meanwhile eliciting an emotional response that matches 
the case itself. To the facts of the case and the story itself must be added an emotional 
element, for it is through our emotional response that we evaluate on the level of 
morality. It is only through the proper guiding of emotions that that justice can be 
                                                 
96 Heidegger makes the following observations on publicness as a mode of being, and its relationship 
to the emotions in the Rhetoric: “Aristotle investigates the pathe [affects] in the second book of his 
Rhetoric. Contrary to the traditional orientation, this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first 
systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another. Publicness, as the kind of 
Being which belongs to the “they” not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs 
moods and “makes” them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator 
speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright” 
(As quoted in Kennedy – Rhetoric, 115). 
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achieved. The audience’s judgment must be influenced; this is legitimate use of pathos 
as proof. As the possibility to err is present, the audience may, without the proper 
guidance, not experience the emotions proper to the particular case. Cooper comments 
on this possibility in his analysis of Aristophanes’ Wasps: 
As Euxitheus notes in his opening statement (prooimion) in defence of the murder 
of Herodes, many innocent people, who had lacked speaking ability, were 
condemned because they were unconvincing in arguing the truth, whereas many 
others, who were able speakers, were acquitted because they were convincing 
with their lies (206). 
 
As Cooper states above, falsehood can be passed off as truth, provided the spokesperson 
is capable of persuading through argument and the appropriate emotional responses. 
Cooper’s discussion underscores the importance of being able to convince an audience 
of the truth, for facts do not necessarily speak for themselves. The truth of a particular 
case, it seems, needs a spokesperson: 
Neither the testimony of the witnesses (martyriai) nor the narration of facts (erga) 
is sufficient to get across the seriousness of the offence. And here is where 
emotionally charged appeals often contained in the proof section of a forensic 
speech become so important in achieving the vividness needed to recreate the 
outrage (208). 
 
The vividness that Cooper mentions can be created by narrative, as well as reasoned 
argument. Unless a case is presented in a way so that an emotional response that is 
appropriate to the case at hand is elicited, the possibility to misinterpret and to therefore 
judge inadequately exists. It is here that the orator’s skill is crucial in order to get the 
audience to see things as he wishes them to be seen: 
An orator who seeks to produce a certain attitude in his audience need not, and in 
most cases does not, intend to get his listeners to proceed to immediate action. His 
aim is to make them see the case at hand in a certain way: to look favorably upon 
his client or upon the orator himself, or to take a negative view of his opponent. 
Which attitude they have will depend crucially, as Aristotle says, on the emotions 
they feel toward the persons involved in the case (Striker, 291-293). 
 
But it is not only the seriousness of the offence that needs getting across. At times the 
law itself is ambiguous or difficult to interpret. Here, too, emotions aid in guiding the 
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audience to the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of the law. Cooper tells us that this was 
the case in Athens:  
As Carey rightly notes, “the jurors are asked to become emotionally involved”, 
and far from being extraneous [they are] relevant as they helped to define 
juristically the issue at stake, since the law itself was not always a clear guide (207 
– my brackets). 
 
Not only does the argument need to convince, it also needs to “feel” right. This is a 
common human experience: we often listen to someone who is very convincing in terms 
of logic, but, as the colloquial expression goes, “It just doesn’t feel right!” Thought and 
feelings need to mesh with each other in order for humans to be convinced of the truth 
of an argument or an evaluation.  
In addition to the use of emotions when defining an issue, Cooper also makes the 
important point that the emotions are necessary to make it possible for the speaker “to 
grab and sustain the attention of the dicasts” (210). Keeping the attention of one’s 
listener is made possible by producing the proper emotional response. The same holds 
true for writers: they must be adept at engaging their readers emotionally if they want 
their readers to finish the work they have produced. In the case of narrative, the ethics of 
the story, not just the events, are what “hook” the reader emotionally, for we as humans 
want to know why things happen in order to judge the events that have been narrated 
from our own value-laden reference point.  
 Cooper’s discussion refers to judicial settings, and therefore is related to the 
values of the community in which the trials occur. The shared values are the basis on 
which the judgments are made:  
In Athens juries were extensions of the community at large, sharing the same 
social values as the litigants, and it is to these shared values that litigants must 
direct their emotional appeals and arguments (207). 
 
Even though a community shares values, the emotional reaction to a particular issue or 
case may be mistaken. The possibility to err in terms of an emotional response exists on 
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two levels. Firstly, the emotions that a particular individual experiences may not be 
appropriate to a particular case. This then, would be a matter of shaping the individual’s 
emotions towards a proper response through education. The other possibility would be 
an individual that in general does respond appropriately on an emotional level to 
morally charged situations, but who does not view a particular case from a perspective 
that allows for an appropriate response. It is the latter case that a rhetor must be able to 
correct. That is, the rhetor must be able to present a case in the proper light so that her 
audience will respond with the proper emotions, and thereby reach a fair and 
appropriate judgment. Martha Nussbaum writes along these same lines: 
Emotions, in Aristotle’s view, are not always correct, any more than beliefs or 
actions are always correct. They need to be educated, and brought into harmony 
with a correct view of the good human life. But, so educated, they are not just 
essential as forces motivating to virtuous action, they are also, as I have 
suggested, recognitions of truth and value. And as such they are not just 
instruments of virtue, they are constituent parts of virtuous agency: virtue, as 
Aristotle says again and again, is a “mean disposition” (disposition to pursue the 
appropriate) “with regard to both passions and actions” (NE 1105b25-26, 
1106b16-17, etc.) (316). 
 
In Nussbaum’s discussion above we can see that emotions need to be educated in order 
to be indicators of right and wrong, truth and falsehood. Aristotle’s “mean disposition,” 
which Nussbaum calls a disposition to pursue the appropriate, would be based, 
obviously, on the system of values that Aristotle held. This system of values is, as I 
have argued earlier on in this dissertation, in my opinion, open to scrutiny. It is 
reasonable to assume that Aristotle himself would be open to entering into a dialogue on 
the merits or flaws of his own system. I have also stated above in my discussion that 
even within the same community there will be difference of opinion on the system of 
values held by its members. Where no difference of opinion is present, rhetoric is 
unnecessary. It is therefore the job of the rhetor to legitimately guide the emotions of 
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her listeners through argument. This task will always be carried out from the standpoint 
of the community’s system of values.  
Now if emotional dispositions are what underlie virtue of character, the influence 
of emotion on judgment cannot be regarded as merely distorting, a distraction, as 
it were, from rational thought. An orator’s attempt to arouse or dispel emotions 
should also not be seen as mere manipulation, or as an attempt to produce 
conviction by illegitimate means. If morally good people can be expected to have 
certain characteristic emotional responses, then, the influence of emotions may 
sometimes be what is needed to see things in the right way. For example, it may 
be perfectly appropriate for a speaker to remind the people in the audience of 
services rendered to the community by his client, so as to make them feel grateful; 
and it may be equally legitimate to arouse pity for the victim of an undeserved 
misfortune. If the audience were impervious to such feelings, it might well arrive 
at an unfair or overly harsh verdict. Since emotion will have an influence on how 
we see and judge people and their actions, the right kind of emotional disposition 
may be what enables us to see things in the right moral perspective (Striker, 297-
298). 
 
In Striker’s discussion we can see again that a speaker has a responsibility to direct her 
listeners towards experiencing the right kind of emotional response in order to reach a 
judgment that is ethically correct. And so, although Aristotle in the third book of his 
Rhetoric allows for persuasion based on word choice that has no truth value, on the 
whole, the aim when influencing the emotions is not to manipulate, but to guide 
listeners towards an appropriate emotional response based on arguments that do not 
exist in isolation. That is, as Walker affirms, the community’s discursive framework 
will contain various perspectives which could be argued forcefully. Properly guided 
emotions will be the indicators of proper judgment: 
This is not to say that rhetoric as a techne of emotional katharsis is an art merely 
of irrational emotion-mongering via stylistic manipulation. Rather, it is to say that, 
insofar as enthymematic argumentation in rhetoric (or perhaps any argumentation 
whatsoever) is necessarily always engaged with the shaping and guiding of an 
audience’s pathe, and insofar as the structure of emotion is itself “enthymematic” 
or “syllogistic,” and insofar as the pathe rise from cognitive frameworks that 
typically (and in a debate necessarily) will include competing premises, it will 
never be sufficient for the rhetor merely to declare the “premises” that should 
conduce to one or another mode of emotion-intention-judgment-action in the 
practical reasoning of an audience (Pathos, 85). 
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We see here again the idea that merely stating the argument is insufficient to persuade. 
The emotions must enter into play, in order for the audience to be able to judge or 
evaluate. Also important in the above passage is that the same system of values will 
necessarily have opposing positions, which must be argued using both logos and pathos. 
Perelman adds nuance to the arguments above, stating that even in the selection of 
elements to be presented to the audience their importance is made evident:  
By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, 
their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a 
choice endows these elements with a presence, which is an essential factor in 
argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in rationalistic conceptions 
of reasoning (Treatise, 116). 
 
It could be argued that mere selection and presentation must be accompanied by 
arguments that, through guiding the emotions, reveal their significance in order to 
persuade the audience. Still, Perelman’s argument that endowing elements with 
presence increases their emotional impact on the audience thereby augments their 
capacity to move the audience into action is significant. In this sense, narrative can also 
be seen as the making present of an event through discourse with the objective of 
influencing the audience in a particular way. 
Walker, in the passage cited earlier, brings to the fore the idea that within the 
same community there will be competing arguments on the same issue.
97
 Obviously, the 
arguments will be based on ethical standpoints that are open to dispute. We have 
already stated above that an emotional response is a reaction to the perception of good 
and/or evil, and that the response will be an indicator of an individual’s virtue or lack 
thereof. Due to ambiguities in Aristotle’s texts, the question arises whether Aristotle’s 
objective was for the readers of his treatise to strive towards moral excellence in their 
                                                 
97 Cooper brings the idea of competing emotional stances into focus: “The orator’s purpose [with 
regard to emotional state of mind] is actually to make his hearers feel in some of these ways, and 
prevent them from feeling in other ways, toward specific persons on given occasions and 
circumstances (toward his client in a judicial case, for example), and to use these feelings to direct or 
influence their judgment” (Cooper – Aristotelian, 241). 
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rhetoric or to give in to the mochtheria, that is, to the unruly mob that made up the 
audience. In this regard, Oksenberg Rorty interprets Aristotle as follows: 
The rhetorician is concerned with the typical psychology of the ambitious youth 
or the power-hungry demagogue rather that with the idealized psychology of the 
phronimos or that of the relatively noble tragic protagonist. Even the best 
deliberative rhetorician attempting to persuade his audience of significant benefits 
and dangers can only rely on rough generalizations about the psychology – the 
interests, motives, and habits – that might be typical of potential allies and 
enemies. He can only address the fears and hatreds that are typical of various 
audiences, presenting considerations that are, at best, only likely to move them to 
pity or emulation. Instead of resembling a quasi-scientific treatise on breeding the 
best, most fertile chickens, the Rhetoric is like a treatise telling farmers how to get 
ordinary chickens to lay good eggs (10-11). 
 
Rather than appealing to phronimoi, the rhetorician’s aim in Oksenberg Rorty’s view is 
to reach garden variety members of the community. Her interpretation is that Aristotle 
has his sights set at the middle, or lower middle in terms of arête – excellence as related 
to virtue. Striker, however, believes Aristotle had higher aims:  
Aristotle no doubt expects a virtuous person’s emotions to be in line with “what 
the person of practical wisdom would determine” (NE 2.6.1107a1) because her 
spontaneous reactions will not be independent of her education, her previous 
experience, and the advice of others (299). 
 
As discussed earlier on in this dissertation, a person of practical wisdom is a phronimos, 
the ideal in terms of ethics and knowledge of appropriate decision-making and action in 
the polis. A middle stance is also possible with respect to Aristotle’s aims. It is possible 
that he wrote his treatise with a view to accommodating all types of audiences and 
situations. That is, Aristotle could have simply taken a realistic stance towards the social 
reality of his day. If this is true, the contents of his treatise interpreted as applicable to 
contemporary socio-political reality as well.  
 In any case, and in order round off the discussion of pathos in my reading of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, we can consider what scholars have said with respect to which 
emotions ought to be aroused in a rhetorical event.  We have already mentioned that 
emotions such as filial love, pity and reverence for the gods were feelings that were 
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typically appealed to in antiquity. In a judicial setting, however, Kennedy states that the 
prosecution used one emotion more than the others, while the defense used another: 
The prosecution makes most use of indignation or anger, which the speaker tries 
to arouse against the crime and person of the defendant. The latter needs most of 
all to arouse the feeling of pity. . . A clever orator is not content to leave pathos 
entirely to the end of a speech; much of his art consists in the subtle way in which 
he insinuates his cause into the soul of his hearers, evoking their unconscious 
sympathy, horror, astonishment, and indignation as the case unfolds (Persuasion, 
94). 
 
Important here is, in addition to the emotions most used by prosecution and defense, the 
list of other emotions that the litigants wished to insinuate into their listeners’ souls 
(psyches) throughout the process of the case at hand. This means that a variety of 
emotions can enter into play in rhetorical persuasion, and that their use is significant and 
necessary in order to reach a proper judgment. Konstan writes that Cicero provides a list 
of the crucial emotions that a good orator must seek to arouse:  
Cicero, in his essay On the Orator (2.206), observes that the most important 
emotions that an orator must aspire to arouse are ‘love, hate, anger, envy, pity, 
hope, joy, fear, and distress’ (amor, odium, iracundia, invidia, misericordia, spes, 
laetitia, timor, molestia) (422). 
 
This list may seem unreasonably long, but Cicero defines a great speech by its 
audience’s experiencing an outright roller-coaster of varied emotions: 
In the Brutus (188) . . . Cicero says that a crowd listening to a good speaker ‘feels 
pleasure and pain, laughs and cries, hates, scorns, envies, is moved to pity, shame, 
and disgust, grows angry, calms down, hopes, and fears’ (gaudet, dolet, ridet, 
plorat, favet, odit, contemnit, invidet, ad misericoriam inducitur, ad pudendum, ad 
pigendum, irascitur, mitigatur, sperat, timet) (422-23). 
 
What is particularly interesting about Cicero’s conception of a good speaker is the limits 
to which he has taken an idea presented in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and expanded upon it. It 
is important to keep in mind that, while Cicero’s description of a crowd’s reaction to 
what he calls a good speaker is quantitatively impressive, the qualitative aspect remains 
all-important in Aristotle’s framework. Still, Cicero’s commentary stands as a highly 
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significant contribution to rhetoric’s evolution and development, and reveals the multi-
faceted nature of this complex discipline. 
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2.8 ETHOS 
Evidence for ethos as a component of oratory can, according to Kennedy, be found as 
early as Homer’s Iliad. When Agamemnon engages in debate with Achilles, his 
personal authority and the impression he creates give weight to his argument 
(Persuasion, 37). In the 5
th
 century B.C.E., the legendary founders of rhetoric, Tisias 
and Corax, also placed emphasis on this aspect of argumentation (McCroskey, 83). 
Ethos formed part of 5
th
 century Athenian speech writer and politician Antiphon’s 
rhetorical strategies as well: 
In practice as early as Antiphon a Greek orator concentrates in the prooemium on 
presenting the character of the speaker in a favorable light. Usually, like Socrates 
in the Apology, the speaker claims to be unskilled in speaking, simple, honest, 
deserving, but caught up in circumstances; his opponent is sly, cunning, and 
worthless (Kennedy – Persuasion, 91). 
 
In Part 4 of this dissertation, the narrator of the recit de voyage under study has similar 
aims. The narrator of “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler” attempts to present himself 
in the best light possible, meanwhile denigrating other characters as well as social and 
political institutions in the narrative with a view to enhancing the impression he creates 
of his own character. In the fictional case that Gass creates, it is the woman’s moral 
integrity that is in the balance. Each detail provided as background is at the same time a 
reflection on her character, which influences the reader’s judgment of her actions. 
We have already discussed Plato’s shifting stance with regards to rhetoric. He 
takes an anti-rhetorical stance in the Gorgias, yet in the Apology uses rhetorical skills 
with great aplomb to “preserve the character and principles of Socrates” in a way which 
has “won the good will of posterity” (150). Kennedy tells us that although Socrates does 
not, in his defense, use flattery or emotional appeal, and although his argument is not 
developed by formulae characteristic of the courtroom, he nevertheless uses “many of 
the commonplaces and in general observes the rules for oratorical participation 
(prooemium, narration, refutation of charges, a section demonstrating his character, 
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peroration) with the aim of “demonstrating moral integrity by specifically rejecting the 
usual pathetic conventions” (151). As we can see, Plato’s aim was to use ethos in order 
to persuade and convince his readers of Socrates’ moral integrity, and to present his 
character in a favorable light.
98
 As Plato’s Socrates defines in the Phaedrus what he 
calls a true rhetoric, we can assume that, in the Apology, Socrates is putting his 
definition into practice. 
Walzer, Tiffany and Gross inform us that ethos, in the framework of the 
Rhetoric, has three components: “Aristotle describes ethos as a tripartite complex 
consisting of phronesis (practical wisdom), arête (moral virtue), and eunoia (good 
will)” (194). These three aspects that make up the ethos complex have withstood the test 
of time. The terms themselves have changed, but their essence remains constant: 
Twenty-three hundred years later, three social psychologists, Carl I. Hovland, 
Irving L. Janus, and Harold H. Kelly, when studying source credibility, identified 
the dimensions as expertness, trustworthiness, and intention towards the receiver. 
When we examine these writings, we find remarkable similarity. Aristotle and the 
three psychologists agree that a source is judged by an audience in terms of her or 
his knowledge of the subject of discourse, veracity, and attitude toward the well-
being of the audience (McCroskey, 85). 
 
According to McCroskey, the power of ethos has been proven scientifically to be the 
most valid constituent of rhetorical proof:  
Of all the aspects of classical rhetorical theory, the one that has the greatest 
support from modern empirical research is the theoretical importance of ethos in 
rhetorical communication. Almost without exception, experimental studies have 
demonstrated the power of ethos (83). 
 
McCroskey asserts that ethos has maintained its status as a powerful force in 
argumentation, a position it has maintained since rhetoric’s legendary founders taught 
Syracusans how to defend themselves in litigation:  
Since the days of Corax and Tisias, rhetorical theorists have been concerned with 
the role of ethos in communication. During this twenty-four-hundred-year period, 
                                                 
98 Interestingly, Xenophon’s Socrates was less “rhetorical¨ with respect to ethos, and “dealt 
immediately and directly with the charges made” (151). 
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Aristotle’s view that ethos is the most potent means of persuasion has seldom 
been challenged (83).
99
  
 
We have seen that Aristotle does state that ethos is perhaps the most powerful of the 
pisteis he has identified in his construct of rhetoric. He makes this affirmation in spite of 
his initial stated desire for logos to be the central proof. Ethos, like pathos, is in 
Aristotle’s system to be used to influence the pending judgment to be made. Judgment, 
as we have been saying, is always part of the rhetorical process. Aristotle makes this 
clear in his treatise, as well as the role ethos plays in this regard: 
2. But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is 
said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is necessary 
not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive but 
also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person 
and to prepare the judge; 
3. for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion (especially in deliberations 
but also in trials) that the speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his 
hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a certain way and in addition 
if they, too, happen to be disposed a certain way [favorably or unfavorably to him] 
(Kennedy – Rhetoric, 112 – author’s brackets). 
 
Aristotle does not mention epideictic rhetoric in the above passage, but, as we have 
already stated, judgment is necessarily involved with this genre also. Thus, in epideictic 
rhetoric, the importance of creating a good impression on the audience also takes on 
great importance when attempting to persuade. In the excerpt above Aristotle refers to 
logos when he states that it is necessary to look to the argument, but then immediately 
speaks of the rhetorician’s need to construct an image of herself as a certain type of 
person in order to prepare the judge. The similarity with pathos in this regard is 
obvious. Aristotle’s text here is crabbed, but the conclusion that can be drawn is that the 
speaker must create an image of herself as being a friend to the audience, which will 
dispose the latter towards a favorable judgment. If the speaker does not manage to 
                                                 
99 With respect to the tremendous power of ethos, Skinner tells us that Hobbes, like Livy, “suggests . . . 
that the rise of new religions may depend less on the content of their creeds than on the success of their 
founders at establishing themselves in the eyes of the populace as persons of wisdom and sincerity . . . 
The successful establishment of ethos may be sufficient in itself to induce belief” (360-361). 
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present a friendly image but instead creates a hostile one, the judgment will not be 
favorable. In this sense we can see the importance of creating kinship with one’s 
audience. The friend/foe dichotomy that we as humans use to determine whether or not 
we will work together with or against another individual or group of individuals is 
evident here. If it is true that in love relationships opposites are at times attracted to one 
another, in persuasion things work quite the other way around: like attracts like. 
Aristotle then goes on to mention what he considers three aspects of ethos that he views 
as necessary in order to manage to persuade an audience, which McCroskey rewords, as 
stated above, as expertness, trustworthiness, and intention: 
5. There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are 
three things we trust other than logical demonstration. These are practical wisdom 
[phronesis] and virtue [arete] and good will [eunoia]; for  speakers make mistakes 
in what they say through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these; 
6. for either through lack of practical sense they do not form opinions rightly; or 
though forming opinions rightly they do not say what they think because of a bad 
character; or they are prudent and fair-minded but lack good will, so that it is 
possible for people not to give the best advice although they know [what] it [is]. 
These are the only possibilities. Therefore, a person seeming to have all these 
qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers (112-113 – Kennedy’s brackets). 
 
Aristotle makes it clear that ethos plays an enormous role in the persuasive process. For, 
as he states, what we trust in addition to logical demonstration are the three ethos 
factors: phronesis, arete and eunoia.
100
 He then goes on to state that even though a 
speaker may know what the best advice possible is, they may not be able to persuade 
due to their inability to appear practical, as possessing the right moral character, or as 
being favorably disposed towards the audience. Aristotle tells his readers that it is 
possible to appear prudent and good by analyzing the virtues. Good will and 
friendliness he connects with his discussion on the emotions. It is here that the way the 
different proofs are inextricably woven together in Aristotle’s system becomes apparent. 
Brunschwig brings out the interconnection between logos and ethos, which in his 
                                                 
100 McCroskey provides one of many possible translations from the Greek original: “Aristotle 
identified the dimensions as intelligence, character, and good will” (85). 
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system is part of the art of rhetoric. The rhetorician is to create the right image by means 
of the discourse: 
When Aristotle deals with ethos, he uses the same general criterion in order to 
legitimate its place among entechnical proofs: the confidence inspired by the 
speaker must “be due to the speech itself, not to any pre-established reputation of 
the speaker” (1356a9-10). Aristotle goes so far as to qualify ethos, although with 
some caution, as “so to say, the main proof” (1356a13) (46). 
 
So we can see that logos is to create what, as McCroskey states, is the speaker’s 
knowledge of the subject of discourse, veracity, and attitude toward the well-being of 
the audience. Skinner writes that Quintilian agreed with Aristotle’s assertion that a 
speaker’s ethos must be embodied in the discourse itself: 
The analysis he [Quintilian] goes on to offer can hardly be said to meet his own 
accustomed standards of clarity, but he appears to have two closely related points 
in mind. One is that the creation of good ethos is partly a matter of presenting a 
good image or impression of ourselves. “If the term ethos refers to disposition or 
character”, he suggests, “then our speeches must themselves reflect good 
character when we are portraying those who possess it” (128). 
 
Quintilian’s use of the word “reflect” suggests a mirror. Discourse can be viewed as 
mirror of the mind of the speaker or writer, and, by association, the character of the 
person who has produced the discourse. It is this conception of discourse that makes it 
possible for Jaeger, as Kennedy informs us, to create an image of Demosthenes’ 
character, based on the latter’s speeches: “If Demosthenes did speak in person we can 
see his image in the ethos of the speech. Jaeger drew a picture of a restrained, dignified, 
somewhat aristocratic advisor – in a word a humanist” (Persuasion, 220). Whether we 
are mistaken or not, or whether we are projecting our own image onto that of the image 
reflected in a particular text, we inevitably draw conclusions regarding the character a 
person who has produced a text or who gives a speech based on her discourse. We then, 
also inevitably, judge that person from our own system of values. This judgment is 
obviously open to debate, and in the sharing of opinions on a particular individual’s 
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discourse it is possible, through rhetoric’s  dialectical aspect, to decide with others 
whether our own particular judgment is accurate or not.  
An important point that Aristotle brings out in relation to the creation of ethos 
through discourse is that the speaker’s previous reputation should not matter. Aristotle’s 
ideas are accurate on this point, and can be easily applied to any public figure. For even 
if a person becomes famous, they can maintain a high-ranking position before a critical 
audience only if they continue delivering quality that is on par with that which made 
them famous in the first place, regardless of the area in which they are working. Famous 
people that “no longer have it” are proverbial. It is, as a norm, not possible to rest on 
one’s laurels without eventually falling from grace in the audience’s eyes. And it is 
possible to fall from grace during the rhetorical act, due to not being able to maintain 
high ethos. Rhetoric, in this sense, can be viewed as a dangerous and complicated game. 
We can now turn to other general characteristics of ethos is in Aristotle’s rhetorical 
framework. 
Kennedy agrees with other scholars that Aristotle’s view of ethos is highly 
psychological, which he inherited from Plato:
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It is this knowledge which Aristotle undertakes to impart, and it is Plato’s 
emphasis here on psychology, the need to understand character and the way 
character is “enchanted” by argument and by emotional elements, which 
eventually moved him to give such a prominent place in his theory to character 
and pathos (95). 
 
We see in the excerpt above the link between reason and emotions. Emotions are 
influenced by logos and by ethos. The interplay between logos, ethos and pathos  
                                                 
101 Kennedy discusses the psychological approach to rhetoric as follows: “A third type of rhetorical 
ethos of interest to Aristotle is the character of the audience to which the speaker must suit his 
language and argument (1365b22 ff. and 1388b31 ff.). This is the psychological approach to rhetoric 
inherent in Gorgias’ theory of kairos, or the opportune, and developed slightly by Plato in the 
Phaedrus (271a4 ff., cf. also Gorgias 513b8 f.)” (Persuasion, 92-93).  
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constitutes its dynamic and highly complex psychological nature.
102
 Thus, an 
individual’s character traits that an audience interprets are by nature labyrinthine and 
characterized by multiple facets, as Oksenberg Rorty argues: 
The dispositions and habits that constitute character are layered in a veritable 
archeological site. Some traits – like being hot-tempered or slow-witted – are 
constitutionally based; others derive from a person’s social condition (as those 
with power are said to be serious and dignified [2.16-17]); yet others are formed 
by an individual’s polity (as citizens in a democracy are said to love liberty). Still 
others (the habits that constitute the virtues and vices, for example) derive from 
individual education and experience (1114b26 ff.) (11). 
 
The various categories that make up an individual’s character are outlined by Oksenberg 
Rorty: constitution, social condition, polity and education and experience. This is, 
however, just half of the picture that Aristotle is painting of character. The above 
categories provide a basic point of reference upon which reasoned choices are made. It 
is the combination of the traits of character with reasoned choice that constitute an 
individual’s ethos:  
Character is the configuration of hierarchically ordered, long-standing, actively 
dispositional qualities and traits – a person’s capacities and habits – that (by 
setting the general direction of his desires and the range of his passions) direct but 
surely do not determine his choices. In one way, therefore, a person’s character 
can be summarized by his ends: they form an organized system of ordered 
preferences, the structure of his practical reasoning. In Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle puts the importance of this aspect of character very strongly. Choice 
(prohairesis), he says, involves reasoning toward an end; it requires the 
combination of thought (dianoia) and desire (orexis) (NE 1.1.1139a32 ff.). Since 
thought moves nothing, choices require a combination of thought and ethos. The 
ultimate source (arche) of action is the person (anthropos), presumably conceived 
as a structured unity of his character traits. For the purpose of understanding 
deliberation and choice, a person’s character is a structured unity of a special 
kind, the union of reason and desire (13). 
 
The union of reason and desire which the individual then bases his choice to take action 
on provides the complex of ethos that the audience judges. A person’s character, in 
Aristotle’s system, is manifested in action, which is the result of reasoned choices. 
                                                 
102 Kennedy writes that Plato’s Socrates teaches that the “orator must know (271d2 ff.) that some 
people are affected one way, some another by certain things, and he must learn to apply this principle 
to individuals, that is, learn what arguments to use with what man” (95). 
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While a person’s socio-economic background (to use contemporary terminology) may 
predispose her to act in a certain way, this does not discount the possibility for her to 
make decisions that contradict expectations. In this sense, although Aristotle would 
argue that we are predisposed towards predictable behavior, it is still possible for an 
individual to make decisions that, if they contradict expectations, show that there is 
considerable freedom of choice. Since it is possible to choose contrary to expectations, 
judgment is possible. Were we not able to make choices that contradicted our socio-
economic configuration, freedom of choice would not exist, and judgment would be 
superfluous, as choice would be determined. Still, in Aristotle’s estimation, we are 
predisposed by what Oksenberg Rorty calls deep-seated dispositions: 
The psychology of the Rhetoric forms a neat pairing of character and emotions as, 
respectively, the active and passive features that affect a person’s judgment and 
choice. Aristotle stresses the active aspect of character: a person’s hexeis form and 
direct patterns of salience in his perceptions, thoughts and desires. Character sets a 
pattern of activity that does not necessarily require any external intervention for 
its exercise. By contrast, pathe derive from contingent and fortuitous changes 
brought about by external causes. Aristotle’s definition of the emotions in the 
Rhetoric (“those modifications [metaballontes] which bring about changes 
[diapherousi] in [a person’s] judgments and are accompanied by pain and 
pleasure” [1378a21]) develops the central motif of his general definition in the 
Metaphysics: pathe are exogenous and contingent changes that affect a person’s 
judgment and motivation. For all of that, a person’s character – his deep-seated 
dispositions – defines his relative susceptibility or immunity to a specific range of 
emotional responses: a proud man is susceptible to anger, a courageous man finds 
little to fear. Since political systems influence character, freedom-loving 
democrats are more prone to be jealous of those better off than are the citizens of 
an aristocracy (15). 
 
Here we must note that, although surprises may occur, particular groups are prone to 
particular types of behavior.
103
 This sort of profiling, to use a politically charged term, 
makes it possible for the speaker to present herself as having similar attributes, and thus, 
as being a friend whom the audience can trust and, as a result, worth paying attention to. 
                                                 
103 Fortenbraugh writes with respect to category types tied to age and fortune that will be prone to 
certain emotional reactions according to Aristotle: young men, old men, then good birth, wealth and 
power. Fortenbraugh asserts that the placement in Aristotle’s treatise of this analysis suggests that “this 
discussion of character was intended to supplement the analysis of emotion” (118). 
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In Part 4 of this dissertation, I shall present my reading of the narrator’s ethos in the 
recit de voyage and how he uses it to his advantage in order to plead his case and 
persuade his readers that he is praiseworthy – based on the system of values held in 
common by both the narrator and his readership. In the case written by Gass, the 
narrator presents the facts as an observer, and so they represent the woman by proxy. 
 The role the emotions play in an individual’s attitude is crucial in the defining of 
his ethos. Interestingly, the emotions that an individual experiences in the face of his 
life experiences contribute to what the audience views as his ethos, an evaluation that 
also reveals the shape and definition of the ethos of the audience. The audience reacts to 
the speaker with reason and emotions it is prone to due to its character traits. 
Grimaldi reduces Aristotle’s discussion of ethos to the emotional reactions that 
predominate in connection with decision-making or reactions to morally-charged 
circumstances: 
Ethos ultimately . . . is nothing more nor less than an established attitude with 
respect to one’s dominant emotional reactions (EN 1098a 3ff; 1102a 27 ff.; 1105b 
19ff.; 1139a 17 ff. are a few places which indicate this), or a firm disposition of 
the appetitive part of the soul with respect to all the elements which make up this 
part of the soul (27 – footnote 14). 
 
How one reacts emotionally to action which is the result of desire (here Grimaldi refers 
to desire as the appetitive part of the soul) or to the events that occur in our human 
existence determine what an individual’s character is in Aristotle’s system. A person of 
good moral character will experience the emotions appropriate to virtue. A person of 
bad moral character will do the opposite. Similarly, the emotions that come into play 
when making decisions also determine an individual’s character. When making a 
decision, the emotions necessarily come into play and aid in making a decision. And so 
similar to the emotional reaction an individual experiences in the face of morally-
charged circumstances, a person of good moral character will experience emotions that 
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are appropriate to virtue when making decisions, and the morally corrupt individual will 
experience emotions that are not appropriate when making a decision. 
McCroskey makes some interesting albeit debatable observations on ethos in his 
rhetoric handbook. The first is his idea that the speaker (or source, in his terminology) 
does not have ethos: 
Two things need to be made clear at the outset. First, we shall frequently refer to a 
source’s ethos. This may mislead some people into thinking that a source has 
ethos. The source does not. The receiver has the ethos. It is in the mind of the 
receiver, just as any other attitude is. Thus, the ethos of a source may vary greatly 
from receiver to receiver or among receivers in a collective audience. It is not 
something a source has, but it is convenient to talk about ethos as if this were the 
case (83-84). 
 
His position that the source does not have ethos is extreme in that his argument makes it 
seem as if the speaker (or source) were character-free. If ethos is something that a 
source does not have, the question arises of precisely what it is that the audience is 
perceiving. In Aristotle’s model, both the source and the audience have ethos, and it is 
in the interplay between the two parties that emotional responses are elicited and 
persuasion either occurs or does not occur. McCroskey makes this assertion no doubt 
because it is possible for different receivers to have different perceptions of the same 
source. If different perceptions are possible that means, in McCroskey’s lights, that the 
real locus of ethos must be in the receiver. But his argument, while interesting, does not 
take into consideration the possibility of different reactions to the ethos of a particular 
individual. Oksenberg Rorty’s position – a reflection of Aristotle’s – would seem to be 
more reasonable. That is, when she states that freedom-loving democrats are more prone 
to be jealous of those better off than are the citizens of an aristocracy, she is allowing, as 
Aristotle would, for two different reactions to a particular circumstance. In this case, it 
is the reaction of democrats and aristocrats to those who are better off. It seems 
impossible to argue that those better off do not have an ethos that would provoke an 
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emotional response due to how it was perceived by the two groups. Further, in 
Aristotle’s system, as we have noted, while a particular group may be prone to certain 
behavior patterns and attitudes, there is always room for differences within the group 
that contradict expectations. 
Although McCroskey’s position that ethos only exists in the mind of the receiver 
is extreme and, in my opinion, inaccurate, he nevertheless states correctly that ethos is 
an attitude held by the audience with respect to its perception of the speaker, and the 
terminology he uses adds to the understanding of the term itself:  
Ethos is the attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a 
receiver. Source credibility, prestige, and personal proof are terms that have been 
used to refer to constructs similar to what we have here defined as ethos (83). 
 
The terms that McCroskey uses, source credibility, prestige and personal proof add 
nuance to the term ethos, and aid in the understanding of how ethos functions as a proof 
in Aristotelian rhetoric. Credibility, for example, is a term that we use to refer to an 
individual’s trustworthiness. A person can have high or low credibility. A contemporary 
term like credibility clarifies for contemporary readers the idea that Aristotle was 
attempting to get across, and facilitates the idea of ethos having an impact on 
persuasion. This is because a person of low credibility would not be conceived of as 
persuasive, whereas a person of high credibility would.  The audience will be more 
disposed to listening to her arguments, and, as a result, more readily persuaded. The 
same is true for prestige. For prestige arises from past and consistent demonstrations of 
quality and consistency, and thus provides the bases for the subsequent inductive 
reasoning that makes persuasion possible. If a writer, for example, can boast having 
published articles in the “New Yorker,” she will have much greater ethos than a writer 
who has published in a low-ranking university publication. Personal proof is also 
important. If a well-known expert makes an assertion about something in his field, the 
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immediate response will again be based on inductive logic: this person has proven to be 
an expert in his field; therefore his statements must be true. The emotional responses to 
these three bases would necessarily be positive and also aid in the persuasive rhetorical 
process. 
McCroskey brings up other important aspects of rhetorical ethos that come to 
bear on the present discussion. One observation that he makes is that ethos is an 
attitude: 
Ethos is an attitude. . . This dimension has been called the evaluative dimension    
. . . Our evaluations of things range between good and bad, harmful and 
beneficial, wise and foolish, and so forth. If our attitude is favorable, we think the 
thing is good, beneficial, wise. If our attitude is unfavorable, we think the thing is 
bad, harmful, foolish. Our attitude, then, is our evaluation of something (85). 
 
Just as the various scholars’ wordings and rewordings shed light on the way Aristotle 
conceives of logos in his approach to rhetoric, McCroskey’s wording here and 
interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric brings out aspects that aid in our understanding of 
ethos. Here the key phrase that clearly illuminates ethos is favorable or unfavorable 
attitude. It is the way we perceive something or someone. And it is our attitude that 
determines whether or not we are positively disposed towards a speaker or a writer, 
which will subsequently allow us to consider with greater receptivity the arguments that 
are being made. 
Another observation that McCroskey brings up with respect to ethos is that it 
changes within the same receiver, and may do so in the same rhetorical event:  
A source’s ethos may vary greatly from time to time, even with the same receiver. 
Like other attitudes, ethos is subject to change as a result of experiences the 
receiver has with the source. It will often change markedly in the course of a 
single communicative act (84). 
 
This observation affirms how it is possible for a speaker to make an initial good 
impression but then create just the opposite, with the attending consequences. The 
opposite is also possible: a speaker may create an initially poor impression but could 
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conceivably, through the course of her speech or writing, change the perception to a 
more positive one. This demonstrates the importance of managing to say the right thing 
to the right audience, something, as already mentioned, that Plato’s Socrates also knew. 
With respect to the mercurial nature of ethos, McCroskey identifies three different types 
of possible ethos in the same communicative act: initial, derived and terminal ethos. He 
describes initial ethos as follows: “Initial ethos is the ethos of a source prior to the 
beginning of a given communicative act. It is the speaker’s ethos just before he or she 
begins to speak or the writer’s ethos just before the reader begins to read (83).” Here 
McCroskey allows for ethos to exist prior to what he calls the communicative act. We 
have noted above that Aristotle’s goal is for ethos to arise from the discourse itself, and 
not from any prior reputation. Arguments could be made for both approaches, but here 
what is important to take into consideration is that McCroskey’s system reflects the 
reality of a rhetorical event. That is, a speaker may very well have ethos prior to the 
communicative act, and this initial ethos can affect either favorably or adversely what 
follows. That is why, in McCroskey’s approach, the next type of ethos is important: 
Derived ethos is the ethos of a source produced during the act of communicating. 
It includes the impact of the message, the effect of the circumstances in which the 
communication takes place, and (if oral) the delivery of the message (83). 
 
We have already discussed the possibility of a speaker or writer to either increase or 
diminish her ethos potential during the communicative act or rhetorical event. Ethos is 
fluid and may improve or get worse, depending on the speaker’s or writer’s ability to 
present an image that is favorable to the audience or readership. This precarious 
situation is dependent upon both what the speaker says and how she says it, and upon 
the ethos of the audience itself. The expression “An audience can kill a comedian!” 
applies here with great force. The same comedian will make one audience laugh 
uncontrollably and another audience boo and sneer. Anyone who has had experience in 
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public speaking will attest to the “chemistry” being right with one audience and wrong 
with another, and experiencing success in the first instance and failure in the second, in 
spite of having given the same presentation twice. McCroskey rounds off his discussion 
with the third type of ethos that he has identified: “Terminal ethos is the ethos of a 
source at the completion of a communicative act. It is the product of the interaction of 
initial and derived ethos” (83). McCroskey adds to the above statement the following 
observations:  
Terminal ethos is the product of the interaction between initial ethos and derived 
ethos. Terminal ethos should always be considered by the source prior to a 
communicative act.  In some cases it will be the source’s prime concern; only in a 
very few cases will it be relatively unimportant (95). 
 
McCroskey, perhaps rightly, asserts that terminal ethos is, on the whole, highly 
important, and perhaps the most important of the three types. It is possible, however, to 
add to his model a fourth type of ethos, which, if we borrow the show-business term 
“staying power,” could be called staying ethos. For it is one thing for an audience to be 
convinced at the end of a communicative act, and quite another for it to remain 
convinced once the emotions that have been aroused during the act have worn off. The 
persuasion would not, in this case, be mere enchantment (to use Plato’s terminology). 
The total effects of logos, pathos and ethos would, in the case of staying ethos, remain 
intact, and the persuasion would not be ephemeral. For persuasion to be lasting at least 
two things must not occur. First, the audience must not, following the communicative 
act (whether spoken or written), reconsider the act and conclude that her emotions were 
being unfairly manipulated. The second situation that must not occur but that is also 
highly possible, especially when we consider Aristotle’s low evaluation of the 
audiences of his day, is when the audience, due to its fickle nature or indifference to 
truth, decides to ignore what the speaker has argued cogently and appropriately. There 
is no accounting for the potentially unstable nature of an audience. The expression “I 
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could care less what anyone says!” would apply here, as well as Dostoevsky’s position 
that we, as humans, are in our right and are not necessarily mistaken when making the 
wrong decision, even when it goes against the dictates of conventional reason.
104
 
McCroskey sums up the highly changeable nature of ethos rightly as follows:  
Ethos, then, is a dynamic construct. It is always subject to change and may even 
be said to be volatile. As noted later, even apparently small things can drastically 
alter a source’s ethos (85). 
 
In spite of the highly volatile nature of rhetoric, persuasion does, at times occur. 
McCroskey provides an interesting recipe for possible success in his rhetoric handbook, 
in relation to ethos: 
To summarize, sources are most likely to find their  ethos  increased if they 
carefully select propositions to support so as to be certain that they are not highly 
discrepant with the audience’s attitudes; support arguments with evidence from 
well-qualified sources; present the message in a sincere manner to establish 
credibility; establish common ground and good will with the audience; appear to 
be open-minded; and make the audience aware of the favorable aspects of their 
background, experience, and affiliations. In some cases, sources may also benefit 
from using unfamiliar words and irrelevant or humorous digressions. The source 
who makes a serious attempt to employ these methods whenever appropriate is 
not likely to have ethos reduced as a result of the communication (95). 
 
All of the above is pure Aristotle, reworded for contemporary university students in 
their first semester of rhetoric. McCroskey’s disclaimer is also pure Aristotle. That is, 
he states that if the source follows the above suggestions whenever appropriate, she is 
not likely to have ethos reduced. Aristotle made the same assertions when, as discussed 
earlier in this dissertation, he compares the doctor who prescribes the appropriate cure, 
but, due to the patient’s being terminally ill, cannot cure his patient, with the 
rhetorician, who, in spite of following all the rules of right rhetoric, does not manage to 
persuade or convince the audience. 
                                                 
104 See Dostoevsky: Notes from the Underground. 
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 McCroskey brings up other important points about ethos that will come to bear 
on the analysis of Part 4. The source can be more than just one person. In fact, a source 
can be things other than people: 
A source is not necessarily a single person. However, because most sources are 
individual people, we will treat the term source as grammatically singular 
throughout this book. A source may also be a group, an organization, a 
government agency, or even a country. . . .While her or his individual ethos may 
in some cases affect the impact of the message, the primary ethos involved is that 
of the organization (84). 
 
McCroskey’s observations will prove to be crucial to the discussion in Part 4. For I 
analyze the impact that the company that has published the story under study has in 
terms of ethos, as well as the way the story is marketed. Both the name and the 
marketing add to the ethos of the travel narrative, and, in this way, act as a springboard 
from which the narrator operates upon telling his tale.  
 Aristotle’s discussion of ethos in his Poetics can also be utilized when analyzing 
rhetorical mechanisms in narrative. Ethos is used in oratory to persuade by creating a 
positive image of the speaker or narrator, but in Aristotle’s system this idea can also be 
applied to the mimetic creation of characters. What is crucial to bear in mind is that 
whether it is the creating of a character for a tragic drama or that of a positive image of 
oneself in a rhetorical event, in Aristotle’s construct there is always a link with ethics. 
Halliwell, in his seminal study on the Poetics, brings this out: 
When Ar. discusses ethos, which we have to translate as ‘character(isation)’, we 
need to divest the latter term of almost all its strong sense of a high degree of 
individual differentiation. Whether as critic or as philosopher, Ar. regards the 
fundamental question about character to be not, in what does the distinctiveness or 
even uniqueness of this person consist?, but, what ethical virtues or vices are 
embodied in his active life? (Poetics, 140). 
 
The first point that merits focusing on in the above excerpt is Halliwell’s translation of 
ethos in Aristotle’s Poetics as ‘character(isation)’, due to the highly literary overtones 
inherent in the term as he has phrased it. His translation fits with the fabric of the text he 
is analyzing. And although it could be argued that he has arrived at the above translation 
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with its respective connotations because of its appropriateness for a work of literary 
theory, if we keep in mind the fact that when discussing ethos in his Rhetoric Aristotle 
states that it is important for the speaker to present himself as seeming to be positively 
disposed towards the audience, it is also possible to conclude that in Aristotle’s 
conception of rhetorical ethos, there is both room and perhaps a need for fictive 
appearances with respect to the persona an orator presents. For seeming to be friendly 
and actually being friendly are two very different things. And which of us does not, in 
some way, create a persona when performing on the various stages that life sets before 
us? The same process occurs when one writes a work of non-fiction, as is the case of 
travel narrative. That is, the author creates a persona for her narrator, a persona whose 
ethos will be interpreted by the reader as possessing certain character traits – even if 
those traits are real traits that she selects when representing her self. These same traits 
will then, in the framework of Aristotelian rhetoric, influence the judgment of the 
reader. 
Although in Halliwell’s interpretation a character’s uniqueness or distinctiveness 
are not concerns of Aristotle, this does not prevent contemporary writers or readers from 
focusing on or taking attributes of this sort into consideration. In fact, a narrator’s 
uniqueness or distinctiveness will have no small amount of ethos value for 
contemporary readerships.  
 Now that the “what” of ethos has been discussed, its “how” can be considered. 
Kennedy draws up a list of things an orator can do to create an impression of 
friendliness based on Aristotle’s discussion of the same in the Rhetoric: 
A good example is the list of qualities that create friendly feeling, given in 2.4.11-
22. The audience will feel friendly to a speaker who is pleasant and good-
tempered: he can accomplish this by not criticizing other people’s faults, by 
joking, by praising other people, by being neat in appearance, by refraining from 
slander, by being serious about serious things, by showing himself to be like his 
hearers in interests and desires, and so on (Rhetoric, 115). 
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The list of things that a speaker ought to do in order to create positive ethos which is 
perceived as friendliness can perhaps all be subsumed under the last item in the excerpt 
above, that is, by showing himself to be like his hearers in terms of their interests and 
desires. The list Kennedy has created based on Aristotle’s discussion of friendship also 
reinforces to what a great extent the like seeking and/or attracting like herd mentality is 
at play in persuasive argument. Although a term like herd mentality can have pejorative 
connotations because of the contemporary notion that an individual needs to distinguish 
herself and to be “different,” a simultaneous and very human desire to belong to a group 
exists and functions as the constitutive basis of all political systems. In Aristotle’s 
definition, politics is a sort of large scale friendship. That is, Aristotle extends the basic 
model of friendship between two individuals to a large group. So here again we can see 
the important role similarity plays in persuasion.  
 Skinner discusses Quintilian’s views on how to create a positive image using 
ethos that would pave the way for persuasion. In the latter’s view, it is crucial to appear 
to be acting benevolently: “. . . ‘if the orator seems to be undertaking cases out of the 
goodness of his heart, this will greatly benefit him in most of the cases he undertakes’” 
(130). This positive image, in Quintilian’s model, arouses emotions that affect the 
audience’s perception of what is being presented: 
He . . . maintains that the term [ethos] refers to the feelings an orator can hope to 
arouse if he is successful in presenting an attractive image of himself. By these 
means an orator can hope to excite a number of calmer passions, prompting his 
auditors to view his cause with a heightened sense of attention and docility, and 
even with an increased feeling of benevolence and friendliness (129). 
 
The audience pays more attention to what the speaker is saying, and, at the same time, 
becomes docile in terms of reception, if the latter is successful in her efforts. 
Benevolence and friendliness are also increased according to Quintilian. We shall see in 
the travel narrative under study that acting not out of benevolence but malevolence can 
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also produce positive effects that foster persuasion. For, depending on the circumstances 
and audience of the rhetorical act, maliciousness can increase the speaker’s or writer’s 
ethos if handled properly. 
Skinner discusses further ideas Quintilian presents on the creation of ethos in 
order to persuade: 
We must be sure to speak with moderation and modesty, avoiding the least sign of 
anger or hatred as well as any trace of self-importance or loftiness. We must 
remember that ‘anyone who, in the process of speaking, appears to be a bad man 
can already be said to be speaking incompetently’(130). 
 
Quintilian’s assertions are accurate but context dependent. For, depending on the 
audience, moderation and modesty may or may not have ethos power. A recent 
president of the United States, George W. Bush, could hardly have been described as 
moderate or modest when speaking. In fact, the image he projected was quite the 
opposite: a brash and cocky “don’t mess with me” All American. These attributes are 
precisely what those voters who supported him saw as a likeness that allowed them to 
view him as a friend to trust in, as someone who acted in a way similar to their way of 
acting, and who, as a result, managed to persuade the same population of voters to unite 
with him in the causes that he promoted during his presidency. He appealed to those 
citizens whose notion of American aggrandized self-importance on both a national and 
international scale was interpreted as a virtue. And it is also quite possible that Bush’s 
famous incompetence in speaking had, among his supporters, a positive ethos value, due 
to the anti-intellectual image that he projected. Here we can see the point that I have 
brought out earlier in Part 2 of this dissertation: among the same population difference 
of opinion exists – division is present, if only latently, always. In the United States there 
exists a division between highbrow pro-intellectuals typically epitomized by the 
inhabitants of New York, and the lowbrow, anti- or non-intellectuals epitomized by 
those inhabitants of southern states – Texas and Alabama being the most typically 
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represented in this way. In Part 4 I will show how the narrator of the recit de voyage 
under study plays with both high-brow and low-brow stances, using both to his 
advantage when he creates an ethos that is positive for his particular readership.  
 Skinner writes that according to Quintilian, another way to increase one’s ethos 
is to appear to avoid taking sides: “We must give an impression of complete 
impartiality, ‘making it seem that everything we say arises out of the facts of the case 
and the characters of the persons involved’ (130).” This piece of advice demonstrates 
the discursive legerdemain that the speaker or writer must be capable of. For if the aim 
is to persuade, the speaker or writer is necessarily biased, and ought to do everything 
possible to persuade her audience of her case. However, due to the very human 
resistance to being manipulated, it is crucial for the speaker or writer to do precisely 
what Quintilian advises. That is, to appear to be impartial and, at the same time, to let 
the facts of the particular case speak for themselves. Still, an argument could be made 
for a speaker making her bias evident, provided that the audience shares similar 
attitudes with respect to the same issue.  
 We have been presenting Aristotle’s as well as other writers’ idea that 
persuasion based on ethos should come from the discourse itself. However, appearance 
also plays a significant role in creating ethos. Vanderspoel discusses how Marcus, a 
fourth century orator, used this to his advantage: 
A contemporary of Polemon, Marcus, came from an ancient Byzantine family, 
served as an ambassador to Hadrian, and played a key role in mediating a serious 
dispute between Athens and Megara (Philostratus, Lives 529-530). He imitated the 
fourth century Attic orator Isaeus, to great acclaim, but cultivated a rather coarse, 
‘rough and ready’ appearance, apparently designed to match his talent at 
extemporization (159). 
 
Marcus obviously dressed the part, bringing into the play the question of whether it is 
the man who makes the clothes or the clothes that make the man. There is no 
questioning the importance appearance holds in creating positive ethos, a phenomenon 
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that is manifest in all areas of society. It is common knowledge that John F. Kennedy 
was the first U.S. president whose campaign and presidency was created by the media, 
and that the visual image of a young, attractive and “modern” family man that 
marketing experts created for him had enormous appeal to a great number of voters in 
the United States. This is yet another manifestation of the herd mentality that permeates 
human consciousness and that plays such an important role in the cohesion of groups. 
One need only think of high school social environments and the groups that arise based 
on similar appearance to witness this phenomenon in its rawest form. Humans, on the 
whole, naturally gravitate to those possessing similar visible physical characteristics. 
The incidence of like attracting like is much greater on the average than opposites 
attracting. In the case of Marcus, he created a look that fit his style of public speaking. 
This same creation of a particular look can be observed in popular music groups, the 
most famous being the Beatles and the Rolling Stones at the outset of their careers. In 
their early days, the Beatles created a nice-boy-next-door look to their advantage, 
whereas the Rolling Stones created a bad-boy-from-the-wrong-side-of-the-tracks look, 
which also worked to their advantage. Fans at the time could be divided based on their 
preference: some were loyal to the Stones, others to the Fab Four. Both groups (and in 
this sense, the groups include the musical group and aficionados) could be defined by 
their appearance and respective system of values represented in the lyrics. Generally, 
one was either first a Stones fan or first a Beatles fan. Those who opposed one’s 
preference were the enemy, even in the “peace-loving” sixties.  
With respect to division and enmity that occurs between opposed groups, the 
question arises whether it is advisable to use this to one’s advantage when employing 
rhetorical strategies for creating a positive image through ethos. That is, it must be 
asked whether it is perilous or wise to denigrate the opposition in order to strengthen the 
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possible bonds of friendship that the orator or writer wishes to create with her audience 
or readership.  In our discussion above we quoted Aristotle as giving advice to avoid the 
least sign of hatred. But, as Skinner writes, the Ad Herennium takes the opposite stance:  
We can hope to provoke hatred of our antagonists ‘if we can point to some base, 
proud, perfidious, cruel, arrogant, malicious or disgraceful act they have 
committed’. We can hope to turn them into object of odium ‘if we can pin on 
them such attributes as violence, lust for power, factiousness, excessive wealth 
and promiscuousness’. And we can hope to bring them into contempt ‘if we are 
able to draw attention to their idleness, their cowardice, their inactivity and their 
luxuriousness’ (131). 
 
Eric Hoffer asserts in The True Believer – a work that analyzes the nature of mass 
movements – that whereas love does very little to unify a large group of people, hatred 
does quite the opposite.
105
 That is, by creating an enemy, a group will be unified in 
hatred against that enemy. What is needed is a devil. In the case of the Nazis, the devil 
that Hitler created (among others) was the Jew. Fidel Castro and communist Cuba is, 
even at present, the devil that American politicians use to band American citizens 
together in their hatred for socialism and communism. Castro is an interesting devil, for 
he has been somewhat of a toothless tiger since the Cuban missile crisis under J.F.K.’s 
rule. But as the fear and hatred for communism and socialism is so strong in the United 
States, just the mention of these words together with media-based representations of the 
Cuban leader are still enough to get the American population’s blood boiling with the 
hatred that unifies.
106
 The Ad Herrenium gives similar advice. Firing up rage against the 
opponent will increase the ethos of the speaker, and win the audience over to her side. 
Skinner cites this work:  
Besides establishing the excellence of our own character, we must take advantage 
of the fact that ‘the benevolence of our audience can also be won if we can 
manage to bring the character of our adversaries into hatred, odium and contempt’ 
(131). 
 
                                                 
105 See Hoffer. 
106 Mitt Romney uses this strategy in his 2012 acceptance speech. See “Mitt Romney, the Republican 
Presidential Nominee”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGTi4-ysJS8 
242 
 
 By denigrating the enemy, the character of the speaker is enhanced. This type of 
strategy is part and parcel of the mud-slinging that takes place in politics, especially 
during elections. Quintilian, however, takes a more Aristotelian stance:  
To Quintilian this seems a dangerous as well as an unworthy enterprise, and he 
reminds us of the need ‘to avoid appearing abusive, malignant, arrogant or 
slanderous to any individual or body of people’ (131). 
 
Skinner writes that although Quintilian concedes that it is possible to arouse strong 
emotions by attacking the opposition, he “more soberly concludes that we can rarely 
hope for more than an increase ‘in benevolence, attention, and docility’” (133). Again, 
modern political practice takes the side of the Ad Herennium, and so the conclusion that 
appears to be obvious is that if it is a practice, it must work. In the recit de voyage under 
study, I shall show how the narrator creates enemies through his description that 
enhance his ethos and make him more praiseworthy in the eyes of his readership.  
 While it is true that appearances are important in rhetorical encounters and it 
may or may not be a good idea to denigrate the opposition or to create a devil, in the 
Aristotelian rhetorical model ethos is – ideally - to be established through the body of 
the text. Isocrates also concurred with this notion. Walker writes:  
Discourse is constitutive of intelligence and is its embodiment. As Isocrates 
declares, one’s speaking is the ‘great sign’ of one’s phronesis: discourse that is 
‘true and lawful and just’ is the ‘image’ of a ‘good and trustworthy soul’ (Against 
the Sophists 14-15; Antidosis 181-182, 255-257) (Rhetoric, 29). 
 
We have touched upon the fact that discourse can portray character when discussing 
Jaeger’s view of Demosthenes as restrained, dignified and somewhat aristocratic, based 
on his contemporary reading of the latter’s texts. In Isocrates’ lights, it is possible to 
detect through discourse whether or not the speaker or writer possesses phronesis, 
translated as practical wisdom, which he deemed one of the highest goods. Isocrates’ 
use of the term image again suggests the idea of a mirror, that is, that discourse (spoken 
or written) produces on some level a reflection of the “soul” (i.e., psyche) of the speaker 
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or writer that attains some sort of physical quality that can be imagined visually. If an 
individual’s soul is just and good, the discourse will also be just and good. If the soul is 
evil, then, Isocrates would argue that the discourse will necessarily reflect that quality. 
Oksenberg Rorty’s discussion of Aristotle shows that Aristotle held a similar view: 
The character of the speaker is manifest in his discourse – in what he says and 
how he says it. It is implicit in the way he argues and in the way he addresses the 
character and emotions of his audience (1356a5 ff.). Particularly when he might 
seem to speak from his own interests or on his own behalf, the rhetorician must 
establish his credibility, his intelligence (phronesis and eunoia), and character 
(arête) as such traits might be perceived by his audience. Of course, land mines 
surround the phrase “perceived by his audience.” The rhetorician must understand 
his audience’s perspective: he shows himself to be trustworthy in their eyes by 
showing that he understands their interests (8-9). 
 
Oksenberg Rorty argues cogently that it is in what the speaker says and how he says it 
that allows ethos to be embodied in the discourse. She then indicates the complexity 
involved in the attempt to present oneself as possessing the attributes that are valued by 
the audience, for it is in the latter’s perception – a point already discussed above and 
emphasized by McCroskey – that everything takes place. That is, the rhetorician must 
possess the savvy to understand her audience, to “psych out” her listeners. This is no 
easy feat, and it takes enormous psychological acuity to form an estimate of an 
audience’s psyche in order to present an image to which they will respond positively in 
terms of ethos. We see here again the “like attracts like” herd mentality so necessary in 
this type of discourse. 
Fortenbraugh also refers to Aristotle’s requirement that the image that is 
projected must be established by the text itself. He asserts that the speaker, “through 
what he says, is to present himself as an upright person who is worthy of trust (1356a2-
13)” (114 – my italics). The possibility of a person of renown to fall on her face due to 
poor performance has been discussed above, as well as McCroskey’s observations that a 
speaker’s ethos may rise or fall during one specific communicative event. It is no easy 
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thing to maintain ethos, and the possibility of failing due to a faux pas on the one hand, 
or to the fickle nature of listeners, on the other, underscore the precarious nature of this 
Aristotelian proof, as well as the enormous skill that is needed to win the audience over 
with one’s character. Oksenberg Rorty speaks of the necessity of the speaker’s 
understanding the audience’s needs and desires in order to do so: 
It is entirely appropriate – and indeed necessary – for the rhetorician to address 
the character of his audience: he crystallizes their general ends into specific 
desires. The orator’s speech – what he says and how he says it – links the 
character and desires of his audience to the decisions and actions the orator wants 
them to take (1355a20 ff.) (10). 
 
The path from general to specific in the passage above reflects the concept that we have 
been discussing about a repository of values that the rhetor bases her arguments upon. 
What a particular community of listeners or readers views as desirable aims in general 
can be made concrete through discourse and promoted through argumentation. 
Character is tied to desire, which is tied to that which is valued as the good. 
It is common knowledge that it is possible to write discourse that appears to a 
particular audience to be ethically sound. Any politician knows this, as well as all 
citizens possessing normal awareness of the goings on in the political arena. That 
politicians hire professional speech-writers who create discourse tailored to the 
audience’s needs, that is, discourse that tells the audience either what they want or need 
(or both) to hear, is no secret.
107
 This of course means that the opposite is possible. That 
is, it is also possible to please an audience that desires an ethically unsound discourse 
without necessarily adhering to a system of values that promotes evil. One only needs to 
consider the example of music groups that advocate worshipping Satan. Often the image 
these groups create through apparel, lifestyle and lyrics is mere window-dressing that 
allows these musicians to earn enormous amounts of money and, after a concert, laugh 
                                                 
107 Worthington writes: “The rhetores of classical Athens have left a legacy that modern politicians 
(and their speechwriters) do not hesitate to use when the occasion demands, good or bad” (Rise, 268). 
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all the way to the bank. The conclusion to be drawn here, in any case, is that it is 
possible to present an image of oneself, whether false or not, that possesses certain 
attributes that will be attractive to one’s audience in terms of ethos and that the audience 
identifies with. If the speaker or writer expresses herself in the right way, her ethos will 
increase, with the concomitant effect of greater possibility to persuade.  
 In relation with the idea that the speaker’s ethos must be made manifest in the 
discourse itself is the case of Lysias, who made important contributions to rhetorical 
theory, in relation to two spheres: 1) style and 2) ethopoiia. As for Lysias’ contribution 
to style, Kennedy writes that Lysias’ style “became the standard of Attic purity and 
grace 350 years later – a vocabulary which consciously distinguished the proper word 
for each object, action, and quality” (Persuasion, 136). In this sense, Lysias can be seen 
as the originator or precursor of what is called Standard English in the United States or 
Received Pronunciation in England. In this sense, what Lysias did was determine a style 
that was to be used for all citizens, regardless of their origins. In this way, the basis for 
ethos based on a standard version of discourse was established. Kennedy writes: 
In general this character portrayal is effected by the thought rather than the style. 
What the speaker says, his demonstrations of pride or folly, show what he is like. 
Lysias does not attempt to vary the diction to suit the speaker, and farmers, 
merchants, and aristocrats all speak the same, simple, flawless Attic (136). 
 
Lysias’ contribution to style can be viewed as highly democratic in that it places all 
groups in the same discursive category: a common register for all. In this way, regional 
or class differences would be eliminated, and the thought itself present in the discourse 
would necessarily become the vehicle to enhance one’s ethos. An aristocrat, who might 
have an advantage (or disadvantage) due to her style of speech, is placed next to the 
farmer, whose handicap or privilege (depending on the audience) is likewise eliminated. 
It is, in effect, the homogenization of numerous styles of discourse in to a single style. 
The burden is then placed, as Kennedy writes, on the demonstrations of character that 
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are conveyed through the mono-style, through the thought itself. Since the same style is 
used for all, the emphasis shifts to content, rather than form. 
Once the danger or privilege of style has been removed, Lysias’ second 
contribution, ethopoiia can be employed to great effect. Ethopoiia was Lysias’ 
“technique of conveying something of the character of the speaker into the orations he 
wrote for a customer to deliver” (136). Kennedy writes in this regard: 
By showing some trivial human weaknesses of character he establishes a rapport 
with the audience and convinces them of the general human virtue of his client. . . 
for example, the defendant is old-fashioned and blunt in his ways; one might not 
choose him for a friend or even respect him, but because of Lysias’ portrayal it is 
difficult to believe that he has laid a subtle trap for his wife’s love and very easy 
to believe that he killed the lover when taken in the act of adultery (Persuasion, 
136). 
 
What Lysias does is create character through discourse. This is precisely what Halliwell 
is speaking about when he refers to Aristotle’s use of the word ethos in the Poetics: 
‘character(isation).’ It is a creative act that may or may not be a fiction, or is perhaps a 
mingling of truth and fiction. In any case, the discourse itself is the medium that 
conveys the character of the speaker or writer, making it possible for the audience to 
identify or sympathize with her, based on what she says about herself, without 
differences of style.  
It could be argued that the same sort of stylistic procedures used by Lysias are in 
operation at the editor’s desk of a particular publication. For example, the publication 
from which the recit de voyage under study has been selected has its requirements in 
terms of style. If the writer does not meet the formalized standards established by the 
respective publication, he will not be published. And so what Lysias did when writing 
speeches for his clients is, in essence, being carried out by the publication and its 
weeding out of what are deemed inappropriate styles for its audience. The difference is 
that the brunt is now on the writer to meet the standards. In the case of Lysias, it was his 
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job to ensure that his client’s pleadings were couched in the stylistic requirements of 
Attic purity and grace. The effect, however, is the same. Just as Lysias’ clients all ended 
up using the same style, so the writers submitting to a particular publication write within 
the stylistic norms dictated by the publishing company’s editor. The style and content of 
any publication in question will necessarily be tailored to its respective audience, which 
will (or will not) be persuaded by the text at hand.  
 While Aristotle’s goal was for ethos to come from the body of the discourse 
itself, reality dictates that other factors foreign to both the text and the speaker’s prior, 
already established ethos come into play. According to McCroskey, studies prove that 
the person or organization that presents the speaker also has an effect on the amount of 
ethos generated in a communicative act: 
It appears from these studies that objectively irrelevant ethos factors ordinarily do 
not have a major effect on attitude change. In some circumstances, however, 
factors that appear to be unrelated to a source’s ethos may make a meaningful 
impact . . . Termed sponsorship effect, it concerns the circumstances surrounding 
the communicative event (89 – author’s italics). 
 
If a speaker or writer is sponsored by Oxford University Press, for example, her chances 
of persuading an audience of academics, due to the high ethos power brought by 
McCroskey’s concept in the passage above, would be much greater than a 
communicative event in which the same speaker were presented to the same audience 
by, say, the city hall or newspaper of the town where the communicative act takes place. 
McCroskey writes: 
The implications of the sponsorship effect are important for the source. One may 
expect to have substantially higher ethos if introduced by a person respected by 
the audience than one would have without such an introduction. If the message 
appears in a national news magazine, the source may expect to have substantially 
higher ethos, at least for most receivers, than it will if the message appears in a 
movie magazine (89 – author’s italics). 
 
It is not quite the same thing to be sponsored by a respected university’s publishing 
house as say, by that of a small town city college. And while for an academic the initial 
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supposition is that a publishing company such as Oxford University Press would have 
greater effect on ethos, what really matters, as indicated above, is the respect conferred 
on the sponsor by the audience. This means that, depending on the audience, it will 
perhaps be promotion by a Hollywood movie magazine that brings higher ethos. Thus 
the selection of the sponsor must match the character of the audience, with its respective 
system of values and needs. McCroskey is accurate, therefore, when he writes, “A 
speaker, then, may enhance initial ethos by carefully selecting the person who 
introduces her or him to the audience” (89). The emphasis must be placed on the 
qualifying adverb “carefully.” It is necessary to be able to match as accurately as 
possible the ethos of the speaker or writer with that of the audience in order for 
persuasion to occur. As already stated, rhetoric is, in this sense, tightly linked to the 
herd mentality manifest in human behavior. Rhetoric, therefore, holds great value as a 
fundamental vehicle for setting human collective activity into motion.  
 Another effective strategy for getting the listeners’ or readers’ attention is to 
emphasize the content of the discourse in terms of its novelty, strangeness or benefits. 
Skinner writes that the classical rhetoricians advised “promising our auditors to inform 
them of something at once novel and of public importance (129). This strategy is no 
doubt a stimulus that results in a basic animal response. When a stranger enters a room, 
all eyes are immediately upon her. It is her strangeness, novelty, and possible promise 
for benefit or threat of harm that excites the onlookers. In the Ad Herennium, Skinner 
writes that Quintilian tells us that we will get our listeners’ attention by using the 
strategy of claiming that what we are about to present is new and/or unusual: 
The Ad Herennium agrees that ‘we shall guarantee attentive hearers if we promise 
to treat of great or new or unusual affairs, or such as concern the commonwealth’. 
Quintilian similarly observes in his chapter on the exordium that ‘nothing makes a 
judge more attentive than the sense that the issue about to be discussed is novel, 
important, atrocious, relevant to setting a precedent, or above all something that 
concerns either him personally or the good of the community’ (129). 
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Both the Ad Herennium and Quintilian advocate the use of novelty, strangeness and 
personal interest in order to increase ethos during a communicative event. This 
communicative event, as I have been indicating, can be written, or spoken. The use of 
this strategy affects the emotions of the listeners or readers, paving the way for 
persuasion to occur with greater ease. 
 Crucial to this dissertation is the use of narrative when pleading a case as a 
technique for increasing ethos. One of the strategies used in antiquity was to use the 
framework of formal argumentation as the guiding structure for a narrative: 
Though the speech falls into the standard formal parts: prooemium . . . narrative . . 
. proof. . . refutation. . . and peroration. . . the impression of the speech 
[prosecution of his guardian Aphobus] is entirely narrative, as though the orator 
were telling his story and proving every word. Except for the increase in pathos at 
the end the parts do not show the stylistic differences found in parts of other such 
speeches. Nothing is probably more reassuring and convincing to a jury than this 
candid technique. An orator can only use it if he has a very good case with many 
documents and witnesses and is himself the complete master of the material 
(Persuasion, 210). 
 
Here we see that the basic sections of formal judicial rhetorical argumentation underlie 
the narrative. Since the argument is put into narrative form, the effect is that the 
rhetorician is relating personal details that he experienced. The “telling of one’s own 
story” increases ethos, provided the audience believes what is being told. The 
possibility for influencing the audience’s emotions positively through the use of 
narrative told in the first person is enormous, due to its highly personal, if not intimate 
nature. That is, the narrator present personal and intimate details of his life, which, 
provided the audience is convinced of his sincerity, will increase ethos, and thus 
facilitate persuasion.  
 The narrator can also use other devices that will enhance the narrative, and, at 
the same time, ethos. Representation of the visual through words, whose aim is to make 
an object or event present in the listener’s or reader’s mind’s eye, is discussed in chapter 
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10 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This is a technique that is utilized in fiction writing as well. 
Webb comments on its use and effects: 
[Elementary rhetorical students] also learned “characterization through speech . . . 
training in the verbal representation of the visual . . . the evocation through words 
of any number of sights, situations, places, even happenings . . .This exercise is 
therefore relevant to all of the vivid re-creations of events in the novels. In fact the 
type of illusion of presence that ekphrasis specialised in lies at the heart of 
fictional discourse. Through its appeal to the imagination, ekphrasis invites us into 
the world that is created by the novelist and gives us an illusion of presence 
‘making listeners (as ancient readers were) into spectators’ (Webb, 529 – brackets 
mine). 
 
We see here again the use of the word “characterization,” for ethos is created not only 
through abstract notions, but through the representation of actions and visual 
characteristics. As Webb puts it, the listeners become spectators. This technique is 
accomplished through discourse and is woven into the narrative. The recreation of an 
event from the past in the imagination of the listener or reader makes it possible for 
them to better comprehend what occurred, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact 
that they visualize the event increases their identification with the narrator, due to the 
fact that it is made possible for the audience to vicariously experience the event. Thus 
ethos can be enhanced. This technique is carried out via logos (discourse) and also has 
an effect on pathos. The tripartite system of proofs that Aristotle describes, as we have 
said above, is inextricably woven together. It is not possible to separate one proof from 
the other two, as they always work in conjunction.   
 We can now look more closely at Halliwell’s seminal work on the Poetics, 
which provides enormous insight into Aristotle’s ideas on ethos in the framework of 
tragic drama. The concepts that Halliwell discusses, can, as already stated, be applied to 
non-fiction narrative as well. 
 Aristotle gives enormous importance to the action of tragic personae, who are 
agents whose actions we judge. We base our judgment of the personae’s actions on how 
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they are characterized. Who they are and the motives they give for their actions provide 
the dramatic stuff, so to speak, that we examine through the lens of our system of 
values. Halliwell writes: 
Since tragedy is a representation of an action, and is enacted by agents, who must 
be characterised in both their character and their thought (for it is through these 
that we can also judge the qualities of their actions, and it is in their actions that 
all men either succeed or fail), we have the plot-structure as the mimesis of the 
action (for by this term ‘plot-structure’ I mean the organization of the events) 
while characterization is what allows us to judge the nature of  the agents, and 
‘thought’ represents the parts in which by their speech they put forward arguments 
or make statements (Poetics, 37). 
 
We see here the importance of judgment, which I have been emphasizing in this 
dissertation. The agent’s character (who she is), what she does (action), and the reasons 
for making the decisions and acting in the way she does (i.e., thought, which reveals 
motives), all work in unison to reveal ethical aspects of the persona’s character. We 
examine all of the elements both separately and together in order to reach a judgment 
that either considers the agent’s actions to be laudable or inappropriate. This judgment 
is then, in Aristotle’s framework of tragedy, connected to the idea of success or failure 
in life. We must keep in mind the fact that in Aristotle’s construct, as much as possible 
of the life of a particular agent is compressed into one work with the objective of 
representing the entirety of the person’s life within a manageable period of dramatic 
representation with respect to time. In the case of the texts under study, it is not an 
entire life that is being represented, rather a short period from the narrator’s or player’s 
existence that is being presented. What we are examining, therefore, in the present 
study, is a small segment taken from the entirety of one real, one fictional character’s 
existence. This does not mean, however, that we cannot or do not judge the narrator and 
his actions or those of the woman being depicted from the standpoint of our system of 
values. The narrative gives insight into a small part of the life that the agents lived and 
took action in. And while it would not make any sense to decide whether the life of 
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either the narrator or the woman being depicted was, on the whole, a success or failure, 
it is still possible to decide whether the particular event that the narrator describes 
stands as a particular instance of ethical success or failure, and, whether the agents’ 
actions, and by association, the agents themselves, are praise- or blameworthy. In 
relation with agency, we can take into consideration an excerpt from Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics:  
The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place 
he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for 
their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character (Barnes – Complete, 1746). 
 
Aristotle here is laying the foundation for what ethical behavior is. It is based on choice, 
and the choice is based on knowledge of what is being chosen. The choice that the agent 
makes is inextricably connected to who the agent is. That is, the agent’s firm and 
unchangeable character (ethos) is the center from which the agent acts. Aristotle’s use 
of the terms firm and unchangeable in this excerpt reveals his goal of guiding the reader 
to higher values. That is, in the text under consideration, Aristotle’s aim is to prescribe a 
standard of ethics based on an ideal character that his reader ought to attempt to achieve. 
In the analysis of the texts under study, the same idea of an ideal agent who is firm and 
unchangeable could be applied, but with very different characteristics from those that 
Aristotle is referring to here. This is simply again the concept of prenotions that I have 
already talked about. Just what an agent ought to be firm in and unchangeable about in 
Aristotle’s view (and, particularly, in the Nichomachean Ethics) will be quite different 
from the readers’ of the narratives under study. That is, what Aristotle is defining as the 
good in his treatise on ethics will differ radically from what the readers of the texts 
under study define as the good. In every case, an agent’s actions are judged (in 
Aristotle’s view) depending on their knowledge when carrying them out. 
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In connection with the idea of agency is the discussion Paul Ricoeur holds in 
Time and Narrative. Paul Ricoeur’s discussion on this issue is crucial for the present 
study on two levels. First, agency holds importance from the standpoint of narrative, for 
agents are the stuff, so to speak, or “beings” upon which this form of discourse depends. 
Without agents there can be no action. Without action there can be no narrative. As 
actions carried out by agents with motives, the second level of importance for the 
present discussion is the evaluation, or judgment of the same from the standpoint of 
ethics. It is this aspect for which Ricoeur’s discussion provides a solid base for 
understanding and executing judgment of the agents in a narrative: 
Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen 
or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends. 
Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did 
something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event 
leads to another. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are 
taken as their work, or their deed. As a result, these agents can be held responsible 
for certain consequences of their actions. In this network, the infinitive regression 
opened by the question “Why?” is not incompatible with the finite regression 
opened by the question “Who?” To identify an agent and to recognize this agent’s 
motives are complementary operations (Time, 54).  
 
Actions are carried out by agents who have motives, and, as a result these very agents 
can at once be identified as the owners of the actions and, thus, they are responsible for 
the consequences of their deeds, which are based on motives. Motives are more 
important than the act itself, and provide the meaning behind the actions. This 
framework is applicable to narrative, where actions and motives are depicted. Making 
sense of a narrative necessarily involves judgment from an ethical standpoint of action 
and, more importantly, motives, which are inescapably tied to responsibility. This is 
precisely what the term agent identifies: a person responsible for certain acts which, we 
assume, were carried out based on motives. The combination of motives and action 
make possible the teleological evaluation of narrative, in the sense Ricoeur brings out in 
Time and Narrative. The agent’s motives and corresponding responsibility take away 
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any notion of randomness or necessity that can be applied to mere physical movement. 
It is this lack of randomness or sheer physical inexorability that furnishes narratives and 
stories with a gap that we humans, whether as readers, viewers or listeners, experience 
their unfolding as an audience. We attempt to fill the gap that is created by asking the 
question why. Without this question, narrative has no hook to keep our interest, for we 
seek reasons and motives behind the physical actions that take place in order to make 
sense of what occurs in terms of events. 
The sum total of the components that comprise the scenario (what might be 
called influencing or mitigating circumstances) also plays a role in the audience’s 
evaluation of what transpires in narrative. Ricoeur writes: 
We also understand that these agents act and suffer in circumstances they did not 
make that nevertheless do not belong to the practical field, precisely inasmuch as 
they circumscribe the intervention of historical agents in the course of physical 
events and offer favorable or unfavorable occasions for their action. This 
intervention, in turn, implies that acting makes what an agent can do – in terms of 
“basic actions” – and what, without observation, he knows he is capable of doing, 
coincide with the initial state of a closed physical system (54).  
 
Ricoeur’s point is that the agents represented in narrative find themselves in 
circumstances that they did not create, and that these same circumstances affect the 
range of possible action the agents can carry out. These circumstances may be favorable 
or unfavorable. These two aspects of the closed physical system in which the agents 
find themselves color the way in which the audience will evaluate the actions. The 
variables are myriad, and that is why each narrative stands as a case that must be 
evaluated on its own terms.   
 Nor is the agent alone when we speak of action as Ricoeur conceives it. To say 
that the basis of ethics is the existence of the Other is a truism, but perhaps bringing this 
point to the fore, however obvious, is crucial: 
Moreover, to act is always to act “with” others. Interaction can take the form of 
cooperation or competition or struggle. The contingencies of this interaction then 
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rejoin those of our circumstances through their character of helping or hindering 
us. Finally, the outcome off an action may be a change in fortune toward 
happiness or misfortune (54). 
 
To the physical circumstances of the scenario within which the emplotment unfolds are 
added other agents, which also affect the outcome of the plot, as well as what 
boundaries can be placed on the acts of the protagonist. Ricoeur rounds off the 
preliminaries of his discussion of agency with a list of the relative questions and terms 
that can be used in the conceptual framework that he is articulating: 
In short, these terms or others akin to them occur in our answers to questions that 
can be classified as questions about “what,” “why,” “who,” “how,” “with whom,” 
or “against whom” in regard to any action. On the one hand, every narrative 
presupposes a familiarity with terms such as agent, goal, means, circumstance, 
help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, success, failure, etc., on the part of its 
narrator and any listener. In this sense, the minimal narrative sentence is an action 
sentence of the form “X did A in such and such circumstances.” In the final 
analysis, narratives have acting and suffering as their theme (54-56). 
 
Although doubtless Ricoeur takes this for granted – due to his already having 
distinguished mere physical movement from motivated action – his minimal narrative 
sentence could be expanded as follows: “X did A in such and such circumstances for the 
following motives.” It is at this point that Ricoeur brings in the idea of evaluation of 
narrative in terms of ethics: 
As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or 
evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby 
receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable than that one. 
These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the agents 
themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse . . . We thus rejoin, by 
way of cultural anthropology, some of the “ethical” presuppositions of Aristotle’s 
Poetics, which I can therefore attach to the level of mimesis1. The Poetics 
presupposes not just “doers” but characters endowed with ethical qualities that 
make them noble or vile. If tragedy can represent them as “better” and comedy as 
“worse” than actual human beings, it is because the practical understanding 
authors share with their audiences necessarily involves an evaluation of the 
characters and their actions in terms of good and bad. There is no action that does 
not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a 
function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the 
poles. When the time comes, I shall discuss the question of whether a mode of 
reading that would entirely suspend all evaluation of an ethical character is 
possible. What, in particular, would remain of the pity Aristotle taught us to link 
to unmerited misfortune, if aesthetic pleasure were to be totally dissociated from 
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any sympathy or antipathy for the characters’ ethical quality? We shall see that 
this possible ethical neutrality has to be conquered by force in an encounter with 
one originary and inherent feature of action: precisely that it can never be 
ethically neutral. One reason for thinking that this neutrality is neither possible 
nor desirable is that the actual order of action does not just offer the artist 
conventions and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to 
resolve in a hypothetical mode. Many contemporary critics, reflecting on the 
relation between art and culture, have emphasized the conflicting character of the 
norms that culture offers for poets’ mimetic activity. They were preceded on this 
score by Hegel in his famous meditation on Sophocles’ Antigone. But, at the same 
time, does not such ethical neutrality of the artist suppress one of the oldest 
functions of art, that it constitutes an ethical laboratory where the artist pursues 
through the mode of fiction experimentation with values? Whatever our response 
to these questions, poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics, even when it 
advocates the suspension of all ethical judgment or its ironic inversion. The very 
project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical quality of action on 
the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself only a corollary of the major 
characteristics of action, that it is always symbolically mediated (57-59). 
 
Ricoeur is speaking of works of fiction, but the same ideas that he presents above can be 
applied to travel writing, which represent real events from the past. In any case, the 
point that I want to drive home here is simply that when we read a narrative – whether it 
is a work of fiction or non-fiction – we inevitably evaluate what is being told from the 
standpoint of ethics, and that it is ethics which provides the primary motor that makes 
engagement when reading, viewing or listening to a story possible. Ricoeur’s statement 
that poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics sums up concisely what I am arguing 
here. When he states that attempting to criticize or create narrative action that is free 
from ethics demonstrates that there has been a connection to ethics previously stands as 
a challenge to those who would argue for a system of value-free aesthetics. Finally, his 
point that there is no action that is not judged for approval or disapproval comes to bear 
on and informs the present discussion. 
Halliwell’s discussion on Aristotle’s views on the poet’s manipulation of the plot 
also comes into play here: 
The poet must handle plots to ‘good effect’, possible a) for the deed to be done 
with full knowledge and understanding . . . b) for the deed to be done, but by 
agents who do not know the terrible thing they are doing, and later recognize . . . 
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c) for one who is on the point of committing an incurable deed in ignorance to 
come to a recognition before he has done it (46). 
 
What we see in the above excerpt are various degrees of knowledge with respect to the 
decisions that the agent makes resulting in actions that are carried out. All three 
possibilities will have different effects on the audience. Each case will result in 
judgment that will depend on the knowledge that the agent holds when committing the 
acts that are represented. The possibilities Aristotle presents are related to his discussion 
of tragedy. Of course, other scenarios with respect to knowledge are possible for 
tragedy, and, by extension for other genres as well. But what is important here is to keep 
in mind the idea that, in this regard, the knowledge the agent has with respect to the 
actions that he is going to carry out, whether limited or complete, will affect the 
audience’s or readership’s judgment of the agent’s actions and character. We shall see 
that, in the recit de voyage under study, the narrator passes from ignorance to 
knowledge with respect to the circumstances he describes and within which he takes 
action, and it is this very passage from what might be called innocence to culpable 
realization that he uses in the pleading of his case. Whether he is judged blame- or 
praiseworthy will depend, on the one hand, on how effective a rhetorician he is, and 
how he employs the three proofs (i.e., logos, pathos and ethos) to establish his 
praiseworthiness, and, on the other, on the readership’s reception of his persuasive 
arguments. 
Our focus at this point is ethos, but, as we have been stating, it is inextricably 
connected with logos, which is linked to dianoia, or thought. What the agent thinks and 
says about her actions reveals motive, and therefore, character. Halliwell tells us that if 
there is no choice, no character judgment can be made. It is action based on decision 
that determines a person’s character: 
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Character is the element which reveals the nature of a moral choice, in cases 
where it is not anyway clear what a person is choosing or avoiding (and so 
speeches in which the speaker chooses or avoids nothing at all do not possess 
character); while thought arises in passages where people show that something is 
or is not the case, or present some universal proposition (38). 
 
A person may talk extensively about a particular ethical issue, but until she takes action, 
it is not possible to judge her. She must make a decision and act in order for the 
observer to decide how she measures up within the latter’s scale of values that merits 
praise or blame.  
 Halliwell tells us that Aristotle’s Poetics lays the groundwork that, at the 
theoretical level, considers fictive (mimetic) works as a good: 
But in firmly asserting human action to be the province of poetry, Ar. is also 
laying the basis for a theory of poetic value. In Aristotelian philosophy, ‘action’ 
denotes intrinsically purposive behaviour: in their actions, men engage in the 
distinctively human pursuit of aims, the realization of their intentions. So ch. 2’s 
formula, ‘people in action’, implies that poetry is capable of treating, if only in 
fictional form, the fundamental patterns of life (75). 
 
The representation of purposive behavior, which, as we have been asserting, involves 
agents that carry out actions that can be judged morally, in Aristotle’s theoretical 
framework, constitute human behavior within a system of behavior that can be 
identified as repetitive, and thus, as a source for reflecting on our own actions. The same 
model can be applied to works of non-fiction. That is, fundamental patterns of life can 
be detected in biographical and autobiographical narratives. In Part 3 of this 
dissertation, I shall discuss the work of scholars not working in literature that affirm that 
personal narrative is a mode that humans use to make sense of their lives. It follows that 
patterns of behavior will emerge that can be categorized and subsequently evaluated for 
their worth in terms of existential meaning as well as in terms of the place they hold as a 
good within the respective system of values they are embedded in. In Aristotle’s theory 
of tragic representation, the agents act within an ethical framework that, in order for the 
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work to be effective and to hold value, dictates that they can be perceived as noble 
agents carrying out noble actions: 
It should follow that the characteristic subject-matter of tragedy, as Ar. sees it, 
must in some sense be natural for a poetic genre which aims to portray ‘noble 
actions and noble agents’. This means that Ar. accepts vulnerability and 
instability, which he will later identify as the crux of tragedy, to be an inescapable 
part of the human pursuit of excellence and goodness (82). 
 
As always, we must remember that the “noble” human pursuit of excellence and 
goodness are abstract notions or prenotions that will be defined differently depending 
on the respective individual or group. Thus, the narrator of the recit de voyage, whose 
work is part of a publication that asserts that it is a work of the “best” American travel 
writing, presents himself at times as noble, at others as playfully devious, while making 
every attempt to win the reader over to his side as he makes his case with a view to his 
being judged as pursuing excellence and goodness as he defines it. He tells a story that 
gives insight into his thought and motives, which provide the backdrop for the action 
that he describes, not only actions that he carries out, but the action of others. In this 
way he provides characterization not only of himself, but of the other players in his 
narrative. In his story, vulnerability and instability also play a role. These two 
characteristics hold high ethos value, for an agent that possesses these qualities is 
perceived as being human, and it is in this way that identification with and sympathy for 
the agent are achieved, thereby increasing ethos. 
It is the interconnectedness of character, motive and action that reveals character 
from an Aristotelian standpoint, as Halliwell asserts: 
Ar. believes in a reciprocal relation between character and action – character 
motivating action, and action cumulatively helping to shape character . . . What 
matters in life is that people should engage in the pursuit of suitable aims and 
ends, not that they should rest quiescent in a fixed or achieved state; and since 
drama is, on Ar.’s premises, the mimesis or representation of life, it too must 
centre on people’s actions rather than their characters as such. But this does not 
eliminate the need for characterisation, since the latter can help to give a fuller 
dramatisation of the significance of the agent’s actions (94-95). 
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We see in the excerpt above that while Aristotle’s emphasis in on action, the agents’ 
character nevertheless fleshes out the acts undertaken within the dramatic work. 
Aristotle’s emphasis does not prevent a contemporary student of literature from 
bringing the motives behind the action into greater relief, and by so doing explore in 
depth the psychological complexities that underlie human action. By examining in 
depth both action and psychology represented in a work of literature – whether it is a 
work of fiction or non-fiction – she can explore what is or is not important in life: 
Tragic drama offers us images of the actions on which depends the difference 
between happiness and unhappiness, terms which for Ar. signify judgements on 
the success or failure of a life in the fullest ethical sense. Against such a 
background, ‘action’ is no loose or empty term for whatever may occur in a play, 
but a way of denoting tragedy’s encompassment of the significant goals of life 
(95). 
 
I have mentioned Eagleton’s assertion that there has been a tendency for students of 
literature to evade moral issues, due to their being perceived as personal rather than 
political. But it could be and, in fact, is argued, that true politics begins with the 
individual. Unless an individual takes account for and judges her own actions within an 
ethical framework, the bigger task of large-scale political reformation will only amount 
to empty arguments with no real foundation. That is, that true reformation begins with 
the individual, and it is the individual that must take action, based on a system of values 
that the agent adheres to personally.   
Halliwell discusses happiness and unhappiness in the excerpt above. This is an 
area rife with possibilities for discussion and analysis, using literary texts as springboard 
for discussion. For happiness is, in the opinion of the vast majority of human beings, the 
greatest good to be sought. What happiness is and its relation to action and ethics can be 
examined in depth using a rhetorical approach to looking at literature.
108
 
                                                 
108 In their work on ethics, Aristotle and Kant assume that happiness is the goal of human life. See 
Mackie. 
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 It is interesting that certain actions, in Halliwell’s reading of Aristotle, can, in 
and of themselves, be viewed as characterizing the agent carrying them out, regardless 
of whether the motives are supplied through the discourse. That is, the actions 
themselves are ethos laden: 
[There are] signs of a slight equivocation . . . some degree of characterisation is 
inevitable (ch.2), and that it can (though should not) be dispensed with altogether 
(ch. 6). The fundamental principle, I think, is that many actions will necessarily 
have a degree of characterisation built into them, since their nature will 
presuppose particular ethical dispositions; but some actions are not of this kind, 
and in these cases characterless action is a possibility (95). 
 
It is quite possible that Aristotle might not agree with the above reading, especially 
when we consider the unfinished nature of his corpus, as I have already discussed. 
Whether or not he would agree does not prevent us, however, from insisting that actions 
must not be taken at face value. That is, the motives must be revealed in order to reach a 
proper judgment. Halliwell tells us that Aristotle allows for both implicit and explicit 
representation of ethos, but that he places the greatest emphasis on action that can be 
represented outwardly:  
There is, then, probably a sense in which Ar. considers that character can be  
either implicit or explicit, but it is the latter – the positive ways in which a 
dramatist can illuminate the moral motivations of his agents – which he has in 
mind when making most of his remarks on the subject (95). 
 
Halliwell’s view that Aristotle’s emphasis is on ways motivation can explicitly be 
represented is linked to the fact that he discussion of dianoia (thought) to his 
Rhetoric.
109
 For in the Rhetoric Aristotle insists, as already stated, that ethos must come 
from logos. That is, ethos must come from the discourse itself. Thus it could be argued 
that in a tragic work, what the characters say necessarily takes on great importance, and 
                                                 
109 Halliwell writes: “[Aristotle] relegates the study of it [‘thought’] precisely to his ‘discourses on 
rhetoric’. That late passage indicates that ‘thought’ is the sphere of the ‘internal’ rhetoric of tragedy, 
the rhetoric used by the characters to explain, defend or justify themselves, or to state their attitudes to 
one another” (96).  
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that both action and thought are woven together, and it is in the combination of the two 
that ethos is revealed.  
 Aristotle also places limits on the characterization of tragic personae. They 
must be similar to the audience, in order for the latter to sympathize with them: 
This brings in Ar.’s requirement for tragic figures who are ‘like ourselves’ – that 
is, within the range of our moral experience and comprehension. Pity and fear 
presuppose and involve, in other words, a fundamental sympathy for the tragic 
agents, and a sympathy which is not purely spontaneous or unreflective, but one 
which engages us imaginatively in understanding the causal nexus of the tragedy 
(125). 
 
Halliwell’s discussion focuses on tragic characters, but the same requirements apply to 
other genres as well. In the case of the recit de voyage under study, the sympathy that 
the narrator attempts to achieve with his readership is tied to pity and fear, the 
predominant emotions that arise in Aristotle’s definition of tragic drama. The narrator 
also attempts to guide his readership to other emotions as well: indignation, joy, and so 
on. In any case, the rule of similarity applies. That is, the narrator of a travel narrative, 
in order to be able to persuade her readers of what she is arguing, must also be similar to 
those persons reading her text. In Part 4 of this dissertation I shall show the similarities 
between the narrator and his readership that make it possible for the latter to become 
engaged in what is being told, which leads to a judgment. Halliwell brings up the very 
important point that when Aristotle writes about characterization, he is necessarily 
writing about ethics, a subject he explores in other works:  
It is clear, then, that Ar.’s view of character, both in life and in artistic mimesis, is 
conceived in terms of explicit, unambiguous and essentially ethical attributes – 
above all, indeed, in terms of the virtues and vices which he defines and explores 
in his two Ethics (140). 
 
Crucial here is Halliwell’s position that Aristotle views character to be related to ethical 
attributes both in life and in artistic mimesis. In the case of travel narratives, the 
assumption is that the representation that takes place in the body of the text is of events 
263 
 
that have actually occurred. This means that what is represented in a travel narrative can 
be judged from the standpoint of ethics. It is also important to keep in mind the 
connection that Aristotle makes between ethos and an individual’s ethics, as stated in 
the above excerpt. (As stated at the outset of this dissertation, in order to use Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric or Poetics when analyzing a particular text, it is necessary to have read other 
related works in his corpus.) 
Halliwell asserts that Aristotle’s position requires that the characters should be 
“good.” That is, that their actions should, from the standpoint of the audience, be 
depicted as praiseworthy: 
This allows him to state in the present chapter his series of four principles for 
tragic characterisation. Of these, ‘goodness’ is required . . . and this entails that its 
central figures should, in large, be seen to be striving for laudable aims: it is 
important, for example, that Sophocles in the Oedipus Tyrannus shows Oedipus to 
be acting, and to have acted in the past, for motives which a Greek audience could 
recognise as noble ones (140). 
 
The same rule applies to the two narratives under study. Just what is deemed laudable 
is, as I shall demonstrate, a matter of opinion, and a matter of the respective audience. In 
other words, the rule that there must be some similarity between the narrator and the 
audience in order for the narrator to persuade her readership that she is indeed 
praiseworthy applies. Halliwell states that, in Aristotle’s Poetics, the characters ought to 
be depicted as “ethically elevated” (142). As it is the audience that, using its system of 
values as the reference point for evaluating precisely what is ethically elevated 
behavior, the rule of similarity again applies. That is, the pursuits of the tragic agents 
must be “ethically elevated” according to the audience’s standards. We see that, as we 
have been asserting, in Aristotle’s framework of ethos, like attracts like, and it is in the 
quest for similarity that persuasion takes place. 
Halliwell discusses other aspects of character that, in contemporary terms, are 
socio-economic: “Ar. regards character as partially circumscribed or qualified by social 
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and related factors . . . it helps to keep in mind the difference between ancient and 
modern notions of character. . . the character of a slave or a woman is inevitably 
deemed to have lower possibilities of achievement (141).” Although the term slave is 
abhorrent to contemporary readers, it could be argued that, in terms of socio-economic 
status, little has changed. That is, a non-documented worker in a sweatshop in Los 
Angeles working for sub-standard wages, whether a real person or as represented in a 
work of literature, would, to a contemporary audience, be considered as capable of 
achieving less on the socio-economic ladder – for obvious reasons. This is true 
regardless of whether or not the institution of slavery is in force. The reality is, in effect, 
the same. But what is important here is that the depictions adhere with the audience’s 
conception of reality, which means, in the end, that the writer of literature, whether 
fiction or non-fiction, must create representations that coincide with the audience’s 
conception of social reality. Kennedy highlights the same point in his discussion of 
ethos or “character(isation)”: 
An old man and a young man must show quite different attitudes; a rich man 
would not think of things in the same way as a poor man. Such dramatic character 
is treated by Aristotle under style (1408a25 ff. and 1417a15ff.) and is called 
ethopoiia by critics (e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lysias 8). It is especially 
important in the narration (Persuasion, 92). 
 
The same concepts apply today, as will become evident in the analysis of the recit de 
voyage under consideration. Each character in the narrative can be analyzed in terms of 
their socio-economic status. How ethos works in the socio-economic framework can 
then be examined, as well as how ethos functions rhetorically in order to bring about 
persuasion. 
I have discussed the phronimos, which is Aristotle’s paragon of political and 
ethical behavior. That is, the phronimos stands as model citizen, an ideal the readers of 
his treatise ought to aspire to be. This ideal stands at one end of the spectrum of ethical 
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behavior. Oksenberg Rorty uses this extreme to discuss those who are not phronimoi – 
that is, the vast majority of humanity: 
So much for the phronimos. For the rest of us, matters are more complicated, the 
fit between our thoughts and desires is not so neat. Each type of character has its 
own perspective on what is desirable, seeing it as noble, or as expedient, or as 
pleasant (1113a30 ff.). The practical reasons of ordinary folk, however intelligent 
and astute they may be, is influenced by their character-hexeis, their age, social 
status, and polity (14-15).  
 
What is important to cull from Oksenberg Rorty’s commentary is the idea that each 
person’s ethos will be, to a great extent, a product of who they are in terms of socio-
economics. The various elements that make up a person’s social status come into play, 
and, in the literary work, whether fiction or non-fiction, either contribute to or hinder 
persuasion. This is again, due to the audience’s tendency to seek similarity in the 
characters being represented in works of literature. It is similarity that makes it possible 
for sympathy with and compassion for the characters to occur. These emotional 
responses to the ethos of the character being represented are audience-specific. In Part 4 
I assert that what I call a “highly educated and cultured readership” will identify with 
and be persuaded by both texts under study. It is an audience for which we find 
forerunners in a 2
nd
 century CE work by Apuleius, the Apologia. 
Apuleius’ Apologia provides a case in point of the various factors that enter into 
persuasion through character, in its face-off between Apuleius and what are depicted as 
bumpkins that have accused him of being irreligious. Apuleius’ text is interesting for 
this study for it provides an example of a character who is, on the one hand, cultured 
and well-read (by the literary and academic standards of the day) and who, on the other, 
must defend himself against the accusations of a number of uncultured (by academic 
standards) characters. It is possible to see in Apuleius’ Apologia how judgment, to a 
very significant extent, is determined by like seeking like. For the judge whom Apuleius 
appeals to is also a man of letters and sophistication, and due to the socio-cultural status 
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he shares with the defendant, passes judgment in the latter’s favor. Sharing similar ideas 
in terms of what the good is has great impact in terms of ethos, which I discuss in 
relationship to the marketing of the anthology in which the recit de voyage I examine 
was published due to its being an outstanding example of travel writing – based, of 
course, on the standards set by the editorial staff. Parallels can be drawn between 
ancient and contemporary literary texts which show that the system of values that 
provides the base for today’s readers has many aspects in common with 
audiences/readerships of the past. 
As for the Apologia, Walker discusses the identification that occurs between the 
judge, who has much in common with the pleadings of Apuleius, and, by extension, the 
readership of this ancient work: 
Whatever the true origins of the Apologia may have been, it is clear that, as a 
literary declamation, the text invites its Roman reader to identify with Apuleius 
and (perhaps more important) with the learned proconsul, Claudius Maximus, 
while regarding as an object of derision not only Aemilianus, Pudens, and the 
other accusers, but also the sort of culture and the sort of rhetorical practice they 
represent – for theirs is a narrow, conservative, provincial version of Roman 
culture, productive of an ethos interested only in practical advantage in the 
crassest sense, motivated chiefly by avarice, and indifferent, suspicious, or 
actively hostile toward the kind of culture that Apuleius represents. Likewise, as I 
have noted, theirs is the “bloodthirsty, gain-getting,” and “gladiatorial” rhetoric 
that defines the world of delatores: the philosophically vapid, ethically indifferent, 
power-seeking kako-rhetoric that Cicero describes as eloquence’s evil twin and 
that Dionysius portrays as a corrupting force in the “house” or polis where 
communal life transpires. In the Apologia, such culture and such kako-rhetoric are 
portrayed as the source and instrument of injustice (Poetics, 126). 
 
It can easily be inferred that Walker also sides with Claudius Maximus and Apuleius in 
terms of culture. And it is here that, in order to be objective, it is possible to affirm that 
crucial terms like provincial, crass, materialist describe characteristics that the highly 
educated and cultured readership that I shall articulate in Part 4 would attribute to 
others. It is easy to see that the system of values that underlies the ethical framework of 
persons steeped in the tradition of literary studies creates an ethos that is particular to its 
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members, and that what is determined as goods, both tangible and intangible, will enter 
into the rhetorical event and provide the bases for judgment. Walker makes the very 
important point that the accusers in Apuleius’ text are portrayed as members of a culture 
and users of kako-rhetoric that represent injustice. What must be kept in mind with such 
comments is the fact that, were the text written not by Apuleius but by a writer whose 
system of values were the same as those of Aemilianus, Pudens, and the other accusers, 
there would be a readership that, due to shared culture and values and in so doing, 
would view Apuleius as an arch snob, an effete, and as someone who reads and values 
excessively intellectual literature. In order to persuade, the narrator must display 
attributes that are valued by her readership. Identification is achieved through shared 
values, which are, in the end, socio-economic and cultural. The question that arises, of 
course, is whether or not, in the example I have just given, one position is truer than – or 
preferable to – the other. This is a difficult question to answer, but one way of looking 
at the two parties’ described above being at loggerheads is to view each stance as 
necessary, if only to provide definition for each system’s respective system of values. 
Walker continues: 
Moreover, Maximus [the judge] is presumed throughout to be familiar with, and 
to enjoy discussion of, the varied literature and fields of knowledge that Apuleius 
digresses into. It is this shared paideia, then, that enables Apuleius’s discursive art 
to attain the “clemency of understanding” and to receive fair justice from his 
judge according to law. Apuleius’s gestures toward Maximus’s learning are thus 
not merely conventional efforts to conciliate or flatter a powerful authority 
(though they are that too), but – through the text’s function as a literary 
declamation – they also are expressions of a cultural and ethical solidarity the 
reader is asked to share. As Apuleius at one point says, “[s]ee, Maximus, what a 
tumult they have raised, now that I have mentioned a few magicians by name! 
What shall I do with such rubes, such savages? Shall I demonstrate in reply that I 
have come across all these and very many other names in public libraries while 
reading the most distinguished writers? . . . Or, which is much better, relying on 
your learning, Maximus, and your perfect erudition, shall I disdain to give these 
clods and dullards a response to such things? Indeed that’s most what I’d like to 
do (91).” More important, perhaps, the reader is asked to affirm, at least 
implicitly, a rhetoric founded on a broad, Isocratean paideia as that which sustains 
and makes possible civil culture, and indeed to affirm that Roman civil culture 
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should be guided and informed by the sort of paideia that both Apuleius and 
Maximus embody. In its incarnation as a literary declamation, then, Apuleius’s 
Apologia belongs to a series of “defences of rhetoric” that begins at least with 
Isocrates’ Antidosis and that embodies the more or less Isocratean philosophy we 
find resurgent in such documents as Cicero’s De Oratore, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus’ On the Ancient Orators, Tacitus’s Dialogus de Oratoribus, and 
Aelius Aristides’ Against Plato Concerning Rhetoric. As such, the Apologia both 
continues and embodies a tradition that for Apuleius is already more than five 
hundred years old, while it figures forth, in a paradigmatic scene, what is and 
what will be the place of rhetoric in the Roman world for the rest of antiquity and 
in the Byzantine world as well for another thousand years (126-27). 
 
Crucial in the passage above is the role that cultural and ethical solidarity play in 
delivering justice. Fairness is determined by shared values, which are necessarily socio-
economic. A system of shared values necessarily creates difference. What is fair to one 
group is not fair to another. The construct of the Other in the above text reveals the 
division that is necessarily present in rhetorical encounters. Opinions are pitted against 
opinions, and, in the end, the power structures that make decisions on fairness or 
unfairness are determined by shared values, which are, as I have been arguing, also 
opinions with respect to what is good. We have seen this above in the discussion of the 
various constitutions that Aristotle identified, each with its respective system of values.  
 The other point that Walker makes is that Apuleius is participating in a tradition 
that at the time of the Apologia’s writing was more than five hundred years old and that, 
in his view, lasted for another thousand years. My opinion is that while the rhetorical 
practice has perhaps changed somewhat, the same system of values remains, mutatis 
mutandis, intact at present. The type of readers that value what Apuleius and his readers 
valued have been in existence since antiquity in the western tradition. 
Be that as it may, the key to rhetorical persuasion is understanding that the 
audience seeks not an Other, but instead An-other, an alter ego. The Other functions as a 
defining limit against which cohesion of a particular human herd can be achieved. 
McCroskey’s thoughts on human nature can be directly applied here: 
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Essential to our understanding of rhetorical thought is an understanding of human 
nature. Humans are basically self-centered creatures. They normally do things 
because they think they will benefit from their actions. They normally believe a 
thing because the belief fits nicely inside their little ego-centered world. Self-
interest is the primary motivating factor in human life. [But] Most noble 
aspirations and acts are also prompted by self-interest (80). 
 
If we are as self-centered as McCroskey indicates, it follows that an audience would 
seek in an orator, or, in the case of this dissertation, a writer with whom its respective 
readership identifies. McCroskey’s realistic, if not cynical observation “Altruism is 
another term for ‘enlightened self-interest’” (80) could be seen as applicable. This 
enlightened self-interest is necessarily the product of cultural goods, both tangible and 
intangible, that are valued by a respective group. Precisely which goods are valued by 
the narrator/writer and readership in the cases under study will surface in the discussion 
in Part 4.  
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PART 3 
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS & OBJECT OF STUDY 
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3.1 JUDGEMENT BY THE AUDIENCE 
When Eagleton makes a request to examine a vast spectrum of human discourse under 
the lens of rhetoric, he can do so because rhetorical devices and structures are present in 
any text or object where persuasive argumentation occurs. What he is calling for is the 
audience (or consumers) of these cultural artifacts to act as judge. The types of texts that 
Eagleton identifies as possible objects manifest in a broad array of genres. His list bears 
repeating here: “from Moby Dick to the Muppet Show, from Dryden and Jean-Luc-
Godard to the portrayal of women in advertisements and the rhetorical techniques of 
Government reports.” We can see that not only is the rhetoric of written discourse to be 
targeted for critique, but the rhetoric of visual arts  like advertising and film also come 
into play. As Eagleton mentions Dryden, he also includes poetry as possible material for 
rhetorical analysis. Eagleton is not alone here, for in Part 1 I have discussed Rosemond 
Tuve’s method in which she analyzes poetry of the Renaissance for their logical 
structures. Logical structures in poetic texts are detectable as well in ancient texts, as 
Walker illustrates in his seminal Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Walker argues that 
there is an underlying logic of persuasion in early poetry. Conclusions that Walker 
draws about the audience and the role it plays in relation to the poetry he analyzes are 
also applicable to the rhetorical analysis of narrative. Major points of his discussion are 
presented below. 
Two points made by Walker are cardinal: 1) the audience acts as judge and 2) 
if wise judgment is to take place, the experience of hearing (or reading) the poem is 
neither merely aesthetic nor just the attempt to understand the meaning of the text. 
Instead, the audience must, when analyzing rhetorically, use sophia (wisdom): 
This rhetorical sophia, and the principle of answerability it implies, also includes 
a recognition that the role of the poet’s audience is to judge, not simply to have an 
aesthetic experience, and not simply to understand what the poet means – though 
the aesthetic experience is part of what will make the poet’s discourse persuasive 
and is part of what the audience’s judgment will respond to, and though an 
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intelligent judgment must proceed from an understanding of the poet’s probable 
meaning and intentions (143-44). 
 
Important in the excerpt above is the word answerability (as related to sophia), for the 
audience is, in the end, answerable for the judgments it makes. Appreciation of the 
aesthetics and ascertaining the meaning of the text are crucial, but not the end-all when 
it comes to judging the discourse. As Walker affirms, wise judgment must be based on 
understanding of the poet’s meaning and intentions in combination with the aesthetics 
of the text. The audience must address these three aspects of a poem in order to be able 
to critically judge the arguments present in it. This is what Walker is getting at when he 
discusses answerability, for the audience or reader must take responsibility for the 
judgment they make on a poet’s persuasiveness. In order to take on this sort of 
responsibility, the audience or reader must be able to both demonstrate that they have 
understood  the probable meaning of the poem on several levels and to provide 
arguments that logically cohere with those of the poem in the case of agreement, or that 
contradict those of the poem in case of disagreement. 
Walker asserts that poetic discourse is used both “as a rhetorical transaction and 
as an instrument of ethical paideia” (148). It is in this transaction that “the speaker, as a 
competitor in an agon with other voices, attempts to persuade/seduce his addressee to 
choose and keep him as a companion, mentor, and ethical model,” on the one hand, and 
also that “the role of the audience is to exercise its powers of judgment and response, in 
choosing to be persuaded by his counsels” (148). Earlier in this dissertation the idea that 
within the system of values and discursive framework utilized for the functioning of a 
single community opposing voices are present. A single system of values is necessarily 
characterized by opposing argumentative forces that form part of the repository shared 
by the same community. Walker uses the poetry of Theognis to sum up the relationship 
between speaker and audience that functions in this space where opposition occurs: 
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As the audience rehearses its acts of judgment in response to the poetry, and 
insofar as it judges Theognis admirable and persuasive, it rehearses also various 
acts of assent that constitute a will to identify with the poet’s ethos or, more 
precisely, with the shifting, complex, varied ethical positions figured forth in the 
poet’s self-embodiment in his poetry (148). 
 
The judgment that the audience makes in the face of the shifting and complex ethical 
positions will depend on the persuasive force with which the pleader argues his or point. 
Walker makes the crucial points that the audience responds and then, in an act of will, 
decides to identify with the various ethical positions embodied by the poet and his 
poetry. Thus we see the importance that ethics play in rhetorical transactions – 
whenever judgment and choice take place. Walker discusses some of the earliest 
rhetorical enactments in the poetry of Homer, where the audience must judge complex 
issues. He states that when Achilles argues that he does not want to participate in the 
war because a long life at home without glory is preferable to the early death and eternal 
fame that prophecy has foretold for him, he is challenging the audience’s system of 
values, and putting it in an uncomfortable position where no easy answer comes 
immediately to the fore: 
Homer’s audience . . . is presented with a strikingly (even vehemently) well put 
yet paradoxical argument that, on one hand, agonistically challenges a dominant 
value-scheme and that, on the other hand, is fairly persuasive within its context, 
thereby calling for a complex exercise of judgment. Is Achilles just rationalizing 
what might otherwise be seen as cowardice, or as a young noble’s excessive 
sensitivity to insult? Is his argument valid or persuasive only within a certain very 
specific context?” (163) 
 
Crucial here is Walker’s bringing to the fore the agon of rhetorical enactments. This 
aspect has been alluded to throughout Part 1 where rhetoric’s field has been discussed. 
That is, it is possible to argue forcefully either for or against the issues rhetoric deals 
with. Also crucial is Walker’s identification of context. For, as stated throughout this 
dissertation, persuasion is case-specific. Arguments that are persuasive to one audience 
in one context may not be persuasive to the same audience in a different context. 
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Further, the complexities of judging arguments are highlighted in Walker’s discussion, a 
characteristic that holds true in all cases that are objects of rhetorical analysis. The 
decision of an audience as to whether an argument is valid or not is dependent upon the 
specifics and complexities of the particular instance. Each bit of information obtained in 
relation to a particular case colors the eventual and ongoing judgment. Without crucial 
bits of information a snap decision might be made about the justice or injustice of a 
particular case, a judgment that could be erroneous. We see in the above text on 
Achilles that opposing arguments are present when rhetoric is used to persuade. Judging 
which argument is most persuasive is a complex procedure, due to their inherent 
persuasive force, as Perelman affirms:  
Practical eloquence, including judicial and deliberative genres, was the 
traditionally favored field of confrontation of litigants and politicians who 
defended, by argumentation, opposed and sometimes even contradictory theses. In 
such oratorical contests, the adversaries would seek to win the adherence of their 
audience on certain debated subjects, in which the pros and cons would often have 
equally able and apparently equally honorable defenders (Rhetoric, 45). 
 
We have already seen that Perelman believes that not only judicial and deliberative 
rhetoric, but that epideictic rhetoric also functions as a persuasive vehicle for change. 
The idea that there are opposing points of view that are ably defended, and that a 
rhetorical encounter is often adversarial is brought out in the excerpt above. Perelman 
also brings out the important point that positions are defended honorably. The term 
honorable highlights again the ethical and complex nature of rhetorical persuasion. The 
example of Achilles provided by Walker demonstrates this point, for the former’s 
position was in opposition to the status quo, and in his speech he, in effect, engaged in a 
battle of opposing ideas that could, depending on the circumstances and how they are 
presented, could prove to be more persuasive. 
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As stated above, the speech, rhetor and audience constitute units of a much 
larger web of interconnected variables in human interaction and civic management. 
Halliwell asserts that rhetorical enactments do not occur in a vacuum: 
The judgment occurrent in rhetorical contexts involves an interplay between 
audience and rhetorician; it is the entire institutional procedure, not the persuasive 
speech alone, which carries the processes of deliberation, decision, and action 
(Poetics, 178). 
 
Halliwell is writing about deliberative rhetoric, but the same holds true for judicial 
rhetoric. The processes of deliberation, decision and action operate within a larger 
mechanism of human societal administration governed by discourse. As such, the 
effectiveness of the arguments, although often presented alongside contradictory and 
complex theses, nevertheless falls within a framework of thought dictated by vox 
populi. As Halliwell writes, “the material on which this skill is manipulatively exercised 
is, in large part, the substance of popular morality as embodied in the convictions 
presumed to be widely shared by a representative audience” (178). Arguments that are 
classified as “unusual” or “provocative” will always be judged from the perspective of a 
system of values that is normative and accepted. In the end, perhaps what is called 
unconventional perhaps amounts only, in fact, to the conventionally unconventional, 
with the greater good as defined by those in power finally constituting the foundation of 
judgments made. Walker argues, however, that there is always conflict in a culture’s 
value-hierarchies, and that change or novelty can be promoted.  
The rhetor’s necessity, in short, is to work within or through the presuppositional 
sets that both rhetor and audience can share, or that the rhetor is willing to 
concede, in order to win the audience’s assent to the rhetor’s particular claims – 
and to what is new and distinctive in the rhetor’s discourse. This inescapable 
situation does not necessarily produce a mere reiteration of conventional beliefs 
(or “ideologies”) because no body of conventional beliefs is ever (or can ever be) 
fully coherent, internally consistent, or systematic. Any culture’s conventional 
values and beliefs, and value-hierarchies, are inevitably heterogenous because 
they are the sedimented products of tradition, the happenstance products of a 
history and of cultural forces that no one person can ever fully perceive or control. 
It is always the case that at least some values/beliefs or hierarchies will be at least 
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potentially in tension or conflict with at least some others, especially in specific 
situations that bring those conflicts into high relief. It is always possible to 
promote, demote, refute, problematize, satirize, rearrange, revise, revalidate (and 
so on) one established set of values by means of appeal to some other established 
set or, by the same means, to promote an unconventional or novel set (164). 
 
Walker is arguing that the conflict is generic to the hierarchical system of values held by 
the community. No system of values is fully coherent, and it is the contradictions found 
within the community’s system of values that provide the basis for the differing 
arguments.  
 Whether the arguments represent positions of the value system dictated by a 
community’s status quo or others that are in conflict with the latter, it appears as if, in 
the end, advantage is the aim. Halliwell argues that, in Aristotle’s system, sumpheron, 
or “advantage,” holds sway in most human decisions and judgments. He contrasts this 
with actions that are based on nobility: 
Sumpheron seems, on the face of it, to be an intrinsically selfish or self-regarding 
criterion: by definition, it refers always to the advantage or benefit of an 
“interested party,” whereas nobility offers an express contrast to this (1.9.17-
19.1366b36-1367a61, 2.13.9.1390a1), and virtue in general is held by Aristotle, in 
the Rhetoric at any rate, to involve behavior that benefits others (euergetein). 
Twice, indeed, the Rhetoric cites the idea – as a commonplace, and hence 
rhetorically serviceable, prejudice – that human beings are, in harsh reality, 
incorrigibly committed to pursuing self-interest, however much their public 
professions might suggest otherwise. All this appears to fit well with the thesis, 
shared by some modern scholars with Plato, that it was rhetoric itself, and its 
exploitation by hard-headed Sophistic “realism” or realpolitik, which had 
established and disseminated the notion of expediency as a dominant mechanism 
of human behavior, especially in struggles for political power (182). 
 
We have seen that the idea that incorrigible commitment to self-interest is the motor of 
nearly all human action earlier, as presented by McCroskey. McCroskey would argue 
that what Aristotle calls service to others is, in fact, enlightened self-interest. If this is 
the case, then dialectic and rhetoric are the tools that all human value systems use to 
attain what are, in the end, selfish aims. Halliwell writes, “For advantage is, of course, 
stated to be the supreme concern of deliberative oratory (1.3.5-6.1358b20-36, 
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1.6.1.1362a17-18), and in view of the observation that it is a standard by which ‘all men 
are persuaded’ (1.8.2.1365b25), it has a claim to be regarded as paradigmatic of the 
content and workings of popular morality” (181). Although Aristotle in the citations 
Halliwell refers to is discussing deliberative rhetoric, advantage can also be seen as the 
supreme concern in both judicial and epideictic rhetoric. This means that all rhetorical 
transactions, whether their aim is to promote, demote, refute and so on a particular set of 
values, are characterized by selfishness, and it is this selfishness that must be appealed 
to, using as base the inherent values held as normative within a particular culture. As 
Walker informs us, Aristotle’s poet does not bring forth issues that are utterly opposed 
or completely original assertions. The values of the culture being addressed must always 
be kept in mind when attempting to persuade. The speaker must always work within a 
framework of existing normative criteria: 
When we consider this penchant for agonistic competition from a rhetorical 
perspective, it is clear that it need not and indeed cannot require that poets place 
themselves in utter opposition to the dominant value-schemes of their culture, or 
the audiences they perform for. Rather, as every rhetorician knows, all that is 
possible is to question a particular position, assert an attitude, rearrange a value-
hierarchy, or make the case for a minority position (that is, “make the weaker case 
stronger”) by means of connecting the “new” or unconventional position (or 
hierarchy) to an existing set of values and beliefs that the intended audience 
already considers authoritative. To the degree that the audience’s adherence to 
that preexisting scheme can be intensified and transferred to the “new” position, 
the “new” position is correspondingly validated and made persuasive (164). 
 
Interesting in Walker’s text are the quotation marks used with the term new, by which 
he suggests that, in fact, no truly new positions are ever argued for. That is, what he 
calls the “new” position is really one that is already present in the scheme of already 
existing values, which are often in conflict.
110
 What the rhetorician does is bring to the 
                                                 
110 We have stated from the outset that Aristotle views rhetoric as the counterpart to dialectic. Both 
forms of argumentation argue in opposite directions. Cole explores and expands upon the link 
rhetoric has with dialectic. His comments identify in different terminology the bases of rhetorical 
argumentation discussed by Walker: “The rhetoric that is a counterpart to this [i.e., dialectic], or 
compounded out of it and some other set of skills, requires a corresponding ability to produce the 
premises and inferences a deliberative or judicial body is likely to accept (Rhet. 1.2 1356b35-
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fore a position that is part of the values scheme but is not a dominant one. As Walker 
asserts above, only a sort of transference is possible. In this sense, it could be argued 
that what a rhetorician does is persuade the audience of something that it already 
believes in, but that it has deluded itself into thinking that it is opposed to it. Values are 
always shifting in Walker’s vision, and it is a question of which values set prevails at a 
given point in time, and whether another set can replace the one that is currently 
accepted as being in force. In any case, Walker then adds that the listener still must 
exercise rational judgment and decide whether the rhetorician’s arguments are 
persuasive without feeling that he or she is being coerced. The listener must exercise her 
freedom of choice following critical scrutiny and heartfelt evaluation: 
But the person addressed is also to make an effort to understand or “gather in 
mind” what the poet says and is not to do anything with which his own thymos 
does not agree: his assent or being-persuaded, in short, is not to be forced. Rather, 
it is to be a willing agreement based on careful assessment of the poet’s 
charmingly persuasive telling, or in other words a response that has been mediated 
by some thought-taking. The function of the poet’s telling is to persuade the 
listener’s heart; the role of the listener is to exercise his judgment (144). 
 
Both the persuasion of the poet (who acts, in any case, as a rhetorician) and the 
listener’s heart will make claim to sophia, according to Walker. What is crucial here is 
Walker’s insistence that the heart (read: pathos) plays a role that is just as important as 
reason. The two Aristotelian proofs, pathos and logos, work in conjunction when an 
individual’s will (thymos) is being exercised. Further, the judgment that is based on 
sophia will necessarily be a shared agreement of what is considered wise by the 
audience. The two I’s involved here (i.e., poet and listener) become we. And it is in the 
                                                                                                                                           
57a1). And insofar as it is provided by Aristotle’s great treatise, the rhetorician’s training in 
dialectic or a counterpart to dialectic involves mastering, first, an inventory of truths, partial truths, 
and received truths of the sort likely to provide acceptable premises for argument, and then another 
inventory (much less extensive than that required of the dialectician) of the logical operations by 
which further truths can be derived, or made to seem to derive, from those premises. The premises, 
drawn from the realms of ethics, politics, jurisprudence, and criminology, and arranged according 
to the type of oratory (forensic, deliberative, or epideictic) most likely to make use of them, 
constitute the bulk of Book 1 of the Rhetoric, whereas the inventory of logical operations closes 
Book 2” (10). 
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we that wisdom is elevated through the syllogistic argumentation of rhetoric. Wisdom is 
a shared value, whose definition is logically built upon the community’s accepted 
beliefs. 
As stated above, Walker argues that the aesthetics of a poet’s discourse function 
as a persuasive factor. In the critique and analysis carried out in Part 4, aesthetics will be 
considered as part of the general framework of values held by the readership. But the 
way aesthetics are considered will be from the standpoint of argumentation, not from 
the standpoint of critiquing artistic beauty. Walker, whose study on the origins of 
rhetoric in early poetry brings to the fore the underlying rational properties of ancient 
poems, discusses how even the ancients fell into the trap of starting a critique of a poem 
with rhetorical language, yet, in the end, practicing art appreciation. The example he 
discusses is Dio Chrisostom’s Oration 52: 
Dio’s reading of the plays, as one would expect of a sophist, is in many ways 
informed by a fundamentally rhetorical orientation: he says that he played the role 
of dikastes, “judge” (4); he remarks, though rather casually and in passing, on 
how the choral odes and speeches .  . . are “most political and rhetorical” (11);      
. . .  But he offers no serious critique of the poems as rhetorical transactions, no 
sense of what issues were at stake when their poets composed them, and no sense 
of what still might be at stake for a reader of them now, other than questions of 
artistic excellence. . . Dio does not so much enact a rhetorical encounter with the 
poems as represent an exercise in educated art appreciation (306). 
 
My aim in this study is to avoid the type of reading that Walker describes Dio as having 
undertaken, and to reveal the rhetorical underpinnings of the texts to be examined. 
 Walker’s thesis in his seminal Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity can be summed 
up as follows: There are implicit rational, syllogistic arguments of persuasion in poetry 
that it is possible to make explicit. He does this by identifying a series of syllogisms 
embedded in the poetic texts that make up arguments whose aim is to persuade the 
listeners of the positions being set forth. In the following section, work by scholars 
whose approach to analyzing narrative is to bring to the surface underlying structures of 
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persuasive argument is discussed. The work of these scholars will provide concepts and 
procedures that inform the analysis carried out in Part 4. 
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3.2 SCHOLARS FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES USING RHETORIC 
I have intentionally reserved this section of my dissertation for a discussion of 
scholars working in rhetoric that are rather more remote from literary studies than 
those I discussed in the review of the literature in Part 1. For what is interesting about 
the scholars that I am about to discuss is that although their disciplines would be 
considered in terms of both tradition and practice as having less than psychology, 
philosophy or linguistics have to do with literature, they nevertheless borrow 
methodology from literary history and criticism, which they recognize they have 
appropriated:  
To some degree, the literary readings collected here are a borrowing, a 
transportation of methodologies from the humanities, particularly literary history 
and criticism, to the social sciences. The unit of analysis is often big gulps of text 
– entire stories – rather than the more discrete units of discourse that are explored 
later in this book. Likewise, the authors in Part 1 apply literary concepts such as 
author, narrator, reader, genre, plot, poetics, metaphor, and aesthetics, as tools for 
interpreting and analyzing their data. But there is also an emphasis here on the 
impact of literature itself, that is, how socioculturally relevant literary genre and 
rhetorical traditions – even specific works of literature – shape individual lives 
and development (Daiute – Narrative, 2). 
 
That there is a link with the present study, on the level of both concepts and 
methodology, is evident in the passage above. Firstly, the authors use conceptual terms 
that I have been using throughout my discussion: narrator, reader, plot, and poetics. 
Secondly, they study the impact that socioculturally relevant literary genre and 
rhetorical traditions have on individual lives. Thus, bringing the work of these scholars 
into my discussion might be read as a sort of re-appropriation of the methodology and 
practice of literary studies from Social Science, Sociology, and Public Administration. 
After providing an overview and description of the work of these scholars, I then 
discuss the work of John Rodden, a scholar working within the field of Literary Studies 
who advocates an approach that is based on classical rhetoric. The reason that I have 
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placed the discussion Rodden’s work at this point in my dissertation is that his 
methodology is similar to the work of Feldman et al (see below) in that he makes 
implicit syllogistic (or enthymematic) arguments explicit in order to show how the 
logos of rhetoric functions in narrative. 
The aim of scholars working in social science when undertaking narrative 
analysis can be seen in the title of the following text: Narrative Analysis: Studying the 
Development of Individuals in Society. Narrative necessarily presents events that 
individuals have experienced in time, experiences that involve the evolution and 
development of the individual. The authors outline the various planes that this type of 
analysis makes possible:   
Researchers who have adopted narrative methods have found them particularly 
useful for addressing the unmet challenge of integrating culture, person, and 
change – a challenge that has become especially acute in the last quarter century. 
Facilitated by advances in medicine, technology, communication, and 
transportation, the texture of modern life is increasingly defined by weaving 
together separate generations, life stages, cultures, and social and political 
ideologies. At the same time, understanding these life systems, in all their 
complexity and diversity, is essential to such daily affairs as educating our 
children, caring for our elderly, designing equitable intervention and assessment 
programs, and formulating policies bent on nurturing the development and well-
being of individuals across diverse contexts (Daiute et al – Narrative, viii). 
 
There are parallels between the work that these scholars are undertaking and Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and other works that are cross-referenced with it. For instance, when they state 
that modern life is increasingly defined by weaving together separate generations, life 
stages, cultures, and social and political ideologies, the similarities are, on a thematic 
level, apparent. Aristotle in his treatise addresses the psychology of the young, middle-
aged and old. Further, he speaks of the various constitutions for the different political 
systems that he has studied, constitutions that arose in different cultural contexts of the 
day. Finally, when in the above passage the authors speak of the proper education of 
children, care for the elderly (for example) and the formulation of whose aim is 
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nurturing the development and well-being of individuals across diverse contexts (viii), 
the echoes with Aristotle’s Politics, where he discusses education, and his 
Nichomachean Ethics, where he discusses the common good, are clear.  Thus it is 
possible to assert, that, on certain levels, medicine, technology, communication and 
transport have evolved, but humans have changed little in the last 2,400 years. 
Technology has advanced tremendously, but it could be argued we still remain the same 
beings searching for meaning under the same sun, moon and stars that shone over 4
th
 
century Athens. 
The social scientists assert that their approach is cross-disciplinary, and “may 
employ literary tools like metaphors, linguistic devices like pronouns, or cultural 
conventions like time for insights about diversity within and across participants in their 
research . . .” (viii). My focus in this dissertation has been primarily its argumentative 
components as opposed to its connection with metaphoric uses and the aesthetics of 
language. Still, the use these scholars make of metaphors and linguistic devices falls 
within other spheres of rhetoric. There are also thematic links between their work and 
the definition that Terry Eagleton provides of rhetorical criticism, as can be seen in the 
following passage:  
We are therefore pleased to present this collection of theory-based case studies of 
narrative analysis seeking clarity around the issues of educational inequity, gender 
and racial discrimination, conformity and agency in response to oppressive 
institutions, context-sensitive concepts of mental health, citizenship, and ideas 
about development across the life span (ix). 
 
If we remove the social science focus on mental health, citizenship and studying 
development across the life span, the above text sounds like a student of cultural theory 
could have written it, especially if one considers the terms inequity, gender and racial 
discrimination, and oppressive institutions in the above excerpt. Agency also surfaces as 
a focus of inquiry in the above passage, which I have also discussed in depth. Further, 
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the passage above refers to case studies of narrative analysis. The two narratives 
examined in Part 4 section stand as particular cases are examined and analyzed using 
rhetoric as the methodological base to do so. 
That these scholars use components from rhetoric in their approach is also 
apparent when they speak of “the nature and role of audience in narrative writing; the 
multiple stances of narrators as speakers, subjects, and cultural interpreters; and the 
issue of research data and their relationship to life” (ix). I have explained the role the 
audience plays in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric. The multiple stances of the narrator 
as speakers, subjects and culture interpreters can be seen as the evolution and 
development of Aristotle’s discussion of the rhetorician’s ethos and delivery vis-à-vis a 
diverse audience, which he insists must be addressed properly in order to persuade. 
These authors state that their approach “relies on themes, mostly drawn from literary 
theory, to explain vicissitudes in the drama of interpreted lives, including time, truth, 
beauty, character, and conflict” (x). What is interesting in these assertions made by 
Daiute and Lightfoot is that the themes time, truth, beauty, character and conflict are 
those traditionally related with literary studies. This is a manifestation of the cross-
pollination that has been taking place among academic fields during recent decades. 
The social scientists under consideration outline the various appeals that 
narrative analysis has for their field. The fourth appeal they identify has a direct link 
with the work I am carrying out, for it has to do with the “why” of narrative, and, as a 
consequence, with values:    
Finally, narrative analysis permits the incursion of value and evaluation into the 
research process. Two major narrative theorists of the late 20
th
 century found that 
narrative discourse interweaves two phases of meaning when describing past 
events (Labov & Waletzky, 1997). In one phase, referential language in narratives 
points to the physical world . . . to “landscapes of action,” while in the other 
phase, evaluative language in narratives contains messages from the narrator to 
the listener or reader that say why the story is being told (xiii). 
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The two phases of meaning presented in the above passage coincide with what I have 
been repeatedly discussing in this dissertation. The first phase, the “landscapes of 
action” is the “what” of narrative. The second phase is the “why.” Rhetoric is concerned 
with and inseparable from both phases. Daiute and Lightfoot also state that their 
analysis has to do with “moral judgment” (xiv). We have already stated that without 
motive, no plot exists. And motive is necessarily tied to ethics, providing the basis for 
the “why” that gives meaning to actions carried out by agents in the narrative. If 
students of literature have, as Eagleton has stated, shied away from discussing morality, 
these social scientists take quite a different tack, which, in my opinion, merits 
consideration and imitation – if only because they do not hesitate to recognize their 
indebtedness to literary studies: 
Scholars have long equated life with the story of life. Epic poetry imposed order 
in ancient times. The Bible added moral order. The conflict plot prevalent in some 
cultures integrates temporal and moral representations, while the spiritual quality 
of folktales in many cultures, and character-rich moral tales in others, are 
frameworks for how people perceive and evaluate their lives (xiv). 
 
In the passage above, the idea of evaluation of a life in moral terms surfaces. During my 
discussion, I have been referring to Terry Eagleton, who has asserted that there has been 
an aversion among students of literature to discuss moral issues. He discusses this 
aversion in After Theory: 
For a long time, cultural theorists avoided the question of morality as something 
of an embarrassment. It seemed preachy, unhistorical, priggish and heavy-handed. 
For the harder-nosed kind of theorist, it was also soppy and unscientific. It was 
too often just a fancy name for oppressing other people. Morality is a question of 
what our parents believe, not what we think. Most of it seems to be about sex, or 
more precisely about why you should not have it. Since having sex in the 1960s 
was a kind of sacred obligation, like wearing mascara or worshipping your 
ancestors, morality rapidly gave way to style. Or, indeed, to politics. The ethical 
was for suburbanites, while the political was cool (140). 
 
Thus we see that in Eagletons’ lights, morality, or the ethical, was replaced by politics. 
But I would argue that while the terms morality and ethics were avoided, as Eagleton 
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asserts, the politically correct, or PC movement has a moral agenda. That is, matters of 
inequality with respect to gender, socio-economics, and ethnicity – all post-modern, 
politically correct themes – are related to morality and its adherents’ system of values. 
This is evident in the term inequality, which is a term that indicates an ethics-laden 
judgment call. The aversion to morality has been to that type of morality that has been 
identified with religion. It is the post-modern aversion to religion and anything related 
to them that has in literary studies resulted in the distancing from any talk about 
individual responsibility with respect to action. The focus has been on institutions. 
Morality has been codified in the post-modern framework as the territory of the church, 
and has been labeled as an ipso facto evil by those holding the politically correct banner 
high. The conservators of religion are also identified as politically conservative. This is 
evident in terms like the Moral Majority, which was used by the far-right to identify 
itself, and, at the same time, as a term of disparagement and abuse by liberals in the 
United States. The term morality has such powerful connotations in this regard that my 
attempt to use it – as the social scientists do – in a dissertation about literature is perhaps 
an exercise in futility. Depending on one’s perspective, and in this case I am referring to 
a perspective that is neither PC nor conservative, one could take Eagleton’s irony about 
the morality being a fancy name for oppressing other people and ask whether the 
liberals fighting against the oppression of a morality that they do not adhere to have not, 
in fact, created a system of oppression also. The question from antiquity, quid custodiet 
ipsos custodes must, in my view, always be asked. But these questions can only be 
answered by opening a dialogue that focuses on the question at hand, in which rhetoric 
and dialectic come into play, as opposed to dogmatism. In any case, it is interesting that 
– unlike students of literature – social scientists discuss ethics and morality with no 
qualms, and as a constitutive aspect of the narrative analysis they undertake:  
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Narrative is a cultural tool in several senses. Narratives are cultural forms often 
referred to as scripts (or dominant discourses, or master narratives) with 
embedded values and moralities. Tensions in the practices of cultural and personal 
narratives provoke the creation of and reflection about individual lives and about 
the society. It is in these milieu [sic] that symbol systems evolve. The culturally 
relevant symbol systems discussed in this book include genres, event scripts, 
selves, transcendent scripts, and exclusionary scripts like “illegal” person. These 
symbol systems are the building blocks of the higher order thinking that organizes 
identity and knowledge (xiv-xv). 
 
In the above passage the authors bring to the fore the conflict that can occur between an 
individual and society, and how analyzing narrative makes it possible to demarcate the 
symbol systems that create identity and knowledge. For social scientists, morality and 
narrative are tightly connected, and provide a rich source of material whose study leads 
to valuable insights. In the passage above, the authors use terms like “illegal” person. A 
parallel category idea in relation to illicitness surfaces in the text that I examine. The 
narrator presents himself as an infractor, which can be seen in the title of the text: 
“Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” I will examine the case of this illicit person from 
a perspective that extols him as a hero rather than a victim, and will examine the 
underlying system of value of those readers who see his illicit behavior as a good rather 
than an evil. The narrator uses ethos to win the audience over and judge him as 
praiseworthy, in spite of his thoughts and actions which would be interpreted by other 
readerships as unethical. Interestingly, in this regard, the social scientists in their 
introduction describe the position of one the writers as follows: “Bamberg (Chapter 2.3) 
explains that the narrator is a ‘subject constantly seeking to legitimate itself, situated in 
language practices and interactively accomplished, where ‘world- and person-making 
take place simultaneously’” (137). The link to persuasion in connection with the proof 
ethos is apparent. We have stated that Aristotle, in his treatise, indicated the importance 
of convincing the audience that the speaker is worthy – in terms of her character – of 
being listened to, which then paves the way for convincing or persuading the listeners of 
290 
 
her position. Bamberg is saying quite the same thing when stating that the narrator is a 
subject constantly seeking to legitimate itself.  
 One of the social scientists that has contributed to the text I am discussing 
admits that his practice is more poetic than scientific. This is interesting, if only because 
what may be read, since the 1950s (or earlier) as an anxiety on the part of students of 
literature to employ methodology that is more scientific and philosophical. That is, 
students of literature could easily be read as wanting to be less poetic, less romantic. 
Just the term “literary theory” alone provides evidence. This is interesting when we 
consider that social scientist Freeman states openly that his approach is not scientific, 
per se, but is instead, in his definition, poetic: 
The approach suggested herein tends more toward the qualitative than the 
quantitative; it is more idiographic, focusing on the individual person, than 
nomothetic, focusing on generalities across individuals; it looks more toward 
interpretive understanding than explanation; and, not least, it relies more on 
poetic than scientific modes of writing and is thus oriented not only toward the 
cognitive and discursive functions of language but also toward the emotional and 
evocative. On the face of it, this shift of emphasis would seem to take narrative 
inquiry away from psychology’s customary aim of portraying objectively a given 
phenomenon; it seems more ambiguous, indefinite, “subjective.” But it may very 
well be that only through more interpretive modes of inquiry and more poetic 
modes of writing can there emerge that sort of fidelity to the phenomena that is 
the first requirement of the narrative analysis of human lives. Put more quaintly, 
this shift of emphasis seeks to practice greater fidelity to the reality of human 
experience and thereby to tell a more truthful story about it (63-64). 
 
What is interesting here is Freeman’s veering away from scientific method in order to 
achieve a more faithful reading of human experience as related to truth. And so we have 
the students of literature attempting to be scientific and philosophical, while Freeman 
the social scientist leans towards the poetic, steering clear of the typical questionnaires 
that social scientists design to collect quantitative data. Freeman is trying to take a 
methodological tack that is more in line with his object of study: human beings. 
Freeman bases his approach on the work of Paul Ricoeur, whose ideas that are pertinent 
to his discussion he summarizes as follows: 
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Human action consists of events that are, essentially, “episodes in the making” – 
that is, events that will become episodes, retroactively, by virtue of their 
interrelationship with other events, both antecedent and subsequent, as well as 
with those “endings” that will ultimately serve to transfigure them into the stuff of 
narrative. In a distinct sense, one often does not know “what is happening” until 
the moment is past, until it can be located within some broader constellation of 
events, read for its significance in some larger whole (64). 
 
Because it is not possible to know what is happening until it is past, the way to interpret 
what eventually becomes narratives or stories is the “hermeneutical circle” that Ricoeur 
employs in his work. Freeman provides a concise summary: 
On the one hand, it may be said that the beginnings and middles of stories 
determine their endings. At the same time, however, it can also be said that 
endings determine beginnings and middles; for only when a story has ended – 
whether the ending in question is temporary, as in life, or permanent, as in death – 
is it possible to discern the meaning and significance of what has come before. 
There must, again, be a synoptic act of reading, whereby events are seen together 
in their interrelatedness as episodes in an evolving narrative. Ricoeur (1981b) thus 
speaks of two distinct dimensions of narrative: the “episodic,” which refers to the 
events of which a story is comprised, and the “configurational,” which refers to 
this process of seeing- or grasping- together, “eliciting a pattern from a 
succession” ([Ricoeur] p.  174) (64-65). 
 
Due to the nature or process of building or creating narratives from the stuff of life, 
which parallels literary modes of story-telling or narrative building, we can analyze 
human experience as retold by its subjects in the same way we would analyze a literary 
work. Freeman writes, “‘Reading’ human action partakes of the same temporal dialectic 
that is involved in reading literature. What Ricoeur calls ‘narrative time’ may thus be 
regarded as a constitutive feature of human experience” (65). In the above passage the 
reference to death provides further evidence of its importance in human discourse as a 
reference point to determine meaning. Freeman takes the point about reading human 
experience as narrative even further: 
This brings me to a final set of reasons for considering human experience as a 
kind of literature, and it is one with which we are all familiar: Our very lives are 
bathed in stories, in comedies and tragedies, with happy endings and shocking, or 
unanticipated, or disappointing ones. I do not wish to overdramatize human 
experience. It can be uneventful and quite tedious. It can also be truly chaotic, 
possessing no discernible meaning at all, even in retrospect. But much of the time 
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it is quite different than this. Stories abound and proliferate. Data are everywhere 
(65-66). 
 
Freeman equates a substantial part of life with literature, and for that reason analyzes 
narratives with a view to finding data that reveal meaning. He operates under the 
assumption that it is through narrative that we make sense of our lives, and it is in the 
analysis of these stories that we engage in what Franzosi calls a double hermeneutic: 
analysis of the analysis. By means of the double hermeneutic, we can gain insight into 
our behavior as humans, and use this analysis to examine our own system of values in 
an attempt to comprehend it and possibly benefit from the analysis.  
Study of narrative makes it possible, according to Freeman, to attain knowledge 
on several levels. He outlines these levels in an analysis he undertook of a case study in 
narrative form written by a man whose wife died of cancer. I have provided a summary 
of his outlook below:  
1) Interpretation: the new “data” that the man discovered about himself had 
to be put into some sort of interpretive context, in order to understand the 
change (77). 
2) Self-interpretation: self-interpretation is both self-construction or poeisis. 
That is, the act of self-interpretation is “the fashioning of a new, and 
perhaps more adequate view of who and what one is. It is an act of 
development, a reconfiguring of the self (77). 
3) Self-narrative is linked to culture: the cultural narratives (i.e., of the 
happy American family, the quintessential Mother-Provider), no longer 
provided a framework. Against these failed cultural resources, a new 
narrative is constructed (in Freeman’s study) (77-78). 
4) Use of the imagination to re-fashion the self: in Freeman’s words, 
“Narratives don’t simply maintain and uphold the status quo; they can 
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also change it, revise it, exactly through the kind of imaginative labor that 
had been exercised in this case” (78). Freeman states that it was a process 
of “deconstruction” after which came a process of “reconstruction” (78). 
5) The social dimension: the self is located in a specific culture, where there 
is a wider world, “the world of the individual in society,” which provides 
the background or setting for the story. In Freeman’s words, “This is the 
world of doctors and x-rays, norms and values, wives and children. There 
is no story apart from this world (78). 
 
As we can see, Freeman’s work a social scientist here is to show how individuals have 
experiences and how they change as a result. For Freeman, the resultant change 
provides a way in which, through analyzing this change as it is documented in narrative 
form, it becomes possible to discover truths about oneself. This process of analysis 
leads to discoveries about the cultural framework within which one lives. Freeman’s 
aims are those of a social scientist, and like the sociologist Franzosi’s approach (to be 
discussed below), brings to the fore data that are relevant to his field. Still, in his work, 
he writes of various narratives that express the human social framework, within which 
the narrative of the individual is intermeshed. Freeman states that his approach is poetic, 
which he juxtaposes and contrasts with scientific methodology.
111
 
 That a poetic approach is used by a scholar from a field that is scientific by 
definition reveals, in my opinion, the value that the non-scientific has in scientific 
disciplines. If scientists are using poetic approaches, the question that arises is why 
                                                 
111 Freeman states that his approach goes beyond empiricism: “Narrative analysis of the sort being 
considered here also moves beyond the confines of a “theory” as it is ordinarily conceived. I 
emphasize the phrase ‘as ordinarily conceived.’ Ordinarily, theory is conceived in rationalistic, 
scientific terms. One develops a theory, about this or that, in order to rationally account for a particular 
sphere of reality. One then goes on to test the theory, which may in turn lead to further refinement and 
differentiation of its terms or, if the data prove to be too recalcitrant, abandonment” (78-79). 
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should students of literature not do the same? In this regard, Gore Vidal expressed 
dissatisfaction with attempts by literary scholars to be scientific or theoretical during 
theory’s heyday. In an essay titled “American Plastic: The Matter of Fiction,” Vidal 
makes the following observations in reference to Roland Barthes, a major post-modern 
theorist:  
Barthes’s American admirers are particularly fascinated by semiology, a quasi-
science of signs first postulated by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Course in 
General Linguistics (1916). For some years the school of Paris and it American 
annex have made much of signs and signification, linguistic and otherwise. 
Barthes’s Elements of Semiology (1964) is a key work and not easy to understand. 
It is full of graphs and theorems as well as definitions and puzzles (101). 
 
Interesting here is the fact that this essay was published in the 1970s, which 
demonstrates that a major intellectual took a critical stance at the early stages of theory 
when, for all intents and purposes, it had been completely adopted by departments of 
literature. Also interesting is Vidal’s identification of semiology as a “quasi-science.” 
At another point in his essay, he refers to semiology as the “science” of signs. The 
quotation marks are Vidal’s, indicating that he questions whether or not Barthes’ 
approach is, in fact and essence, scientific.  In the excerpt above Vidal mentions the 
graphs, theorems, definitions and puzzles that are not easy to understand. He writes in 
this regard: 
Like so many of today’s academic critics, Barthes resorts to formulas, diagrams; 
the result, no doubt, of teaching in classrooms equipped with blackboards and 
chalk. Envious of the half-erased theorems – the prestigious signs – of the 
physicists, English teachers now compete by chalking up theorems and theories of 
their own, words having failed them yet again (101-102). 
 
Vidal is relentless in his irony, and his statement that words failed the English teachers 
of the day hits hard. My interpretation of the passage above is that Vidal’s subtext is 
that literary studies are not scientific per se, and that that does not matter, for they are 
not meant to be. Leave science for the scientists. Literary studies has other concerns that 
are as valid if not more so than what scientists deal with.  
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Vidal takes a position that attacks scientific or theoretical approaches to 
literature. Here it is worth recalling Barry’s approach which I discussed at the outset of 
my dissertation. That is, he attempts to present the various theoretical approaches in a 
clear manner, meanwhile indicating the merits and flaws of each. Vidal is somewhat 
less fair in his attack. But I would argue that, even though Vidal takes an aggressive 
stance towards literary theory, his arguments must be examined and evaluated with a 
view to discovering their flaws and merits. In this way it will be possible to discover to 
what extent his position is valid or not.  
Freeman’s methodology, as I have mentioned above, is based to a large extent 
on the work of Paul Ricoeur. He also makes reference to the work of hermeneutist 
Gadamer. One of the main thrusts of Gadamer’s seminal text, Truth and Method, is that 
empiricism, which aims to undermine hermeneutics due to its not being scientific, has in 
its own discourse the seeds of its own destruction. That is, Gadamer insists that truth is 
not necessarily nor always quantifiable by empirical means except ex post facto.
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Thus, while moving away from empiricism, Freeman is siding with other scholars who 
see the value that “unscientific” methodologies hold, and, at the same time, is arguing 
that narrative analysis may be used in order to discover the “truth” of life, which, as he 
states, can be read as literature.  
 Another aspect of Freeman’s approach is his aim to reconnect academic 
discourse and activity with reality. (I have already mentioned this topic in the work of 
Eagleton and Ford, both of whom see a disconnect between the academy and the real 
world outside its walls.) 
This sort of project isn’t for everyone. For some, however, working in this way 
sometimes allows there to be more of a bridge between work and life, between the 
academic and the lived realm of narrative. The two become continuous: trying to 
make sense of experience and trying to think about narrative become one and the 
                                                 
112 See Gadamer. 
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same undivided process. Maddening though this can sometimes be, it helps ensure 
that narrative analysis remains anchored in the world we most intimately know 
(79). 
 
Freeman’s aim is to connect academic work with life, which, as I have stated, is also the 
aim of several scholars whom I have been discussing. This is also the aim, whether 
directly stated or not, of sociologist Roberto Franzosi. 
 Franzosi’s work is interesting and relevant to this discussion, for he is a 
sociologist that analyzes narrative and in his discussion and makes explicit reference to 
rhetorical devices and how they function in the text to create meaning and to persuade. 
In his essay, “Narrative Analysis – Or Why (and How) Sociologists Should be 
Interested in Narrative,” Franzosi states that the answer to the question why in the above 
title is because “[n]arrative texts are packed with sociological information, and a great 
deal of our empirical evidence is in narrative form” (517).  
 That narrative texts are packed with sociological information is undoubtedly 
true. Nevertheless, although Franzosi states that a great deal of empirical evidence 
comes from narrative texts, in this article he does not follow strict empirical procedure. 
Instead, his method is rhetorical and hermeneutical. Franzosi’s use of rhetoric and 
hermeneutics provides arguments for a return to classical rhetoric by students of 
literature. 
When stating his objective, Franzosi recognizes that his approach is a borrowing 
from other disciplines: “My goal is to introduce sociologists to the basic concepts, 
particularly as elaborated by linguists, and to show how linguistics and sociology 
interplay at the level of a text” (518). Franzosi’s approach is both rhetorical and 
hermeneutical, and thus is relevant to the overall framework within which I am 
working. We can see in his work, like that of Freeman’s, a shift away from strict 
empiricism, from the analysis of quantifiable data to a more qualitative approach: 
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What is characteristic about these new techniques is that their real contribution 
does not seem to lie so much in the methodological but in the epistemological 
realm. As Abbot argues with reference to sequence analysis, sequence analysis is 
not just “a particular technique [of data analysis, but] … rather a body of 
questions about social processes” (Abbot 1995:93). No doubt, a view of social 
reality fundamentally based on narrative data shifts sociologists’ concerns away 
from variables to actors, away from regression-based statistical models to 
networks, and away from a variable-based conception of causality to narrative 
sequences. That view promises to bring sociology closer to history and 
sociology’s own original concerns with issues of human agency (527 – author’s 
brackets). 
 
One of the primary reasons that Eagleton in his Literary Theory: An Introduction makes 
a plea for a return to rhetoric is that he views rhetoric as the original model on which 
real politics in the real world were based. In the above passage we can see that Franzosi 
has a similar aim, as his wish is to bring sociology back to its original concerns, which 
he states is issues of human agency. This is just one of the links that Franzosi’s work 
has with rhetoric. 
 In his explanation of how to analyze narrative, Franzosi states that “ideological 
color” created implicitly in narratives needs to be made explicit (532). This, according 
to Franzosi (who bases his ideas on work done by Labov), is the difference between the 
what and the why: 
According to Labov, the sequence of purely narrative clauses performs the 
referential function of narrative. Basically, that function deals with the question: 
What is the story? But narratives are also characterized by a second function – the 
evaluative function – which deals with the question: Why is the story told? 
(What’s the story’s point? See e.g. Toolan 1988:147.) A typical story will contain 
explicit evaluative statements that reveal the teller’s attitudes to the events 
recounted (532). 
 
The point that I want to make on the above passage is that the attitudes that Franzosi 
states are explicit are necessarily expressions of the system of values embedded in the 
story. His methodology is thus rhetorical in the way that I am defining it.  Franzosi 
analyses a narrative about a man called Neville, which brings this idea to the fore: 
Certainly, Neville’s story suggests (or is at least compatible with) the following 
causal proposition: Because a wife kicks out a husband, the husband ends up 
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homeless. There is some truth to that. In a survey of three different populations of 
single homeless people conducted in England in 1991, the breakdown of a 
relationship is the main reason for homeless persons leaving their last home 
(Anderson et al 1993:70-73). But that, of course, is dodging the question: Why did 
Neville’s wife kick him out in the first place? (533). 
 
Franzosi’s question is both crucial and incisive. For without knowing why Neville’s 
wife kicked him out, the reader cannot make a fair judgment on her (or his) actions. 
And it is questions like these, questions to which there are not always answers but 
attempts at doing so can be made based on the evidence provided by the narrative 
using rhetoric as the analytical tool. 
I have discussed in Part 2 how certain actions are necessarily ethos-laden. That 
is, the action itself appears to contain a particular motive. Franzosi discusses this 
rhetorical mechanism in his analysis of the Neville case, juxtaposing action with the 
explicit creation of ethos, which he calls character traiting: 
In the absence of explicit character traiting, we can also infer character from 
action (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:60-61; Toolan 1988:102). Thus, the dramatic 
opening of Neville’s story “After my wife kicked me out” implicitly points an 
accusatory finger towards the wife. After all, as far as we know, Neville did 
nothing to deserve this. In his narrative, Neville does not volunteer any 
information on the reasons why he was kicked out of the house. We are left to 
imagine: Because he abused his wife, because he refused to carry any 
responsibility around the house, because he had affairs, because he was a drunk or 
a drug addict… In fact, the violence perpetrated against Neville in the opening 
clause – violence all the more senseless and gratuitous because it has no 
(narrative) explanation – helps to bring Neville into focus as a victim rather than a 
villain. We feel sorry and we sympathize for victims, while we are repulsed by 
villains (535). 
 
Franzosi’s observation, that the dramatic opening of Neville’s story points an 
accusatory finger towards the wife – thus identifying her as malefactor – but 
nevertheless leaves the reader with important questions that need to be answered in 
order to weigh her actions on a scale of ethics, has parallels with the first case study that 
I examine in Part 4. For in the narrative that Gass has created, one of the speakers in the 
dialogue reports that a woman left her husband, taking her child with her. The other 
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participant in the dialogue then unleashes a barrage of questions in order to obtain as 
much information on the case as possible in order to 1) understand why the woman left 
– that is, what her motives were for her actions – which will lead to 2) a moral judgment 
of her as a person. In both cases, that of Neville and that of the woman in Gass’ story, 
the underlying logos can be brought to the surface using rhetorical criticism with a view 
to revealing the syllogistic reasoning that leads the reader to an evaluation, and how this 
evaluation develops and evolves with each detail relevant to each case. Feldman’s work, 
which I shall be discussing below, does just that: the syllogistic reasoning is brought to 
the surface in order to demonstrate the logical, and therefore rhetorical underpinnings, 
that inform the texts she analyzes.  
Franzosi’s commentary above demonstrates rhetorical criticism in action, for, as 
he asserts, Neville presents himself as victim rather than villain, with a view to gaining 
sympathy from the reader. We can see that the three proofs of rhetoric, ethos, pathos 
and logos, are operative here. Logos: a man should not be kicked out of his own house, 
Neville was kicked out; therefore, he has been unjustly treated, and is a fortiori, a 
victim. Ethos: as Neville is a victim, he must not be a villain. Therefore, his character is 
good. Pathos: victims deserve sympathy, Neville is a victim. Therefore, the reader 
sympathizes with him. All three proofs are inextricably woven together and operate in 
unison with a view to persuading the reader that Neville is a good person that deserves 
sympathy. Neville, while narrating, acts as his own advocate. His narration employs 
mechanisms of judicial rhetoric, in the sense that he is pleading his case, with, on one 
level, a view to presenting his character as not guilty, as deserving of compassion. One 
other point deserves mentioning: Franzosi’s system of values, in his role as sociologist, 
dictates that victims deserve our sympathy whereas villains do not. We shall see that 
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this system of values does not necessarily hold true in the case of students of literature. 
At times “villains” are heroes.  
 As Franzosi states above, Neville does not provide sufficient information so we 
are left to imagine the causes for his being kicked out. Were we to know the details of 
Neville’s case, we doubtless would judge differently, each bit of knowledge modifying 
our judgment of him as praise- or blameworthy. The point that I want to bring out here 
is that, in spite of the absence of information, Franzosi still, using his imagination and 
intuition, is engaging in rhetorical analysis, and that, in spite of its not being empirically 
sound by hard scientific standards, is nevertheless based on sound reasoning.   
 Franzosi discusses the clues that Neville leaves in order to build his ethos. 
Franzosi states that, based on evidence in Neville’s discourse, in all probability he is 
young and white. This is the ethos of rhetoric at work and, at the same time, these 
factors influence the emotional reaction for or against Neville as advocate pleading 
his own case. Franzosi tells us that, based on clues Neville provides, he is probably 
poor and most likely unemployed. These ethos creating variables also increase his 
pathos in terms of compassion. Other factors that provide clues to who Neville is are 
purely linguistic, such as the speech community that Franzosi categorizes him in: the 
lower ranks of British society (537-538). Franzosi then discusses the “language of 
power” that is used by the upper ranks, as opposed to “a powerless language” used 
by working-class individuals in Britain (538). All of these ethos creating factors 
increase Neville’s capacity to arouse sympathy via pathos, and, in so doing, increase 
the reader’s adherence to Neville’s argument. Of course, depending on the 
readership, an adverse reaction may be aroused. In the recit de voyage that I examine 
in Part 4, the importance of language as ethos-building tool will be explored. 
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Taste can also be factored into the rhetorical transaction that occurs in Neville’s 
narrative: 
In his study of taste, Bourdieu provides quantitative evidence on the relationship 
between socioeconomic background and images of an “ideal home” (Bourdieu 
1984:247-48). “The proportion of choices emphasizing overtly aesthetic 
properties (studied, imaginative, harmonious) grows as one moves up the social 
hierarchy, whereas the proportion of ‘functionalist’ choices (clean, practical, easy 
to maintain) declines” (Bourdieu 1984:247) (538). 
 
We have already seen in Walker’s discussion of Apuleius’ Apologia how the level of 
culture aids in ethos-based persuasion. Taste is a reflection of the cultural level of an 
individual, and in rhetorical enactments functions as a factor of persuasion through 
identification. 
Franzosi notes that there are no clues that indicate “posture, gestures, gaze, or 
voice pitch,” which is, in his opinion, “unfortunate” (538 – footnote 16). We have seen 
that extralinguistic factors such as the above as well as others are also explored by 
Aristotle when he considers delivery in Book 3 of the Rhetoric. While these aspects are 
fascinating and constitute fundamental aspects of rhetoric as a discipline, they lie 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is must be pointed out that Franzosi, in this 
article on narrative analysis, discusses basic rhetorical devices and strategies without 
identifying them as such.   
 What value does narrative analysis hold for the sociologist? Franzosi makes the 
following statements:  
About Neville we know very little. All we know is what he has left behind in a 
short narrative of a moment of his life. In fact, we cannot even be sure that Neville 
is a real or fictitious character. We do not know what the purpose of the story is. 
 Yet, the linguistic analysis of Neville’s narrative has allowed us to shed light 
on many real lives like his. Narrative analysis has not only revealed the close 
relationship between the words in a text and between a text and other texts (e.g. 
stories and advertisements). Narrative analysis has brought out relationships 
between people – texts do not just index a relation between words and between 
texts, but between text and social reality. Sociology has crept in behind 
linguistics. Neville’s simple (and perhaps, fictitious) narrative has sparked our 
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sociological imagination; it has allowed us to get a glimpse of British society at 
the turn of the second millennium (547). 
 
The main point that I wish to make is that Franzosi is using methodology transferred 
from the province of literary studies and is applying it in the field of sociology, with the 
objective of making a bridge between academic research and the real world. Franzosi 
admits that his conclusions may be “‘too brazen a claim’ in the eyes of the sociological 
‘scientist’” (547). He states that historians deal with lives from the past, that linguists 
argue “over the structure and meaning of a four-line text” and that “[o]ther members of 
the academic community make their living on the basis of a single story” (547). 
Franzosi contrasts the work of these disciplines with that of sociology: “[S]ociology is 
about discovering general laws. Sociology is a science. It is not interested in the 
particular; its objective is the universal. We can hardly find any interest in this man’s 
[Neville’s] life a man we do not even know is real” (547). This phrase represents 
sociology’s party line, which Franzosi questions. He questions the validity of a content 
analysis approach to narrative, which sociologists use in an attempt to maintain 
scientific rigor. Against content analysis, which he states sociologists use to “count and 
tabulate” themes found in narrative, Franzosi writes: 
In analyzing “respondents’ stories,” sociologists cut up individual stories and 
recompose the pieces into new stories, with the coherence and context of each 
original narrative lost and forgotten. Upon the new stories, sociologists then 
impose the coherence of the “scientific” ethnographic text in the context of 
sociological “literature.”  
Yet, “precisely because they are essential meaning-making structures, narratives 
must be preserved, not fractured, by investigators, who must respect respondents’ 
ways of constructing meaning and analyze how it is accomplished” (Kohler 
Riessman 1993:4). That, of course, is easier said than done (548). 
 
Franzosi is arguing against the practices of sociology, whose empirical methods take the 
sociologist far afield from the social realities whose conditions it is the sociologists’ job 
to analyze and discover something other than numbers reflected in statistics. It appears 
as if Franzosi is saying, yes, we now have the stats, but so what? That is, what good 
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does it do to have a high number of statistics-based tables and graphs if there is no 
connection with the human object being studied? After questioning what he calls 
scientists’ use of scientific language, he states, “the emphasis on ‘objective,’ 
‘systematic,’ or ‘scientific’ in the process of going from text to coding may succeed in 
drawing attention away from the murky waters of text understanding, but ..  it does not 
get us any closer to finding real solutions to the problem” (549): Franzosi then asks, 
pointedly: 
Has the current culture of scientific or pseudoscientific discourse blinded us to the 
point that we actually believe some of the things that we are writing? . . . Perhaps, 
in light of the themes discussed in this chapter, what we need is more “open 
texts,” scientific texts that are open to the conditions of their own production. 
Hopefully, in this process of self-reflectivity, we will not have fallen prey to 
postmodernist gibberish, nor will we have given up an honest search for rigor in 
the social sciences” (549). 
 
Franzosi’s use of the term “pseudoscientific discourse” resonates with the passages that 
I have cited above from Gore Vidal. It is my opinion that Franzosi is expressing a 
concern about the disconnect between the academy and the reality outside its walls, that 
scientific and post-modern discourse have created (in his opinion). In this sense, he is 
making the same assertion as Ford, who, as one of his aims, wished to present a method 
that was less theory-oriented, and that had more to do with the real world, in order to re-
evaluate the place of literary studies in the educational system. We can see that Franzosi 
hopes to bridge the gap in the following excerpt: 
The narrative analysis of Neville’s story also points to a different way of looking 
at the relationship between the micro and the macro, the particular and the 
universal. The process of contextualizing a text for narrative understanding – the 
foreknowledge of knowledge – quickly leads us away from Neville’s microcosm 
to the macrocosm of British society. That same process quickly leads us away 
from narrow linguistic concerns. I have provided a handful of examples on how to 
link a linguistic analysis to a sociological analysis, how to go from text to context, 
from Neville’s particular to the universal (549-550). 
 
In his search to find universals from particulars, Franzosi believes that the approach that 
he is using shows “that narrative analysis (broadly conceived here as the analysis of 
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both linguistic and extralinguistic characteristics of speech acts) yields an understanding 
of social relations as embedded in linguistic practices” (550). He contrasts his approach 
with the standard approach of sociologists that obtains knowledge that is “based on 
tenuous statistical relations between poorly measured and even more poorly understood 
concepts in the context of poorly estimated models, even if the rules on how to go from 
the particular to the universal are scientifically embedded in the procedures we use” 
(550). What Franzosi is expressing here is a dissatisfaction with “scientific” methods 
(the inverted commas are Franzosi’s – note the parallel with Vidal’s criticisms), that he 
believes do not properly answer the questions that it is sociologists’ jobs to answer. He 
also suggests that his method might allow sociologists to analyze their own practices: 
“[N]arrative analysis may have also shown how social scientific practices involve 
specific language games in relation to the people we draw information from (our 
subjects/objects of study) and pass information to (our readers)” (550). Franzosi is 
arguing that by using narrative analysis, it may be possible to identify problems within 
the discipline of sociology itself, with the obvious aim of evaluating and providing 
solutions to those problems. Franzosi sums up his article as follows: 
To the novice, all of this will surely sound like a daunting task (perhaps it is easier 
to let the computer run regressions). The understanding of the text has required us 
to zoom down on linguistic problems the understanding of the context has 
required us to open up to neighboring and distant disciplines, to harness 
knowledge that comes from far afield. Don’t despair! The good news is that 
literary competence is not intuitive but learned (Culler 1975:113-30); Toolan 
1988:29; Cohan & Shires 1988:22; see also Bourdieu 1984:399). And so is the 
“competence” of linking a narrative analysis to a sociological analysis. Just start 
from Statistics 101 … sorry … Narrative 101 (550). 
 
Franzosi’s assertions reflect his discontentment with the state of affairs in the discipline 
of his field, sociology. His solution is for sociologists to change, or at least, to add to 
their methodology the practice of narrative analysis, which he states is knowledge that 
comes from distant disciplines: linguistics and literature. In his approach, Franzosi is 
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appropriating knowledge and methodology which I – as I have already stated – am 
reappropriating. 
Social scientists are not the only scholars interested in using narrative and 
rhetoric in their methodology. Scholars that are even further afield than sociologists are 
also using rhetoric. It will perhaps come as a surprise to students of literature that 
scholars in the field of Public Administration have written an article with the following 
title: “Making Sense of Stories: A Rhetorical Approach to Narrative Analysis.” One of 
the primary aims of the article is to examine “data about change in city administrations” 
(147). In the abstract to the article, the authors write, “We demonstrate the use and 
usefulness of a method for analyzing narratives that is based in concepts from classical 
rhetoric and semiotics. The method allows researchers to make more available the 
unstated, implicit understandings that underlie the stories people tell” (147). In the title 
alone we note an important difference from the articles examined above by Freeman 
and Franzosi, for the term “rhetoric” figures explicitly. Further, Feldman et al outline 
how they use the logos of classical rhetoric in their methodology. By making implicit 
understandings in the stories people tell explicit, these scholars make sense out of them. 
We can also conclude – due to the fact that they are conducting research on real people 
telling real stories – that they are attempting to bridge the gap between the academy and 
the real world. As stated above, this approach allows the researchers to examine change 
in city administrations. Feldman et al’s methodology is an unexpected use of rhetoric in 
an unexpected discipline, a case that might even be viewed as embarrassing since those 
who were in the past labeled by students of literature as Philistines (i.e. Business 
students) are using an approach that was once ours.
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113 Feldman states that this approach, which has “an air of novelty,” has been in existence for quite 
some time in the field of administration and policy and of administration and policy management. For 
Feldman, writing in 2004, cites work being carried out as early as 1957 by Selznick, in 1972 by Clark 
and in 1975 by Mitroff and Kilmann (147). 
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Why would narrative analysis using a rhetorical approach be of interest to 
Business students? Feldman et al spell out their reasons in the article under study:  
Stories are useful to both participants and observers of organizations because they 
are a basic tool that individuals use to communicate and create understanding with 
other people and for themselves. Stories are used to make sense of organizational 
life (Weick 1995) and to communicate the sense created (Orr 1996). Stories carry 
information relevant to decision making (Czarniawska and Sköldberg 2003; 
Maretin et al. 1983) and enable participants in policy and administration to 
“predict, empower and even fashion change” (Boje 1991, 124). Stories have been 
said to mediate reality and construct political space and are critical constitutive 
forces in politics and public policy making (Schram and Neisser 1997). People 
outside organizations, such as scholars, have demonstrated both the study of 
organizations as narratives and the study of narratives and stories in organizations 
as ways of making sense of the world of administration (Czarniawska 1998; 
Hummel 1990, 1991) (147-148). 
 
The first point that surfaces here is the concept of story that functions as a tool for the 
following uses: 
1) communicating 
2) creating understanding 
3) making sense (i.e. of organizational life)  
4) communication of the sense that has been created 
Due to these uses, the analysis of stories reaps the following analytical benefits: 
1) information depository (i.e., on decision-making) 
2) enabling of prediction, empowerment, and the fashioning of change 
Further uses of stories identified by Feldman et al are: 
1) mediation of reality 
2) construction of political space 
3) constitutive forces in politics and public policy making 
Feldman et al sum up the entirety of the uses listed above by stating that scholars, by 
analyzing narrative rhetorically, are able to make sense of the world of 
administration.  
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 We can compare the above uses with the uses identified by Daiute and Franzosi. 
Daiute states that researchers use stories to discover “the values, practices, and controls 
inherent in groups determining who the heroes are, what life should be like, and what 
should be heralded or hidden” (x). Franzosi states that his analysis makes it possible to 
move from the microcosm of the specific narrative to the macrocosm of society (in the 
case under study, British society). All of the methods argue that humans use narrative to 
create meaning and to make sense, which they then communicate via story-telling. 
The conclusion that I wish to make here is that these scholars, who are working 
outside of the field of literature, find narrative to be a fertile field for the discovery of 
knowledge about the creation of meaning from the chaos of lived experience, and that 
the rhetorical analysis of stories is a useful tool for their respective fields and objectives. 
All of the abovementioned methods are based on the assumption that the meaning is 
often implicit, and that it is the researcher’s job to make the underlying logic of stories 
explicit. Feldman writes, in this regard: 
In order to understand research participants’ stories about change, we use a 
methodological technique that opens up narratives to an analysis of the internal 
arguments they make. Our analysis reveals an implicit logic in the explicit 
examples of actions and understandings of our storytellers. This analysis enables 
us as researchers to uncover the process of how change plans have translated into 
specific, and sometimes unanticipated, changed actions in these cities (148). 
 
So we see that the stories have a surface structure underneath which lies a logic where 
the meaning of the story can be made explicit. Once made explicit, the underlying logic 
is for Feldman et al a rich depository of information that reveals the processes of 
change.  
 All of the scholars under study in this section explain the why of studying 
narrative. Feldman follows form, in this regard: 
Why narratives, in particular? Narratives are useful data because individuals often 
make sense of the world and their place in it through narrative form. Through 
telling their stories, people distill and reflect a particular understanding of social 
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and political relations. Stories are a common, habitual method people use to 
communicate their ideas. Barthes extols narrative’s universality, noting that “all 
classes, all human groups, have their narratives . . . narrative is international, 
transhistorical, transcultural; it is simply there, like life itself” (1977, 79). In other 
words, we are likely to find our research informants providing us with information 
by means of narrative (148). 
 
It is in these international, transhistorical, transcultural phenomena that Feldman et al 
find underlying implicit logic through rhetorical analysis that provides the information 
that they seek as scholars of Public Administration. Important are the roles played by 
researcher and narrator/protagonist, for we again see the “what” of the story, which 
attains meaning through its “why”: 
Generally, the job of the narrative researcher is to interpret the stories people tell 
(Riessman 1993). As the narrative analysis has to do with “how protagonists 
interpret things” (Bruner 1990, 51), narrative analysts tend to ask why the story 
was told that way and what the storyteller means (Franzosi 1998) by looking at 
form, structure and content (148). 
 
As we can see by the statement above, Feldman et al’s analysis has to do with 
interpreting interpretation. That is, the narrator/protagonist interprets or makes sense of 
her life experience by putting it into words, but it is from a particular interpretation of 
what she has experienced. In this article, Feldman et al “discuss the nature of stories and 
why they are both important to and facilitate the interpretation of meaning” (149). This 
is a crucial concept: the interpretation of meaning. For the protagonist interprets the 
meaning of a particular life experience and then presents the interpretation in story 
format. The researcher must discover the embedded interpretation and make it explicit 
in order to reveal how the protagonist has interpreted the meaning of the particular 
experience. Once the implicit interpretation is made explicit, the research can then 
analyze and evaluate. In other words, the researcher, using rhetorical methodology, 
passes critical judgment on the data discovered through analysis.  
 In their rhetorical analysis of narrative, Feldman et al stipulate that when 
applying their methodology, which is “based on concepts derived from logic and 
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semiotics,” they are not seeking to assert scientific truths. They state that their 
methodology has different aims, that is, a search for meaning: 
We appropriate these concepts of classical scholars to explore social interactions 
and constructed meanings, rather than mathematical reasons and logic. As we are 
interpretive researchers, our work engages the meaning embedded in narratives, 
rather then [sic] the external validity of probability claims (306). 
 
The importance that these scholars give to the mining and interpretation of data culled 
from narrative is evident. At the same time, these scholars assert that the interpretation 
of meaning they arrive at is not necessarily the only one. Feldman et al state that “one 
can expose implicit understandings in narrative, reason or representational practices, 
without also claiming that this is the only way to interpret a narrative” (151). This is 
rhetorical practice, for, as I have been asserting, various stances are possible and can be 
argued with force. The authors grant that several views can be taken on the same 
narrative with respect to its meaning or meanings:  
Indeed, our analysis is based in the presumption that we live in a social world 
characterized by multiple interpretations and that as people tell stories these 
numerous interpretations are manifest in multiple and sometimes conflicting 
logics (151). 
 
That multiple interpretations exist with respect to interpretation and that these same 
numerous interpretations are manifest in multiple and sometimes conflicting logics 
parallels Aristotle’s defining rhetoric and dialectic as having to do with matters that can 
be argued in opposing directions. We have also seen these ideas reflected in the work of 
Walker and Cole. Their work thus has direct links with rhetorical practice other than the 
ones they recognize. 
 As for the rhetorical mechanisms that they state they employ in their analysis, 
Feldman et al state that they make enthymemes that are implicit in the narratives 
explicit. I have discussed the problematics of the term enthymeme in Part 2 of this 
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dissertation. The model of enthymeme that Feldman et al use in their approach is the 
incomplete or truncated syllogism: 
Generally speaking, an enthymeme is an incomplete or “careless” logical 
inference. That is, enthymeme takes the form of an argument or, more formally, a 
syllogism, one of whose parts is missing. Often and most typically, the missing 
part is the major premise, but sometimes it may also be the minor premise or even 
the conclusion. A second but somewhat less recognized property of the 
enthymeme is that it is a plausible, likely, or probabilistic inference, rather than a 
logically binding one (as in a perfect syllogism) (152).  
 
As already stated, scholars of logic and rhetoric have, over the last two millennia, 
debated what Aristotle meant when he used the term enthymeme in his Rhetoric. I have 
stated that the term sullogismos is used by Aristotle to identify a logical argument in its 
broadest sense, that is, not necessarily as a perfect syllogism as the authors state above. 
But for these scholars’ purposes, the definition they utilize functions. They then state 
that “[s]torytellers often have enthymemes embedded in their stories” (152). The 
method that Feldman et al utilize makes the embedded, implicit enthymemes explicit, 
with a view to analyzing the underlying reasoning of the storyteller: 
Our analysis allows us to present the implicit argument made by the storyteller. 
Our concern is not with whether the argument is right or wrong or whether the 
events in question actually happened but, rather, with the understandings that the 
storyteller is expressing through the story. This task is directly related to the larger 
epistemological stance that contends that human communication in all of its forms 
is imbued with what Fisher calls mythos – “ideas that cannot be verified or probed 
in any absolute way” (1987, 19). People tell stories in order to convince, and our 
concern is with the understandings that they are trying to convey through their 
stories (152). 
 
What is most important in the above extract is the authors’ assertion that the 
understandings, or embedded reasoning of a story have to do with ideas that cannot be 
verified or probed in any absolute way, and that humans tell stories to convince. They 
are, in essence, stating that they are working with the ambiguities of human reasoning in 
their interactions. To state that ideas cannot be verified or probed in any absolute way is 
a rewording of the idea that they are dealing with opinions. I have discussed this 
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tendency in legal terminology earlier, which is an attempt to remove the negative 
connotations that the term opinion contains. That Feldman et al state that humans tell 
stories to convince parallels my argument that a narrative can be viewed as a pleading 
that is argued using logic, both at the surface level and hidden beneath.  
Feldman et al summarize their approach as follows: 
We use these rhetorical and semiotic concepts in the manner described below to 
provide a systematic surfacing of the arguments used by the storyteller. The 
concept of the enthymeme provides the researcher with a tool to transform the 
implicit parts of the arguments into explicit and analyzable data. Because stories 
often have multiple arguments, this form of analysis facilitates disentangling the 
various arguments in a story. Often one syllogism serves as a stepping-stone to 
other arguments in the story (152). 
 
The primary aspect that I shall be transporting from Feldman et al’s approach is the 
identifying and making explicit of implicit, embedded reasoning in two narratives, with 
a view to analyzing the system of values inherent in the reasoning used by the narrators. 
In their analysis, Feldman et al first identify the story line, which they define as follows: 
“The story line is the basic point (sometimes points) that the analyst thought the 
interviewee was trying to make about change” (154). This aspect of Feldman et al’s 
approach also provides a useful analytical tool, and parallels the practice in literary 
studies of reducing a narrative to its basic plot in order to identify the moral. This aspect 
of their methodology answers two questions, what is the story about and why is the 
narrator telling it?  
Highly important in the analysis carried out by Feldman et al is the terminology 
they use when describing the observations that they make, as seen in the passage below: 
From these statements [made by the narrator] we infer that he considers playing 
the game to be a failure and providing the best service at the lowest cost to be 
success. Although he never says explicitly that doing the right thing for the wrong 
reason results in failure whereas doing the right thing for the right reasons results 
in success, we felt it was a reasonable interpretation of the combination of 
statements he makes (156 – my italics). 
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The language that I wish to highlight here are the terms “infer” and “felt.” In their 
analysis, Feldman et al are making reasonable, but not necessarily intractable assertions 
using formal logic that are based on data that is not explicit. That is, in essence, they use 
rhetorical reasoning (enthymematic/syllogistic) as the base for their observations. This 
practice is much more ambiguous when compared to the strict rules of empirical science 
or formal logic.  
The final scholar that I shall bring into this discussion, whose approach is very 
similar to the one just examined, has done work in English Studies.  
 John Rodden, in the article “How Do Stories Convince Us? Notes Towards a 
Rhetoric of Narrative,” includes as a prefatory text a quote from a book published in 
1907 written by Ida Tarbell, that illustrates a major point that I have been making in my 
dissertation: 
I tell you he got more arguments out of stories than he did out of law books, and 
the queer part was you couldn’t answer ‘em – they just made you see it and you 
couldn’t get around it. I’m a Democrat, but I’ll be blamed if I didn’t have to vote 
for Mr. Lincoln as President, couldn’t help it, and it was all on account of that 
snake story of his on illuminatin’ the taking of slaves into Nebraska and Kansas. 
Remember it? (Tarbell 1907, 9) (148). 
 
The main thrust of this excerpt is that stories can function as vehicles of (or proofs for) 
persuasion, due to the fact that they contain logical arguments. In Part 2 in the 
discussion of the traditional division of rhetoric into five parts we have seen that 
narratives were used in the proof section. The excerpt above falls in line with rhetorical 
practices from antiquity: narrative functions as a proof in argumentation. The passage 
above is interesting firstly due to its assertion that stories function as tools in 
argumentation, because of their capacity to illuminate or illustrate a point, and secondly 
because of the speaker’s claim that the person he is speaking about was able to get more 
arguments from stories than from law books. The irony is of course that one would 
expect just the opposite. The stories referred to in the excerpt above argued a point, and, 
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in the case of their interlocutor, the point was made so forcefully in narrative form that 
the listener could not argue against them and, being convinced, acted accordingly. 
Rodden, in effect, uses a story that makes the point that stories argue in order to make 
the same point: stories argue. This assertion simply reinforces what I have been 
suggesting throughout my discussion above: narratives have implicit and explicit 
rational arguments that act as the motor that drives the narrative. Stories have a point, if 
not many points to argue. Further, story is where agency and motivation find their 
expression, and underlying the deeds and events expressed in the narrative is a logic 
that, together with the particular agent and her character traits, provides the stuff that we 
as audience and judge evaluate as either praise- or blameworthy. 
 Rodden’s article is highly relevant to my dissertation, for he bases his approach 
on classical rhetoric. Rodden states that his aim is to “tak[e] a sharp turn away from 
contemporary narrative theory and toward classical rhetoric” (158). Rodden thus takes a 
stance similar to other scholars discussed in this dissertation (i.e., Eagleton, Ford, 
Kastely, etc.) who also advocate a return to the roots of literary criticism.  In his 
discussion, Rodden states that it is his aim is to demonstrate how enthymemes function 
to persuade. He distinguishes between the aims of formal logic and rhetoric:   
As with logic, the defining unit in rhetoric is the proposition. Whereas the 
syllogism is the instrument in logic, however, the enthymeme (the rhetorical 
syllogism that deals in probabilities rather than proofs) is the instrument of 
rhetoric. The aim of rhetoric is not proof but assent (151). 
 
In the passage above illustrates the idea that rhetoric does not deal with matters that can 
be proved by formal logic, mathematics or empirical means, due to its field of 
operations: opinion. As opinions cannot be proved, we can only hope for assent on the 
audience’s part. Rodden, in a definition that he borrows from another scholar, describes 
the process of using probability to gain assent, which is, in Perelman’s terminology, 
adherence: 
314 
 
An established definition of rhetoric is that it is “the function of adjusting ideas to 
people and people to ideas” (Bryant 1953, 123). This process ranges on a 
continuum of poles between a complete accommodation of speaker ideas to 
audience views (“telling people only what they want to hear”) at one extreme to 
total intransigence at the other (“my facts speak for themselves” or “my viewpoint 
is the only reasonable/moral/etc. one”). The would-be convincing speaker, 
therefore, must always be adjusting his or her ideas (and self) to the listeners; the 
listeners are always “measuring the speaker up,” bending toward him or resisting 
him. He projects a certain image to them, as his discourse proceeds, they 
reconsider their impressions of him, filling in the missing links of his argument, 
placing it within the context of their own experience and relating to it in their own 
idiosyncratic way (154). 
 
What is important in the above excerpt is the idea of how the speaker either does or 
does not accommodate ideas to the audience, and that this accommodation can be 
placed on a continuum ranging from complete accommodation to a complete absence 
thereof. The listeners are always measuring the speaker up. That is, they are judging 
what she is saying, based on the image they have of her, an image that we must add is 
based on the speaker’s logos, ethos, and pathos. Also crucial here is Rodden’s very 
insightful observation that each listener, while engaged in a sort of intellectual tug-of-
war in which they either bend toward or away from her, place the argument within the 
context of their own experience and relate to it in their own idiosyncratic way. This 
concept has its roots in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which, as we have seen, advocates 
adjusting one’s discourse to the audience at hand.  
 Also important in the excerpt above in relation to the measuring up that the 
listener carries out throughout the arguments presented by the narrator is the idea that 
she must take into consideration counter arguments that the listener (or, in the case of 
travel narratives – or any written narrative – reader)  may come up with and must 
address them accordingly. That is, the writer of a narrative must, in the course of her 
narrative, weave counter-counter arguments into the fabric of the narrative in order to 
provide reasons that will undermine the counter arguments that occur to the reader. 
Taking Wayne Booth’s concept of the implied author, Rodden creates the “implied 
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orator.” In this sense, Rodden’s view of rhetoric coincides with Aristotle’s model of 
rhetoric. I have been arguing that the narrator can be viewed as pleading a case with a 
view to persuading the readership to accept his arguments, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, to find her praise- as opposed to blameworthy. Rodden, borrowing from the work 
of Iser, also creates the implied auditor, which I have been labeling reader or readership. 
The point that I wish to make here is that, although the terminology is different, 
Rodden’s ideas coincide with those I have presented in this dissertation. That is, the 
reader, in the role of judge, evaluates the arguments of the particular case as presented 
by the narrator who is acting as a sort of litigant:  
The scene for the implied orator and the implied auditor is more properly a 
courtroom. Here they interact as advocate and jury member, respectively. The jury 
(presumably less so than the judge) will be “convinced” not only by rational 
argument but also by emotional and ethical appeals. Instead of “realizing a 
world,” the implied auditor weighs appeals and then assents or rejects. Whereas 
the implied reader’s [Iser’s term] overriding task is to interpret a world and “take 
an active part in the composition of the novel’s meaning,” the implied auditor’s 
ambition is to evaluate a case and (re-)actively shape the terms of the argument 
(Iser 1978, xiii) (156). 
 
Rodden’s uses the image of the courtroom, which also coincides with the way that I 
view the rhetorical framework of narrative. As stated in Part 2, I have based the function 
of the reader/listener on Aristotle’s presentation of judicial rhetoric.  
 In his discussion of rhetoric’s classical framework, Rodden brings up the 
quinquepartite model speech. Ancient rhetoric’s five main divisions “from Aristotle 
through Quintilian” were: “invention (discovery and invention), dispositio 
(arrangement, adaptation), elocutio (style), memoria (memory), and pronunciatio 
(delivery)” (158). Rodden discusses the place narrative occupies in the categories 
listed above: 
Classical scholars beginning with Aristotle considered the narratio and 
argumentum to be the two essential parts of dispositio. Classical theorists worked 
primarily from the model of the forensic (courtroom) speech. Thus narratio was 
the statement of the case; argumentum was the “proof” of the case (159-160). 
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Rodden defines narrative as I am using it in the model that I have articulated in Part 2. 
The difference is that, in the framework that I have articulated, narratio and 
argumentum are combined and present in the narration itself. At times the “proof” of the 
argumentum is explicit, and at times it is implicit. 
In his article, Rodden explains what the aim of narratio is from Quintilian’s 
perspective. He also discusses the role it played in deliberative and epideictic rhetoric:   
The precise nature of the narratio was to “indicate the nature of the subject on 
which he [the judge] will have to give judgments” (Quintilian 1805, iv. 2. 1). In 
practice, it was not merely informative but also suasory, “a speech in miniature” 
(Ragsdale 1966, 21). Quintilian advised that narratio function “not merely to 
instruct but rather to persuade the judge” (1805, iv. 2. 21). Forensic oratory was 
most appropriate to a statement of the facts since the province of courtroom 
speech is the past, but deliberative and epideictic (ceremonial) oratory also made 
use of reciting past events as a basis for recommendations about the future and 
present – and so narratio also came by Quintilian’s time to figure prominently in 
non-forensic discourse (160). 
 
Although Rodden states that by Quintilian’s time narratio was used in non-forensic 
rhetorical discourse, the fact is that there are examples of narrative being used in 
epideictic and deliberative rhetoric in Aristotle’s treatise. Be that as it may, the point 
that I wish to make from the above passage is that two functions that narrative has, 
whether used in deliberative, judicial or epideictic rhetoric, are: 1) the presentation of 
past events in story form and 2) persuasion. Another important point is that combining 
the three modes has been a practice since (at least) Aristotle’s Rhetoric was written. 
That is, the lines separating tactical practices in judicial, deliberative and epideictic 
rhetoric were not hard and fast, and elements from each sphere were often used 
indiscriminately in the others, depending on the aims of the orator.  
 The texts that Rodden uses in this article are passages from Orwell’s 1984. At 
one point in his article Rodden states that “it seems likely that not all narratives argue – 
not all of them advance logical appeals. Certainly not all advance rational arguments 
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that may be formulated in enthymematic chains” (165).  Rodden’s ideas reflect the title 
of his argument title in the arguments he sets forth. That is, he is still in the drawing 
board stage of moving towards a rhetoric of narrative. This can be seen clearly when he 
shifts back and forth between arguing that narratives do or do not argue or persuade:  
Still it might be said that all stories, at least in a weak sense, persuade us (or at 
least a few readers) of something. For even if we consider a story on the model of 
a “fictional world” [here Rodden is reverting to Booth’s conception of rhetoric] 
rather than a speaker-listener exchange, we as readers enter a world that is 
animated by values. Whether we grant or withhold assent, whether we are 
“moved” to embrace the story’s Weltanschauung or not, we nevertheless confront 
that world’s axiology when we enter it – just as surely as we do when we enter a 
different culture (165-166). 
 
Rodden here is, in my opinion, mistaken when he states that all stories at least persuade 
in a weak sense of something. In my view, all stories attempt to persuade. Whether they 
manage to achieve this end is another matter which Aristotle addresses when he states at 
the beginning of his treatise, “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] 
case, to see the available means of persuasion.” To see is not necessarily to manage to 
perceive. Aristotle illustrates this idea metaphorically when he equates the rhetorician 
with a doctor who follows all the procedures of medicine to cure a patient that is 
incurably ill. So the point that I made at the outset regarding gaining as much 
knowledge as possible about a field of study in order to be conversant as possible in the 
field on the one hand, and, on the other to be able to identify the insights and blindspots 
of other scholars working in the same field that either have not done sufficient research 
or are “fudging” when they put their ideas down on paper holds weight in this case. The 
other interesting thing that Rodden is doing, since he has read Booth, is to conflate 
rhetorical “convincing” with artful story telling. For that is what I assume he means 
when he says that we either are or are not “moved” to embrace the story’s 
Weltanschauung. That is, he views the persuasion on the part of the narrator as having 
to do with convincing the reader of the story’s verisimilitude in terms of narrative 
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technique, which is something quite different from what Aristotle’s treatise was about – 
in my reading. Still, on a more positive note, Rodden hits the nail on the head when he 
states that the world of narrative is animated by values. And it is values that provide the 
implicit reasoning of a narrative that can be extracted and expressed in syllogistic form. 
Rodden argues in fits and starts, perhaps because he has not thought the matter 
through, or because he has read Booth, whose work is, in my view, often perplexing. 
For first Rodden says that not all narratives advance arguments that can be expressed in 
enthymematic chains, but then he states that all stories – “at least in a weak sense” – 
persuade us (or at least a few readers) of something. Rodden’s expression is highly 
ambiguous. Precisely what is that something that Rodden is referring to? Does he even 
know? If all stories persuade, they are, a fortiori, rhetorical by nature, and can, 
therefore, be analyzed for the implicit reasoning. Rodden concludes as weakly as he 
begins: 
Are stories arguments? Are narratives persuasive discourses?  
Sometimes. If they progress primarily by conceptual chains or by motifs 
carrying ideas, we may posit, enthymematically, a tentative “yes.” But as with the 
interrelation of inventio and dispositio, and with the dynamic, dialectical character 
of the communicative act, the what of narrative is not a separate question from the 
how. We must constantly be attentive as to how narratives move if we are to 
distinguish the modes within them accurately. 
Only then will we become aware of how they are moving us (169). 
 
In my view, Rodden has a confused idea of how stories or narratives (I use the terms 
interchangeably) function rhetorically, and how, for that reason, they are necessarily 
persuasive discourse that argue based on an underlying system of values which can be 
examined by analyzing the implicit reasoning embedded in the narration itself. In spite 
of what I see as flaws in Rodden’s work, his intentions are good, for he at least attempts 
to take us closer to the earliest form of literary analysis by using a definition (however 
mistaken) of classical rhetoric.  
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 In their analysis of narratives, both Feldman et al and Rodden make implicit 
enthymemes explicit using  as their object complete narratives that can be several 
paragraphs long (in the case of Feldman et al) or paragraphs from larger texts (Rodden 
analyzes paragraphs from Orwell’s 1984). In the case of Feldman et al, as many as three 
or four enthymemes are extracted from a paragraph, and then linked together in order to 
illustrate the rhetorical component (in terms of logos) present in the narrative. Rodden, 
in his article, extracts only one enthymeme per paragraph (or entire section of text) 
analyzed. My work will differ in two respects: first, I shall break the narrative down into 
its smallest units, at times discussing a single word in order to demonstrate how it can 
function to produce an argument in its broadest sense.
114
 At times I shall examine larger 
units, such as the title, and show how a small group of terms functions rhetorically, that 
is, how logos, ethos, and pathos are at work in the smallest units possible of the text 
under study.  At other points in my discussion, I shall consider, like Feldman et al and 
Rodden, larger portions of the recite de voyage, in order to demonstrate how the 
narrator is pleading his case in the “courtroom” of the readership. The implicit 
arguments that are made implicit I then examine in terms of the system of values that 
informs the narrative. 
  
                                                 
114 We have already seen how one word constituted an entire rhetorical enactment in the chapter on 
ethos. 
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3.3 TRAVEL LITERATURE 
The object of study, a short travel narrative, belongs to a genre that had long been 
ignored by scholars of literature and other academic fields, but which became an object 
of interest in the 1980s. Kowalewski writes: 
In the last ten years there has been a resurgence of interest in travel writing 
unequaled since the twenties and thirties. This revival is evident not only in the 
recent reprinting of travel classics but in the remarkable number of new travel 
writers and otherwise established authors who try their hand at the genre, both 
commanding sizable popular audiences (1). 
 
In 2002 Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs write in The Cambridge Companion to Travel 
Writing: 
Travel has recently emerged as a key theme for the humanities and social 
sciences, and the amount of scholarly work on travel writing has reached 
unprecedented levels. The academic disciplines of literature, history, geography, 
and anthropology have all overcome their previous reluctance to take travel 
writing seriously and have begun to produce a body of interdisciplinary criticism 
which will allow the full historical complexity of the genre to be appreciated (1). 
  
What was once a minor art became, due to recent academic interest, a fertile field that 
had been virtually unploughed.
115
 Suddenly legitimate, travel writing provided a fresh 
object for academics from various fields. Mary Baine Campbell writes that since 1980, 
“theoretical models were developing which would help to launch illuminating readings 
of texts once considered ‘subliterary’, of mainly archival use for narrative history, or 
just boring” (261).  
Percy Adams’ Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel (1983) is a 
seminal text for students of travel literature, to a great extent because of its scope. 
After providing evidence that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries travel 
accounts were more popular than romans and novels (75), Adams writes: 
By now this sketch of the history and types of the literature of travel should have 
made certain facts obvious. One of the most important is that, like the novel, it 
                                                 
115 See Duncan and Gregory for a post-modern interpretation of the new interest in travel writing.  
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was always more or less international. In the ancient world, the writings of 
Herodotus and those other traveler-historians concern the whole Mediterranean 
and often more. In the Middle Ages, the volumes filled by the author of 
Mandeville, who by some scholars is considered English, are nearly all 
Continental. The letters of Columbus and Vespucci were translated into many 
languages immediately, while the great collection of the de Brys – published in 
Latin and French but in Germany – favored the literature of no nation. And, 
finally, the collections of the eighteenth century, such as those of the Churchills 
and J.-F. Bernard, were in each case non-nationalistic. Perhaps because of the 
vastness of the subject, however, most students of travels other than the historians 
of exploration have not ventured into languages other than their own, or even into 
translation of foreign books. Such a limitation mars the effectiveness of studies by 
R.W. Frantz (1932-33) and A. Lytton Sells (1964), who consider only English 
travelers, and of Gilbert Chinard and his disciple Geoffroy Atkinson, whose 
various books – in spite of their excellence – seldom consider any but French 
travelers (75-76). 
 
The importance that travel writing had had throughout history is evident in the 
above passage. Adams also brings out the important point that travel writing was, for 
the most part, international, and the texts produced were widely read. Adams writes that 
“the historians of ideas, including students of the novel, must know that those many 
readers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – and of course long before – had 
access to and knew well the travel literature of many nations” (76). Due to its 
popularity, travel writing had significant influence, a fact that is, according to Adams, 
now being appreciated among contemporary scholars working in a variety of 
disciplines: 
With all this wide reading of the literature of travel, the influence on every phase 
of the history of ideas was incredibly broad and deep. Geographers and students 
of exploration have long been aware of it, but now that influence is being 
estimated and described more and more in special studies in other realms of 
thought (77). 
  
Where was this influence felt, according to Adams? He states that the books produced 
by businessmen and ministers of state made it easier for others to follow their paths, and 
also “inspired a longing for exotic goods that quickly became necessities. As a result, 
accounts written by men engaged in such travel were often propagandistic” for 
international trade and colonization (77). Geographers and cartographers were highly 
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dependent on récits de voyages, making it possible for them “to draw better and better 
maps” (77-78). Adams writes that although much travel literature was full of 
exaggerations and “incredibilities,” they “also recorded facts that belong to the real, the 
valuable, world of science,” and became more accurate over time, as the various texts 
could be compared (78). So science also is indebted to the literature of travel. Adams 
writes that the “gripping, yet untold, story – travel literature and the evolution of science 
– is one of the most important for the history of ideas (79). Finally, Adams outlines the 
influence of the literature of travel on religion, which is linked to its influence on 
science: 
First, science helped the traveling Jesuits to evangelize the pagan world . . . 
Leibnitz was convinced that the success of the Jesuits in Asia was due “solely to 
the wonderment aroused by their introduction of European inventions and 
discoveries” in science. Second, the Jesuits more than any other religious group 
were so eager to convert pagans that they found closer and closer ties between 
Chinese ethics and Christian practices – Confucius became almost a saint – or 
between the gods of Canada and the god of Europe . . . Third, travelers other than 
Jesuits or Protestant pastors affected religious thought in many ways, but as Frank 
Manuel and others have shown, they were especially important to philosophers 
proving the universality of religious beliefs, to deists attacking revealed religion, 
or to the adherents of one religious sect arguing with those of another. . . For the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then, travel literature was both a source of 
revolution in religion and a sourcebook to be drawn on by biased readers 
searching for evidence to support their preconceived notions about religion (79-
80). 
  
Adams sums up his discussion of the influences of the literature of travel in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when he states that “[t]he importance of travels, in 
fact, extends to every realm of thought, to every significant business, political, religious, 
academic, or creative enterprise undertaken during the centuries when the European 
novel was maturing so fast” (80). He asserts further that not only is there proof of the 
importance of travel literature for religion and science, but that there is also proof of its 
importance “for political science, for philosophy, or for the visual arts” (80). 
As for the importance of travel literature with respect to discovering the Other 
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(a term that had not yet been coined, but whose concept was alive), Adams writes: 
Obviously travelers as far back as “Mandeville,” with his liberal contrasts of English 
with Arabs and of Christianity with other religions, were instrumental in leading 
Europeans to consider satisfactory not only a plurality of religions for a given 
country and for the world, or political systems, or languages but also to recognize 
their own insularity. It is indeed true, as Lévi-Strauss argues, that, beginning with the 
Renaissance, western Europe experienced “that crucial moment . . . when, thanks to 
the great voyages of discovery, a human community which had believed itself to be 
complete and in its final form suddenly learned . . . that it was not alone, that it was 
part of a greater whole, and that, in order to achieve self-knowledge, it must first of 
all contemplate its unrecognizable image in this mirror” (80). 
 Experiencing what in post-modern terms is called alterity is still a topic in travel 
literature and its theory and criticism. It is also interesting to note the very different 
conclusions that Adams reaches vis-à-vis those of Said in Orientalism, which brings to 
the surface mechanisms of imperialism present in the same genre.
116
 Nor is the image of 
the traveler necessarily as positive as Adams paints it, as Hulme and Youngs indicate: 
“Societal attitudes to travel have always been ambivalent. Travel broadens the mind, 
and knowledge of distant places and people often confers status, but travellers 
sometimes return as different people or do not come back at all” (2). Due to this 
ambivalence, Hulme and Youngs insightfully identify one of the earliest travelers as the 
archetype for this group: “So the ambiguous figure of Odysseus – adventurous, 
powerful, unreliable – is perhaps the appropriate archetype for the traveller, and by 
extension for the travel writer” (2). In spite of this ambiguity, what travel writing has 
probably always offered is “observed experience and curiosity towards other lifeways,” 
                                                 
116 See Said 1979. 
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(3) which, whether the effects have been positive or negative, nevertheless makes it 
impossible not to view the framework within which one lives with different eyes. Along 
these lines, Hulme and Youngs state when writing about the sixteenth century that “the 
real power of travel writing lay in its independence of perspective. The claim to have 
been there and to have seen with one’s own eyes could defeat speculation” (4). They 
concur with Adams with respect to the great influence travel writing had in the 
seventeenth century: “it was in effect travel writing which provided the vehicle for the 
conveyance of the new information which laid the foundations for the scientific and 
philosophical revolutions of the seventeenth century” (4). 
Hulme and Youngs also bring out the traveler/tourist dichotomy, a topic that is 
the source for a large amount of disagreement, as well as an image that is either 
desirable or undesirable: 
Increasingly, too, travellers were defined, or defined themselves, against the 
figure of the tourist. Modernity is a deeply contested term, but its original form – 
as Baudelaire’s modernité, dating from an 1863 essay – ties it closely to notions 
of movement and individuality which, in the aristocratic figure of the flâneur, or 
stroller, stand out against the democratization of travel marked by the appearance 
of Thomas Cook’s first tour in 1841 (7). 
 
The traveler/tourist dichotomy is a highly ploughed theme in the criticism of travel 
writing. Travelers never want to be associated with tourists, considering themselves to 
be the elite of those making journeys across geographical spaces. Perhaps there is 
something to the idea that there is a difference between travelers and tourists, but in 
“Storming the Beach,” Rolf Potts tells of a conversation he had among “travelers” in 
Thailand, in which they all, after some intellectual sparring, agreed that, in the end (and 
sadly) both travelers and tourists were mere consumers.
117
 His ironic position is, of 
course, yet another opinion that could be debated forcefully in dialectical or rhetorical 
discourse. 
                                                 
117 See Potts. 
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Another important point that Hulme and Youngs bring out about travel writing is 
the transition it makes, in the twentieth century, from undervalued travel writing to art 
form: travel literature: 
Whereas scientists and explorers would inevitably – to use an old shorthand – put 
content before form, literary writers were also beginning to travel and to write 
about their travels: Dickens, Trollope, Stendhal, and Flaubert had done so earlier 
in the nineteenth century; but now writers such as Robert Louis Stevenson, Henry 
James, Edith Wharton, and D.H. Lawrence began to commit large amounts of 
time to travelling and travel writing. Travel writing was becoming travel literature 
and was therefore taken with new seriousness . . . (7) 
 
The transition to literature’s terrain has given travel writing greater importance, adding 
to its worth as an object of study.  
I have shown the difficulties and complexities involved with defining the term 
rhetoric in the first part of this dissertation. A similar situation arises with respect to 
defining travel writing. Due to limitations of time and space, I shall present only three 
ways of defining travel writing, and then add some comments for the purposes of this 
study. Percy Adams, whose work examines the relationship between the novel and 
travel writing throughout history, states the following: “[W]e have noted how “novel,” 
or long prose fiction, cannot itself be defined to the satisfaction of any group.  And to 
define travel literature – that is, the récit de voyage, perhaps a better term – is just as 
impossible.” (279). Adams states, in the face of this impossibility, that travel writing is 
perhaps best defined through negatives.
118
 Adams concludes his list of negatives as 
follows: 
Finally, the récit de voyage cannot be a literary genre with a fixed definition any 
more than  the novel is; it is not even sui generis since it includes so many types 
both by form and by content. For, like other forms just as amorphous, it evolves 
and will continue to evolve (282).  
 
Adams’ conclusion parallels Hulme and Youngs, who state: 
In putting together this Companion we have strengthened our sense that travel 
writing is best considered as a broad and ever-shifting genre, with a complex 
                                                 
118 See Adams, pp. 280-282, for a list of the negatives. 
326 
 
history which has yet to be properly studied  . . . just as the ways and means of 
travel are constantly changing, so travel writing will continue to change in their 
wake: stories emerging from space travel, from virtual travel, and from the 
‘travails” of the world’s refugees and migrants will doubtless continue to extend 
the genre in the years to come (10-11). 
 
Given the difficulties related to defining travel writing as a genre, perhaps the best 
definition of travel literature is that given by Bill Bryson: 
Travel writing, as I once observed elsewhere, is the most accommodating – one 
might almost say the most promiscuous – of genres. Write a book or essay that 
might otherwise be catalogued under memoir, humor, anthropology, or natural 
history, and as long as you leave the property at some point, you can call it travel 
writing (xviii). 
 
Bryson’s definition, in which he skirts any scholarly dispute over genre with aplomb, 
nevertheless is satisfactory for the purposes of this study.
119
 What I shall add to this is 
that the travel narrative that I have chosen to examine is a story that is written in the first 
person that is presented as being true. As it is written in the first person and presented as 
being true accounts of the events described, it falls in the category of subgenre of 
autobiography.  
 Related to its being a form of autobiography is another allure that travel writing 
holds. The often transgressive nature of individual travellers which they put into writing 
makes this genre attractive, perhaps because readers experience vicarious thrills or 
because they experience some sort of illicit frisson as voyeurs. As Hulme and Youngs 
write, travellers do not always follow the instructions from their superiors (i.e., those 
issued by the Royal Society), nor do they follow the same societal roles when in other 
territories: 
Travellers will usually follow their instincts and opportunities, rather than 
directions from home, and it is travellers’ eccentricities and extravagances – in the 
literal sense of wanderings off – which have attracted many readers to the genre of 
travel writing (5). 
 
                                                 
119 See Glaser for further discussion of defining travel writing as a genre. 
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Hulme and Youngs call this aspect of travel writing its “idiosyncracy,” and state that it 
“marks much modern travel writing” (5). While the idiosyncratic aspect of travel writers 
and writing is not the focus of my dissertation, the fact that the recit de voyage is 
written in the first person leads to what Philippe Lejune calls the autobiographical pact 
which assumes that the author and the narrator are one and the same, and that this 
person is telling a true story.
120
 Since the story is true, its content necessarily provides 
data about the narrator, the other persons that appear, as well as the descriptions made. 
Along these lines, Hulme and Youngs write: 
Travel writing and the novel, especially in its first-person form, have often shared 
a focus on the centrality of the self, a concern with empirical detail, and a 
movement through time and place which is simply sequential (6). 
 
Two points come to the fore in the above passage: the focus on the self and recording of 
facts. In my discussion above on the work carried out by sociologists and business 
administration scholars, the idea that humans make sense out of their lives through 
story-telling or narrative has been examined. The focus on the centrality of the self in 
travel writing (a form of autobiography) and the idea of putting one’s self in writing and 
narrating about oneself in order to give meaning to one’s own life all come to the fore. 
And by using rhetoric to examine the events that have been put into writing by an agent 
it becomes possible to evaluate the details of the narrative from the standpoint of a 
system of values.  And so while it is true – as Hulme and Youngs state above – that at 
times, travel writing merely depicts movement through time and space which is simply 
sequential, the narrative tells not only the what of the narrator’s experience, but also the 
why. The why of the narrative provides the reader with the motives that underlie the 
narrator’s actions, as well as her position on the actions of other persons in his tale.  
                                                 
120 See Lejeune, who defines autobiography as follows: “Retrospective prose narrative written by a real 
person concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the story of 
his personality” (2). 
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And it is the individual in the particular tale – or case study – that provides the focus of 
examination. 
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PART 4 
ANALYSIS 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The model of rhetoric as critical and analytical tool that has been presented in the 
chapters above contains more aspects than can realistically be brought to bear on the 
analysis that follows. Thus, only certain concepts will be applied. The core concept 
from which all of the other related concepts that make up the definition of rhetoric that 
has been presented is Aristotle’s point of departure for his definition in the Rhetoric: 
“Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available 
means of persuasion.” The entire discussion found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric is built upon 
this initial proposition. And it is the word “persuasion” in this same proposition that has 
generated the countless volumes produced since its appearance more than 2,000 years 
ago. For what Aristotle attempted to do and what has been attempted ever since was to 
answer the question, “What does it mean to persuade?” or “Just what does seeing the 
ability to persuade entail?” The nature of rhetorical argumentation terminology can be 
brought into high relief by juxtaposing “to persuade” with terminology such as “to 
prove empirically, logically or mathematically.” That is, when placed side by side with 
methods employed by disciplines whose aim is the designation of hard facts, we see that 
rhetoric is about argumentation with respect to opinion. While elements of absolute 
certainty come into play as possible bases for argumentation, in the end, only matters 
that cannot be proven with absolute logical, mathematical or empirical certainty are the 
object of rhetorical discourse. We have seen that defining rhetoric in this way is an 
opinion and so the model of rhetoric that Aristotle presents is also subject to dispute. 
His initial defining propositions is therefore, like countless other definitions which 
provide the bases for humans in the management of their affairs, acquires value only as 
an agreed upon convention.  
The second defining proposition that Aristotle sets forth in his treatise provides 
the other base upon which his construct for argumentative discourse rests. He calls 
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rhetoric the antistrophos to dialectic, which requires the answering of another question: 
“Precisely what is dialectic? In answering it, we have seen that Aristotle’s definition of 
dialectic differs from Plato’s. Plato views dialectic as a means for discovering absolute 
truth, whereas Aristotle views dialectic as a means for arguing about matters which can 
be argued in at least two opposing ways – the search for absolute truth is reserved for 
his Analytics, which as already stated is, in essence, formal, as opposed to informal 
logic. Aristotle’s second assertion is thus another opinion and, as a definition, an agreed 
upon convention from which, combined with the first, the rest of the discussion in his 
treatise is derived. These two propositions then, lead to the entire body of other 
assertions, illustrations and explanations aimed at answering precisely what is meant by 
the initial propositions. A fundamental aim of Parts I and II of this dissertation has been 
to reveal the ways in which the two initial propositions have been built upon by 
Aristotle and other thinkers.  
These two assertions, therefore, provide the core concepts that function as the 
theoretical backdrop for the analysis in Part 4. At the same time, a selection of concepts 
that have been explored in the first three parts of this dissertation will also be used in the 
analysis when relevant. The first concept that forms part of the critical and analytical 
framework to be employed is that it is possible to discover truth or what appears to be 
truth in relation with matters where judgment must be made. Judgment is necessary due 
to rhetoric’s field being opinion – opinions which can be contradicted by other, 
opposing opinions that can also be argued forcefully. The audience must judge the 
arguments that are set forth and decide, using reason, which of the opinions rings truest. 
We have seen that judicial rhetoric attempts to prove past events that have, in fact, 
occurred, so in this sense rhetoric, using probability, aims to establish real events as 
they actually happened. That is, the determination of whether a crime actually occurred 
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is a goal of this mode of rhetoric. Although past events often cannot be proven with 
absolute precision and certainty, what is taken for granted is that some action carried out 
by human agency did, in fact, occur. This means that with adequate empirical or logical 
proofs, the hard facts, or absolute truths of an action could be ascertained. We have 
discussed the difficulties of doing so, due to the problems related with empirically 
proving past events on the one hand, as well as problems related with attempts made by 
human agents whose goal is the obstruction of justice by deliberately hiding or 
falsifying evidence or matters related with the particular event.  
The other type of truth Aristotle addresses in his treatise is the evaluation of the 
actions carried out. This type of truth is, by comparison, distanced from the verification 
of actual events that have taken place, and is thus lies fully in the field that rhetoric 
deals with: opinion. While this at first glance may appear to be contradictory in that 
opinions per se cannot be either true or false due to the impossibility of quantifying the 
assertions made, judgments of this sort can be compared with the evaluations that J.L. 
Mackie explores in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. He asserts that evaluations that 
can be labeled as true or false are commonly made when there are agreed upon or 
assumed standards: 
The classing of wool, the grading of apples, the awarding of prizes at sheepdog 
trials, flower shows, skating and diving championships, and even the marking of 
examination papers are carried out in relation to standards of quality or merit 
which are peculiar to each particular subject-matter or type of contest, which may 
be explicitly laid down but which, even if they are nowhere explicitly stated, are 
fairly well understood and agreed by those who are recognized as judges or 
experts in each particular field. Given any sufficiently determinate standards, it 
will be an objective issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular 
specimen measures up to those standards. Comparative judgements in particular 
will be capable of truth and falsehood: it will be a factual question whether this 
sheepdog has performed better than that one (25 – 26). 
 
The point that is made in the passage above is that within certain frameworks of agreed 
upon conventions – in this case standards – it is possible to objectively identify truth and 
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falsehood. Aristotle’s addresses this type of truth in his Rhetoric when he speaks of 
discovering truth and/or apparent truth. The focus of his discussion is judicial rhetoric, 
which ties in with Mackie’s argument, and is at the same time highly relevant to the 
present discussion: 
There is an objective distinction which applies in many such fields [i.e., aesthetic 
and moral], and yet would itself be regarded as a peculiarly moral one: the 
distinction between justice and injustice. In one important sense of the word it is a 
paradigm case of injustice if a court declares someone to be guilty of an offence 
of which it knows him to be innocent. More generally still, any award of marks, 
prizes, or the like is unjust if it is at variance with the agreed standards for the 
contest in question: if one diver’s performance in fact measure up better to the 
accepted standards for diving than another’s, it will be unjust if the latter is 
awarded higher marks or the prize. In this way the justice or injustice of decisions 
relative to standards can be a thoroughly objective matter, though there may still 
be a subjective element in the interpretation or application of standards (26). 
 
The relevance to the present discussion is evident, for the mode of rhetoric that is being 
superimposed on the narratives under study is judicial. Judgments are based on fairness 
and can be argued in opposite directions. But this does not mean that each particular 
case does not, based on conventions accepted by the community, have any value with 
respect to truth and falsehood. It is in this sense that Aristotle argues that the judge in 
rhetoric can be compared to an assayer of silver.
121
 Further, the subjective nature 
underlying what are objective judgement calls due to agreed upon standards creates the 
framework for evaluating the qualitative aspects of a particular case. The subjective 
nature of “objective” judgements will be brought into focus in the analysis carried out in 
Part 4. In judicial rhetoric, the judge’s (or jury’s) responsibility is to decide, based on 
the arguments set forth, whether an act has occurred and whether the defendant is guilty 
or not. The nature of the crime must also be defined. In this dissertation, the judicial 
model is superimposed on the overall structure of a narrative act composed of narrator 
                                                 
121Another type of truth or falsehood related with rhetorical argumentation is ex post facto proofs. That 
is, in deliberative rhetoric when opinions are given about the results of future events, they can be 
proven true once they have occurred as foreseen. 
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and readership. These roles parallel that of the defendant and jury/judge in judicial 
rhetoric. The narration thus stands as a sort of pleading in the framework that is being 
proposed. 
Another concept to be brought to bear on the analysis in Part 4 is the framework 
for any rhetorical transaction. We have seen the framework for rhetorical enactments as 
presented by Bons and by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser. There must be: 1) an issue with 
opposing claims which is characterized by critical doubt, disagreement, controversy or 
conflict; 2) there are at least two parties, whose participation demonstrates that the issue 
at stake can allow of being otherwise; 3) both parties attempt to make the best possible 
case when arguing, which can be done orally or in writing (in the latter case, the 
rhetorical enactment is carried out in silence); 4) the arena in which the rhetorical 
transaction takes place is similar to a court room or assembly where judgment takes 
place. These characteristics provide a framework that makes it possible to put 
Eagleton’s proposal to use rhetoric as a means to enter into a dialogue on “genuine 
moral argument, which sees the relations between individual qualities and values and 
our whole material conditions of existence” (see p. 79 above).  
It is crucial to bear in mind when utilizing rhetoric as a critical and analytical 
tool for entering into a dialogue on ethics and values that the judgments made are 
necessarily based on the community’s system of values. The audience, whether listeners 
or readers, are persuaded to the extent that the arguments that are put forth are based on 
principles they accept. The principles are components of what the community 
determines to be good or evil, as well as what it identifies as “the good life,” “well-
being,” or eudaimonia, in both tangible and intangible terms. It has been stated above 
that within the same community there will be complex and often conflicting values, and 
that often when rhetorical persuasion takes place it is, in effect, the reinforcing of values 
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that are already shared but which are latent. Further, within the same community there is 
necessarily a multitude of voices, each of which expresses its opinion on what is good 
and evil, right and wrong, praise- or blameworthy. Rhetorical transactions are often, if 
not necessarily, characterized by conflict and strife among opposing groups and/or 
individuals within the same community.  
Due to the fact that the two narrative texts under consideration fall in the 
category of literature, they are, in rhetorical terms, epideictic works. The first text is a 
dialogue in which the amount of information given on a particular action affects the 
judgment made by the interlocutors on the agent who has carried out the actions, and so 
while the text is epideictic in category, it has characteristics of a judicial rhetorical 
enactment. The same is true of the second text, a recit de voyage. It is a narrative and 
can thus be classified as epideictic, due to the contemporary practice of equating this 
rhetorical mode with literature. But its quality as a judicial rhetorical enactment is 
apparent in the title alone: “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” A confession assumes 
1) a guilty (or possibly guilty) party, and 2) some type of crime (or sin, if the context is 
religious – still, in a religious confessional transaction judgment and evaluation of the 
sins committed takes place). If there is a confession, this same confession will be 
evaluated and a judgment will be made on the agent’s actions in terms of truth and 
falseness, as well as guilt and innocence. The narrator pleads on his own behalf with a 
view to being judged as innocent – or if not innocent, as deserving both pardon and 
praise, as will be shown in the analysis. Linked to the acts of pleading and judgment 
within a judicial rhetorical framework is Ricoeur’s statement cited in a previous chapter 
that “There is no action that does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however 
small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and 
wickedness are the poles.” And so the rhetorical transaction in a narrative about past 
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actions can be understood as a courtroom in which a defendant pleads his case and  will 
be judged based on principles inherent in the community’s system of values, while at 
the same time, due to its being epideictic, as an artifact of discourse, it necessarily – as 
Walker asserts – represents and participates in the shaping and cultivation of essential 
factors of values and beliefs that govern a society or culture, and in this way reflects the 
ideology of individuals in a community which binds them together due to their 
identification with what he calls the “deep” commitments and presuppositions that 
inform decision making. Walker, as already stated, gives pride of place to epideictic 
works as “the central and fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture” (see p. 143 
above). If we accept Walker’s position, the role that the student of literature plays as 
judge and commentator of cultural artifacts expressed in writing can be seen as taking 
on great significance with respect to the critique of the system of values within which 
the object being evaluated is embedded. Students of literature can thus, within this 
conception of literature, participate in the advocating of societal change.
122
  
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, assertions made by Brown were explored, 
against which it was stated that evidence would be presented that argues a position 
contrary to his. That is, Brown affirms that contemporary society is “eviscerated” of 
narrative form, on the one hand, and on the other, that it is hard to find moral agency – 
that there is “no social order of meaning in advanced industrial societies.” The two 
cases that are presented in Part 4 of this dissertation are contemporary narratives, which 
as such, contradict Brown’s first assertion. His second assertion will be challenged in 
the analysis, for by using rhetoric as critical and analytical tool, both narratives will 
                                                 
122 Nussbaum argues that the study of literature, Greek tragedy in particular, can be a catalyst for 
ethical action. She writes, “As Philoctetes knew, pity means action: intervention on behalf of the 
suffering, even if it is difficult and repellent. If you leave out the action, you are an ignoble coward, 
perhaps also a hypocrite and a liar. If you help, you have done something fine” (Fragility, xxxvii). 
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provide evidence, both fictional and factual, of motive-based action carried out by moral 
agents. 
Ricoeur’s equation of agency in narrative will come to bear in the analysis of the 
two narratives:  X did A in such and such circumstance. The circumstance in which the 
protagonist or main character of a narrative acts provides great numbers of variables 
from which to examine the actions carried out that were based on decisions with their 
underlying motives. Tied to Ricoeur’s equation and discussion on the necessarily ethical 
nature of actions carried out by humans is Halliwell’s seminal study on Aristotle’s 
Poetics which has been explored in the chapters above. Halliwell argues that, in 
Aristotle’s vision of dramatic ethos, character, motive and action provide the means by 
which it is possible to determine and evaluate the essential character being portrayed in 
the dramatic work. This same concept will be applied in the analysis of narrative, with a 
view to demonstrating another argument that has been presented in this dissertation: 
rhetoric can be used as a tool to discover and judge characters depicted in narrative who 
are engaging in the pursuit of their respective aims and ends, basing this discovery and 
judgment on the system of values upon which the action is based. At the same time, 
since the judgment that is taking place is based on community’s system of values, this 
same system becomes an object of evaluation, also subject to approbation or 
reprobation. 
The three pisteis, or proofs, as defined by Aristotle in his Rhetoric – logos, 
pathos and ethos – will come to bear on the analysis in Part 4. All three rhetorical 
proofs operate in unison. Logos, which is present both implicitly and explicitly in the 
narratives, will be stated in an informal, syllogistic format, as well as how it functions in 
unison with pathos and logos. In addition to the concepts outlined in this introduction, 
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other concepts that have been presented in the first three parts of this dissertation will be 
applied based on relevance.  
One of the aims of this dissertation is to provide a model to address, analyze and 
critique morals from the standpoint of the system of values in which they are embedded. 
In this way, what follows is a response to the subtext in Eagleton’s assertion that 
scholars of literature have been shamefaced with respect to moral issues. That is, the 
discussion which follows presents a model with which to candidly discuss morals, 
ethics and values. However, this dissertation contrasts with Eagleton’s, whose work is 
informed by his ideology. For when he states that a method be developed with which to 
examine a broad array of cultural artifacts from the standpoint of rhetoric, his aim, as 
stated above, is to promote socialism – as he defines it – using rhetoric – as he defines 
it. Eagleton’s methodology is thus prescriptive, whereas the way of looking at literature 
is meant to make analytical description possible for subsequent critique. It would, of 
course, be naïve to assume that there is no underlying ideology that provides the basis 
for the methodology that has been presented herein. For even the aim of making the free 
exchange of ideas possible must rest on underlying or assumed premises. Still, it is one 
thing to promote a particular political or philosophical view and quite another to suggest 
that to examine all views could prove fruitful for students of literature. As stated at the 
outset, the aims of this dissertation are to present a way of looking at literature that will, 
in the first place, provide what has been perceived as a gap in the critical-analytical 
tools used by students of literature that will add to the other approaches they already 
have, and in the second place, to use this tool to critique and analyze discourse, whether 
primary or secondary (i.e., critical and theoretical), in order to make it possible to open 
a dialogue on what values are embedded in the discursive artifacts (including the 
method presented in this dissertation), with a view to evaluating the merits and flaws 
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present within them. Whether or not change is necessary once evaluation has taken 
place will be a matter for those participating in the conversation to decide subsequent to 
the critique and analysis.  
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4.2 A FICTIONAL CASE 
In the following case study, Ricoeur’s equation of agency in narrative (i.e., X did A in 
such and such circumstance) will provide the focal point for the analysis. We have seen 
how this is rhetorical practice that originates in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and which was later 
developed as stasis theory. This equation leads necessarily to aspects that portray both 
the agent of the acts carried out and the context within which they were performed. The 
primary aim of the discussion that follows is to demonstrate how we as humans seek as 
much information possible in order to adequately judge actions in terms of approbation 
and reprobation. In the fictive dialogue that follows, the starting point (i.e., the first 
sentence of the text) is a brief summary of an event. This summary is the catalyst for an 
initial judgment, which provides the motor for seeking out further details related to the 
actions carried out in the past being described and the agents in question. As the 
dialogue progresses, each detail adds aspects to the overall case, which modifies each 
successive judgment. If we follow this argument, what occurs in the dialogue below is, 
in essence, a defining process. That is, the details that are added to the particular case 
make it possible to progressively define with increasing precision what happened. This 
defining process is addressed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric when he discusses the need to 
adequately define offences and crimes. Details are needed in order to determine the 
gravity or levity of each act before passing judgment. We have seen how judgment 
occurs in all three rhetorical modes (i.e., deliberative, judicial, epideictic). In the case 
below, due to its being presented in a narrative that takes place in the past, the rhetorical 
mode that applies in a generic sense is judicial. I say in a generic sense because the 
narrative that follows does not take place in a courtroom. But, as it will become obvious 
upon examining the text, a great amount of judgment takes place not only on the part of 
the interlocutors of the text but on the part of the readership. Opinions are presented 
implicitly and explicitly via logos. They are, in no small way, already a judgment. The 
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interlocutors of the text deliver their opinions/judgments in response to each added 
detail. The reader’s job is to then evaluate the judgments being presented. 
While in the second case to be analyzed the narrative is in first person and the 
narrator acts as his own defendant that attempts to persuade, in the first narrative (in 
dialogue format) there is no defendant/persuader per se. Instead, it is the circumstances 
and facts of the case related in the dialogue that make both persuasion and judgment 
possible. Based on what is told, it is the details themselves of the case that persuade for 
a mother’s innocence or guilt, negligence or responsibility. Each detail, with its 
attendant opinion thus stands as a specific facet of the case which affects the way in 
which it is appraised and judged.  
The case below, although brief, is highly complex, as are most rhetorical events. 
The text is a fictional situation William Gass calls a confusing case, which shows very 
clearly how we are, in the first place, natural judges of human behavior and, in the 
second place, how we seek more information in order to properly assess the actions of a 
case in terms of goodness and wickedness. Gass writes; “I think we decide cases where 
there is some doubt by stating what it is about them that puzzles us. We hunt for more 
facts, hoping that the case will clear.” The dialogue which follows exemplifies his point: 
“She left her husband with a broken hand and took the children.” 
“She did! the ungrateful bitch!” 
“He broke his hand hammering her head.” 
“Dear me, how distressing, but after all, what’s one time?” 
“He beat her every Thursday after tea and she finally couldn’t stand it any 
longer.” 
“Ah, of course. But the poor children.” 
“He beat them, too. On Fridays. And on Saturday he beat the dog.” 
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“My, my – such a terrible man. And was there no other way?” 
“The court would grant her no injunction.” 
“Why not?” 
“Judge Bridelgoose is a fool.” 
“Ah, of course, poor thing, she did right, no doubt about it. Except – why didn’t 
she also take the dog?” (Gass, 237) 
Gass’ tone is highly ironic, but this does not detract from his subtext whose seriousness 
takes on an even more sober tone precisely for that reason. Let us look at this case point 
by point.  
In the first sentence, we are told that a woman left her husband and took their 
children with her. Her husband has a broken hand. At first glance, it appears as if the 
woman has acted unfairly. We see this in the listener’s response when they call the 
woman an ungrateful bitch. She is perceived as a transgressor of a rule that stands as 
one of the prime clauses of the marriage contract: to stand together in sickness and in 
health until death. The second rule she is perceived as transgressing is that one must not 
engage in unjustified violence against another person. Especially, we might add, if it is 
one’s family member. The judgment might have stood as it is, that is, with the woman 
as culprit, but the listener is then provided with further details in relation to the case: it 
was the husband, not the wife, who broke his own hand while hammering on his wife’s 
head. Here Gass plays with social reactions to violence against women, for when the 
woman is perceived as the aggressor she is harshly condemned as an ungrateful bitch, 
but when the male is the transgressor, his behavior is met with a much milder appraisal: 
“how distressing.” So, although the blame begins to shift in his direction, the husband is 
not condemned with the label “dirty bastard,” or “son of a bitch,” value-laden terms 
roughly equivalent to “ungrateful bitch.” Further, at this point, even though the listener 
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is also informed that the beatings occurred on a weekly basis, additional doubt is placed 
on the case for, if one is to consider the children and their need to have both a father and 
a mother, the implicit question and opinion in “But the poor children” that can be made 
explicit – even though his behavior is distressing – is, “Couldn’t she have put up with 
her head being banged on weekly for the children’s sake? After all, children do need a 
father.” The great irony here is the suggestion that the mother, a woman, should 
sacrifice her health and well-being for her children at any cost – even if it puts her own 
health and safety in jeopardy. Here we can see the system of values that is in operation 
and that provide the basis for the opinions/judgments being delivered. The children and 
father are what really matter, not the mother. It is only when the listener discovers that 
the children, too, are being beaten that the second interlocutor approves of the 
dismantling of the institution of the family with father at head. The children must not be 
put in jeopardy by their father, and if a father beats his children, that action provides the 
listener with justification for the children’s being separated from him. Even more biting 
is Gass’ suggestion that perhaps it is not even the children’s but the dog’s being beaten 
that supplies justification for the rupture of the marital institution. For the dog is brought 
in at the end, in the same breath as the children, thereby creating ambivalence about the 
worth of both categories (children / dog). Here again the judgment made against the 
husband is not very harsh. That is, when the listener hears that the father is beating the 
children on Fridays and the dog on Saturdays, she uses the weak expletive “my, my,” 
followed by “such a terrible man.” The use of this expletive does not compare in terms 
of the harshness with the judgment that the woman received when she is labeled as 
ungrateful bitch at the beginning of this case. The expression, “such a(n) X” is much 
less emphatic in terms of its expression of surprise or disapproval than the expression 
“What a(n) X!” The statement “What a terrible man!” would have indicated much 
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harsher objection. “Such a terrible man” is, by comparison, too refined and rational, 
bordering on genteel.  
 The listener, although informed of the reasons the woman left her husband, 
nevertheless continues to search for a way to keep the institution intact, by asking 
whether there was no other way to solve the situation. We discover that not even the 
court would grant her an injunction, due to Judge Bridlegoose’s foolishness. And so, 
finally persuaded, the listener grants that the woman, the “poor thing” – a term of 
condescending disregard – is justified not only for breaking up the marriage but also for 
breaking the law. Not, however, without further ambivalence about her worth as a 
person in connection with her behavior towards the dog. That is, doubt is inserted about 
whether she has acted in a completely ethical way. For once the listener grants that the 
children had to be separated, she then asks why the woman did not take the dog as well. 
The obvious suggestion is that the mother has, in trying to save her children from harm, 
perhaps not acted as morally as possible. And the fact is that, in the values system upon 
which this case and its judgment rests, the interlocutor’s asking why the mother has not 
taken the dog as well is a perfectly valid question. For pets are important members of 
the family and also have rights. (Perhaps a cat may not have elicited the same pathos.) 
But it is at this point that Gass brings his narrative to an abrupt halt and allows judgment 
on that crucial aspect of the case to hang in full suspension. As judges, we are left both 
unsatisfied and impotent, our minds crying for motives that explain her behavior in 
relation with the dog. Without motives, her character and moral code remain dubious, 
no matter how virtuously she behaved on behalf of her children. Questions surface, but 
we remain in ignorance. Until this ignorance becomes knowledge, we remain incapable 
of carrying out a proper and full assessment of this case.   
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In spite of the suspension of judgment due to its having ended abruptly, a very 
ironic and indirect suggestion that comes to the surface in Gass’ narrative is that in the 
system of values held by the community being represented, the mother, a woman, holds 
less worth than a dog. This is very likely Gass’ major aim in this piece: to reveal that 
certain members of society or perhaps society on the whole greatly undervalue women 
and that this is an issue that must be addressed. His not mentioning this directly allows 
us to act as sleuths and to discover it for ourselves, thus making the impact of what he is 
suggesting even greater – the reader is effectively hammered on the head – by the force 
of Gass’ argument.  
The obvious final question is whether any good will come of this discovery. 
That is, will readers of Gass’ text begin to value women more? Or is it a text that merely 
allows readers to reconsider/examine values that they already hold as well as put into 
practice? For the type of reader that would consume this text would almost certainly 
already agree with the opinion that Gass is presenting. That is, although undervalued by 
certain other segments of society, women have great worth. The members of society 
that might undervalue women in the way that Gass suggests might not read this text or 
might not even “get it” in the first place. In any case, Gass’ narrative participates in a 
conversation that has been taking place in Europe and the United States since the late 
19
th
 century. While in Aristotle’s model, rhetoric does not necessarily lead to action, 
Gass’ narrative in dialogue form nevertheless stands as an expression of dissatisfaction 
published in 1970 that contributes to the conversation on women’s position in society. It 
is therefore, in that sense, a reflection of the values system of the “highly educated and 
cultured readership” to which it is addressed.  
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4.3 A NON-FICTIONAL CASE: “CONFESSIONS OF A CHEESE 
SMUGGLER” 
 
The three proofs Aristotle identifies, logos, pathos, and ethos, function simultaneously 
and are inextricably interconnected. As all three proofs operate in conjunction, it is 
artificial to isolate each one during analysis. It is, however, only in this way that the 
individual functioning of a particular proof with respect to persuasion or what is 
persuasive can be analyzed. The analysis carried out below stands as one out of many 
other possible perspectives. Analysis by another student of literature would reap 
different conclusions. It is, nevertheless, in the sharing of the conclusions that the 
dialectical aspect of rhetoric surfaces, and it is in this dialectical process that truth – in 
the sense indicated above in the references to Mackie – can be discovered – until 
another voice with greater capacity to persuade from yet another perspective manages to 
weaken the argumentative bases of previous opinions.  
The narrative “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler” will be analyzed first from 
the standpoint of logos. Subsequently, the way in which both ethos and pathos function 
in connection with logos will be considered. This order of analysis has been chosen 
primarily due to the fact that, in Aristotle’s model, logos is meant to function as the 
central proof. Another reason for this order is that the recit de voyage is a written text, 
and, as such, the rhetorical transaction takes place through reading. This does not mean 
that pathos or ethos could not function as initial catalyst prior to the enactment. For as 
the text under discussion is found in a book, it is possible that its color scheme and 
design could have an effect on pathos, that is, the visual presentation of the book itself 
could create some sort of initial positive emotional response on the reader’s part, 
thereby contributing to the overall persuasive power of the text itself. It is even possible 
that the materials the book is made of function, on both the cognitive and tactile planes, 
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as elements that persuade. That is, the quality of paper as well as the ink used could 
trigger emotional responses that induce persuasion, thereby contributing to putting the 
reader in a receptive frame of mind for the contents. For instance, Cambridge University 
Press uses forest green for its series on the history of philosophy. The quality of paper 
and ink is very high, and the sensations produced – tactile, visual, even the weight – all 
work together and on par with the established ethos of the institution. The message 
conveyed by the material object of the book is: You, reader, hold in your hands 
academic work of the highest quality, which is also matched on the physical and 
aesthetic planes. When the abovementioned characteristics combine with the ethos 
established in the institution of higher learning Cambridge, the presentation itself 
becomes even more persuasive – depending, of course, on the reader examining the 
book.  
Similarly, the place of purchase can have impact on the ethos plane. If, for 
example, the place of purchase is Barnes and Noble, a bookstore chain in the United 
States whose reputation for selling quality reading material aimed at consumers with 
high levels of education whose tastes are labeled as intellectual or cultured, the already 
established ethos of this bookstore will be transferred to the book’s contents. In this 
way, the author’s primary ethos is linked to an institution. The syllogistic logical 
process that works in conjunction with ethos and pathos can be expressed as follows: 
Barnes and Noble sells high quality books / This book is sold at Barnes and Noble / 
Therefore, this book and its content are high quality. Of course, the critical reader will 
ultimately judge and decide from the perspective of her system of values after having 
read the book whether the product sold by the bookstore whose ethos is very high has 
met the standards of quality that are promised.  
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 As stated above, the publishing company also persuades by means of ethos. The 
travel story that has been selected for analysis was published in an anthology titled The 
Best American Series 2000. This story has been selected for reasons that, on one level, 
have to do with the product delivered by the publishing company itself. For in addition 
to the data it provides for analysis – due to its claim to present what is best in the year 
2000 – it functions as an entity that evaluates written works within the framework of 
United States literary culture. Thus the system of values that inform the judgment of the 
texts found in this volume can also be examined. Another reason for selecting a 
narrative from this publication is the fact that this story was published recently (2000), 
and is therefore contemporary. Because of this, it can be defined as participating in the 
present era when compared with certain texts published say, in the 1960s. The mindset 
and cultural milieu of the 1960s were quite different from the decades that followed. 
Texts like Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, for example, now reek of the past by 
comparison with the publication to be analyzed below. The recit de voyage that is the 
object of study is, comparatively speaking, seamless in terms of continuity with the 
present historical moment. It is as if it had been published in this morning’s edition of 
The New York Times. As the narrative under study is to be examined from the 
standpoint of ethics, using a text that is close to the present moment is important, for 
value systems change over time. Using a text that is contemporary makes the discussion 
relevant to present concerns. The narrative under study has been chosen for its having 
been judged (by the publication’s process) as highest in its genre in terms of its quality 
of writing. As such, the work provides data that will make it possible to examine the 
system of values that provided the bases by which it was evaluated as outstanding and 
popular travel writing. It will therefore provide insights into the narrator and readership 
community in which it exists as a cultural artifact that has been classified as a good. 
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 Rhetorical persuasion begins with the title of the series from which the story has 
been taken: The Best American Travel Writing 2000. Prior to examining the contents on 
the cover of this volume, I shall consider first a later volume from the year 2004 in 
order to demonstrate how the publishing company of this series utilizes ethos to 
persuade, which adds to the ethos value of both the narrative under study and author. 
The tactics are the same, but the later volume provides additional data which will make 
it possible to reveal how institutional ethos functions to build the ethos of the writers the 
publishing company showcases. 
Implicit sullogismoi embedded in the text of the book cover blurbs in the volume 
published in 2004 that contribute to its ethos-based persuasion can be made explicit. 
Since the Best American Series makes the claim that the contents of the present volume 
are the very “best,” then the quality is assumed to be high. The basic argumentative 
assumption is that the editorial staff, whose criteria are believed or proven to be high in 
terms of standards, have made a selection from a number of texts and have compiled 
their selection into a single volume. We are already being persuaded, based on the ethos 
of the entity or institution The Best American Series that the story will be of high value 
in terms of its artistic or literary merit. When we turn to the back cover of this volume 
we encounter the following blurb: 
Since its conception in 1915, the Best American Series has become the premier 
annual showcase for the country’s finest short fiction and nonfiction. For each 
volume, a series editor reads pieces from hundreds of periodicals, then selects 
between fifty and a hundred outstanding works. That selection is pared down to 
twenty or so very best pieces by a guest editor who is widely recognized as a 
leading writer in his or her field. This unique system has helped make the Best 
American series the most respected – and most popular – of its kind. 
 
The Best American Series is providing proof using ethos that is established via logos of 
its credentials as an entity that provides high quality short fiction and nonfiction. The 
date 1915 is offered as a proof whose underlying logos can be expressed as follows: If a 
351 
 
publication has been in existence for a long time / Then it has high value. This 
represents the value time has in this context: the longer something good exists, the 
greater value this thing has as a good.
123
 1915, by American standards, is viewed as a 
very long time ago. If the common argument that the longer an institution has remained 
in business the greater worth/credibility/quality it has is effective, the ethos of the entity 
and its products increases and, as a result, its power to persuade.  
The procedure for the selection of the texts that are chosen is then outlined on 
the cover. In the first step, we are informed that the series editor selects between fifty 
and a hundred outstanding works from hundreds of periodicals. Thus, in the first step, 
the following argument can be made explicit: Since an expert has selected outstanding 
works from many works (which cannot all be outstanding) / The quality of the works 
selected by the expert is very high. The second step in the process of selection is then 
described. That is, in order to guarantee even higher quality, another expert is brought in 
to decide on the outstanding works from the recently chosen few that is now a “many” 
from which even more excellence is obtained. That is, even among the fifty to a 
hundred outstanding works that were initially selected, only a few will stand out from 
that number. The guest editor, described as “a leading writer in his or her field,” is the 
designated expert for this task. The blurb then states that this “unique” twofold process 
has contributed to the company’s products’ becoming the most respected and most 
popular short fiction and nonfiction publication in its field. Even the term “unique” 
increases the ethos value of the publishing company by means of the same logic that 
only a very small number can be graded as the best. For if from the many a few 
outstanding are chosen and from the outstanding even fewer are chosen to be the best, if 
it is a single thing that stands in a class by itself, it must, following the same line of 
                                                 
123 An opposite argument can be made based on the amount of time something exists: Because X has 
been around for so many years, it is now old-fashioned or démodé. In either case, it is up to the 
audience to determine the truth value of the claim being made. 
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argument, be excellent also. The overall logic can be expressed as follows: Since an 
expert in short fiction and nonfiction has selected the outstanding from the many and 
afterwards yet another widely recognized expert writer has pared down even further 
what has been chosen in terms of excellence / The entity The Best American Series has 
established by means of this unique process a reputation that is both the most respected 
and most popular of its kind. This is the establishing of ethos through logos, where 
ethos holds the highest value in terms of persuasion with respect to the three pisteis 
Aristotle defines in his Rhetoric. The corresponding pathos that the reader experiences 
can be expressed as follows: The Best American Series has high ethos for having 
produced high quality and popular short fiction and nonfiction over several decades / 
Since the reader desires the best and the most popular / The reader feels pleasant 
anticipation as well as increased personal ethos through the expectation to participate in 
as well as through identification with the entity’s claim to excellence.  
The process of identification that occurs between the reader/purchaser in relation 
with excellence and popularity that takes place results in desire, a desire to be associated 
with excellence on the one hand and to be part of the crowd (of purchasers or 
appreciators of excellence) on the other. There is an obvious contradiction here, in that 
“popular” is a reference to “many,” and, if the same standard of selection were to be 
applied to the readers/purchasers the contradiction could only be removed by using a 
label like “elitist,” but this would doubtless go against the entity’s aim of selling the 
highest number of volumes possible. For while a limited number of members of the 
community would wish to be classed as elitist, those who would be opposed to being 
classified in that way could be alienated. So the publishing house plays a very wily 
rhetorical game when it states that it delivers difficult to obtain excellence due to its 
being rare that has made it the most popular product of its kind. The question that arises 
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is that if excellence is, in the first case, based on a low number, how can excellence in 
the second case be based on a high number? But the reader/purchaser solves this 
apparent contradiction by reasoning that although the many see, for instance, 
McDonald’s hamburgers as a good, this is not the same as the many seeing a Rolls 
Royce as a good. Sometimes the many are wrong (assuming the reader, contrary to 
popular opinion, views McDonald’s hamburgers as an evil – this notion surfaces in the 
narrative under study), and sometimes the many are right – as is the case with Rolls 
Royce’s. And so the ethos in relation with excellence and popularity functions nicely in 
the blurb, and increases its power of persuasion when arguing that the product delivered 
by the entity The Best American Series is both high quality and popular.  
 The ethos of the 2004 volume is increased further in the blurb on the back cover 
via the short bio provided of the in-house series editor: “Jason Wilson has written for 
the Washington Post, Condé Nast Traveler, Travel & Leisure, and Salon.com.” These 
credentials provide added weight to the argument that the entity produces short fiction 
and nonfiction of the highest quality. The logic is that if Jason Wilson has worked for 
the above-mentioned high profile and high quality publishing entities, he is an editor 
that has criteria for selecting excellence which is backed up by his professional 
background and experience. His selection will thus be outstanding in terms of quality. 
The same logical process is applicable to the short bio given for the guest editor: 
“Pico Iyer writes novels and essays and is also the author of several books of travel, 
among them Video Night in Kathmandu, The Lady and the Monk, The Global Soul, and 
Sun After Dark. He lives in suburban Japan.” It goes without saying (among those in the 
know about contemporary travel writing) that Pico Iyer is a recognized and high-profile 
author that produces high quality work in his field. His having published several travel 
books is added proof of his credentials. The fact that he lives in suburban Japan 
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increases his ethos value even further, for this means he is a non-tourist, which is 
deemed a good in travel writing circles. Living in a country places one a notch above 
the already higher category of traveler. The fact that Iyer lives in another culture is a 
warrant for his being an expert on and insider of that culture, which can be opposed 
either to a traveler (which, although given high marks, is still an outsider) or a crass 
tourist. And as the post-modern stance is to view the Other with equanimity, the 
conclusion that the reader/purchaser draws based on the brief bio is that Iyer is the man 
for the job for deciding which works stand out from the selection made by Jason 
Wilson, series editor. The pathos that derives is trust and exhilaration. The logic on one 
plane is that if Pico Iyer, recognized expert in travel literature, has made a selection, 
then the selection must be outstanding – he is to be trusted. On the second plane, it is 
exhilarating, instructive, and entertaining to read outstanding nonfiction travel writing. 
If a reader buys/reads this volume, she will be exhilarated, entertained and instructed. 
All of this feels good. Feeling good is equated with happiness. The reader wants to feel 
good/happy, so she will read/purchase the volume, based on the ethos proofs 
encountered on the book’s front and back cover. 
 Further ethos is derived from the following paragraph that appears on the back 
cover: 
The Best American Travel Writing 2004 transports readers from Patagonia to 
Ivory Coast to small-town Vermont. Readers are treated to skiing in Kashmir, 
horseback riding with gauchos, driving by car and truck across America, and 
rescuing gorillas in the heart of the Congo. This year’s volume is edited by Pico 
Iyer, who writes in his fascinating introduction, “Restlessness is part of the 
American way. It’s part of what brought many of the rest of us to America.” 
 
Just the word “travel” has high ethos power, due to connotations of romance and 
adventure. So, in the very first sentence of the blurb, the writers use connected terms as 
part of their rhetorical strategy. The signifier “transports” has enormous value on both a 
physical and imaginary plane. The slippage between concepts of physical and mental or 
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spiritual transport increases the series’ value as a good, for to be transported from one’s 
circumstances on an imaginary or spiritual plane stands as part of the system of values 
held by the community at which the text is aimed. Travel, transport, movement from 
one place to another – are goods that lead to happiness, well-being, eudaimonia. The 
reader can imagine having her desire of being carried away (“transport” has erotic or 
amorous overtones) from the humdrum albeit comfortable existence of her living room, 
or, on another level, from the trap in which she finds her very self caught, that is, the 
space enveloping her as a physical and sentient being: her body. The publisher’s 
message: If you read this travel literature, you will be carried aloft, possibly even 
transmogrified (a post-modern term) on an internal journey of discovery, pleasure, and 
satisfaction. We have seen that Aristotle states that the speaker needs to present herself 
as possessing goodwill. To be an agent that professes capability of conveying the 
reader/consumer to such exhilarating states can be read as goodwill. In this way, the 
ethos of The Best American Series increases greatly, while its matter-of-fact tone when 
asserting that the series does transport its readers to places that are both far away and 
close to home makes the possibility of experiencing this good more plausible, more 
persuasive. 
The entity’s goodwill is also manifest in the term “treat.” For not only will the 
reader be transported, but she will experience a pleasurable boon on behalf of The Best 
American Series. To be able to say “What a treat!” is a good in American culture, and 
thus the use of this term imbues the publishing company with even higher ethos. The 
places listed that the reader will be treated to combine the exotic with the home country: 
Patagonia, Ivory Coast and small-town Vermont. In this case, even home is infused with 
exotic color. Finding one’s own country exotic is an ironic concept that is given high 
value as a good among highly-educated/cultured readers. That The Best American Series 
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makes it possible to be transported to exotic places in one’s own backyard also 
increases its ethos greatly in the view of this type of reader. 
The blurb’s use of the signifiers “America” and “American restlessness” in 
relation with other, more distant and exotic terrains also has enormous ethos power. 
Skiing in Kashmir is truly exotic, for very few Americans ever go to Kashmir, and even 
fewer ski there. Horseback riding with gauchos exploits the traveler vs. tourist 
paradigm: a typical American tourist would most likely just take pictures of the “quaint” 
gauchos on horseback, only to rush back to a five-star restaurant for an enormous slab 
of Argentinian beef and an evening in the hotel’s hot-tub. In this case, the ethos value 
generated by the exotic and unusual nature of the trips being described is an appeal to 
the desire on the readers’ part to be among those who wish to participate in activities 
that stand as a class apart. That is, as those who appreciate things and activities that the 
“collective mass of humanity” does not ordinarily value. In other words, the publishing 
company is increasing its ethos through an appeal to a select few – a tactic which is a 
powerful and highly persuasive tool.    
After Kashmir and Argentina, the next treat referred to repeats the motif of 
eroticizing of the homeland: driving by car and truck across America. This type of 
journey reverberates strongly with the Beat generation’s sojourns that Keroac 
immortalized in his On the Road (see below) as well as Route 66, the consecrated path 
on which the true American road trip transpires. And this driving experience, this 
vicarious transport the readers are treated to is not only done in a car but in a truck as 
well. In this way the ethos of The Best American Series increases even further, for the 
signifier “truck” suggests the rough-and-ready, the down-and-dirty, the All-American 
way of rambling aimlessly across the country’s vast and wide-open spaces. Traveling in 
a truck is far more romantic than a car, for some of the passengers may be riding in the 
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back, the wind blowing in their hair, their cares and caution having been thrown to the 
wind. That The Best American Series offers such a treat identifies it as a benefactor that 
provides a good that appeals to the vast majority of Americans.  
The blurb does not stop there, however. It ends in a crescendo that outdoes the 
emblematic road trip across the U.S.A.: rescuing gorillas in the heart of the Congo. The 
allusion to Conrad’s novel is blatant and effective, yet it is not linked to violence. The 
appeal that rescuing the poor mountain gorillas holds is huge, for it speaks to those 
readers who are environmentally concerned. This treat, which is at once exotic, 
romantic and politically correct, stands as an enormous good provided by the benefactor 
The Best American Series, which in so doing adds further to its power of persuasion 
through ethos. 
The use of the term restlessness can now be explored in greater depth. The 
power of abstract concepts cannot be underestimated, and Pico Iyer’s exploitation of 
this term in the passage cited above to increase his own ethos and that of The Best 
American Series is magisterial in terms of its rhetorical strategy. Iyer states that this 
intangible good, restlessness, is part of the American way. This term resonates 
powerfully in the American system of values in both music and literature. For instance, 
bluesman Fred McDowells’ “You Gotta Move,” was popularized by the Rolling Stones 
in 1971: “You got to move, child / You got to move / But when the Lord get ready / 
You got to move.” The religious overtones of the lyrics mesh nicely with and 
reverberate profoundly with the themes of not staying in one place: the pervasive 
restlessness in the American consciousness. Movement as a good is linked to physical, 
political and religious/spiritual freedom that goes back to the earliest memory of U.S. 
history – the Puritans’ flight from England instantiating the starting point. In this blues 
song, it would appear that even God is restless in the American imaginarium, or, in any 
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case, keeps his children on their toes, commanding readiness to move at any moment. It 
is impossible to keep still under such terms, which, whether classified as a categorical, 
as opposed to hypothetical imperative,
124
 stands as an unquestioned good in American 
culture. 
The lyrics of the Allman Brothers’ “Ramblin Man” also reveal the importance of 
the term restlessness in the American psyche and system of values: “Lord I was born a 
rambling man / Tryin’ to make a livin’ and doin’ the best I can.” In this song the theme 
of surviving to the best of one’s ability linked with restless movement surfaces, as well 
as the innate inquietude Americans perceive themselves as possessing, for they imagine 
themselves as having come into the world already in transit, as being born on the run: “I 
was born in the backseat of a Greyhound bus / Cause I was born a rambling man.” The 
themes of religion, non-stop movement and survival – all of which form part of the 
American mindset – permeate this song that became a top ten single in 1971.  
In literature, Jack Kerouac’s novel On the Road details the exploits of Sal 
Paradise and Dean Moriarty as they travel together on spontaneous journeys across the 
American continent. Both characters can be defined by their restlessness, their inability 
to stay in one place. Their restlessness is, in part, the result of an overpowering urge to 
experience life to the fullest and wildest. So when Iyer states that restlessness is part of 
the American way, he is striking a powerful chord in the American consciousness. And 
when he then connects it to immigrants who have come to the United States because of 
their restlessness, he is stating quite directly that America is a haven for those who are 
restless, and that restlessness is a good for those who come to and are born in America. 
Restlessness is a good which functions as a catalyst for travel, which has the benefit of 
allowing one to live life to the utmost and “discover what’s out there.” The Best 
                                                 
124 See Mackie, chapter 1. 
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American Series promises that this intangible good will be delivered to the reader when 
it rounds off the citations from Iyer’s introduction as follows: “The Best American 
Travel Writing 2004 displays American restlessness at its most tantalizing and 
entertaining.” Here we have the pathos component of the rhetorical transaction that is 
taking place on the front and back cover of this volume. The logic is this: The Best 
American Series provides, using its expertise, exotic treats which will transport the 
reader who will, as a result, be tantalized and entertained. These two terms are blatant 
emotional appeals. The expectation of being tantalized (a somewhat illicit form of 
pleasure in that it has sado-masochistic overtones) and entertained constitute goods that 
promise that the reader will be thrilled if he reads the stories contained in The Best 
American Series. This use of pathos combines with the already high ethos established in 
the blurb to persuade the reader that buying and reading the publishing company’s 
products will lead to well-being on several planes: intellectual, emotional and 
psychological. For the reader will, upon consuming the product, enhance his 
knowledge, will experience pleasant emotional states, and will feel better about himself 
as an individual for having consumed what has been identified by two authorities as 
outstanding literature. All of these benefits are promises to enhance the reader’s 
eudaimonia, well-being. 
The Best American Travel Writing 2004 has been examined prior to the edition 
of the same series in which the narrative to be analyzed appears because it uses multiple 
rhetorical devices that attempt to persuade the reader of the quality of its contents as 
well as the quality of the experience the reader will obtain if she reads them. However, 
even though the number of devices used in The Best American Travel Writing 2000 is 
lower, they still have high impact. On the front cover in bold capital letters appears the 
name of the most popular American travel writer in the twentieth century: Bill Bryson. 
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The appeal that Bryson’s name has in terms of ethos is huge, much greater than that of 
Pico Iyer. It is perhaps for this reason that no front or back cover blurb appears on this 
edition of the series. Bill Bryson’s name speaks for itself, and, in this way, provides 
argumentative rhetorical proof that the contents are of the highest quality. The logic is: 
If Bill Bryson, a high-profile travel writer, is the editor / The contents must also be high 
quality. Underneath Bryson’s name appears the series editor, Jason Wilson, but his 
name does not have the same clout on a popular level as Bryson’s. Wilson’s name, 
however, does have ethos weight within the readership that consumes travel writing.  
On the back cover, the titles of all the entries are listed with their respective 
authors. Although many of the writers have established reputations, two stand out more 
than the others in terms of reputation: Ryszard Kapuscinski and William T. Vollmann. 
Both of these authors, due to their reputation, bring high ethos to this volume in terms 
of quality. Although the appearance of Bryson’s name would have been sufficient to 
imbue the volume with high ethos, the two additional authors add even more.  
In the forward to The Best American Travel Writing 2000, Jason Wilson plays 
the advocate for travel writing, arguing that it is through this medium that we shatter 
reductive stereotypes by experiencing the particular: 
Having a travel writer report on particular things, small things, the specific ways 
in which people act and interact, is perhaps our best way of getting beyond the 
clichés that we tell each other about different places and cultures, and about 
ourselves (xii). 
 
He takes his argument further by quoting Pico Iyer: “Travel is the best way we have of 
rescuing the humanity of places, and saving them from abstraction or ideology” (xii). 
Wilson and Iyer are arguing here for the uniqueness of the particular, which cannot 
necessarily be subsumed by ideology, grand narratives or reductive universals. The 
particular must be taken and judged on its own terms, not on those of homogenizing 
conceptual frameworks. This perspective resonates deeply with those who identify with 
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post-modern ideology, and has a powerful effect in terms of both pathos and ethos. 
Wilson, along these lines and in defense of the particular, even calls globalization a 
mega-myth: 
Abstraction is what has given rise to one of the biggest myths going: the supposed 
“globalization” of the world. The idea that we all share one insidious 
monoculture. That very soon the world will all be the same. . . Just because our 
American pop culture has spread like a virus doesn’t mean the world is suddenly 
turning monochromatic. Look closely at the specific ways in which various 
cultures adopt American icons and ideas and see how quickly your notion of 
globalization becomes confounded (xii). 
 
The arguments in Wilson’s forward present travel writing as a cure to fears we might 
have of cultures’ losing their identity through the globalization process. He thus 
increases the ethos of the showcased writers as providers of yet another good: 
knowledge that the uniqueness of the Other is intact, and, by extension, the reader’s 
also. Both the practice and effects of travel writing are presented as a good in this 
argument, which can be added to the other goods obtained through reading the works 
selected by the publishing company’s staff discussed above.   
 These rhetorical strategies are picked up by Bill Bryson, in his introduction to 
this edition. He bemoans the previous absence of interest for travel writing in the United 
States, while assuring the reader that that situation has changed. Travel writing has 
become as big in the U.S as in other countries. This is an argument from popularity that 
starts as follows: Travel writing has been important in European countries (particularly 
Britain), therefore it has high value / It is currently gaining importance in the U.S. / 
Therefore, we Americans are finally waking up to the fact that travel writing has high 
value. The appeal to popularity here is obvious, and functions as a proof based on ethos. 
That is, if Europeans who are known for recognizing quality appreciate travel writing, it 
must be good. Bryson continues in this vein, by linking the interest of Europeans in 
travel writing to journalists:  
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As the pages that follow amply demonstrate, many of the sharpest minds and 
freshest voices in journalism are drawn to foreign subjects these days – 
increasingly (and encouragingly) to places far beyond the trampled paths of 
tourism (xxi).  
 
This interest on the part of many of the sharpest minds and freshest voices in journalism 
gives credence based on ethos that the stories contained in the volume will be of the 
highest quality. The reference to the tourist/traveler dichotomy is an appeal to the value 
system of the readership, which will generally view tourists as blame, rather than 
praiseworthy. This reference increases via ethos the value of the texts contained within 
the edition as a high quality good. 
At the end of his introduction, Bryson describes what, in his estimation, goes 
into good travel writing. Discomfort and dislocation – not the comfort of a well-beaten 
path – contribute to great revelations and adventure. Thus taking adversity and turning it 
to one’s advantage is presented as a good that some of the stories are characterized by. 
One does not need to travel far in order to produce good travel writing, “You just have 
to be able to see things in a different way” (xxvi). This is the idea that traveling in one’s 
own back yard with a fresh perspective can yield benefits. “Seeing things with new 
eyes” is a highly valued good for the community of readers he is addressing. Finally, 
Bryson writes that the stories in the 2000 edition all share one quality: “a penetrating 
curiosity, an almost compulsive desire to experience and try to understand the world at 
some unfamiliar level” (xxvi). The curiosity to learn and to better understand the world 
in different ways are qualities that are revered by “highly educated and cultured” 
readers in the U.S., and, since Bryson affirms that that is precisely what all of the 
articles in The Best American Series have as a quality, the reader will be able to 
participate in that good which can be defined as a desire to seek new knowledge. The 
value placed on knowledge  for The Best American Series’ readership cannot be 
underestimated, and the possibility to obtain such knowledge by reading the articles 
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Bryson is promoting functions as an ethos proof aimed at persuading the readers that the 
activity that they are about to engage in is of high value. Bryson rounds off his 
discussion as follows: 
The fact is, of course, that there is an amazing world out there – full of interesting, 
delightful, unexpected, extraordinary stuff that most of us know little about and 
consider much too seldom. Turn the page and I promise you will begin to see 
what I mean (xxvii). 
 
This is Bill Bryson speaking, the best known American travel writer of the twentieth 
century. As he is an unquestioned authority on travel and travel writing, his words, it is 
assumed, are true. Due to his high ethos power, Bryson’s capacity to persuade the 
reader that he will now experience part of the amazing world out there and its 
interesting, delightful, unexpected and extraordinary stuff, is great. 
We can now turn the analysis of the recit de voyage selected for this dissertation: 
“Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler” by David Lansing. 
The title itself has rhetorical force. The term confessions is a term both religious 
and judicial that is permeated with serious overtones: crimes committed against other 
individuals, God and the state must be confessed and either punished or forgiven. 
Further, the term confession is linked to one of the three autobiographical genres: 
confession, apology and memoir.
125
 The “highly educated and cultured reader” will, 
therefore, based on the title of the recit de voyage under study, immediately place the 
text within the genre of autobiography.
126
 One tells the truth about oneself when one 
writes an autobiographical confession, and “comes clean” in the process by revealing 
the ugly truth behind the façade of one’s life. The motive underlying a confession 
counts as a virtue – that is, to play fair with those who have been beguiled with the 
confessor’s previously deceptive appearances. Thus the term confession has serious 
overtones. The term in the title confession stands in parallel with the term smuggler 
                                                 
125 See Goodwin, James. 
126 For a discussion on the definition of the term “autobiography,” see Durán Giménez Rico. 
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which, although informal, nevertheless falls in the sphere of criminal behavior. The 
initial connotations of the term smuggler are thus also serious. The gravity of these two 
terms is, however, turned on its head in the title itself by the term by the term cheese. 
This is because, as a rule, the types of goods that are generally designated as contraband 
are, for instance, narcotics, arms, precious gems – not cheese. The title, due to the 
narrator’s having juxtaposed the three terms in a prepositional phrase, will be 
interpreted by “highly educated and cultured readers” as ironic, as heavy with comic 
overtones. This is seriousness which is not to be taken seriously, and the recit de 
voyage, is, therefore, categorized as a spoof even before the story begins. We can now 
make explicit the implicit logoi that imbue the title with rhetorical force. 
One possible reading of the implicit syllogismoi is the following: The genre 
confession is normally about serious topics / Due to the juxtaposition of serious terms 
with a term that, in this context, cannot be interpreted as serious / The story that follows 
is therefore to be taken as playful and humorous. Once we accept this as a possible 
implicit argument made explicit from the standpoint of logos, the following chain of 
reasoning obtains with regards to ethos: Cheese smuggling is unusual. A confession 
about cheese smuggling is even more unusual / Since this story is ironic, humorous and 
playful due to its title, and further, since the topic is unusual / The writer/narrator is 
therefore, from the standpoint of the system of values of a “highly educated and 
cultured readership,” highly clever. That is, the writer thus far is delivering what the 
blurb and Bill Bryson’s introduction have promised. Since the writer is clever on a 
sophisticated level, the reader can expect to be entertained intelligently. So we see that 
the writer/narrator has, using only five words in his title, created the ethos of an 
intelligent and entertaining storyteller. It is also possible to add the term creative to this 
list of positive attributes, because to put such contrary notions in the same title 
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demonstrates this quality, which is a good that ranks among the highest in the value 
system of the readership. Because of this, the highly educated and cultured reader will, 
in the act of reading, give the narrator a favorable evaluation in terms of the ethos 
contained in the title alone. This positive ethos wins the reader over, with the 
simultaneous and corresponding pathos. That is, the logos and ethos of the title 
discussed above produce amusement in the reader. Perhaps the reader will even smile or 
laugh ironically at the title. Aristotle states in the Rhetoric that a person does not see the 
same event the same when happy or sad, so the narrator in this case, having made the 
reader laugh (together with appreciation due to the writer’s cleverness, sophistication 
and creativity) has prepared the reader psychologically to view what is to follow not 
only with a smile, but, from the very start, feelings of approval for the self-declared 
criminal.
127
 The defendant has already gained his readership’s sympathy. This means 
that the initial judgment on the character of the narrator – who is the agent and is, 
therefore, responsible for the actions that are to be detailed – will, for the moment, be 
favorable. So far, the narrator is preparing his readers with a view to reaching his goal: 
to be cherished and appreciated for both who he is and for his ability as a writer before 
the court of readers he is pleading to. Obviously, this reading is based on a readership 
defined as “highly educated and cultured.” It is a construct that holds parallels with the 
judge in Apuleius’ case discussed in Part 2. Another reader could very well obtain a 
radically different reading and evaluation. Take, for example, a reader who has not done 
university coursework and who either does not get or does not appreciate irony. The 
response to the title would not be positive, for this reader would argue as follows, based 
on the same text: Confessions are supposed to be serious. Cheese smugglers do not 
normally exist / This story is, therefore, not serious, and mocks serious institutions (i.e., 
                                                 
127 On humor in rhetoric, see Rabbie. 
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religious and legal) / Since this story is not serious and mocks sacred institutions, it is 
not good. In fact, it is evil / Therefore, this story should not be read and should perhaps 
be banned. This reader, who is less educated (by academic standards), wants a real story 
about real criminals smuggling real contraband with real consequences and does not 
want an ironic spoof that attacks institutions held sacred in the system of values of the 
community in which he participates, because to do so is neither moral nor normal by his 
standards. Because this story is neither moral nor normal, the “less educated” or 
“unsophisticated” reader would not even bother to read the story, as he will not have 
been won over by the cleverness in the title but will have, instead and from the very 
start, given the narrator a negative evaluation. This reader, put off by the title, passes 
judgment and condemns both the recit de voyage and the narrator as an evil, as 
blameworthy, based on his system of values.  
This negative evaluation stands in contrast with the classification of the written 
work as “best” by the publication in which it appears. And this evaluation has truth and 
value based on the framework within which it operates. It thus stands as one of many 
other possible responses to the text under study, thereby demonstrating the complexity 
of making judgments based on values in the first place. The possibility of alternative 
evaluations also functions as a reminder to the “highly educated and cultured reader” 
that other viewpoints are in existence and perhaps merit consideration.  
For the moment, however, the focus of our discussion is the reaction obtained 
from the construct “highly educated and cultured readership.” Lansing’s having made 
the readers from this construct smile from the beginning with the title is powerful 
rhetorical strategy. His title also shows promise of treating the reader to something 
good, of the reader’s being delighted with unexpected stuff, as promised by Bryson in 
the introduction. But this is only the title, and the narrator, who has set very high 
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standards for himself, must now prove, if his ethos is to remain high in this rhetorical 
transaction, that he can continue in the same vein. That is, since the title is high quality, 
the question that surfaces in the reader’s mind is: Will Lansing continue to deliver what 
he has delivered so far? The story then begins: 
Elaine has done me a favor. A huge favor. As the public relations account 
executive for a major European hotel chain, she’s managed to arrange several 
nights accommodation for my wife and me at a very swanky establishment in 
Paris, the Hôtel Lutétia. During the high season, mind you (128). 
 
In this paragraph the narrator/protagonist/agent begins his story in media res, and 
informs the reader that he has received an enormous favor from “Elaine,” a high level 
executive. The favor is several nights’ accommodation in Paris at a luxury hotel. Were 
this not already a big enough favor, the fact that Elaine has arranged things during the 
high season makes it all the more significant in terms of its weight. But so far we have 
only been informed of the what of the story. That is, Elaine has done the narrator an 
enormous favor. And so, in the reader’s mind a series of why questions will arise, as 
well as certain hypothetical reasons that answer the same questions. The first and most 
important question is related to her motives: “Why would she do a thing like that?” And 
the possible reasons that arise are, “She must be a really good friend,” or “Maybe she 
likes doing people favors for the fun of it,” or “Maybe she’s paying back a favor.” Since 
this is a story and therefore necessarily has a plot, the first possible reason, that is, 
Elaine’s being a good friend, will not make for good story-telling on its own: My friend 
did me a huge favor because she’s a nice person, let me tell you what a nice person she 
is…….. the end. This is a boring story, if it is a story. So, the highly educated reader 
thinks, “Okay, perhaps she is a good friend, but she must be doing that favor for a 
reason. What’s the hitch? Nobody does a favor like that for free. Elaine must want a 
favor in return.” This formula makes for good story telling, because it allows for her to 
ask for another big favor in return, and this big favor could involve complications for 
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the narrator. Based on this assumption, the following implicit reasoning (logos) can be 
made explicit: If someone does a favor / A favor in return and in kind can be expected. 
If the favor is big, the return favor will most likely also be big. This equation, a favor 
done deserves a favor returned in kind, leads the reader immediately to the ethics of the 
favor being done and its being repaid. Questions such as the following surface 
immediately in the reader’s mind: “Was the initial favor legitimate?” and “What kind of 
person is Elaine? Is she a(n) good/bad/crazy/honorable/and so on person?” These 
questions, which are just like those questions asked about Gass’ example that was 
provided earlier on, provide the wanted details that add to the plot and which, as 
Ricoeur would argue, are necessarily woven into the poetic act of story-telling. That is, 
ethics and poetics cannot be separated. Similar questions arise about the narrator: “What 
is his relationship to this woman Elaine?” and “Will he honor the moral code that 
underlies the dictum “If-you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours”? That is, “Will the 
narrator, once he is asked for a favor in return, do the right thing and return the favor?” 
All of these questions stand as a framework for seeking details about the case at hand, 
with a view to defining it in terms of what has happened, who has acted, and, most 
importantly, what motives underlay the actions carried out. Ricoeur’s narrative 
equation, X did Y in such and such circumstance provides the basic focus for inquiry, as 
in the first narrative examined in this section.  
The narrator, because he is – at least in the view of the editors of The Best 
American Series – one of the best travel writers for the year 2000, certainly knows that 
these questions must be answered, and that his reputation is at stake. He must convince 
the readers that his character, his ethos, is good in the sense explored by Halliwell as 
discussed in Part 2 Chapter 7 above. That is, he must persuade his readers that he is 
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attempting to achieve laudable aims, that his motives are good – from the standpoint of 
his readers’ system of values. 
 And, in fact, the narrator has been working hard at creating high ethos in the 
excerpt above, on several levels. One way he does so is through his tone. He speaks 
directly to the reader as if she were right in front of him and as if she were an intimate 
friend. Lansing’s tone is matter-of-fact, straightforward – not aloof. This builds ethos 
and creates a feeling of camaraderie at the pathos level. When he uses the very informal 
(thus amicable) expression, “mind you,” it is as if he were putting his hand on the 
reader’s shoulder while telling her his tale. This draws the reader in even further, in 
terms of closeness, which is deft use of pathos.  
The narrator’s use of the term “swanky” is also shrewd use of rhetoric on the 
lexical level. Swanky is a term that is out-of-register for the one the narrator has used to 
describe the hotel. The terms he uses prior all fit within what could be called terms and 
phrases found in newspaper or magazine journalese: “public relations account 
executive,” “major European hotel chain,” “managed to arrange several nights’ 
accommodation,” “establishment in Paris,” “the high season.” All of these expressions 
fit together nicely in terms of tone and register, and so when the narrator utilizes the 
term “swanky,” he is giving his reader a wink, and undermining just a bit the – by 
comparison – elevated register that he has been using. Because the reader knows that 
the narrator has intentionally used this term, she knows that this writer is in absolute 
control of his language on the one hand, and, as he is continuing to use the ironic, 
somewhat flippant tone established in the title, the highly educated and cultured reader 
knows that Lansing is in control of his tone as well. Further, to call the Parisian Hôtel 
Lutétia “very swanky” will make an American reader laugh, because of the national 
inferiority complex that many “highly educated and cultured” Americans have with 
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respect to the French. To use an unsophisticated term for the group of people that are 
considered by many – and most of all by themselves – to be the most sophisticated 
humans on earth will bring a wry and vindictive smile to the face of the red-blooded 
American highly educated and cultured reader.
128
 Revenge is sweet and we must 
remember that the cultural underdog, in this case the American literati, have their pride, 
too. Paris with its museums and boulangeries is a fabulous and grand old place to visit, 
the “highly educated and cultured” American will say defensively, but give me New 
York with its Central Park and a hot dog with “da woiks” any day. So, the narrator, by 
making the reader laugh derisively by taking a stab at a nation that considers itself 
culturally superior, but which is, as every American will proudly assert, politically 
inferior (in terms of economic and military might), has further disarmed his reader with 
humor, which, as we have seen, rhetoricians of antiquity recommend in their works on 
the subject. Thus, the narrator continues to gain in terms of ethos. That is, the reader 
who gets the narrator’s irony every step of the way is persuaded that, so far, the latter is 
a clever and funny writer worth listening to. The ethos transferred by Wilson’s and 
Bryson’s introductory remarks combines with the ethos that the narrator is creating 
from the body of the text, which is in line with Aristotle’s recommendations on this 
proof. The narrator continues: 
“Darling”—that’s Elaine talking, not my wife; Elaine is very continental and 
always calls me darling—“Darling, you’re a very lucky man. The Lutétia is très 
chic.” 
 
Elaine is from Los Angeles but she can get away with nonsense like this because 
she’s married to a Parisian, though I doubt if her husband has ever said “très chic” 
in his life. 
 
Anyway, I’m indebted. “Sweetheart,” I say to her (these silly endearments are a 
game we play), “what can I bring you back from the City of Light? Foie gras from 
Fauchon? A lacquered tray from Palladio? Tell me, mon petit écureuil, what do 
you desire?”  
                                                 
128 For an interesting discussion on Cicero’s use of similar techniques of language and style, see 
Ramsey. 
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Elaine does a little trilling laugh over the phone that she knows drives me crazy. 
“Rien, rien, rien,” she says. And then she pauses. “Unless….” 
 
Ah hah! I think. Payback time. “Yes?” (128) 
 
In this section of the narrative, the narrator answers the questions that arose in the 
previous section. He begins to give details about Elaine. She is from Los Angeles, and 
uses what the narrator calls nonsensical French expressions not even her French 
husband would use. By describing her in this way he undermines the way he has 
described her previously, that is, as continental. In this way, he is painting a picture of 
her as a person with the following implicit logos: Elaine is from Los Angeles but, 
because she is very continental, uses the term darling. However, she also uses French 
terms which not even her French husband would use / Therefore, Elaine is a bit (if not 
very) pretentious. The fact that the narrator delivers this evaluation of Elaine increases 
his ethos, because, in line with the attack he has made against the French earlier, he is 
attacking Elaine for being a Franco-monger. This sort of attack would sit well with 
certain “highly educated and cultured” American readers, who, although they might 
hold French culture in very high regard, would consider it poor taste to put on airs using 
expressions like très chic. Again, the average red-blooded American with a Liberal Arts 
degree or who is well-read has her pride, and might even speak and read French 
fluently, but to intersperse French expressions in the way Elaine does would be tacky. 
(Behavior carried out in poor taste is an offence in the system of values held by the 
readership construct that is being articulated in the present analysis.) Although the 
narrator does hold Elaine in very high regard (on several levels) he nevertheless, at the 
same time, presents her as somewhat pretentious and a bit superficial. The logos of this 
character description can be stated as follows: Pretentious people lack integrity / Elaine 
is pretentious / Thus, Elaine lacks integrity, is false, not authentic. The highly educated 
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and cultured reader values integrity and authenticity, both of which are goods in the 
system of values that provide the basis for his having depicted her negatively. 
Categorizing Elaine in this way is crucial for the overall evaluation of both her and the 
narrator, for her pretentiousness provides a contrast with which to compare the 
narrator’s sincerity with his readers and, as will be seen when he is dealing with his wife 
– insincerity. Whether his insincerity is justifiable or pardonable is a matter for the 
judges in his readership to decide, once he has pleaded his case. 
 When the narrator says, “Anyway, I’m indebted,” he is letting his reader know 
that although he thinks she is a bit false, he is going to ignore that about her and, 
respecting and adhering to the terms held sacrosanct with respect to favors, asks what he 
can do for her. His holding to the terms that regulate doing and responding to favors in 
kind reveal his character: he has integrity, which is a highly valued good in the system 
of values held by his readers. 
The narrator does not define the relationship with a specific term (i.e., friend, 
lover, ex work-colleague), but based on the conversation that he repeats it becomes 
apparent that they are close. She calls him darling and he calls her sweetheart, which he, 
in order to dispel any suspicion on the reader’s part of infidelity or of their directly 
devaluing the relationship that each is involved in (i.e., marriage), claims that the terms 
of endearment “darling” and “sweetheart” are “silly” and part of a game they play. The 
reason he does this is to counteract the conclusions of the following reasoning, based on 
everyday ethics: One should only call one’s partner, spouse, lover, wife, husband, 
significant other and so on “darling” and/or “sweetheart” in earnest / Both Elaine and 
the narrator are married, thus they should not be using the terms “darling” or 
“sweetheart” with each other in earnest / Since they are not using these terms in earnest, 
they are not transgressing the code expressed in the first sentence of this argument. The 
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conclusion that the reader arrives at is since Elaine and the narrator are not in fact and 
deed transgressing the code, but are playing an ironic game, that is, calling each other 
“darling” and “sweetheart” knowing full well that they are playfully breaking societal 
rules connected with these terms, they demonstrate the capacity to recognize a rule and 
to play with it. To do so is ironic sophistication, and to be ironically sophisticated is, as 
a norm, given high value in the system of values of the “highly educated and cultured 
readership,” whose members recognize and appreciate outstanding literature. So, the 
narrator increases his ethos because he is being clever and a bit devilish at the same 
time. Highly educated readers find devils endearing – especially playful, ironic and rule-
breaking devils who are not doing much, if any, harm at all. Pathos is at work here in 
the narrative. At the same time, although Elaine is perhaps a bit silly because she is a 
fake, she nevertheless gains in ethos status because she is the narrator’s playmate in the 
sophisticated language game they play. The narrator’s ethos also increases here, because 
he sees the societal rules that “highly educated and cultured readers” know are societal 
constructs that, in other circumstances, would have no value. His playful scoffing at the 
rules endears the reader to him via pathos, and aids him in presenting himself as a 
“good” and, at the same time, quite complex, person. The fact that he is giving the 
reader the details in what appears as frank honesty, along with his offer to make good 
on the favor-for-a-favor pact, also increases his ethos. Ironically, when he later 
undermines his own credibility, his ethos as perceived by the audience of highly 
educated readers that he making his plea to, increases even further, as the analysis will 
reveal. 
 As the story continues the circumstances in which the narrator acts becomes 
more complex, for the things he says cast doubt on the statements he has just made. 
That is, doubt enters with respect to their game playing. First, he calls Elaine mon petit 
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écureuil, a noun-phrase even “highly educated and cultured readers” might have to look 
up in their French-English dictionary. And they will, because they pride themselves on 
looking up words they do not know in order to increase their knowledge of other 
languages, in this case French (this is also a highly valued good, especially among 
students of English literature – French not only has huge ethos allure but sex-appeal as 
well). The term écureuil (squirrel) is a term of endearment in French. In English, 
however, the term squirrel has very different connotations, especially when referring to 
women. On one level, the term squirrel in English, especially when referring to a 
woman (i.e., a squirrely girl), does not have positive connotations. Instead, squirrely can 
be equated with nervousness and a lack of seriousness. Since the narrator has already 
poked fun at her pretentiousness with respect to her use of French when speaking 
English, we might assume that he is making inferences from English usage. The implicit 
logos is the following: The term squirrel, when applied to a woman, indicates a lack of 
seriousness / The narrator calls Elaine a squirrel / Thus, Elaine is not to be taken 
seriously. There is yet another possible level: squirrel as rodent. The implicit logos can 
be expressed explicitly as follows: Rodents are foul / The narrator has called Elaine a 
rodent / Therefore, Elaine is (on some level) foul. Perhaps she is not the most ethical 
person, and perhaps the game they are playing is not either. 
 When the narrator offers to do a favor in return and uses the term “desire,” there 
are sexual overtones. This idea is backed up with what follows in the narrative. After he 
asks Elaine what she desires, she makes a little trilling laugh that he states she knows 
drives him crazy. The term trilling has unambiguous sexual overtones, and we can see 
here the rhetoric of desire in action in the text on another level, between the characters 
in the text. Elaine is effectively using her sex to persuade the narrator to do what she 
wants. She switches to French: rien, rien, rien, she says. Nothing, nothing, nothing. 
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This, as we shall see, is the use of logical irony – that is, calling something its opposite. 
For the “nothing” that Elaine requests, as the “highly educated and cultured reader” will 
guess, will not be nothing at all. She then pauses (itself a rhetorical and musical device, 
which functions to create tension and imbues what follows the silence with greater 
impact) and says, “Unless . . .” And here, both the reader and narrator are thinking the 
same thing. This is the narrative device that is known as Chekov’s gun. That is, Chekov 
stated that if there is a gun on a table in chapter one, someone must die by chapter three. 
In Lansing’s narrative, the reader witnesses Elaine offering the narrator a huge favor, 
knowing full well that later she will ask for a favor in kind. And that is precisely what 
happens at this point in the story. The narrator, true to form (that is, he continues 
dropping occasional low register lexical items in the framework of a high-level and 
sophisticated register – always in perfect control) says: “Aha! I think. Payback time.” 
The narrator’s having used the low-register term payback further increases his ethos. He 
continues to present himself as a cool, down-and-dirty but sophisticated literato, who is 
both bookwise and streetsmart. The “highly educated and cultured” American 
readership being articulated in this analysis aspires to this level of cool sophistication – 
an abstract notion of great worth in the readership’s value system. They want to be 
bookish, but they do not want to be nerds. If push comes to shove, they like to think that 
they can slug it out or slum it with the best of them, but, at the same time, imagine that 
they are capable of holding their own when dining with aristocrats. Lansing appeals to 
his readership’s system of values, which mirrors what Trigg calls a “trickle-round 
model” of cultural capital as defined by Bourdieu: 
Bourdieu introduces the concept of cultural capital in order to interpret individual 
tastes as an accumulated stock of knowledge. Individuals adopt strategic strategies 
that enable them to acquire the required cultural capital to secure particular 
positions in the social hierarchy. In taking this approach to taste formation, 
Bourdieu is able to show that there can be feedback of tastes from the bottom to 
the top of the social ladder. The upper classes sometimes adopt the tastes of those 
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at the bottom of the social ladder in order to outflank members of the aspiring 
middle class who find it difficult to compete due to insufficient stocks of cultural 
capital. In contrast to the restrictive trickle-down model a more general trickle-
round model is suggested by Bourdieu’s approach (Trigg, 113). 
  
Lansing, solidly middle or perhaps upper-middle class, adopts a variety of positions, 
moving up and down the social ladder with aplomb. In this way he utilizes the cultural 
capital he possesses to secure a position with his readership on the level of ethos. His 
strategy is brought into high relief through his use of the term “payback.” The term 
payback has currency among African Americans who are, by definition in the cultural 
framework of the United States, the final and absolute standard of cool. The term cool 
in its popular meaning has its origins in the African American ghetto – black Americans 
are the manifestation of this abstract notion which is imitated by non-blacks in the 
United States and by vast numbers of people from other cultures around the world. To 
be cool is one of the highest goods of Americans in general, and Americans that are 
“highly educated and cultured” in particular. So by using the term “payback,” the 
narrator increases his ethos through identification with black American culture and, on 
the level of pathos, creates a feeling of admiration in his audience.
129
  
 Elaine repeats that what she is asking for is not important, and, at the same time, 
provides the narrator an opportunity to escape from his duty of returning the favor by 
suggesting that it would be too much trouble for him. She states: “No, nothing. It would 
be an inconvenience.” In his response, he continues with the flirtatious game they are 
playing, using yet another term of endearment and repeating the term desire: “Tell me, 
my little ferret. What do you desire?”  
 His use of the term desire is repetition of the motif that has been occurring in his 
conversation with her, the framework of which is playful eros. He also repeats the use 
                                                 
129 The importance of this term in black American (and American popular) culture is evidenced by 
James  
      Brown’s hit “The Payback.”  
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of an animal as pet name when he refers to her. This time, however, the language is not 
French but English: my little ferret. The connotations of the term ferret are not usually 
positive. Ferrets stink, they bite, they are nervous little animals that cannot sit still. The 
etymology of ferret is also negative, for furittus in Vulgar Latin means “little thief.” At 
the same time, ferrets are affectionate animals that are often kept as pets. Elaine, it 
seems, possesses similar attributes – that is, she has positive characteristics – which can 
be seen in that she and the narrator are quite affectionate with each other. In spite of 
this, however, the use of the term ferret as a term of endearment is unusual, and, if we 
consider the fact that ferrets are members of the weasel family, the negative 
connotations are even greater. If the term weasel is used in reference to a person, they 
are classed as untrustworthy. Thus, the implicit logos that can be expressed with respect 
to Elaine is the following: The term ferret has blameworthy connotations: nervous, 
untrustworthy, and, at the same time, affectionate / The narrator calls Elaine a ferret /  
Thus, Elaine is, in his opinion, untrustworthy and affectionate. As the student of 
literature will immediately be aware, this is the Chekovian narrative technique referred 
to above in operation once again. The narrative tension created by the question “Why is 
he calling her écureuil and ferret?” will be released later on in the text of the narrative. 
For the moment, Elaine, in question form, asks for some French cheese. At this point, 
part of the narrative tension created by the first question posed in the narrative (i.e., 
What favor will Elaine ask in return?) is released. The other parts of the narrative 
tension – that is, the answers to the questions 1) What will the favor in kind Elaine is 
asking for really be and 2) Why does he use terms of endearment that connote negative 
qualities – will be answered towards the end of the narrative when the fact that she has 
done an enormous favor in order to get an even bigger favor in return on the one hand 
and that she is rather devious on the other is revealed as the events of the narrative pan 
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out. For it will be discovered that Elaine has asked him to bring back an illegal 
substance from Paris: unpasteurized cheese. For the moment, the favor she asks for 
appears to be innocuous, although the fact that Elaine is downplaying the importance of 
her favor in both French and English functions as foreshadowing for its enormity due to 
its being the criminal offence referred to in the title: smuggling. 
 The narrator, bowled over by her erotic language games and coyness, takes the 
bait: “That’s it?” He says. The phrasing of this interrogative reveals the narrator’s 
naiveté and contributes to the irony: what he believes at the beginning of the narrative to 
be “nothing” will turn out to be its complete opposite. His response to her request is 
comic and, at the same time, is further evidence of his ingenuousness in the face of what 
will later be revealed as her deviousness: 
That’s it? I’m going to Paris and she wants a wedge of fromage? Meaning to be 
generous, I suggest something special. “Pepper roll, perhaps? Cranberry-flavored 
Neufchâtel?” (128) 
 
His naiveté will earn him ethos points for to be innocent is endearing to the readership 
that is being articulated in our analysis. We have seen in the presentation of the 
approach that all virtues can be expressed as vices but, due to his having befriended and 
charmed the reader, the possibility of his being called a fool (for being too naïve) is 
null. His weakness works on the level of pathos to enchant his audience. His use of 
French further endears him to his readers, for his language use is masterly in terms of its 
comic effect, in the juxtaposition of fromage with the English word wedge. Wedge has 
base connotations – especially if we compare this term with a comparable term, slice. 
The yoking of fromage with its connotations of high culture merely due to its being a 
French word is high comic irony. Lansing’s cleverness further increases – due to his 
sophistication and control of language and culture – his ethos. The humor-based pathos 
also continues to work as a proof in the narrator’s underlying argument that he is at 
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once good and somewhat devilish in terms of his character. That he offers something 
special to Elaine has the same effect, as he shows that he wants to do the right thing by 
responding in kind to the favor she has done for him. His knowledge of cheeses also 
increases his ethos, for he shows that he is similar to his readers in terms of education 
and culture. Many of the “highly educated and cultured readers” in his audience will not 
even know that cranberry-flavored Neufchâtel exists. This esoteric knowledge will 
impress his audience and, as they also gain knowledge by consuming this text, his 
narrative delivers a boon in this respect, as knowledge is highly prized by this 
readership. We have seen this in the section above on the introductions and blurbs that 
present the contents of The Best American Series. What follows next in the narrator’s 
and Elaine’s conversation functions to further increase the narrative tension on several 
planes: 
“Epoisses,” she growls. Of course, this is before I know what it is, so to me it 
sounds like she’s just said “I pass” with a Brooklyn accent. 
 
I ask her to repeat herself. “Ay-pwoss,” she cries, and I have to admit it is the 
sexiest thing I’ve ever heard her say. 
 
“But of course,” I say, having no idea what she’s just asked for. “A little Ay-
pwoss” (128 - 129). 
 
The depiction of Elaine in terms of animal imagery is reinforced and accented with the 
term “growls.” She persists in using her sex as a weapon to persuade, if not convince, 
the narrator to agree to carry out her petition. This reinforces the image of her as 
untrustworthy ferret, while underscoring the narrator’s innocence. His claim of absolute 
ignorance to his readers about what he is getting into - even though he is only 
pretending to understand her – scores him high points on the level of ethos, for “to tell 
the truth and nothing but the truth” is a much-touted and oft-repeated legal expression 
that constitutes the core of what Americans view their code of personal integrity to be.  
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Lansing gains pathos and ethos points through humor when he draws 
comparisons between the phonological aspects of a high-register term in French and 
those of a low-register Brooklyn accent. This appeals to the anti-snob sentiments of his 
audience. In this way, he continues poking fun at Elaine’s (and by extension, at the 
French) overestimation of French culture while at the same time approving of French 
culture in general. He is doing a complex balancing act on a precarious tightrope, but 
doing it masterfully. At the same time, as he is also “highly educated and cultured,” he 
will in his narrative describe his journey to reach even greater depths in terms of 
knowledge about culture, in this case French, which both impresses and endears him in 
terms of pathos and ethos to his audience.  
On another plane, when Elaine cries the name of the cheese out, a comparison 
can be made between sexual climax and this section of the narrative. It is possible to see 
the incremental rise in pitch in the narrator’s depiction of her on the lexical plane as a 
rise that parallels sexual climax. For he describes her as first talking, then as doing a 
trilling laugh, then as growling, and finally, as crying out in ecstasy. The narrator 
expresses precisely what effect this transition from low to high intensity in terms of 
animal desire has on him when he admits that it is the sexiest thing he has ever heard 
her say. The effect this has on the narrator’s ethos parallels the rise in pitch. The implicit 
logos can be made explicit as follows: A “highly educated and cultured,” sophisticated, 
devilish, yet charmingly naïve narrator is being seduced at the discourse level by a 
charming and seductive femme fatale. In this way, he lets himself, or cannot help but 
fall prey to what countless male protagonists have fallen to since before Samson met 
Delilah. In this way, the narrator identifies himself with other all-too-human males in 
the western narrative. His ethos therefore continues to move upward to greater heights, 
which, combined with sympathetic pathos, works towards persuading the reader of the 
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narrator’s goal: to be cherished and praised as both an outstanding travel writer and 
“good” person (i.e., “good” within the system of values adhered to by his “highly 
educated and cultured readership”). 
 At this point, the narrator turns the tables on his own ethos, which has the effect 
he desires: even more approval from the readership. His first reaction is to honor the 
favor-pact that has been established from the outset of the narrative. “But of course” is a 
formulaic term used by gentleman and ladies, precisely because they are ladies and 
gentlemen. With this he shows his chameleon-like ability to bounce adeptly from one 
socio-economic pose to another. This ability to put on a socio-economic façade at will is 
demonstrative of his sophistication and eagle’s-eye-view of social constructs, thereby 
revealing their vulnerability, or, at least, their fabricated, and, therefore, assailable 
nature. To be able to express these qualities in a literary mode of discourse is a skill that 
is highly valued by the readership he is appealing to. But he then confesses (in line with 
the genre he has chosen) that he does not know what she is talking about when she 
repeats the name of the cheese. Not, however, to Elaine. He instead confesses to the 
audience.  His bringing the audience in on a little secret he has with respect to what 
Elaine knows about him increases his ethos on at least two levels. On the first level, he 
privileges the audience with the knowledge that not only is he playing in his eros-
charged discourse with Elaine, but is also playing a sort of poker game with her by not 
revealing his full hand. That is, perhaps due to pride, he does not tell her that he does 
not know what the word epoisses means. Although he is being dishonest, the audience 
through compassionate and affectionate pathos forgives him and is again endeared by 
him, because he reveals human weakness. For often both weakness and vulnerability 
cause humans to feel compassion or affection for one another. This helps the narrator to 
plead his case at the level of pathos as well as ethos. Further, since he has cast doubt on 
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Elaine’s moral integrity, the audience will happily turn a blind eye to what is, by 
comparison, a small crime. In fact, the audience will approve of his fudging a bit here, 
for he does so innocently. His is a knee-jerk reaction to maintain appearances that – 
since he has built up his ethos with such aplomb thus far – in so-doing he actually gains 
the approval for this minor infraction. In fact, the audience might even argue that Elaine 
does not deserve his complete honesty or that perhaps she, due to her manipulative 
nature, would not even appreciate it. When he responds that he will of course bring back 
a little ay-pwoss without knowing what it is, he is honoring his half of the bargain. The 
fact that he says a “little” adds to the enormity of the favor she is asking him, which will 
be revealed once it is too late for him to back out gracefully.  
 The next section takes place two weeks after the phone conversation with Elaine. 
Now in Paris, it is at this point that the narrator introduces the reader to his wife with a 
brief, but crucial, character sketch: 
Two weeks later, my wife is sitting in a bathtub drinking Veuve Clicquot. She is 
in total heaven. She loves the antique stores around Carré Rive Gauche, the wild 
strawberry sorbet at Berthillon, and the silk underwear at Sabbia Rosa, but mostly 
she loves lounging in the oversize tub in our hotel room sipping champagne and 
admiring the Eiffel Tower, which juts up into the cloudy sky just blocks away 
(129). 
 
We must bear in mind that the narrator and his wife are in Paris, a major European city 
whose offerings in terms of history, culture, art and architecture are vast. The narrator’s 
wife is in heaven, we are told, and we are told why, but not at first. The narrator lists the 
things she loves about Paris: antique stores, wild strawberry sorbet and silk underwear 
from Sabbia Rosa. What is important in the first part of the description of his wife is 
perhaps what is not mentioned. Here she is, in one of the most important cultural centers 
of the western world, and nothing is said about her with respect to art, music, history, 
architecture, literature or culture in general. Instead she is interested in house 
furnishings (granted, they are antique), food, and sexy lingerie. The question that arises 
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immediately to the highly educated reader is: She travelled half way across the world 
for that? She then goes from bad to worse in his depiction of her because his audience 
then discovers what she most loves is drinking champagne in a hotel room bathtub 
while gazing at the Eiffel Tower. The picture he paints of his wife is not quite that of a 
seeker of what Paris has to offer as a place to discover art, culture and history. Instead, 
he depicts her as being a complete and irresolute, albeit elevated in terms of taste, 
materialist. It is also interesting that the narrator does not yet mention her name, 
something he has done immediately with Elaine. Curious, too, is the fact that there is, so 
far, no evidence of the two partners in this marriage’s doing anything together, or 
having anything in common – other than sharing a hotel room. At the same time, 
however, the narrator does not directly paint a negative picture of his spouse. He merely 
paints an image of a complete hedonist who enjoys some of the finer consumables of 
life and the most stereotypical artifacts of this European city. The implicit logos can be 
expressed as follows: The narrator is a very cultured man who appreciates what his 
“highly educated and cultured readership” regards as the finer (and important) things of 
life / The narrator’s wife does not appear to appreciate the same things that the narrator 
does / Thus, the narrator is perhaps caught in an odd, possibly unhappy, marriage. The 
narrator could very well deserve better. This can be interpreted as a sort of denigration 
that, as we have seen in Part 2, the Ad Herennium advocates in order to strengthen the 
bond of friendship between speaker and listener. David Lansing, by (indirectly) making 
a sort of enemy out of his wife on a cultural level, strengthens the bonds of friendship 
that he is creating with his readership. In this way, his strategic use of ethos increases 
his appeal in terms of pathos. 
Certain other arguments also can now be made explicit, which explain the 
narrator’s relationship with Elaine: For all her failings, Elaine is at least “continental,” 
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and meets a need that the narrator has with respect to European culture that his wife 
does not. This explains the sophisticated flirting the narrator engages in with Elaine. His 
intellectual and emotional needs are not being met at home, so he plays a game with 
Elaine in a sort of surrogate relationship that, however inadequate, is better than 
nothing. Were the reader to judge him for being too flirtatious – even though it is 
playful – he is now forgiven because his wife does not seem to meet his intellectual, 
psychological and perhaps emotional needs. 
If this argument is followed, the character sketch of his wife, which conjures up the 
relationship the narrator has with Elaine as well as her character, can then be put in high 
relief with the following paragraph that describes a French woman, whose name the 
reader also finds out right away:  
I am sitting shirtless and shoeless on a green couch in the Hôtel Lutétia’s Opera 
Suite, eating a nougat bar, wedge by wedge, speaking on the phone with Diane 
Mincel, an extraordinarily beautiful and charming (aren’t all French women?) 
jeune femme from the hotel’s marketing department who, during our three-day 
stay, has done everything but walk our dog—and I’m sure she would have done 
that if we’d had one. I have waited until the last minute to secure Elaine’s cheese, 
but we are leaving tomorrow, early, so I have asked Diane where, s’il vous plaît, I 
might find a little “Ay-pwoss” (129). 
 
Here the reader is first given a brief sketch of the narrator, which sheds further light on 
his relationship with his wife: he seems to enjoy eating nougat without his shirt or shoes 
on. Something they might have in common could be food and basic creature comforts. 
However, this snapshot could also be a portrayal of the narrator as someone who enjoys 
sweets and knows when to be comfortable. It does not make him out to be a grossly 
materialist consumer. That he is not a mere consumer is clear due to the amount of 
discourse he has devoted to explaining what he knows and is still discovering about 
French culture. As stated above, to be a seeker of in-depth knowledge is highly valued 
by readership, and further increases his ethos.  
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 The picture painted thus far in the passage above of the Frenchwoman Diane 
Mincel stands in sharp contrast to the one the narrator paints of his wife. Not only does 
he describe Diane as extraordinarily beautiful and charming, but the fact that she has 
done everything but walk their dog (something which the narrator affirms is only 
because they do not have one – more humor, more ethos via pathos) suggests that Diane 
is a woman of substance when placed side by side with his ostensibly superficial wife. 
Curious here is the narrator’s very enthusiastic appreciation for Diane, when (one 
assumes) his wife is lying naked in the hotel room bathtub. One would expect that if 
there were still some embers glowing in the relationship he would at least have made an 
aside about his wife’s physical charms or sexual allure as she looks winsomely out at 
what he calls the jutting (a term with possible sexual overtones) Parisian tower (perhaps 
a phallic symbol). He instead remarks on Diane’s beauty and asks rhetorically whether 
all French women are not extraordinarily beautiful and charming. By comparison, his 
wife might as well be a plastic pool lounge floating motionless amid soap suds.  
 When he asks Diane about the cheese, she reacts with a gesture that the narrator 
calls peculiarly French. He describes this gesture metaphorically as follows:  
Diane makes that peculiarly French blowing noise, like giving the raspberry 
without sticking your tongue out, which, loosely translated, means either “Your 
guess is as good as mine” or “What a silly question” (129). 
 
Aristotle states that the ability to create metaphors is a gift, and places high value on it. 
The comparison that David Lansing makes between a modification of the raspberry, an 
uncouth gesture whose aim is to demean the recipient, and the French reaction to 
questions that are either difficult to answer or silly, is quite ingenious. He thus increases 
his ethos value on several counts. First, his ability to come up with a metaphor that is at 
once very precise and at the same time humorous earns him high marks. Second, he, in 
his loose translation (the fact that he describes his translation as “loose” also earns him 
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points) shows the ambiguity that he perceives in the French in this circumstance. It is an 
ambiguity that is sincere, on the one hand, for they express their ignorance. But at the 
same time, the penchant the French have for believing that they do know what is 
appropriate or not (in terms of seriousness and silliness) is also portrayed. This is yet 
another stab Lansing takes at the French which, through pathos, makes possible the joy 
“highly educated and cultured” American readers experience when little attacks are 
made on this culture’s signature haughtiness. For, as already mentioned, the American 
readership Lansing is addressing on the one hand also have their pride, and, on the 
other, another rule in this readership’s system of values dictates that it is poor taste to 
gloat (without irony) about one’s knowledge with a view to belittling another 
individual. All of this increases the narrator’s ethos even further. The implicit logos is: 
The narrator is capable of creating metaphors that are both imaginative and humorous. 
Both his metaphor and the subsequent explanation illuminate his shrewd insight as a 
traveler and thinker / Thus, the narrator is a writer and thinker of high worth, and the 
rewards reaped from reading his travel writing are great. The corresponding pathos 
could be expressed as follows: Since the reader appreciates the articulate and talented 
way the narrator expresses himself, the reader is also, at least at the critical level, similar 
to the narrator. This perceived similarity that takes place in the reader’s mind creates – 
via logos that leads to pathos – a feeling of contentment and pride. The feeling of 
contentment comes from identification with high quality. The feeling of pride comes 
from the reader’s evaluation of herself as someone who recognizes quality. Through this 
identification via pathos, Lansing disarms his reader, with a view to his being judged 
positively from the standpoint of his readership’s system of values – in spite of the fact 
that, on one level, he could be viewed as a shameless scoundrel. What Lansing is 
playing with here are the contradictions latent in any community’s system of values. 
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The fact that they are present in both the narrator and the readership makes the way they 
are presented crucial in order for a proper assessment of his character to be made.  
 At this point the narrator complicates matters further, thereby gaining more 
ethos points for his keen insight. For although he has put Diane (and the whole of 
French women) on a pedestal he, a sophisticate who knows that perfection only exists in 
the imagination, then pulls the rug from out from under the image he has created of her. 
He describes the noise French people make when asked a question they do not know 
how to answer, and then makes insightful comments on Diane’s (and French people’s in 
general) use of the word “perhaps” when he asks her if she can find the cheese he has 
promised to take back to Elaine: 
“Perhaps I can find out for you,” she says. The French always qualify everything 
by saying “perhaps.” This way they always look like heroes when they actually do 
something. “I will call you back immediately” (129). 
 
This is penetrating and humorous commentary on the character of the French, and 
increases his level of ethos. The fact that he is being reductive is immaterial. To attack 
top dogs, especially they are self-proclaimed, is fair game. He is continuing with his 
balancing act of praising the French, while at the same time taking little jabs at them. 
He has praised Diane’s extraordinary beauty and charm only to bring to light a quirk 
that she has because she is French: a need to be perceived as heroes that weighs down 
so much on the culture that they have a convention that ensures that they do, in fact, 
appear as heroes. The ethos increasing logos is the following: The narrator is a “highly 
educated and cultured” individual that truly appreciates the positive attributes of a group 
of people from the Old World / However, as he also sees the flaws in this same group of 
people, his appreciation does not give way to blind adoration / The narrator is thus a 
“highly educated and cultured” American who has appreciation for high culture, but can 
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also deliver a metaphorical right jab when necessary. The narrator makes the reader 
laugh while doing this, thereby further increasing his ethos.  
 Diane does, in fact, manage to come off as a heroine, as she has found a shop 
that sells the sought after illegal foodstuff. It is at this point that the narrator delivers 
what a good, if not great, travel writer delivers: details about a culture that would 
otherwise be hard to come by. In this way he demonstrates the profound curiosity and 
desire to experience and understand the world in new ways that Bill Bryson states 
characterizes the texts in the anthology he has introduced. The narrator, in a sort of flash 
forward, now treats the reader to a lesson on French cheese-making which is both 
interesting and very thorough without being tedious or dry. A real traveler (as opposed 
to crass tourist), he has interacted with the local culture, and can now bring back the 
privileged knowledge to those who either are unable to travel, or who have not had the 
peculiar experience that he describes in what the publisher claims is outstanding prose. 
In this sense, the narrator is not just a traveler but also a sort of hero who has 
experienced travails (travel – travail) and now brings home the boon of knowledge. His 
concise and highly informative introduction to French cheese-making earns him even 
more points on the level of ethos due to the sincere interest he takes in other cultures, a 
good highly valued by his readership, as well as his eventual participation in that 
culture’s customs (in this case eating unpasteurized cheese), which results in a 
revelation that changes his outlook on both his home culture and that of the target 
culture.  
 What must be kept in mind is the fact that a confession requires a judgment on 
the part of the listener (or, in this case, reader) that will either lead to a pardon or 
condemnation. This confession is not unlike Apuleuis’ apology referred to above, in 
that his appeals are from a defendant that is a cultured sophisticate made to a judge who 
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can be qualified as similar. Just like Apuleius who appeals to the judge’s appreciation 
for culture and disdain for the lack thereof, the narrator of this story appeals to the 
highly educated and cultured reader as he reveals the details of his case in self-
advocacy. This aspect can be seen in how the narrator next depicts his wife: 
I tell Jan I’m off to get le cheese. She doesn’t care. She has half a bottle of the 
Veuve Clicquot left and the bathwater is still hot. So, with Diane’s meticulous but 
complicated directions in hand, I head off in the general direction of the golden 
cupola heralding Napoleon’s tomb, which, evidently, is near the cheese shop (129 
– 130). 
 
The narrator’s calling epoisses “le cheese” will draw a wry smile on an American 
reader’s face, again due to the difference in register of the two terms. That is, the 
narrator places the article “le” (an article that is from what many “highly educated and 
cultured” as well as everyday speakers of English consider as the most romantic 
language of all) alongside the word “cheese.” English does not score high marks in 
romance when compared to French, and, if there are any connotations that could be 
drawn from associations with great literature, the word “cheese” demolishes any 
possible romanticism whatsoever. For the word cheese has many negative and 
humorous overtones, which can be seen in expressions like “cheesy” or the term of 
disrespect when referring to another person as a “cheesebag.” In order for the word 
cheese to have any value in terms of high culture it must be linked with other words like 
“French,” as in the noun phrase “French cheese.” Lansing’s linguistic play is a bit of 
silliness that the reader will appreciate, for in American culture a bit – if not a lot – of 
playful silliness is given high marks. It is also yet another lighthearted attack on French 
culture by an American cultural underdog.  
The narrator reveals his wife’s name in the same breath as he makes his joke. 
Her response is illuminating: “She doesn’t care.” Her indifference can be brought into 
focus by comparing the same sentence with “She doesn’t mind,” or any number of other 
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ways she could have responded. She is portrayed as completely uninterested in the 
object of his quest and, at the same time, the narrator underscores what she really is 
interested in: hot bathwater and a bottle of French wine. His wife’s attitude is brought 
into greater relief with the description of Diane’s instructions: “meticulous but 
complicated,” which further show that Diane is a woman who takes heartfelt interest in 
the narrator’s mission. It could be argued that Diane is simply doing her job, but the 
manner in which she carries out her duties depicts her as a person who takes special care 
when doing so. The narrator’s depiction of Diane’s attitude and character sheds more 
light on his wife’s character and attitude when the two women are placed in 
juxtaposition.  
At this point, the narrator also brings into focus the significance of the food 
product he is after. Mentioning the golden cupola that heralds Napoleon’s tomb 
increases the historical ethos of both the object of his quest as well as the narrator’s. The 
logos related to the product is: The cheese shop is near to Napoleon’s tomb / Napoleon 
was no ordinary individual. French history and culture is also extraordinary / Thus, the 
product that the narrator is seeking is extraordinary. Napoleon’s ethos, that is, increases 
the ethos of the cheese by association. We have discussed this transference of ethos in 
Part 2 of this dissertation. The narrator gains further points due to his mentioning these 
details of place, with a view to illustrating the significance of the food product he has 
been asked to obtain. His ethos thus stands in very sharp contrast with that of his wife’s. 
Jan’s ethos drops considerably when the reader compares her complete indifference to 
anything but hot bathwater and good wine with the narrator’s dedication – as a true 
traveler, not a lowly tourist – to seeking knowledge of and taking great interest in other 
cultures. The narrator’s values are similar to those of his readership. Everything that has 
been said thus far with respect to the narrator’s ethos who is, in effect, his own 
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advocate, can be seen as guiding the reader into evaluating him with approval and 
appreciation. The aim of narrator’s rhetorical strategy is to obtain not only a pardon 
from the judges (i.e., readers) based on his confession (however ironic), but is also to 
obtain an evaluation of his character as praiseworthy, not blameworthy. 
 The narrator now fast-forwards and provides the reader with knowledge about 
the cheese that he is unaware of, but is crucial to the unfolding of his confession. He 
provides a brief but thorough explanation of the French custom of making 
unpasteurized cheeses. He sets up a basic contrast between pasteurized and 
unpasteurized cheeses, where the basic argument is that although there is a risk of 
disease being transmitted in unpasteurized cheese, the rewards in terms of flavor are so 
great that the French take this risk. The narrator then contrasts the French custom of 
cheese-making with that of the United States (his calling the latter the good ol’ US  of A 
is a stab at his own culture, which will earn high points from “highly educated and 
cultured readers,” who are not uncritical of their homeland) (130). In France, half of the 
cheeses are made from unpasteurized milk, whereas in the United States this never 
occurs, because, as the narrator affirms, it is “a no-no,” “positively forbidden” and “as 
illegal as Cuban cigars” (130). 
 The highly educated reader at whom this narration is aimed will note the irony in 
the fact that the process that eliminates disease from cheeses was, “as every schoolkid 
knows,” invented by a Frenchman (130). At the same time, the thinking reader will 
follow other arguments in her head, based on the information given. The most important 
argument is the following: If half of the cheeses in France are made from unpasteurized 
milk, how dangerous can eating them be? Wouldn’t cases of deaths and illnesses due to 
consuming these types of cheeses be part of common knowledge? Vox populi, a source 
of “truth” that Aristotle, as we have said, trusted in, proves to be a solid reference point 
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with respect to the consumption of water and food products when traveling. Nearly 
everyone in the U.S. has either experienced or heard of someone who has experienced 
traveler’s dysentery in Mexico. So the reader will examine her memory banks and will 
draw a complete zero in this regard. That is, neither personal nor friends’ experiences 
will provide evidence for the dangers involved in eating cheeses made in France from 
unpasteurized milk. What is more, no newspaper articles will be retrieved from the 
same memory archives. So the question that arises is: Is it really that dangerous to eat 
unpasteurized cheeses?  
 Another question arises with respect to the practices of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, whose reputation is far from immaculate. The reader who does not take 
everything the Food and Drug Administration asserts at face value will wonder whether 
some sort of economic protectionism is taking place. That is, she will question whether 
the highly-developed and long-standing process of making cheeses in France is illegal 
because if French cheeses were not illegal, thereby allowing their importation, the 
American cheese-manufacturers’ revenues would suffer.   
 Not only does the narrator inform the reader of the scientific details related to 
the supposed dangers, but he also explains the culture of eating French cheeses in terms 
of the right season and the best time to eat them. He provides a specific example to 
illustrate what he means: 
Take a nice artisanal goat cheese like Pourly. These goats graze on grass from the 
limestone plateaus of Bourgogne. The most abundant, flavorful grass is the new 
growth in the spring. And the cheese takes only two to four weeks to properly age. 
So the best time to eat Pourly is late spring to early summer. And if you are a true 
French cheese-geek, that is when you would buy it from your local fromager 
(131). 
 
In the first five sentences, the narrator provides in straightforward and well written 
expository prose a detailed yet concise summary that illustrates the importance of the 
seasons and aging in French artisanal cheese production. This information increases his 
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ethos value due to the high quality of information delivered that is both academic yet 
down-to-earth. The narrator then gives his signature finishing touch in the last sentence, 
where he again mixes high and low register terms. The term French cheese-geek is 
popular, non-academic language that takes a word and turns it on its head.  “Geek” is a 
term of abuse on par with “freak” or “weirdo” used by American high school students 
when belittling each other. However, to be a chocolate-geek, or computer-geek, or 
what-you-will-geek means to be a complete fan of the first term in a compound noun 
construction. In this formulation, the term geek takes on positive overtones that are 
humorous at the same time. One can thus hold one’s head high if one is a French cheese 
geek. This popular term is then set in contradistinction with fromager, where the 
narrator demonstrates his knowledge of French culture, but does so different from 
Elaine, whose use of French is done in poor taste due because she puts on airs when 
doing so. When Lansing uses the term fromager, it is in tribute to French culture, as 
well as yet another demonstration of his knowledge of French. In the framework of this 
sentence and of the entire article, his use of the French language is appropriately 
academic, and will earn points for his ethos as traveler and travel writer in this 
confession. His “highly educated and cultured readers” will also, on the level of pathos, 
identify positively with the narrator’s love of knowledge in terms of culture and 
language. For Lansing’s readers view learning other languages and cultures as a good 
that expands one’s horizons, still another good. The formula “like attracts like” is at 
work here, creating bonds of friendship as advocated by Aristotle and rhetoricians who 
use his treatise as a source for the theory and practice of persuasive argumentation. 
Instead of presenting himself as Other, Lansing presents himself as an-Other, as 
someone like his readers, which, in Aristotle’s model of rhetoric, influences them 
positively on his behalf when it comes to judging his character. 
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 The narrator walks his readers down a Parisian “narrow little side street” to the 
shop which is halfway between the already mentioned Eiffel Tower and Napoleon’s 
tomb (131). This is further ethos for the cheese itself as a food item that is a product of 
an Old World culture with its romantic and winding streets. He then introduces Marie-
Anne Cantin, whom he describes as “sharp, perky, greatly opinionated” (131). This 
description he then undermines using humor by saying that she reminds him “just a bit 
of Debbie Reynolds” (131). The narrator then continues in the same humorous vein that 
combines high and low culture in linguistic expressions: 
Cantin is a second-generation fromager, having taken over the business from her 
father. I ask her if she has any Ay-pwoss, blowing out the second syllable as if 
getting rid of something nasty in my mouth, and she makes that same little 
raspberry noise that Diane made and leads me to one of her stunning little cheese 
displays where we stare, together, at four little creamy rounds that look like 
pumpkin-colored CDs (131). 
 
The narrator now incorporates the term “fromager” into his text unitalicized as if it were 
an English term, since there is now no question about its meaning. As there is no real 
equivalent in the English language, this is proper usage and form at the academic level, 
something his readers will notice and appreciate. He then capitalizes on the attention he 
has been paying to in his narratives of the sounds made while communicating in French. 
The first is related to the pronunciation of the name of the cheese, while the second is 
the noise that French people make when they do not know the answer to a question or 
think that it is silly. The narrator, in an attempt at humor, is making blowing noises 
while the shop owner responds with more blowing noises. It is here that the “highly 
educated and cultured reader” might perhaps say that the narrator has stooped to using 
sarcasm instead of irony in his humor, which may not earn him points. For stating that 
he pronounces the second syllable of epoisses as if  “getting rid of something nasty” in 
his mouth could be interpreted by some readers as having been done in poor taste. Some 
readers might argue that although all of the ingredients for a good comparison are there 
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and that the possibility for humor is great, the execution suffers. To say that it is as if he 
is getting rid of something nasty in his mouth is an attempt to poke more fun at French 
culture (in particular, its language) as he has been doing, and, at the same time, to 
connect this jab with the theme of his narrative, which is a great-tasting cheese. His 
readers may wince a bit here, for the narrator has lowered his standards and has been 
crass due to the fact that what he is really saying is that he is spitting out something 
from his mouth that is disagreeable. This image could be viewed as repulsive, and since 
the entire narrative is aimed, on one level, at extolling the outstanding flavor of a cheese 
that is remarkable due to not only the way it tastes but also due to the process that goes 
into making it – not to mention the long history that it has in French culture – his 
attempt at humor could be judged as inappropriate. This demonstrates the importance of 
not only creating but maintaining ethos in the body of the text itself as stipulated by 
Aristotle. We have seen how both McCroskey and Rodden have commented on the 
precariousness in which the narrator finds herself when being placed on the ideological 
and value-laden balance of her audience’s system of values. But Lansing then saves 
himself in his next attempt at humor, when he describes the shop owner as she holds her 
wares up for display: “Voilà!” says Madame Cantin, as if she had just produced photos 
of her grandchildren” (131). He then, as outstanding travel writer, fully rescues himself 
from being judged negatively when he describes Madame Cantin’s lesson in the art of 
cheese appreciation:  
She carefully lifts one up to my face. I smile and sniff. It is…odoriferous. Seeing 
my reaction, Madame Cantin gives me my first lesson in French cheese 
appreciation: “The worse the cheese smells,” she tells me, “the better it tastes.” 
Then she shrugs and adds, “This is a hard thing for Americans to understand.” 
What the hell. Since I’m not eating it, I don’t care (131). 
 
The use of the word “odoriferous” works nicely in terms of irony, for the narrator is 
being euphemistic: the underlying meaning is “it stinks.” So changing this base reaction 
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to a lofty one earns him more points in ethos because of his subtle cleverness. Subtlety 
is a highly valued quality in his readerships’ system of values. He then, at the end of the 
paragraph above, descends from this elevated and ironic usage to a very low register 
after being told that it is difficult for Americans to understand the smell – taste 
opposition: “What the hell” is a comic yet coarse expression, which coincides nicely 
with the American cultured but tough guy pose he has been developing throughout his 
narrative. This, for the American “highly educated and cultured reader,” is important in 
terms of image as has been asserted above, and works well in terms of the narrator’s 
ethos. The Old World French knowledge that Madame Cantin possesses versus the New 
World American lack of understanding sets up a nice division that shows a lack of 
understanding on the part of both cultures in terms of the Other. Madame Cantin’s shrug 
indicates bewilderment in her encounter with the American Other, and the narrator’s 
indifference displays the attitude typically displayed by Americans that are ignorant of 
the culture of the Other: since he does not understand it, he reacts with complete 
disregard when using the phrases “What the hell” and “I don’t care.”  
 Once the arrangements for delivery have been discussed, Madame Cantin, in the 
narrator’s words “delivers the bombshell” (131). She informs him that the cheese is 
illegal in the United States. When he confesses his ignorance of this fact to her, she 
realizes what has happened to him. The narrator then fuses her realization with his own 
realization that he has been deceived by Elaine: 
And then she sees the problem: I am a dupe. A rube. A cheese mule, as it were. I 
have been asked to carry nine ounces of an illegal substance, something I know 
nothing about. So her mission is clear. If I am to go through with this, first I must 
learn what I’m dealing with. Before she will sell me the Epoisses, she insists on 
giving me a crash course in French cheesemaking (most of which I have already 
revealed to you) (131 – 132). 
 
By calling himself dupe, rube, cheese mule – expressions which identify him as a naïf 
that has been emotionally swindled by Elaine – he uses self-effacement and blunt 
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honesty to gain points in terms of ethos and pathos. For by “calling a spade a spade,” 
that is, the narrator’s not mincing harsh words – especially with regards to himself – ties 
in with the concept of being completely honest when judging oneself (the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth) that is so valued in Anglo-American culture 
(most “highly educated and cultured readers” will recall and revere the advice Polonius 
gives to Laertes: “This above all – to thine own self be true” [Greenblatt, 1680]).130 To 
be hard on oneself, to not lie to oneself, is a highly prized good in American culture, 
and in doing so the narrator earns important ethos points by demonstrating his capacity 
for revealing the bald-faced truth about himself, even though it is negative. This earns 
him sympathy at the level of pathos as well. Further, his admission works nicely in 
terms of ethos and pathos, for he has made every effort to honor his end of a bargain. It 
is at this point that Chekov’s gun fires in the narrative. The narrator has been taken 
advantage of by a shrewd ferret of a “friend,” and is thus a victim the reader 
sympathizes with. All of this adds to the sympathy he has already managed to obtain for 
himself via pathos throughout the narrative based on several levels, as we have seen. 
The reader looks past his weakness of having given in to Elaine’s powerful sexual 
manipulation and sides with him. The logos is: This devilish yet naïve seeker of 
knowledge has, when attempting to honor a promise to return a favor, fallen prey to the 
wiles of a weasel-like American femme fatale, who has manipulated him unfairly to her 
advantage / Thus, he is a victim that deserves pity. The pity that he manages to inspire is 
the pathos of the rhetorical enactment that is both implicit and explicit, and which 
stands as the ethical motor of the plot.  
 Madame Cantin, in comparison with Elaine, turns out to be truly honorable. She 
refuses to let the narrator take the cheese without his obtaining proper knowledge of the 
                                                 
130 Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3, 78 – 82. 
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substance that he has decided to smuggle. The shop owner’s action builds an additional 
case being presented in the narrative to the readers for the French and French Old World 
culture against what now seem unreasonable norms stipulated by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration. The logos with respect to the contraband is as follows: The ban on 
French cheeses made from unpasteurized milk does not seem to make much sense / 
Thus, the illegal cheese should be made legal. With this logic, the American 
government’s restrictions seem ridiculous, and the educated and cultured reader 
sympathizes first with French culture, whose products seem to have been banned for 
political or economic reasons, rather than reasons of health. In this sense, there is a 
political statement being put forth in this recit de voyage about the arbitrary nature of 
governments which reads as follows: The norms established by governments can be 
evaluated in terms of appearance and reality / These norms should be evaluated on the 
basis of reality in order to ensure that they are not unreasonably unfair.  
The narrator then provides further details of the “crash course” he has been 
graciously and honorably treated to. The description the narrator gives is vivid and to 
the point – and, of course, not without its humor. At one point he describes the cheese 
cellar as “The Fort Knox of chèvre” (132). This is a nice simile which indicates, in its 
equation of cheese slabs with gold ingots, the high value that this cultural product has in 
his view. 
 The narrator then launches into an extended conceit that is as clever as it is 
serious and humorous. It is at this point in the narrative that the cultural and legal divide 
between the U.S.A. and France on raw-milk cheeses which results in their being 
declared contraband is presented to the court of readers to judge: 
Madame Cantin is a high priestess in the religion of raw-milk cheeses, and she 
works hard to convert me, putting out a large tray of different raw cow and goat-
milk cheeses, any one of which would be illegal to sell in the United States. 
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Seeing my trepidation, she says, “How can you be afraid to eat my cheese but not 
be afraid to eat a McDonald’s hamburger?” 
 
It is a question for which I have no answer. 
 
I sample her cheeses. They are magnificent. She sees the look in my eyes and 
knows: I am a believer. Praise the lowly goat! 
 
Now—and only now—will she sell me the outrageously expensive Epoisses 
(132). 
 
Madame Cantin’s logic is as elegant as it is devastating. She delivers the death blow to 
the narrator’s fear of eating a potentially dangerous substance by suggesting that the 
McDonald’s hamburgers he eats unquestioningly and without fear is an equally if not 
more dangerous foodstuff. And the fact is, in the face of this logic, perhaps the raw-milk 
cheese is a safer bet. One only needs to think of the quality of and path that the 
ingredients a McDonald’s burger is composed of take before they finally end up on the 
counter in order to see that eating one could be rather less than safe. The implicit logos 
is: The narrator is afraid of getting sick from eating a potentially dangerous French 
foodstuff. At the same time, he fearlessly eats an American foodstuff which is equally, 
if not more dangerous / Shouldn’t one be afraid in both cases? Or at any rate, shouldn’t 
one not be afraid in either case? The argument can then be extended with reference to 
quality: In the case of the McDonald’s hamburger, the narrator experiences no fear 
when consuming a potentially dangerous foodstuff whose taste and nutritional qualities 
are marginal. In the case of the raw-milk French cheese, he experiences fear about a 
potentially dangerous foodstuff whose taste is outstanding, and whose nutritional value 
is high by comparison with the McDonald’s hamburger. If one is going to take a 
calculated risk, which product stands as the better choice in terms of quality foodstuff 
on the one hand, and health, on the other? The obvious answer is that the French raw-
milk cheeses are, in terms of quality fare and health, the more intelligent choice.  
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 What is also interesting here is the narrator’s transition from non-believer to 
believer in the “religion” that he has adroitly created in his extended conceit. The 
narrator’s final ecstatic shout, “Praise the lowly goat!” works very nicely as a persuasive 
rhetorical device that advocates the value of the illicit substance that he has decided to 
bring back. The reader can identify with his emotion-charged reaction, meanwhile 
laughing at his ironic eulogy. We have seen in Chapter 3 that in antiquity things that 
were apparently insignificant were praised in epideictic rhetoric (i.e., mice, salt, death, 
beggars, and so on). Lansing’s praise thus falls firmly in an ancient tradition. 
 When the goods arrive to his hotel, the narrator describes them in loving detail:  
The next morning, as we are checking out of the Hôtel Lutétia, a messenger 
arrives from Madame Cantin’s fromagerie. He has a very large bundle for me. 
Two vacuum-packed parcels wrapped in tissue paper. About 10 kilos of 
unpasteurized cheeses, including all four rounds of the Epoisses Madame Cantin 
had in her shop. 
I also have Camembert de Normandie, Langres, Vacherin Mont d’Or, and a 
dozen different fresh chèvres, some covered in ash, others rippling with a pale 
blue mold, all completely and totally illegal to bring back to the States (132). 
 
The difference between the favor that Elaine has asked for (i.e., a little epoisse) and the 
enormous quantities of cheeses that the narrator has – in his religious fervor – 
purchased, functions as the climax of the tension that has been building on one level 
throughout the course of this travel tale. For the question that is raised at the beginning 
of the narrative is: How will he respond in kind to the enormous favor that Elaine has 
done for him? His having gone completely overboard when keeping his end of the deal 
is high comedy at its best, and earns huge points in terms of ethos for the narrator. What 
would have perhaps been judged as crass extravagance is justified in the reader’s mind 
because the careful preparation that the narrator has been carrying out in order to reach 
the end of his story. Since the narrator has described his passage from blind ignorance 
to true believer in French raw-milk cheese culture by detailing his experience on several 
planes combined with humor, the fact that he has lost control a bit in his purchase is, in 
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this particular case, forgivable, if not worthy of praise. Now that the narrator has the 
“highly educated and cultured readers’” complete approval and has, in effect, 
completely charmed and disarmed them, he can then deliver the final blow which, had 
he not adequately prepared his audience with his shrewd rhetorical strategies, might 
have been judged as unethical: 
My wife looks at me with alarm. “What’s that smell?” she says as I hand her the 
packages and ask her to carry them for me. 
 
“It’s nothing,” I tell her. “Just a little cheese” (132). 
 
His response, a slightly modified mirroring of Elaine’s response when he asked her 
what she desired him to bring back from Paris, is both clever and artful. First, there is 
his wife’s reaction which is based on ignorance. She is completely in the dark about the 
illegal cheeses. The narrator and his readers had also been in the dark. But because of 
the narrator’s quest for knowledge and culture which has resulted in his obtaining the 
crucial information he has gained about French raw-milk cheeses, the reader, who has 
been following him every step of the way, meanwhile appreciating his dedication in 
doing so and his capacity as a writer to express himself at a level of quality that meets 
high literary standards, has also vicariously undergone a passage from ignorance to 
knowledge, which now stands in glaring opposition to the ignorance of the narrator’s 
“better” half. The inside joke that the reader enjoys based on the inside knowledge that 
she has obtained puts her in a position of superiority in terms of the difference of 
knowledge. Here it must be underscored that that reader who has appreciated this story 
at the level of a true seeker of knowledge has not only just taken the time and made 
efforts to understand the present story. The “highly educated and cultured reader” has 
also necessarily made efforts prior to the reading of the story that have made her 
appreciation possible. That is, the reader, much like the recit de voyage’s seeker of 
knowledge about other cultures, must also have done considerable reading at an 
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academic and intellectual level prior to having read the story in order to fully 
comprehend and appreciate all of the nuances as well as the hard work that the narrator 
has put into his article.
131
 Therefore, as the narrator has painted a less than favorable 
picture of his wife in terms of her level of culture and the interest she takes in it, her 
surprised reaction will result in derisive laughter from the audience. Here we can recall 
that when the narrator leaves the hotel to find the cheese shop and tells his wife that he 
is going to get le cheese, he states that she does not care. Her complete indifference to 
the efforts he has been making for cultural knowledge which results in her ignorance 
about the package she has just been handed make the situation comic. The reader, in her 
mind, will perhaps say, “If you only knew!” or, “If you’d been paying attention, you 
wouldn’t be in the dark.” The bundle of cheeses that she has been handed is much more 
than the illegal contents inside the packaging. The narrator and the reader know the 
history and circumstance that imbue the package with its importance, and also know 
that the amount of discourse that the narrator has spent on the story that he has related 
has only scratched the surface, for there is much more to tell about French raw-milk 
cheeses.  
 When the narrator, in response to his wife’s question tells her it is nothing, just a 
bit of cheese, he is, as the reader knows, mirroring the same words that Elaine used 
when she asked him for the favor. This is high quality in terms of writing craft, and the 
implicit logos that makes it possible for the reader to positively evaluate what would in 
other circumstances be grossly unethical behavior, is the following: The narrator’s wife 
has taken no interest whatsoever in her husband’s quest to find and find out about the 
cheeses. She should have done so, rather than spending her time drinking wine in a 
bathtub and staring at the Eiffel Tower / She therefore, due to her indifference, now 
                                                 
131 Vladimir Nabokov writes, “Up a trackless slope climbs the master artist, and at the top, on a windy 
ridge, whom do you think he meets? The panting and happy reader . . .” (Bowers, 2). 
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deserves to be duped. (The narrator, due to his weakness for things French and for 
Elaine’s erotic manipulation, perhaps also deserved to be duped, but, as he is married to 
Jan, a complete dullard with respect to high culture, the reader justifies forgiving him. 
Jan’s attitude has no excuse, and she gets what she deserves.)   
 Throughout the discussion of this narrative the narrator has presented himself as 
a bit of a devil. A likeable, if not loveable devil. Because of his deft use of ethos and 
pathos and due to his outstanding skills as a writer and self-advocate, he has the reader 
completely on his side. When he tells his wife that the packages he has given her 
contain “just a little cheese,” she asks a question about its legality, he  responds in true 
form. That is, as the likeable (or loveable) devil he has made himself out to be: 
“Is it okay to bring back?” 
 
I do my little French snort. “Of course,” I lie. “It’s nothing. Rien, rien, rien.” And 
then, as the taxi pulls away from the hotel, the precious bundles of cheese sitting 
prettily on her lap, I give her a kiss on the cheek. “Trust me, darling” (133). 
 
The repetition of three components that begin the tale functions as an exceedingly well-
wrought framing device that encases this piece of travel writing. Much like a composer, 
who repeats motifs in a work of music, the narrator repeats, with artistic changes, three 
key items that have been appeared within the tale. First, there is the peculiarly French 
noise that the French make when asked a question they do not know how to respond to 
or that is silly. But it is now his, for he states: I do my little French snort. He has made it 
his and he has renamed it by calling it a snort (his readers will recognize this device of 
making minute changes to the same linguistic element as demonstrative of artistic 
capability). Further, the word “snort,” due to its being onomatopoeic, has comic 
overtones, and so he is, up to the very last moment, making the reader laugh with a view 
to evaluating his crime with greater benevolence due to pathos. The second key item he 
repeats are the same words that Elaine used at the beginning of the narrative when 
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describing what she wanted as payback for her favor: 1) “nothing” and 2) its French 
equivalent, rien, rien, rien. The reader that has been paying attention will notice that the 
narrator has reversed the order of these terms as they first appear in the text. That is, 
Elaine first says that what she wants is “nothing,” and then uses the French: “rien, rien, 
rien.” The narrator, in reversing the order, is working as an artist, giving geometric as 
well as visual and auditory balance and harmony to these lexical items as they appear in 
his work:  
rien, rien, rien / nothing – nothing / rien, rien, rien. 
This control and creativity over language use scores the narrator more points as a 
wordsmith, along with the repetition of logical irony. That is, what he calls “nothing” is 
really not “nothing” at all. Also, he tells his reader that he has lied. In this sense, he 
keeps his end of another bargain that he has made with his audience: to confess. He is, 
in telling the truth about putting his wife in legal jeopardy, doing precisely what the 
institution of confession demands. By confessing and through his art as a writer, he 
further increases his ethos. The corresponding pathos is high appreciation. That is, the 
reader evaluates with approbation the narrator’s capacity as writer and integrity as 
confessor. The narrator’s integrity in fulfilling the demands of the confessional pact, 
combined with the way he has portrayed his wife, imbues him with high ethos, 
facilitating the audience’s view of his actions as praiseworthy. 
 Lansing ends his tale with the third item he repeats when he gives his wife a kiss 
on the check and tells her, “Trust me, my darling.” Here the reader will recall  that the 
first phrase that comes from Elaine’s mouth is the same term of endearment, which he 
immediately clarifies as being  spoken by her (i.e., “‘Darling’—that’s Elaine talking, 
not my wife.” The clarifying that he does at the start of the narrative sets up the 
ambiguous and ironic play that characterizes the game that he and Elaine engage in and, 
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at the same time, foreshadows the type of relationship he has with his wife. The term 
“darling” has been used in an ironic game, and so its worth as a straightforward term of 
endearment is null. When he uses the same term with his wife, apart from achieving 
artistic balance and harmony in the text yet again, he reveals that this term of 
endearment is in all probability also empty when he uses it with his wife. Here he 
portrays himself as a complete devil but since he has – by means of his art – 
manipulated his reader throughout the tale in an elaborate appeal to pity (it must be 
remembered that to forgive requires compassion, and the narrator is making a 
confession), he at this point demonstrates his outstanding capability for expression in 
high-level narrative discourse. With this final strategic and rhetorical maneuver, rather 
than being condemned as a shamefaced scoundrel, David Lansing wins the approval of 
his audience as an endearing devil and outstanding travel writer. His confession brings 
not only absolution but approbation (on several levels) as well. 
 Now that an analysis using logos, ethos, and pathos has been carried out, the 
system of values embedded in the text can be examined from the standpoint of a 
framework of ethics/morals articulated by J.L. Mackie. The question that Mackie 
tackles is the problem of universalization with respect to morals or ethics (the term for 
the purposes of this dissertation can be used indiscriminately). Mackie, working from 
the standpoint of moral skepticism, uses the following logical proposition as basis for a 
moral system consisting of three stages: “Moral judgements are universalizable” (83). 
Mackie identifies the differences in each stage of universalization: 
There are, then, different kinds or stages of universalization. In each of them a 
moral judgement is taken to carry with it a similar view about any relevantly 
similar case. But the first stage rules out as irrelevant only the numerical 
difference between one individual and another; the second stage rules out generic 
differences which one is tempted to regard as morally relevant only because of 
one’s particular mental or physical qualities or condition, one’s social status or 
resources; the third stage rules out differences with answer to particular tastes, 
preferences, values, and ideals (97). 
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An example of a moral judgement at the first stage is expressed in the maxim which 
Mackie argues is “well formulated by Hobbes: ‘That a man . . . be contented with so 
much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself’” (88). 
This common-sense basis for morality is capable of universalization. It is, however, 
limited, for it does not take into consideration possible qualitative differences 
mentioned above (i.e., mental, physical qualities or condition, social status, resources 
and so on). Included in these qualities are the well-known differences based on race, 
color, sex, religion, and age. Mackie provides examples that extend beyond these 
qualities to show the limitations of the first level of universalization: “The teetotaler 
may be happy to prescribe universally that no-one should drink wine or beer, the 
philistine that old houses should never be allowed to prevent the construction of 
motorways or divert their course, the sturdy individualist that social services should be 
kept to a minimum” (89 -  90). In each of these cases, the liberties or restrictions that 
each type of individual described are dependent on particular qualities. In order to keep 
such qualitative differences from obstructing fairness, an extension of the first phase of 
universalization is applied in the second phase: “putting oneself in the other person’s 
place” (90). Mackie outlines this phase as follows: 
To decide whether some maxim that you are inclined to assert is really 
universalizable, imagine yourself in the other man’s place and ask whether you 
can then accept it as a directive guiding the behavior of others towards you. 
Having a large income, no dependents, and an iron constitution, you are inclined 
to judge that everyone should pay in full, from his own pocket, for any medical 
attention he requires; but imagine that you are on a modest weekly wage and have 
developed a chronic kidney complaint, or have a child with a hole in the heart: do 
you still endorse the proposed rule? (90). 
 
At this stage, Mackie asserts that putting oneself in another’s gumboots makes it 
possible to take into consideration differences that are not addressed at the first stage of 
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universalization. It is through taking into consideration the qualities of the Other that 
one’s own qualities are kept in check. 
The second stage of universalization also needs to be put in check by further 
tests in order for fairness to be attained in the ethical framework Mackie has articulated. 
He calls this test the third stage of universalization, whose process he states involves 
“taking account of different tastes and rival ideals” (92). Mackie describes this process 
as follows: 
The third stage that is called for involves putting oneself even more thoroughly 
into the other person’s place, so that one takes on his desires, tastes, preferences, 
ideals, and values as well as his other qualities and abilities and external situation 
(92 – 93). 
 
Mackie states that the possibility of discovering “any principles [that] will pass so 
severe a test” is highly unlikely. And it is precisely the third test that presents the 
greatest difficulties with respect to the universalization of any sort of moral principles, 
much more than the second phase, as Mackie affirms: “Of course there are some basic 
desires that almost everyone has, but besides these there are radically divergent 
preferences and values, and it is from these that obstinate moral disagreements arise” 
(93). Most individuals will grant, in their morality, the test for universalization and thus 
fairness that the second phase of universalization requires. With respect to the third 
phase, however, Mackie argues as follows: “It is not only logically possible to opt out of 
this third variety of moral language game; it is quite common and conventional for 
people with strong moral convictions to remain outside it, and it may well require a 
conscious decision to opt into it” (102). A parallel between Epitectus’ prenotions and 
Mackie’s third stage of universalization can be drawn, for while vast numbers of 
individuals will describe themselves as adhering to some version of the Golden Rule 
cited above – or, in any case, expecting others to do so – it is in the concrete 
manifestation of its being put into practice that differences and disputes arise.  
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 Three maxims that are universalizable at the first level and which come into play 
in the travel narrative analyzed above provide the basis for the moral conflict of the 
confession which the narrator attempts to resolve by means of the art of persuasion. The 
first maxim can be expressed in popular terms as “One good turn deserves another.” It 
is this principle that is at play and which puts the narrator’s character in terms of his 
ethos at stake. For since Elaine has done him a favor, by accepting the favor he agrees 
to subject himself to the conditions stipulated in this maxim. Of course, the 
circumstances which make up the arena in which the events of his fulfilling his 
responsibilities in this pact mitigate at the second stage his responsibility. For we 
discover that he has been deceived, which would exonerate him from the requirement of 
fulfilling his duty. He decides, nevertheless, to adhere to the conditions of the first 
maxim, thus overriding his privilege by invoking a second maxim, “A deal is a deal,” 
which imbues him with what is viewed by his audience as a good. By invoking the 
second maxim, he adheres to the letter of the first one. This increases his ethos in the 
view of the readership, which is also buoyed due to his adamant quest for knowledge of 
culture when fulfilling his end of the bargain. All of this weighs heavily in his favor 
when later in the narrative he transgresses a code held sacred by his “highly educated 
and cultured” readership, especially in relation with those who are close as individuals: 
“Honesty is the best policy.” In the first place, whether or not he is faithful to his wife 
or is hiding something from her on this count is placed in doubt because of his 
flirtatious behavior with Elaine. But as this is left highly ambiguous in the narrative, this 
point can easily be waived. It is the second rupture of this code that creates a significant 
moral hurdle that he needs to overcome. That is, when he deceives his wife Jan, telling 
her that the illicit contents of the package he hands her on their way to the airport are 
okay to bring back. At the first level of universalization, he is guilty, for one should not 
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lie unnecessarily to one’s loved ones (or perhaps to Others in general). Even the 
circumstances that make up his having decided to smuggle the illegal substance do not 
free him from honoring this second maxim. That is, the fact that he has been lied to does 
not relieve him, for, as popular morality dictates, “Two wrongs do not make a right.” 
Thus, he cannot justify lying to his wife simply because he has been lied to. It is instead, 
at the third stage of universalization that he finds the bases for justifying components of 
the crime he is confessing to: having lied to his wife and having put her in legal 
jeopardy. That is, he bases his decision to lie to his wife using the ideals, values and 
tastes that he holds in common with his “highly educated and cultured” audience. In this 
way, he manages to obtain forgiveness for his having lied to his wife. How does he 
manage to do so? First, the category of illicit goods that the narrative suggests she ends 
up taking past customs has been effectively argued as being nearly absurd. Lansing’s 
description of his experience when discovering this unpasteurized and therefore illegal 
cheese convinces the reader that its status as contraband is highly unreasonable. When 
the reader takes the narrator’s description of his (near) religious conversion in which he 
becomes a true believer in the French consumable and Jan’s indifference and apparent 
lack of culture into consideration – as compared to the narrator’s high level of interest in 
culture and history – his transgressing the code of honesty is overridden based on a 
preference that is governed, in the end, by the tastes and ideals he holds in common 
with his readers. This can be evidenced by expressing the ideal that Lansing is 
appealing to in an obligatory maxim: One must take interest in other cultures. It could 
be argued that one ought to take interest in other cultures or that it is a good or nice idea 
to do so, but it would be risible to attempt to convert the above dictum into a universal 
maxim. This is because it is possible to respect other cultures without necessarily taking 
interest in them. It is possible to convert this second concept, the idea of respecting 
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other cultures, into a universal maxim. That is, at the first stage of universalization, it 
could be asserted that one must, or in any case, ought to respect other cultures, for to do 
so is, in effect, an extension of the Golden Rule. Taking great interest in other cultures 
is, by comparison, a matter of taste or ideals. Since it is an ideal that the “highly 
educated and cultured reader” holds, it carries great weight as a mitigating factor when 
judging the narrator’s actions in terms of motives. That is, since his motives are, from 
the perspective of the “highly educated and cultured reader,” both good and honorable 
with respect to his interest in other cultures, when they are put in the balance with his 
having transgressed the code of honesty, the scale tips in favor of his worth as an 
individual on the level of ideals and taste. His high interest in culture outweighs his 
having been dishonest, the readership granting a pardon for the latter infraction. 
Thus we see that some sort of inversion occurs with respect to maxims and their 
being universalizable or not. For as humans we tend to place greater value on our 
system of values and preferences with respect to taste and ideals than to more general 
principles that provide the guidelines for our behavior. As Mackie asserts, it is at the 
third stage of universalization that the differences that are most difficult to overcome 
manifest. 
The system of values that the “highly educated and cultured reader” uses when 
pronouncing judgments on actions carried out by human agents can be examined 
further. The “highly educated and cultured reader” is a product of the academy, 
individuals that view themselves as adhering to Mackie’s first and second stages of 
universalization. These readers view themselves as “progressive” or “liberal” in their 
political stance and as individuals that appreciate “the finer things of life” and that see 
moral issues in shades of grey as opposed to black and white. These qualities stand as 
some of the determinants that form part of what is defined as “good” for the “highly 
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educated and cultured readership/audience” that I have constructed, and which can be 
placed in binary opposition to those of the system of values held by what members of 
the same readership construct would label as an “unsophisticated” audience/readership. 
The latter group may or may not be university educated, but in any case does not 
adequately appreciate cultural artifacts in the way that having been educated in the 
liberal arts at an institution of higher learning provides. As a result, these two 
readerships will come into conflict at the third stage of universalization of Mackie’s 
ethical framework, where ideals, values and taste are the variables that distinguish both 
individuals and groups from one another. 
The gulf that exists between these two readership constructs can be illustrated by 
identifying components of their respective systems of values. For instance, the most 
important defining characteristic of the “highly educated and cultured” readership can 
be seen in its relation to and appreciation of logos, whether spoken or written. For due 
to the fact that the “highly educated and cultured” audience has been trained by and in 
the academy, the importance that high quality written and spoken discourse as defined 
by the academy holds is paramount. I focused on the importance of quality discourse in 
my analysis of the ethos of the bookstore (Barnes and Noble) whose reputation for 
selling what the “highly educated and cultured readership” identifies as excellent 
literature is high, as well as in my analysis of the blurbs found on the front and back 
covers of (and introductions to) the series in which the narrative is found. In my 
analysis I also focused on what I call excellent use of language in Lansing’s text, 
showing how his “clever” use of words earns him high points in the category of ethos. 
Of course, we enter into trouble when labeling a type of literature as outstanding or 
excellent, for the same reason that we enter into trouble when trying to define any 
abstract concept. Not only will a particular individual define excellent literature based 
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on her system of values, but the group to which she belongs will as well. This individual 
and her group will contrast themselves with other individuals and groups that define the 
same terms differently, resulting in a clash at the level of logos as expressed in 
literature. For example, the “highly educated and cultured” reader would consider books 
judged as high art by The New York Times Book Review to be quality reading material, 
yet would label books written by Louis L’Amour and those published by Harlequin 
Enterprises Ltd. as being excellent examples of low quality literature. (Academics 
categorize Westerns by L’Amour as popular art.132) An important value that L’Amour’s 
and Harlequin romances hold for the “highly educated and cultured” reader is their 
value as objects of scorn or as examples of low art which they then patronizingly 
elevate to the status of high art by labeling it kitsch (see below). At the same time, it 
must be kept in mind that both L’Amour the author and Harlequin romances have huge 
readerships that consider their works to be high quality literature. Their evaluation is, of 
course, based on their system of values. As I have stated, the readership that consumes 
these works would be identified by the “highly educated and cultured” reader as 
“unsophisticated.” What is interesting about all of this is that most members of the 
“unsophisticated” readership might view being labeled in that way as an insult, for they 
might consider themselves to be “cultured” and “sophisticated” – based on their own 
definition of that term. (They might also proudly take a stance that is either anti-high 
culture or anti-intellectual.) The fact is, along general lines, the members of both groups 
judge the other group in negative terms – as most groups do. That is, both groups view 
                                                 
132 Marsden writes that scant attention has been paid by literary scholars to L’Amour and other writers 
of westerns, as opposed to the same genre in film: “Studies of Western literature have been curiously 
devoid of references to popular Western writers from Zane Grey to Louis L’Amour. This is 
unfortunate, for L’Amour’s seventy or so works have sold over 70,000,000 copies, making him the 
best selling Western fiction writer of all time. Although a remarkable amount of scholarship has been 
devoted to its sister art form, the popular Western film, the “Western” stands as an equally rich and 
historian valuable insight into popular attitudes and values . . .” (203). The reason that more attention 
has been paid to film Westerns is obvious: scholars deem (certain) Western films as de facto high art. 
In any case, Marsden equates high numbers with high value – an egregious fallacy. 
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the members of the group that is not their own as Others. The “highly educated and 
cultured” reader will use terms such as bumpkin, rube, ignoramus and so on to describe 
the readership of L’Amour’s books and Harlequin romance novels. The readers of 
L’Amour’s books and Harlequin romances will label the “highly educated and cultured” 
readers as snobs, know-it-alls, high-fallutin’, pretentious and so on. The groups are 
pitted against each other at Mackie’s third stage of universalization in terms of their 
taste in reading material. They are also, on the whole, pitted against each other along 
political lines. The “highly educated and cultured” readers will perceive themselves as 
leaning to the left and middle-left politically, whereas the “unsophisticated” readers 
will, in general, lean to the right. Be that as it may, what is important here is that two 
very different groups appreciate very different types of written discourse. The respective 
system of values of each type can be revealed through rhetorical analysis. 
There are other qualities that define the “highly educated and cultured readers” 
that bring them into conflict with the “unsophisticated” readers in this binary construct. 
Perhaps the most important defining characteristic of what the “highly educated and 
cultured reader” calls excellent literature is irony. We have seen this in the highly ironic 
title of Lansing’s narrative: “Confessions of a Cheese Smuggler.” Tightly connected, if 
not inseparable from irony, is the term play. The “highly educated and cultured” 
producer or consumer of discourse plays with language, with institutions, with ideas, 
and mostly, with things that are held sacred. The reader of Harlequin romances and 
Louis L’Amour stories do not have this same sense of play and are much more black 
and white in their attributing of values to what is dictated by what the “highly cultured 
and educated” reader would call “old-fashioned,” “preachy” and “heartland” morals. 
With respect to the concepts irony and play, I have discussed how Lansing takes 
the term “confession” and turns it on its head. Members of the “unsophisticated” group 
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would not play with an institution of this sort (i.e., legal and religious), mainly because 
good and evil are black and white categories for members of this group. For this group, 
heroes and villains are well-defined characters in the sense that the heroes are good 
through and through and the villains are thoroughly evil. A villain, therefore, would 
need to confess sincerely and in many cases, in spite of having confessed, be punished. 
The use of irony is unacceptable to the “unsophisticated” reader in relation with a form 
of discourse that makes it possible to admit that one has transgressed against a 
community law, whether written or unwritten. Confession is to be sincere because the 
transgressor is perceived to have behaved in a highly transgressive and immoral 
manner. To play with the confession format is to play with the value-laden rules that 
govern a given community. If an individual plays ironically with the values and rules of 
a community, the underlying message is that the values are questionable. From the 
perspective of “unsophisticated” readers, values are not to be questioned or, for that 
matter, played with. More important, the “unsophisticated” reader will not scoff at the 
system of values, as Lansing does, beginning with the title of his travel narrative and 
throughout the text.  
For Lansing undermines other institutions in his ironic play. In his flirtatious 
discourse with Elaine he makes his reader question whether he is ever sincere at all 
when he uses terms of endearment, both in his relationship with her and, as I have 
suggested, with his wife, a relationship sanctioned by the institution of marriage. If this 
sort of behavior were to be imitated and were to spread throughout the community, an 
institution that is already scarcely intact might be eroded even further. A common 
argument presented by “unsophisticated” readers is that further weakening of the family 
– the core institution of the human community – could, in this readership’s view, lead to 
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the complete downfall of U.S. society, ending in the country’s absolute and utter 
disintegration and demise. 
Lansing also attacks in his ironic play the consummate American food icon: 
McDonald’s. He thereby infers that another culture’s food products are superior and 
perhaps less risky to consume. In this sense, Lansing could be viewed as an enemy to 
his own country’s culture in terms of its heartland cuisine. An “unsophisticated” reader 
would not criticize anything that is American made and would certainly not promote 
French products. French products are for elitist snobs with too much education – like 
David Lansing. “Unsophisticated” readers might argue that he should, for these reasons 
and others, be silenced. These readers would not sympathize with the subtexts of 
Lansing’s travel tale and would most likely not appreciate his sense of humor. 
When Lansing quotes Madame Cantin who questions his unquestioned 
consumption of McDonald’s food products, he is appealing to a “highly educated and 
cultured” readership that would, much like the judge in Apuleius’ text, laugh with him 
at the “rubes” that would oppose and attack him. At the same time, the 
“unsophisticated” readers would question whether the term “best” in The Best American 
Series actually describes either what is “best” or “American” with respect to U.S. 
culture and society. Many members would argue that Louis L’Amour’s westerns and 
Harlequin romances are 1) the highest quality literature produced in the United States 
and 2) the most American – especially in terms of the values they promote. In 
L’Amour’s novels good guys are good guys and bad guys are bad guys, and there are no 
shades of grey when it comes to what is right and wrong. There is no undermining of 
heartland American values in these works of fiction, nor is there irony or play. In 
Harlequin romances, the standard values of consumerist American are not questioned: 
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to be wealthy, good-looking and successful are the goals to be reached for. Any other 
sort of aims would be incomprehensible to this readership. 
The “highly educated and cultured reader” will appreciate L’Amour’s novels 
and Harlequin romances as examples of low art, which she will assess only in terms of 
their kitsch value. When the “highly educated and cultured reader” uses the term kitsch 
in relation to cultural artifacts, it is a (not very subtle) form of condescension. This 
evaluation shows the inherent feelings of superiority on the level of culture and ethics 
that the “highly educated and cultured” reader experiences when comparing himself 
with the “unsophisticated” reader, in spite of copious assertions to the contrary about 
embracing the Other. Ironically, the same logical mechanisms are in force when the 
“unsophisticated” reader judges the “highly educated and cultured” reader and the texts 
this group consumes. She too feels superior in terms of her ethics and system of values 
and would have only negative appraisals for Lansing as a writer and as an individual, as 
well as for his narrative. For, on the one hand, Lansing does not match the ideal 
portrayed by Harlequin romance protagonists: good-looking, astonishingly successful, 
and a “perfect gentlemen.” Instead, Lansing would no doubt be perceived as a not-very-
good-looking, bookish nerd who wastes his time writing not-very-funny and unromantic 
travel stories that probably makes less than 150,000 dollars a year. In other words, the 
“unsophisticated” reader would categorize Lansing with the worst label possible in the 
American system of values: a loser. The “highly educated and cultured reader” would 
respond by calling the “unsophisticated” reader a “crass materialist with no appreciation 
whatsoever of higher culture.”  
I am, in this discussion, attempting to reveal what I view as the components of 
the value systems of two groups: “highly educated and cultured” readers and 
“unsophisticated” readers. The question that arises is whether either group’s “truths” 
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have greater worth than those of the other group. Ironically, members of both groups 
would in all likelihood answer in the affirmative, each claiming that the “truths” they 
adhere to and which give cohesion to and provide the bases of judgment for actions in 
terms of approbation and reprobation for their community are superior to those of the 
other’s, while declaring the other group’s “truths” to be either inferior or mistaken thus 
false. This is true even though both groups would certainly agree on most of the points 
listed in Mackie’s description of what he calls “our conception of the good” in terms of 
“higher pleasures or indirect means to happiness” (150):  
Liberty of thought and discussion, thought and discussion themselves, 
understanding of all sorts of things, including ourselves and other human beings, a 
self-reliant, enterprising, and experimental spirit and way of life, artistic creation 
and craftsmanship of many sorts, the enjoyment and appreciation of beauty, and 
general participatory self-government both in smaller institutions and in the 
determination of large scale social policies and laws (150). 
 
I state above that there would certainly be agreement by both groups on most of the 
points listed in Mackie’s description because what he presents is a list of pleasures or 
indirect means to happiness that would be accepted unreservedly by the group he 
belongs to and is writing to: “highly educated and cultured readers.” It is, however, 
quite possible that the members of the “unsophisticated readers” would not agree with 
Mackie on certain aspects that he lists. For instance, the “unsophisticated reader” might 
not view understanding other human beings as one of the means to happiness. Instead, 
indifference or even intolerance in this regard could be a means to happiness for this 
group. (“Highly educated and cultured readers” are also capable of indifference and 
intolerance with respect to “unsophisticated readers,” but they often mask this type of 
attitudinal response with a façade of philanthropy phrased as alterity.) An experimental 
spirit and way of life might also be viewed with suspicion by the “unsophisticated 
reader,” due to a general tendency to adhere to “conservative” principles or guidelines 
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with respect to living life. Trust (or belief) in and following pre-established and 
authoritative rules would, for this readership, instead lead to happiness.  
Even if we assume one group’s goods to be superior, the question whether 
anything ought to be done about it arises. Should the group whose truths were agreed to 
be superior – given this qualitative distinction – be granted the power to then impose its 
system of values on the other group? Take, for example, the two groups that I have 
described above. The “highly educated and cultured readers” have, with respect to 
“unsophisticated readers,” very few (if any) doubts about the superiority of their system 
of values and of the “truths” that they adhere to. Would the “highly educated and 
cultured” group, because of what it knows to be superior, thus ordain a system that 
would enforce adherence to and participation in this same system of values? It is 
unlikely that any members of this group would consent to this, because this would mean 
the establishment of a dogmatic regime (of values), which would contradict other values 
this group holds sacred. The most important value in relation with this issue is freedom 
of choice, which is associated with both individual liberty and democratic forms of 
government. If the “highly educated and cultured readers” were given the power to 
enforce their system of values on the “unsophisticated readers,” personal and social 
freedom would be undermined, leading to a state of affairs that would be viewed as 
intolerable. In fact, it would most likely not even be necessary to pass from the first to 
the second stage of Mackie’s morality framework to reach this conclusion. There would 
be no need for the “highly educated and cultured reader” to put herself in the 
“unsophisticated reader’s” place in order to see the drawbacks of such an imposition. 
This issue is easily solved at the first stage of universalization by invoking the maxim to 
allow oneself as much liberty against others as one would allow others against oneself. 
And so because the “highly educated and cultured reader” would not tolerate being 
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subjected to the system of values adhered to by “unsophisticated readers,” she would 
not participate in or endorse the establishing of a power structure that would enforce the 
system of values that she herself adheres to, in spite of her conviction that her own 
system of values is unquestionably superior. What is not clear is whether the 
“unsophisticated reader” would follow suite. That is, it is not fully certain whether the 
“unsophisticated reader” would ungrudgingly and unquestioningly relinquish a desire to 
impose her system of values on the “highly educated and cultured reader,” due to her 
group’s perception of moral matters in terms of black and white – even though her 
group would wholeheartedly uphold individual freedom as a primary tenet. It would 
perhaps only be by making the passage from the first to the second stage of 
universalization, that is, by putting herself in the other reader’s shoes that she might 
concede that, as she would not want to be forced to adopt the system of values held by 
the “highly educated and cultured reader” – the equivalent of being subjected to the 
power structure of a non-democratic government – she would not wish to impose her 
system of values on the “highly educated and cultured reader,” even though she would 
think and believe that she ought to be allowed to do so, due to her perception of her 
“truths” as superior.  
 In the readership constructs that I have articulated above, conflict ensues at times 
due to differing abstract values, at others due to disagreement over concrete 
manifestations of abstract values held in common by both groups.  These conflicts 
reveal, in the end, differing positions on what “truth” is, as well as what is considered to 
be good or evil, whether in general, moral or aesthetic terms. The division that occurs is 
based on fundamental differences that are expressed above in “structuralist” paired 
opposites: highly educated (thus sophisticated) / unsophisticated – liberal / conservative 
– crass materialist / idealist – gross consumer / connoisseur of high culture, and so on. 
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While these sorts of dyads have been the object of attack by post-structuralist theorists, 
a very important question arises which I hope will meet objections to this type of 
theoretical framework.
133
 If we accept, for instance, that post-structuralist theory has 
proven that the structuralist conception of discourse was mistaken, due to “slippage” 
and “spillage” between signifiers in the syntagmatic chains that structuralists affirm 
make the sign system of language possible (Barry, 64), as well as “long-dormant 
metaphorical bases of words . . . [that] interfere with literal sense, or with the stating of 
single meanings” of words (65), do these same paired opposites not provide the 
structure that is to be subsequently deconstructed? That is, without structuralism, we 
must ask whether post-structuralism is possible. To put it another way, if the universe is 
in fact a decentered universe, did it not have to become dislodged – if only at the level 
of the text or, at any rate, if only as inscribed within discourse – at some point from the 
fixed site from which it is now decentered? Even if that fixed site was illusory, was 
never in fact anchored, was always astray, was there not a specific moment in time 
when it was identified to never have been fixed, to have always been adrift from any 
discursive moorings whatsoever? If there is a before / after diad that can be identified, 
this would suggest that the edifice of structuralism, however illusory due to post-
structuralist theory’s dismantling of what was not there in the first place, functioned as a 
necessary presence of absence that had to be taken apart in order to show that it was not 
there in the primary instance and that the “truths” of post-structuralism hold sway 
instead. 
 Along these lines we – as critical thinkers – can also question, with regards to 
literary theory, why introductory texts such as those written by Peter Barry and Terry 
                                                 
133 Terry Eagleton comments wryly on the contradictions that can be observed among scholars 
engaged in “cultural thinking”: “With an arrogance thinly masked as humility, the cult of the Other 
assumes that there are no major conflicts or contradictions within the social majority themselves. Or, 
for that matter, within the minorities. There is just Them and Us, margins and majorities. Some of the 
people who hold this view are also deeply suspicious of binary oppositions” (After, 21 – italics mine). 
421 
 
Eagleton categorize and explain different theoretical approaches by means of 
descriptive and illustrative texts which are, in effect, syntagmatic chains that consist of 
rather vast expanses of standard academic discourse. Access to theoretical concepts 
appears to be limited to insiders, unless the abovementioned categories are created and 
illustrated using discourse that adheres to the rules of pre-theoretical writing style. Even 
structuralism requires explanation, which is dependent upon discursive modes of 
knowledge transmission in order to present the uninitiated with its operational and 
defining concepts. 
It is possible to witness the attempt to provide access to the complexities of 
literary theory in the way Peter Barry has written his primer. The style he uses to 
explain the various theoretical approaches is, in essence and effect, “Aristotelian.”134 
That is, his text is written in pre-theoretical, (standard) academic expository prose – not 
in a post-structuralist style. His discursive praxis at the functional level operates as if 
there were some sort of correlation between the logos of his written discourse and other 
texts, as if the latter were ontological entities firmly rooted in an empirically 
quantifiable materiality capable of storing printed data. The assumption that has to be 
made in this regard is that standard academic writing/thought is a necessary preliminary 
form of discourse that enables the decoding of structuralist and post-structuralist writing 
– even if the resulting meaning, according to the tenets of post-structuralist theory  is, 
due to “slippage” and “spillage,” always shifting, always adrift, never ascertainable. 
Even fully post-structuralist texts such as Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” are composed 
                                                 
134 I have stated in the beginning of my dissertation that I am imitating Barry’s style of writing. The 
way Barry writes is Aristotelian as described, mutatis mutandis, by W.K.C. Guthrie: “Here at last was 
a Greek who reflected my own thoughts in plain and comprehensible terms, a mind that worked on the 
same lines and bridged the gap of millennia between us, though it might be truer to say that it is we 
who have learned to think in Arisotle’s way. After all, he laid down the rules of logical thinking that 
guided European thought till the nineteenth century, and if professional logicians have in the last 
hundred years gone beyond him, the thinking of the ordinary man, whether he realizes it or not, is still 
conducted mainly within an Aristotelian framework” (Encounter, 3). 
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of segments of discourse that adheres to the norms of traditional academic writing. 
There is, of course, a liquid movement, a playful to-and-fro between discursive styles, a 
sort of washing up onto the shores of pre-structuralist discursive terra firma, so to 
speak, then back out the to the vast and open seas of decentered and free-floating 
signifiers. It appears that access to theory can only be gained via discourse that is plain, 
clear and concise. That is, it would appear that this style of discourse is necessary for 
the majority of students that attempt to tackle the concepts that different theoretical 
approaches are built on.  
Throughout my dissertation, the problem of definitions has surfaced. This is true 
not only with the term “rhetoric” throughout its long existence as a signifier – as I have 
attempted to show – but with any concept that cannot be proved using scientific, 
mathematical or strictly logical means. As indicated earlier in my discussion, even 
terms that have been classed by empirical means are characterized by ambiguity, if one 
looks closely enough at the identifiable defining characteristics. This means that at some 
point an agreement must be made on the defining limits for a particular term. And so, 
the two categories of readerships which I have articulated as standing in opposition to 
one another have value only if the reader agrees to accept the definitions as conventions 
which find their meaning via structuralist binary opposition.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
My first aim in this dissertation has been to argue that classical rhetoric can – for 
contemporary students of literature – serve as a valuable tool for analysis and criticism 
of any discourse in which rhetorical mechanisms are present. This led to a discussion 
about the problem of defining rhetoric, which began in Classical antiquity and continues 
to the present. As stated at the outset, the debate over how to define rhetoric is still alive 
– rhetoric continues to be defined and redefined today. The fact that the debate over 
rhetoric is still alive means that a variety of opinions, often contradictory, about how to 
define rhetoric have been and are still being articulated. This means, as I have already 
stated, that rhetoric lies in its own field of operations: opinion. The definition that I have 
proposed is based primarily on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where he presents a definition (an 
opinion) of what rhetoric is and how it is used. My definition is also based on readings 
by other scholars whose definitions draw on, reflect and develop the one presented by 
Aristotle and whose academic positions fall, on the whole, in line with what can be 
called traditional academic discourse and thought. The style of writing that I have 
chosen to use is a reflection of the style used by these same scholars. The reason that I 
have used a traditional academic discursive style is that, like Peter Barry in his 
introduction to theory, I am introducing a way of looking at literature (and  discourse) 
that, as certain scholars have asserted, has been in disuse for three centuries in literary 
studies. Thus, my aim in using this style is to provide students of literature with the 
basic concepts of Aristotelian rhetoric in a comprehensible way. As such, what I am 
presenting is meant to be a starting point. The definition that I have provided and 
utilized in the chapters above is perhaps, in comparison with the work of other scholars, 
more rudimentary. This does not mean, however, that the model that I have presented is 
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simple, as has been borne out by its articulation in the chapters that explore the model’s 
integral concepts. 
What I am presenting is not a rejection of literary theory or theoretical 
approaches. I have provided what I believe is a valuable tool for critical thinking that 
can be added to the arsenal of approaches available to students of literature and 
discourse. What this means is that rhetoric as I have defined it can be used to analyze 
and critique any text where rhetoric is in operation. This means that the discourse that is 
capable of being critiqued and analyzed using the definition of rhetoric as defined in this 
dissertation has argumentation as a primary characteristic. As rhetoric’s field is opinion, 
the discourse that can be critiqued and analyzed by the approach that I have presented 
operates in areas of knowledge where empirical, mathematical or strictly logical means 
cannot be used to determine truth or falsehood. I have stated that the definition of 
rhetoric that I have proposed is necessarily an opinion, and thus is an object that is 
subject to dispute regulated by the method itself. Rhetoric is at once its own object and 
subject. If this is a paradox, it is no more mysterious than the capability we as humans 
have of questioning, critiquing and analyzing our own thoughts. While the definition of 
rhetoric that I have proposed is necessarily an opinion, the risk of falling into the fallacy 
of infinite regress is avoided by the agreement which has to be made when defining all 
terms used in human discourse. Definitions are, in the end, agreed upon conventions. 
This means that the charge can be leveled that the definition I have proposed and the 
field of rhetoric (opinion) have very little if anything to do with “truth” (or Truth) and 
can for that reason be dispensed with. The way in which I have attempted to meet with 
this criticism is to refer to  the “truths” that Mackie discusses in relation to particular 
fields of knowledge or particular practices and their agreed upon or assumed standards. 
Wherever there are agreed upon or assumed standards, it is possible to determine truth 
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or falsehood within the framework the standards are contained in. Since Aristotle on the 
one hand states that both dialectic and rhetoric deal with matters about which opposing 
views can be argued for and, on the other, he states that rhetoric deals with truth, it can 
assumed that one type of truth that he is referring to has to do with agreed upon 
conventions in the sense Mackie has described. To enter into the debate of whether 
rhetoric is a viable tool for discovering absolute Truth lies beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. This is a debate that, as we have seen, goes back to Plato’s Gorgias, and 
which has not been settled. For the present, the types of truths that Mackie and Aristotle 
describe present sufficient and profound challenges. 
I have asserted at the outset that a primary aim in this dissertation is to imitate 
the way Peter Barry presents the various approaches to looking at literature in his 
introduction to literary theory. That is, he attempts to explain in a clear and precise 
manner each respective approach that brings into focus not only their merits but flaw as 
well. It is important to bear in mind that Barry does not state outright that the 
approaches that he explains and illustrates are necessarily argumentative positions. That 
is, he does not state that the ways of looking at literature he explores are fully embedded 
with rhetorical devices that can be challenged, due to their falling in rhetoric’s field of 
operations: opinion. Assuming that the definition of rhetoric that I have proposed is 
accepted, one of the conclusions to be drawn is that each way of looking at literature 
presented by Barry will have in its framework of operations criteria with which to 
identify what are, based on the principles and perspective of the particular approach, 
truths and falsehoods. Russian formalism, practical criticism, “Liberal Humanism,” 
structuralism, post-structuralism (deconstruction), psychoanalytic criticism, feminist 
criticism, lesbian/gay criticism, Marxist criticism, new historicism, cultural materialism, 
postcolonial criticism, stylistics – in short, any of these approaches or any others that 
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have appeared prior to or subsequent to those listed above will contain agreed upon or 
assumed standards (as well as identifiable systems of value) by which respective “truth” 
or “falsehood” can be determined using rhetoric as critical and analytical tool.  
Obviously, conflicts ensue among the various approaches with respect to the 
truths or falsehoods that can be identified from within the framework of each approach. 
This has occurred on the one hand as a result of the way literary criticism and theory has 
evolved, and at other times due to differences in terms of theoretical positions. One 
obvious example is the rejection of what has been called “Liberal Humanism” by 
scholars adhering to the “truths” of post-modern theory. Along the same lines, post-
structuralism takes the tenets of structuralism to task, building on while at the same time 
rejecting the latter’s core concepts. (At present, “post-postmodernism” takes 
postmodernism to task, announcing that the latter is dead.)
135
 
An important concept in this regard is that any approach can be used to critique 
or analyze discourse written in the framework or from the perspective of another 
approach. That is, it is possible to carry out a post-structuralist analysis of “Liberal 
humanist” methodology, and vice versa. It is also possible to undertake a Marxist 
analysis of feminist criticism – and vice versa. Any or all of the approaches listed above 
can be used to critique and analyze any or all of the others. What is crucial to keep in 
mind is that none of the approaches are neutral – all of them are based on opinion as 
opposed to empirically verifiable, hard facts. None of the approaches has a monopoly 
on truth. All of the approaches are embedded within their particular systems of values 
by which truth and falsehood, good or evil (or absence thereof, depending on the 
approach) and so on are attributed  – rhetoric included. For even though rhetoric – in 
the definition that I have proposed in this dissertation – functions on the surface as a 
                                                 
135 See Kirby, Alan. 
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neutral device for critiquing and analyzing discourse, as a sort of “meta-approach” that 
stands outside of other approaches it can, when put into application, also easily be 
identified as being enmeshed in a system of values. I have used the term “critical 
thinker,” and have stated that we, as students of literature ought to make it our aim to be 
critical thinkers when examining critically any text we encounter. But even the term 
“critical thinker” is a term based on a particular set of defining values subject to 
scrutiny. The stance that I have utilized in this dissertation is by no means beyond 
reproach and can easily be challenged and, from the standpoint of the agreed upon 
conventions of another approach, be evaluated as holding either “truths” or 
“falsehoods.”  
What I have attempted to do with this dissertation is return to the very origins of 
discourse and literary analysis. The reason I have done this is, on the one hand, as I 
have stated at the beginning of this dissertation, to answer a plea made by Terry 
Eagleton. For in his primer to literary theory he suggests that classical rhetoric is a 
single approach that can be used to analyze the whole of western discourse. He states 
that rhetoric as an approach has been in disuse for three centuries. He later modifies his 
statement in subsequent work where he states that cultural materialists, feminist critics 
and so on have been carrying out rhetorical criticism in the classical tradition. And, 
from the standpoint of his definition of rhetoric, he is not mistaken. That is, the critical 
approaches he mentions undertake what can be called rhetorical criticism. But what 
these approaches do not do is use concepts or mechanisms in the way that I have 
proposed; a model which I believe is rhetoric that has been broken down into its 
fundamental parts. Deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric are the basic modes that 
provide the structuring of persuasive argumentation, while logos, pathos and ethos 
function as the proofs used to argue both coherently and convincingly. Logos as proof 
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entails the manner in which logic and reason enter into argumentation. Pathos stands as 
the emotional, thus psychological component whose importance cannot be 
underestimated in the art of persuasion. Finally, ethos provides a basis for persuasion 
based on the character (i.e., authority on several levels) of the rhetor in question. The 
three proofs function together and are inseparable. In this sense, the proofs feed on 
themselves. For it is possible to take a single argument and examine it bringing into 
focus just one of the three proofs, yet the other two can be shown to be fully and 
simultaneously operative. And it is precisely this definition of rhetoric – a definition I 
have articulated based on Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric and other texts from his corpus 
– which I believe can be highly useful to students of literature as a fundamental and 
powerful critical and analytical tool.  
I have made Plato’s Gorgias my point of departure. As stated at the outset, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a response to Plato. I have made reference to various thinkers 
from antiquity as well as thinkers from history up to the present who use, on the whole, 
an Aristotelian definition of rhetoric. I have done this because, as I have suggested at 
the beginning of this dissertation, if a student of any discipline intends on entering into 
dialogue with other thinkers of that discipline, she must gain as much knowledge as 
possible on what has taken place previously. I have cited Lamont in this regard, who 
when writing about Derrida asserted that the latter’s theoretical approach made it 
possible for students to discuss the so-called logo-centrism of the philosophical tradition 
without having read a single classic of philosophy. I compared this with Kidd’s stance, 
which argues for in depth erudition when entering into a field of knowledge. So rather 
than using, say, Perelman’s approach to rhetoric (which is based on the classical 
tradition) – which he articulated in the middle of the twentieth century - as a my starting 
point for entering into the conversation, I have started from rhetoric’s beginnings in 
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order to provide an adequate basis for understanding how this mode of persuasive 
discourse has been defined from its earliest instances. What is interesting along these 
lines that the major introduction to critical literary theory written by Eagleton uses the 
eighteenth century as its point of departure (17) and Peter Barry’s introduction starts 
with the “first quarter of the nineteenth century” (12). Both Eagleton and Barry are, of 
course, writing their primers from the standpoint of English literature, which in part 
explains their insularity. And while it is true that Eagleton argues that it is necessary to 
return to ancient rhetoric and that Barry identifies Aristotle’s Poetics as the earliest 
work of theory (21), both of their works focus on literary studies’ development from the 
standpoint of English literature, meanwhile providing somewhat incomplete accounts of 
the classical tradition.  These two primers stand as major starting points for students of 
English literature today who wish to enter into the complexities of literary and cultural 
theory. It is for this reason that I have made my focus Aristotle’s Rhetoric. My aim has 
been to fill a gap in order to provide students of (not just English) literature with a more 
in-depth account of the beginnings of discourse analysis. What I have presented is by no 
means comprehensive, but is meant to be a starting point, in the sense Aristotle writes of 
in his Nichomachean Ethics.  
But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we 
must take pains to determine them correctly, since they have a great influence on 
what follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and 
many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it (Barnes – Complete – 1736, 
italics mine). 
 
Since the definition that Aristotle provides of rhetoric in his treatise is the most 
comprehensive and developed of early accounts and effectively changed the history of 
the term and how rhetoric has been defined and understood subsequently throughout 
history, it stands as a crucial point of departure for students of literature who wish to 
add the oldest form of discourse analysis to the critical and analytical tools they are in 
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command of. I have stated in the introduction that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is cross-
referenced with other works which add further dimensions to his definition: Sophistical 
Refutations, Nichomachean Ethics, Poetics, Politics, Topics, and so on. Gaining as 
much knowledge on other works by other thinkers at the time is also crucial. I have 
explored works by other major contributors to the conversation on rhetoric as well, in 
order to provide an adequate base with which to understand and use this way of 
analyzing and critiquing written and spoken discourse. 
The definition of rhetoric that I have proposed in this dissertation is a method 
that can, in my opinion, be used for critical thinking. That is, its concepts can be used to 
analyze not only literary texts, but any and all discourse where the mechanisms of 
rhetoric are present. It is my belief that what I have presented is an extremely powerful 
tool that will enable students to identify the rhetorical, that is, argumentative as opposed 
to empirical, strictly logical (in a formal sense) and mathematical proofs and 
mechanisms utilized by the authors of the texts when analyzing the latter’s works. The 
ability to identify the rhetorical mechanisms utilized by writers, thinkers, scholars – or 
even by their next door neighbors – will empower students to identify both the strengths 
and weakness of the opinions they are being presented in rhetorical arguments. Because 
of the empowerment that a solid footing in classical rhetoric provides, students will be 
able to decide whether or not to accept a particular argument as persuasive or 
convincing, and will thereby be equipped to question and attack arguments advanced 
even by scholars whose ethos is huge, and to decide whether the arguments (i.e., 
opinions) put forth by major thinkers hold water or are, in Aristotle’s words, only “full 
of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” That is, the model of rhetoric that I have 
presented here will enhance and enable students’ capacity for critical thought. 
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I have attempted to show that rhetoric, as I have defined it, makes it possible to 
reveal the system of values in which texts that are analyzed with this approach are 
embedded, which makes it possible to evaluate the morality informed by the same 
system. In this respect, Mackie’s definition of what he calls the “problem of morality in 
the narrow sense” system is will prove illuminating:  
We must think of a ‘game’ in which most, perhaps all, of the ‘players’ are largely 
selfish, or have limited sympathies, in a situation where scarce resources and the 
like tend to produce conflicts of interest; further, it is important for most of the 
‘players’ that certain roughly specifiable evils (which, other things being equal, 
would result from the basic situation) should be prevented or reduced; we are 
asking what are the possibly acceptable principles of constraint on action the 
general encouragement of and widespread respect for which will do most to 
counter these evils, subject to the assumption that these constraints will not be 
respected by all the ‘players’ all the time (165). 
 
I have shown how David Lansing’s narrative functions as a rhetorical argument in 
which he makes his case in order to obtain absolution for his “crime” on the one hand, 
and praise for his ability to write, on the other. I have attempted to show how he makes 
his plea to “highly educated and cultured readers” who, in their seeking of An-other (as 
opposed to an Other), identify with him due to a shared value system.
136
 I have 
contrasted this group of readers with the “unsophisticated” readers, which demonstrates 
what Mackie is referring to above. Both groups are composed of ‘players’ who are 
largely selfish and view their own system of values to be superior. Both groups are in 
competition and, in their respective ways, employ means to obtain and maintain power 
over the other group. (Whether the means are fair or unfair is a matter to be decided by 
each individual, by each critical thinker.) Both groups have limited sympathies for the 
other group. Mackie’s comments on the problem of morality is, of course, meant to be 
applied in a general sense to all of humanity.  
                                                 
136 In this sense I differ from theorists who posit “alterity” as the dominant paradigm of ethics. See 
Hale; also Sanders. 
432 
 
In order to demonstrate the model of rhetoric that I am presenting, I have 
highlighted two constructs, the “highly educated and cultured readers” and 
“unsophisticated readers.” In my discussion I have brought to the fore what each group 
perceives as “good” from the standpoint of their system of values. In doing this I 
borrow from Aristotle’s ideas when he outlines the various constitutions that govern 
different communities: democracy, whose basic motivating principle he states is 
freedom; oligarchy, whose basic motivating principle he states is wealth; aristocracy, 
whose basic motivating principle he states is things related to education and traditions 
of law; and tyranny, whose basic motivating principle he states is self-preservation. 
These groups – which are categorized broadly in political terms – would necessarily, 
due to their differing and selfish interests, come into conflict. Eagleton mirrors 
Aristotle’s mode of categorization when he identifies three basic groups that come into 
conflict on a political plane: conservatives, radicals and liberals He identifies the values 
he believes are held sacred by each group: 
For conservatives, there is that in the world which cannot be tampered with, 
known as property. For radicals, too, there is that which his beyond our meddling, 
known as the autonomy of others. It is this which grounds our notions of 
objectivity. Liberals, characteristically, back both horses, believing in both 
property and autonomy (After, 139). 
 
So we can see that these various groups – which serve here as examples and whose 
systems of values are capable of being presented in reductive form – are described by 
Mackie’s model, which asserts that different ‘players’ come into conflict in the ‘game’ 
he describes.  
I do not pretend that the model of rhetoric that I have presented will solve any 
conflict, rather that it will enable students to critically analyze the rhetorically charged 
discourse that is produced by members of any group, whether or not they are aware of 
this fact or will admit it. One always argues tooth and nail for one’s own opinions, 
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presenting them as “truth,” while attacking the “truths” of others as being mere 
opinions. 
This leads us finally back to the original quote that provides the backstage 
lighting to the rhetorical performance that has just been enacted. That is, Humpty 
Dumpty’s insightful and very “true” comment that it does not matter how many 
meanings a word can have – if a word can mean anything at all in the postmodern (or 
post-postmodern, pseudo-Modernist, digitally Humanistic) world – but instead, as 
Humpty says, what matters is which word is to be master. And that word will be the 
logos whose power is enforced by the existing regime at any given point in history. 
Precisely how this power is enforced is a matter that lies beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, whose aim has been to equip students with the ability to identify and 
evaluate, to analyze, critique and question any discourse in which rhetorical 
mechanisms are present.  
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